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IN THE

**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. **76-156**

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
Petitioner,

vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
a Delaware corporation,  
Respondents.

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT**

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Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered in this action on May 28, 1976, affirming an order of the District Court granting a preliminary injunction in favor of respondents.

**Opinions Below**

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is unofficially reported at 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶ 60,919 and is reproduced in Appendix A. The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the District Court is reported at 403 F. Supp. 527 and is reproduced in Appendix D.

**Jurisdiction**

The final judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on May 28, 1976. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's

petition for rehearing on July 16, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

### Questions Presented

In a previously filed state court proceeding, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed judgments to compensate petitioner Vendo for respondent Stoner's violation of his state-law fiduciary duties while serving as a Vendo director and officer, and this Court denied certiorari. Before the judgments could be collected, however, Stoner obtained from the Federal District Court a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the judgments on the basis of Stoner's claim that the state proceeding and the judgments violated the federal antitrust laws. The questions presented are:

(1) Whether § 16 of the Clayton Act "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

(2) Whether principles of comity and federalism normally applicable to requested injunctions against state court proceedings do not apply where the injunction is sought under § 16 of the Clayton Act.

(3) Whether a single federal district judge has jurisdiction to review and nullify a final decision of the highest court of a state.

(4) Whether state court defendants who have deliberately withdrawn their federal antitrust defense (and thereby have prevented its consideration by the state courts) may on the same federal antitrust ground subsequently obtain a federal preliminary injunction against collection of final judgments entered in the state proceeding.

### Statutes Involved

The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as

expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, provides:

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

#### Introduction

This is a federal antitrust action brought in the Northern District of Illinois under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26). In their complaint the respondents (plaintiffs below) allege, *inter alia*, that petitioner Vendo violated the Sherman Act by bringing and prosecuting an action in the Illinois state courts against two of the



respondents, Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., resulting in judgments against them totalling \$7,516,335.

These judgments against respondents Stoner and Stoner Investments were affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in *The Vendo Co. v Stoner*, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E. 2d 1 (1974), holding that Stoner, while both an officer and director of Vendo, had repeatedly violated his state-law fiduciary duties to Vendo. This Court denied certiorari, 420 U.S. 975 (1975).

Nevertheless, to forestall collection of the judgments, the respondents then obtained from the District Court in this case an order which preliminarily enjoined Vendo from taking "any further steps to enforce or collect, or attempt to enforce or collect" the judgments (App. 40).<sup>\*</sup> The Court of Appeals affirmed on May 28, 1976 (App. 1, 17) and denied Vendo's petition for rehearing on July 16, 1976 (App. 18).

Vendo's state court suit was filed *eleven years ago* in August, 1965. This federal action was filed two months later by respondents Stoner and Stoner Investments, the defendants in the state court suit, and Lektro-Vend Corp., a company (like Stoner Investments) controlled by Stoner and members of his family.

Stoner was the president and the controlling owner of Stoner Manufacturing Corporation (now Stoner Investments), which had been engaged for many years in the business of making and selling candy-vending machines throughout the United States. In April, 1959, Vendo and Stoner Manufacturing entered into a contract for Vendo's

<sup>\*</sup> "App." references are to the pertinent pages in the Appendices to this Petition, *infra*.

purchase of the assets of Stoner Manufacturing.<sup>\*</sup> Stoner also executed an employment contract with Vendo (providing for a salary of \$50,000 a year), and Stoner became a director of Vendo as well as president of the company's Aurora Division (formerly the Stoner Manufacturing plant). Stoner ceased being a Vendo director in March or April of 1964, and Stoner's contract of employment terminated June 1, 1964. (58 Ill. 2d at 293, 295, 300-01, 321 N.E. 2d at 4, 7-8.)

### The State Court Proceeding

In the marathon state court proceeding (lasting approximately nine-and-one-half years), it was determined that Stoner, individually and through Stoner Investments, had violated his fiduciary duties to Vendo *during the 1959-64 period that he was an officer and director of Vendo* (a) by secretly supporting the development and marketing of a new type of candy vending machine by Lektro-Vend, (b) by withholding the facts concerning his involvement with Lektro-Vend and misleading Vendo with regard to its possible acquisition of the Lektro-Vend machine, and (c) by misappropriating Vendo's opportunity to acquire the machine.

It was also determined that Stoner and Stoner Investments had unlawfully breached the non-competition covenants in their agreements with Vendo, but that in any event the judgments were proper on the basis of Stoner's violation of his fiduciary duties "[q]uite apart from any liability which may be predicated upon a breach of the covenants

<sup>\*</sup> Under the sale contract Vendo agreed to pay Stoner Manufacturing (1) \$3,400,000 in cash; (2) 60,000 shares of Vendo stock; (3) for a period of 10 years (or until such time as Vendo might exercise an option to purchase the Stoner plant) all profits in excess of \$250,000 realized from the use of the assets being purchased; and (4) for a period of 10 years, 25% of the income received from foreign sales realized from the use of assets being purchased.

against competition. . .” and “[r]egardless of the . . . disposition of those restraint-of-trade issues. . .” (58 Ill. 2d at 303-04, 308, 321 N.E. 2d at 9, 12.)

In December, 1966, the state trial court sitting without a jury found in favor of Vendo and initially entered a judgment against the two defendants jointly for \$1,100,000 and a judgment against Stoner individually for \$250,000.

The defendants appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, which in 1969 sustained the trial court’s conclusion concerning Stoner’s misconduct\* but remanded the case to the trial court for a further hearing with respect to the amount of damages recoverable by Vendo. (105 Ill. App. 2d 261, 245 N.E. 2d 263.)

The Illinois Appellate Court sustained the validity of the non-competition covenants in the sale and employment contracts. It found that the defendants’ breaches of the covenants occurred “in-term,” i.e., during the period specified by the contract in which Stoner was to be paid to perform services for Vendo and in which Stoner Investments was to be paid a percentage of Vendo’s profits derived from the assets it had sold to Vendo. (105 Ill. App. 2d at 281-86, 245 N.E. 2d at 273-76.)

On the other hand, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the trial court had erred in striking the defendants’ federal antitrust defense and that they were entitled on remand to a hearing on the issue. (105 Ill. App. 2d at 294-97, 245 N.E. 2d at 279-81.) However, just before the second trial was to commence, Stoner and Stoner Investments *formally withdrew their federal antitrust defense which the Illinois Appellate Court had at their behest sustained and had directed the trial Court to consider.* (App. 7.)

\* In addition to Stoner’s violation of his fiduciary duties as an officer and director, Stoner had also been held liable by the trial court on the ground of theft of trade secrets belonging to Vendo, but this alternative ground was reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the issue was not pursued thereafter.

At the second trial, in 1971, on the basis of additional evidence on damages, the trial court awarded a judgment to Vendo in the amount of \$170,835 against Stoner and a judgment against both defendants for \$7,345,000. The defendants again appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, which in 1973 affirmed the judgment against Stoner but reversed the judgment against the two defendants jointly and remanded the case for a further hearing. (13 Ill. App. 3d 291, 300 N.E. 2d 632.) Each side filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, and both petitions were allowed.

In its opinion, written by Mr. Justice Schaefer, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously affirmed both trial court judgments, holding:

*“Quite apart from any liability which may be predicated upon a breach of the covenants against competition contained in the sales agreement and the employment contract, it is clear that Stoner violated his fiduciary duties to plaintiff during the period when he was a director and an officer of plaintiff. . . .*

*“Stoner had a foot in each camp. Not only did his undisclosed individual interest in controlling the further development and ultimately the manufacture and sale of the Lektro-Vend create the possibility of his taking an unfair advantage of plaintiff, but the evidence gives strong indication that he actually misled plaintiff while he was purportedly acting as plaintiff’s agent with regard to plaintiff’s possible acquisition of the Lektro-Vend.”* (58 Ill. 2d at 303-04, 321 N.E. 2d at 9; italics added.)

With respect to the non-competition covenants, the Illinois Supreme Court held:

*“The appellate court concluded, in our opinion correctly, that defendants’ activities directed toward the development and thereafter the marketing of the*



Lektro-Vend, consisting of substantial financial aid, and the provision of physical facilities, as well as defendant's ownership interest in the Lektro-Vend enterprise, were so substantial as to go beyond the limits established by the covenants.

*"Regardless of the appellate court's disposition of those restraint-of-trade issues, the defendants may, as we have pointed out, be held liable on the ground of a breach of fiduciary obligation on the part of Stoner...."*

"At the original trial defendants raised as an affirmative defense and by way of counterclaim a charge that the sale agreement and the employment contract violated both the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 60-1 *et seq.*) and the Federal antitrust laws (15 U.S.C. sec. 1 *et seq.*). The latter charge was withdrawn by defendants on the remand, and references in the record indicate that at some point a suit was filed against plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois relating to the alleged violations of Federal law."

"With respect to the State antitrust claim . . . the Illinois act, having been enacted in 1965, long after the contracts here in question were entered into, cannot properly form the basis of a counterclaim by defendants." (58 Ill. 2d at 308-10, 321 N.E. 2d at 11-12; italics added.)

On November 27, 1974, the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing filed by Stoner and Stoner Investments. On December 9, 1974, Mr. Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court denied their request for a stay of execution pending consideration of their petition for certiorari in this Court. On January 28, 1975, Mr. Justice Rehnquist also denied a request by Stoner and Stoner Investments for a stay of execution pending consideration of their petition for certiorari. On March 17, 1975, this Court denied the petition for certiorari. (420 U.S. 975.)

### The Federal Action and the Decision Below

On January 2, 1975, after Vendo had commenced efforts to collect its state court judgments, respondents reactivated this federal suit, filing an amended complaint reasserting their antitrust claim with respect to the state action. Thereafter, on January 29, 1975, respondents filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the proceedings in the state courts to collect Vendo's judgments.

On May 29, 1975, the District Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order, announcing its decision to grant the preliminary injunction (App. 19).<sup>\*</sup> Thereafter, on June 30, 1975, the District Court's Order Granting Preliminary Injunction was entered (App. 36). Vendo appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on May 28, 1976, affirmed the District Court's order (App. 1, 17).

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, did not bar the injunction. The Court held, on the ground that § 16 of the Clayton Act lodges equitable jurisdiction only in federal courts, that § 16 is one of those federal statutes under which stays of state court proceedings are "expressly authorized" within the scope of that exception to § 2283. (App. 11, 13.)

<sup>\*</sup> The District Court, it should be noted, neither held nor found that enforcement of the judgments would violate the antitrust laws. Instead, the Court merely stated that "There is persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately" (App. 30), *citing only events in the 1963-66 period*. The District Court also stated that, "If the state court litigation was itself part of the anticompetitive scheme, a judgment arising from such litigation is not an ordinary debt" (App. 31, italics added), and "If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention" (App. 34, italics added), but reached no conclusion as to the correctness of the "if" clauses of these hypothetical statements.

The Court of Appeals also rejected Vendo's argument that, entirely apart from the absolute prohibition of § 2283, principles of comity and federalism barred the District Court's injunction against enforcement of the decision of the highest court of a state. The Court of Appeals sweepingly held: "The principle of comity has no applicability when the exclusive remedy for an injury lies in the federal court" (App. 14).

In addition, the Court of Appeals expressly sanctioned the District's Court's assertion of its jurisdiction to review a final decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court stated (App. 14) that "We agree" with the District Court that such a review was "imperative" because the Illinois Supreme Court had not considered the respondents' federal antitrust defense—notwithstanding the fact (acknowledged in a footnote by the Court below, App. 7) that it was the respondents themselves who had prevented the state courts from considering their federal antitrust defense by formally withdrawing the defense several years earlier and never again raising the issue in the state proceeding.

### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision below, in disregard of fundamental policies governing the relationship between federal and state courts, conflicts in principle with decisions of this Court and conflicts directly with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals.

As set forth more fully in the Statement (*supra*, pp. 5-8), the Illinois Supreme Court, after nearly ten arduous years of litigation, affirmed judgments to compensate Vendo for Stoner's flagrant violations of his state-law fiduciary duties while serving as a Vendo director and officer. This Court denied certiorari, and the state judgments were unequivocally final and entitled to full faith and credit. But then, in order to forestall collection of the judgments against them, Stoner and Stoner Investments hit upon a new stratagem. They obtained from the District Court a preliminary injunction against enforce-

ment of the judgments on the claim that the state suit from its very inception was violative of the federal antitrust laws—the same claim, moreover, which they had deliberately withdrawn as a defense in the state proceeding (and thereby prevented the state courts and this Court from adjudicating).

The ramifications of this procedure—approved by the Court below—are, to say the least, extraordinary. It would give to every district judge the power to review, set aside, and nullify final state court judgments through the preliminary injunction device. It would reduce the highest tribunals of any state to the status of special masters subject to *de novo* control by a single district judge. Nor is there any reason why such control should be exercised only under the federal antitrust laws; on precisely the same theory, final state court judgments—even, as here, after the denial of certiorari—could likewise be preliminarily enjoined under myriad other federal statutes as well.

As we shall show, the decision below sanctioning such a procedure is fundamentally at war with settled law regarding the Anti-Injunction Statute, principles of comity and federalism, and collateral review of state court judgments.

### I. In Holding that § 16 of the Clayton Act "Expressly Authorizes" Injunctions against State Court Proceedings for Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the Decision Below Is in Direct Conflict with Decisions of Other Courts of Appeals and Conflicts in Principle with the Decisions of This Court.

The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (*supra*, pp. 2-3), categorically prohibits all federal court injunctions against state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress," or unless one of the other two exceptions stated in § 2283 applies. *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970); *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1972).



Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly held that the exceptions to § 2283 are to be strictly and narrowly construed. Thus, in *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.*, 348 U.S. 511 (1955), the Court stated, in referring to the enactment in 1948 of § 2283 in its present form, that “. . . Congress made clear beyond cavil that the prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation” (p. 514) and that “*This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application*” (pp. 515-16, italics added). Similarly, in the *Atlantic Coast Line* case, *supra*, the Court admonished that “*the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.*” (398 U.S. at 287, italics added; see also p. 297.)

In accordance with that principle, and as pointed out by this Court in *Mitchum v. Foster*, *supra*, 407 U.S. at 234-37, only a small number of federal statutes have been held to “expressly authorize” federal injunctions against state court proceedings. And more specifically, prior to the District Court’s decision in this case, no court had ever held that § 16 of the Clayton Act (*supra*, p. 3) was such a statute. On the contrary, every court which had expressly considered the issue had uniformly held that § 16 does *not* “authorize” injunctions against state court proceedings.\*

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\* See *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953), affirming 109 F. Supp. 925, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); *Potter v. Carvel Stores of N.Y., Inc.*, 314 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963), affirming 203 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1962); *Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp.*, 182 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); *Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp.*, 9 F.R.D. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); *Avon Pub. Co. v. American News Co.*, 143 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); *American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.*, 1966 Trade Cases ¶ 71,918 (S.D.N.Y.). See also the recent decision in *Carter v. Ogden Corp.*, 524 F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1975), reversing an injunction issued under § 16 of the Clayton Act and holding “that under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 this injunction was prohibited. . . .” On the other hand, compare *Sar Industries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries, Inc.*, 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶ 60,816 (C.D. Cal.), relying on the District Court’s decision in this case.

Thus, the Court below not only is the first Court of Appeals ever to hold that § 16 of the Clayton Act “expressly authorizes” injunctions against state proceedings, but furthermore its holding is inconsistent with the holdings of other Courts of Appeals as well as the rationale of this Court’s decisions.

**A. The Decision Below Is in Direct Conflict with Decisions of Other Courts of Appeals as to the Applicability of § 2283.**

Prior to the decision below, the only Courts of Appeals which had decided the issue—the Second and Fourth Circuits—had held that § 16 of the Clayton Act does not “expressly authorize” injunctions against state proceedings. The decision below is in direct conflict with both of those decisions.

*Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953), involved circumstances remarkably similar to those present in the instant case. Westinghouse had sued Lyons and others in the New York state courts for breach of a contract and an accounting. The state court defendants raised a federal antitrust defense in the state suit, claiming that the contract violated the antitrust laws. Thereafter, they brought suit in the federal court against Westinghouse under the federal antitrust laws advancing the same federal antitrust grounds which they had asserted by way of defense in the state proceeding. The District Court held that it could not enjoin the state proceedings, “even though the [federal] Anti-Trust Laws are involved in both actions, as in this case,” because “*a stay of these State court proceedings is not expressly authorized by any act of Congress*, and it is not required in aid of this court’s jurisdiction or to effectuate its judgments.” 109 F. Supp. 925-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (italics added). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, specifically holding that the District Court

*"rightly held that 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 prevents the issuance of such a stay."* 201 F.2d at 510 (italics added).\*

*Potter v. Carvel Stores of New York, Inc.*, 314 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963), likewise involved companion state and federal lawsuits in which the state court defendant was the plaintiff in a federal antitrust action brought against the state court plaintiff. The District Court refused to enjoin the state action on the ground that it was barred by § 2283, specifically agreeing that "§16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26, which provides for private antitrust injunctive relief is not one of the 'Act of Congress' exceptions engrafted into the flat prohibition of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283." 203 F. Supp. 462, 465 (D. Md. 1962). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that "... for the reasons stated by [the District Court], we think that the

\* Neither the Clayton Act nor any antitrust issues were even involved in the Second Circuit case cited below (App. 12-13), *Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (1966). The passing reference to the Clayton Act in *Studebaker*, by way of dictum, did not conclude that § 16 "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings, did not cite any case where such a conclusion had been reached, and did not even remotely overrule the Second Circuit's prior decision in *Lyons*, *supra*.

Equally inapposite are the other two cases cited by the Court below concerning § 2283 (App. 11-12). *Helpenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1971), neither held nor implied that § 16 "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings. *Helpenbein* merely decided that, since the plaintiff's injury had not resulted from an antitrust violation, no injunction of any sort was authorized by § 16. The Court did not even reach the question whether, if a proper showing of causation had been made, the injunction would nevertheless have been barred by § 2283. *United States v. Bayer Company*, 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), was based on a different exception to § 2283—the "effectuate its judgments" exception—and does not even refer to the "expressly authorized" exception.

refusal to enjoin the state court proceedings is unassailable on appeal." 314 F.2d at 46.

See also the recent decision in *Carter v. Ogden Corp.*, 524 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1975), reversing an injunction issued under § 16 of the Clayton Act and holding "that under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 this injunction was prohibited. . . ."

Review of the decision below is essential to resolve the clear conflict between the Circuits.

**B. The Decision Below Conflicts in Principle with This Court's Decisions Construing the "Expressly Authorized" Exception to § 2283.**

As previously stated (*supra*, pp. 11-12), this Court has repeatedly held that § 2283 and the exceptions thereto are to be strictly and narrowly construed. In *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), this Court dealt specifically with the "expressly authorized" exception.

The Court (pp. 234-35) reviewed the seven federal statutes which it had previously held fall within that exception and pointed out (pp. 236-37) that "the criteria to be applied are those reflected in the Court's decisions prior to *Toucey*" (*Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.*, 314 U.S. 118 (1941)). In applying those criteria to the statute involved there—§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act—and after carefully analyzing the origins and history of that statute, the Court in *Mitchum* found that:

"The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial'." (407 U.S. at 242, italics added.)



On these grounds, this Court determined that § 1983 qualified as an eighth federal statute that “expressly authorized” stays of state court proceedings.

In this case, in holding that § 16 of the Clayton Act is also a federal statute which “expressly authorizes” stays of state court proceedings, the Court below misapplied the criteria recognized in *Mitchum* and violated the strictures contained in this Court’s other decisions interpreting § 2283. The decision below represents, in fact, a broad departure from the whole line of this Court’s cases concerning § 2283 and sets forth an approach which, if generally accepted, would have serious consequences for the relationship between the federal and state courts, not only in the antitrust field but in many other areas of the law as well.

Without even attempting to analyze the origins and history of § 16, in the way this Court analyzed § 1983 in *Mitchum*, the Court below held that § 16 created a “uniquely federal remedy” merely on the ground that its grant of injunctive powers to enforce the antitrust laws was conferred only on the federal courts (App. 11, 13). According to the Court below (*ibid.*), this jurisdiction “would be frustrated” if Vendo were allowed to enforce its state court judgments. However, it is well established that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction is *not* a ground for holding that the “expressly authorized” exception applies. *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.*, 348 U.S. 511, 515 (1955). In that case, this Court specifically held that § 2283 may bar an injunction even where federal substantive law preempts state law altogether and a state court has acted “wholly without jurisdiction over the subject matter, having invaded a field preempted by Congress.” Accord, e.g., *T. Smith & Son, Inc., v. Williams*, 275 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1960); *Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin*, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 402 U.S. 987 (1971).

Even more important, the impropriety of holding that § 16 “expressly authorizes” stays of state proceedings is

demonstrated by comparing § 16 with the seven statutes reviewed in *Mitchum* (407 U.S. at 234-35) and with § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Each of these statutes provides for a special set of uniform federal procedures or remedies. But in addition each of these statutes either contains specific language providing for stays of state proceedings or, in the absence of such language, necessarily requires *by its very nature and function* that conflicting state judicial proceedings must be enjoined in order to achieve its purpose.\*

Section 16 of the Clayton Act is clearly not a statute of this type. Even apart from the absence of specific language providing for stays of state proceedings, there is not the slightest basis (and the Court of Appeals pointed to none) for believing that § 16—unlike, e.g., § 1983 of the

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\* The seven statutes enumerated by the Supreme Court are as follows: (1) the provisions in the Bankruptcy Act expressly providing for stays of suits against the bankrupt; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e), providing that upon the filing of a petition to remove a state suit to federal court the “State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded”; (3) 46 U.S.C. § 185, providing that upon filing of a shipowner’s petition in federal court for limitation of his liability and deposit of the requisite funds by the shipowner with the court, “all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease”; (4) 28 U.S.C. § 2361, providing that in federal interpleader actions “a district court may . . . enter its order restraining [all claimants] . . . from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property, instrument, or obligation involved in the interpleader action”; (5) 11 U.S.C. § 203(s)(2), the provision of the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act expressly staying “all judicial or official proceedings in any court”; (6) 28 U.S.C. § 2251, providing that a federal court before which a habeas corpus proceeding is pending may “stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State Court . . . for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding”; (7) § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, governing the powers of the Price Administrator to enforce the provisions of the Act.

Civil Rights Act—was designed to prevent abuses by state courts or other governmental bodies. There likewise is not the slightest basis (and the Court of Appeals pointed to none) for believing that Congress' purpose in enacting the statute was even remotely to place injunctive restraints on state court proceedings.

Furthermore, it simply is not true that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the federal antitrust laws. While the Clayton Act confers only federal jurisdiction of *original claims for relief* brought under the federal antitrust laws, it is well-settled that the state courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate federal antitrust *defenses* to state law claims. See, e.g., *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); 1A Moore, Federal Practice ¶0.208 (2d ed. 1974), p. 2325.

Indeed, in the context of this case, it is especially clear that Stoner's federal antitrust remedy against Vendo's prosecution of its state court action was by no means "uniquely federal." As the Illinois Appellate Court had specifically held in that proceeding, Stoner was entitled to assert the federal antitrust issues in state court as a defense to Vendo's claims. But then Stoner chose to withdraw that defense at the opening of the second state court trial. If that defense to Vendo's claims was valid, it could and should have been asserted in the state court proceedings, and Stoner could thereby have "nipped in the bud" any alleged "injury" from the state action.

Of course, as the Court below pointed out, the federal antitrust laws express an important public policy. But the same is true of numerous other federal statutes as well as the Anti-Injunction Statute itself. See, e.g., *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1939). Clearly the importance of the antitrust laws is not a proper criterion for determining whether the "expressly authorized" exception to § 2283 is applicable.

## II. In Holding that Principles of Comity and Federalism Are Inapplicable, the Decision Below Also Directly Conflicts with the Decisions of Another Court of Appeals and in Principle with Decisions of This Court.

In *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971), and in *Mitchum v. Foster*, *supra*, 407 U.S. at 243, this Court reaffirmed the principles of comity and federalism "that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding," even in a case where such an injunction is not absolutely barred by § 2283. See also *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976); *Cousins v. Wigoda*, 409 U.S. 1201, 1205-06 (1972). Thus, such principles apply even where an injunction is sought under a federal statute that "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings. In *Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.*, 420 U.S. 592 (1975), this Court specifically held that principles of comity and federalism barred an injunction against a civil state court proceeding in the context of a suit brought under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act—the very statute which *Mitchum* held was designed to afford protection against unconstitutional acts by (*inter alia*) state courts.

In this case, however, the Court below held that these principles of comity and federalism were inapplicable for the same reason underlying its decision as to § 2283—namely, that § 16 of the Clayton Act confers equitable jurisdiction only on federal courts. According to the Court below (App. 14): "The principle of comity has no applicability when the exclusive remedy for an injury lies in the federal court." Even apart from the fact that Stoner had a complete remedy in the state courts but deliberately chose to abandon that remedy, the ruling below is not only irreconcilable with the cited decisions of this Court, but furthermore is in direct conflict with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

In both *Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc.*, 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974),



and *Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers*, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952), federal injunctions against state court proceedings were (as in this case) sought under § 16 of the Clayton Act. In both cases, the requested injunctions had been granted by the district courts. But in both cases the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that—even apart from § 2283—the injunctions were improper on the basis of principles of comity and federalism.

In *Response of Carolina*, *supra*, 498 F.2d at 320, the Fifth Circuit held:

“... the principles of comity and federalism recognized by this Court in *Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers*, *supra*, 195 F.2d 406 . . . mitigate against unnecessarily interfering with pending state court proceedings. *Red Rock* involved a question similar to the issue in this case, whether an injunction could issue under the antitrust laws to enjoin a state court suit. This Court reversed the issuance of the preliminary injunctions on the grounds of federalism and comity.”

Similarly, in the *Red Rock* case, *supra*, 195 F.2d at 410, the Fifth Circuit held, quoting *Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co.*, 341 U.S. 341, 350 (1951):

“Considering that ‘few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies,’ the usual rule of comity must govern the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the District Court in this case.”

In addition, contrary to the apparent premise of the Court below in brushing aside principles of comity and federalism, a federal injunction against the enforcement of the state court judgments was never Stoner’s “exclusive remedy” under the federal antitrust laws. Instead, as the Illinois Appellate Court had held, the respondents were

entitled to assert their federal antitrust defense as a bar to Vendo’s claim in the state court. But, for their own tactical reasons, they deliberately chose to abandon that remedy which, if their defense was meritorious, would have prevented the very “injury” of which they now complain.\*

No greater insult to the processes of a state judicial system can be conceived than that which has occurred here: Having deliberately abandoned the assertion of their federal antitrust defense in the state courts (which had provided them with “an opportunity for full and fair litigation” of that defense—see *Stone v. Powell*, 44 U.S.L.W. 5313, 5321 (U.S., July 6, 1976); *Francis v. Henderson*, 48 L.Ed. 2d 149, 154 (1976)), and having elected to proceed to final judgment in the state courts on that basis, the Stoner group then attacked the result of that process by asserting in federal court, as justification for an injunction against the state judgments, the same issues that they had withdrawn from the state courts’ consideration. Thus, far from being inapplicable, principles of comity and fed-

\* Furthermore, § 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes injunctions only against “threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws.” (Italics added.) If the alleged “injury” results from a separate obligation or is based on independent grounds, no injunction may issue under § 16. See *Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc.*, 498 F.2d 314, 317 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); *Helpenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1971); *Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp.*, 502 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1974) (per Stevens, J.).

Here, the Illinois Supreme Court squarely held that the state court judgments are based on Stoner’s violation of his fiduciary duties under state law and that the liability of Stoner and Stoner Investments was independent of the non-competition covenants (*supra*, pp. 7-8). Consequently, even assuming *arguendo* that Vendo could be found to have violated the antitrust laws, this would provide no basis for enjoining collection of the Illinois judgments or for relieving Stoner of his Illinois fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., *Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, Inc.*, 202 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1953); cf. *Kelly v. Kosuga*, 358 U.S. 516 (1959).

eralism are particularly relevant in the circumstances of this case and should have barred such a flagrant abuse of federal equity power.

**III. The Decision Below, in Expressly Sanctioning the District Court's Review of the Final Decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, Has So Far Departed from the Accepted and Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings as to Call for an Exercise of This Court's Supervision.**

The Court of Appeals' express approval of the District Court's assertion of jurisdiction to review the final decision of a state court of highest resort (as to which, moreover, this Court had denied certiorari) also is contrary to fundamental principles underlying the relationship of federal and state courts.

In *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970), this Court pointed out:

"Thus from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems. Each system proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in this Court of the federal questions raised in either system".

The Court also warned (*ibid.*):

"Obviously this dual system could not function if state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case."

See also, e.g., *Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, Inc.*, 202 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1953) ("... it is not our business to review the correctness of fact conclusions reached by the Vice Chancellor of the State of New Jersey and its Supreme Court"); *In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975) ("... the state and lower

federal courts are independent, and ... a federal action is not superior to a state proceeding merely because of its federal character. ... As a corollary to this principle, judgments resulting from federal actions are not preferred to judgments resulting from state actions because of their federal character.").

As the District Court in the instant case recognized (App. 19-20), it was without jurisdiction to review the Illinois Supreme Court's decision under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983. See, e.g., *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1913). Yet, inexplicably, the District Court concluded that it had such jurisdiction under §16 of the Clayton Act (App. 25). The Court of Appeals "agreed" on the ground that the Illinois Supreme Court "expressly refused to consider" the federal antitrust issues raised by the Stoner group (App. 14).

However, although acknowledged in a footnote (App. 7), the Court below then disregarded the fact that it was the respondents themselves who withdrew the federal antitrust issues from consideration by the state courts, and that it was only for this reason that the Illinois Supreme Court did not pass on those issues. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court never "expressly refused to consider" the federal antitrust issues. No such issue was even before the Illinois Supreme Court since it had been withdrawn by respondents years before and never raised again, and the Illinois Supreme Court merely noted that fact in its opinion.

In any event, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court is final and entitled to full faith and credit. This Court, which is the only federal court with power to review the final decision of the highest court of a state, denied certiorari, and the matter should have rested there. The antitrust laws confer no greater power on a federal district court to perform this Court's reviewing functions than the Civil Rights Act or any other federal law. See *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, *supra*, 398 U.S. at 286.

**IV. The Decision Below Raises Issues of Broad National Significance and Is Likely to Have a Serious Detrimental Impact on the Relationship between State and Federal Courts.**

Under the analysis of the Court below, wherever a federal statute provides for a private injunction action maintainable only in the federal courts, then:

1. The bar of § 2283 would not apply, and state court proceedings would therefore be subject to federal stays without regard to the Anti-Injunction Statute;
2. No considerations of comity or federalism would apply in considering whether to grant such injunctions; and
3. Even a final judgment of a state court, reviewed by the highest court of that state, would be subject to collateral review by a federal district court in such an injunction action.

Through this technique, state court defendants would be able to utilize the federal courts to frustrate and interfere with the state court proceedings in which they are involved, and (as in this case) even to nullify final judgments reviewed by the highest state courts. Moreover, it is not only the antitrust laws that might be utilized in that way by state court defendants,\* but indeed many other federal statutes as well.

Review of the decision below is essential, we submit, in view of the critical importance to the Nation's parallel federal and state judicial systems of a clear set of procedural restraints upon improper interference by the courts of one system with those of the other. Such restraints have

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\* At least one such injunction has already been granted by another federal district court on the basis of the District Court's opinion in this case. *Sar Industries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries, Inc.*, 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶ 60,816 (C.D. Cal.)

long been recognized as a basic part of our federal-state structure, and this Court has referred to the Anti-Injunction Statute as

"a limitation of the power of the federal courts dating almost from the beginning of our history and expressing an important Congressional policy—to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts." *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1939).

The maintenance of that policy, and the "fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts," *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, supra*, 398 U.S. at 287, are seriously threatened by the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case.

**CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: August 4, 1976.



# APPENDICES

App. 1

**APPENDIX A**

**Opinion of the United States Court  
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit**

IN THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 75-1792 and 75-1793

LEKTRO-VEND CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; HARRY  
B. STONER; and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware  
corporation,

*Plaintiffs-Appellees,*

v.

THE VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri corporation,

*Defendant-Appellant.*

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Appeals from the United States District Court for  
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 65 C 1755

RICHARD W. McLAREN, *Judge.*

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ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 1975 — DECIDED MAY 28, 1976

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Before SWYGERT and SPRECHER, *Circuit Judges*, and  
WARREN, *District Judge*.<sup>1</sup>

SWYGERT, *Circuit Judge*. The overall question is whether  
the district court properly issued a preliminary injunc-

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<sup>1</sup> The Honorable Robert W. Warren, United States District Judge  
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, is sitting by designation.

tion in this antitrust case, thereby staying enforcement proceedings in the Illinois state courts to collect two judgments entered in a suit on an employment contract that contained a noncompetition covenant. Among the specific issues raised is whether section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, comes within the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1183. We hold that it does. We also hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits and they would suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction.

The Vendo Company is located in Kansas City, Missouri. In 1959 it was a leading manufacturer and seller of vending machines for cold beverages, ice cream, and certain other products. It did not manufacture vending machines for ice cream, candy, cigarettes, sandwiches, or coffee, but was conducting research and development in that area.

Stoner Manufacturing Company, located in Aurora, Illinois, was principally engaged in the manufacture of candy vending machines that had a nationwide market. Compared with Vendo it was a smaller and less diversified enterprise. Harry H. Stoner, his wife, and other members of his family owned all of the Stoner Manufacturing stock. Stoner was the president and controlled the company.

Following negotiations with Stoner, Vendo purchased the assets of Stoner Manufacturing Corporation in April 1959 with the exception of its real estate and buildings. (Upon consummation of the purchase, Stoner Manufacturing was reorganized as Stoner Investments, Inc.) The sales agreement imposed a ten-year noncompetition restriction on Stoner Manufacturing not to own, control, or manage any business engaged in the manufacture or sale

of vending machines. In addition, an employment contract between Vendo and Harry B. Stoner was executed whereby the latter would serve Vendo as a consultant for five years at an annual salary of \$50,000. This contract had a noncompetition covenant also. Stoner agreed that during the term of the contract and for five years following the termination of his employment he would not "[D]irectly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company [Vendo] . . . is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company . . . intends to extend and carry on business . . ." enter into the vending manufacturing business. The employment contract provided that Stoner "[S]hould regulate his own hours of employment and shall determine the amount of time and effort he shall devote . . ." to Vendo.<sup>2</sup>

Almost immediately after the Stoner Manufacturing assets were acquired by Vendo, friction developed between

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the noncompetition clause reads:

5. During the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following the termination of his employment hereunder, whether by lapse of time or by termination as hereinafter provided, Stoner shall not directly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities, enter into or engage in the vending machine manufacturing business or any branch thereof, either as an individual on his own account, or as a partner or joint venturer, or as an employee, agent or salesman for any person, firm or corporation or as an officer or director of a corporation or otherwise, provided however that the Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates shall be excluded from the restrictions hereof and provided also that Stoner shall be permitted to own, hold, acquire and dispose of stocks and other securities which are traded in the investment security market whether on listed exchanges or over the counter.

Stoner and his employer. Stoner complained that his services as a consultant were not being utilized and that he was being treated as a mere figurehead. Very likely this state of affairs prompted the development of the events that lead to the litigation in both the state and federal courts.

For several years before the sale to Vendo, Rod Phillips was the Stoner plant superintendent and his son, Bill, the assistant superintendent. Because of their disagreement with the policies and operations of Vendo, the father and the son resigned from their respective positions in mid-1960. Bill Phillips after quitting Vendo began the design of an electronic coin detecting device and attempted to interest Stoner in financing its development. Stoner evinced interest and agreed to pay the younger Phillips \$650 per month to develop the device. It was agreed that any patents on the invention would belong to Stoner Investments. By the end of 1960 a model was completed and a patent applied for. The patent was issued in October 1960 and was assigned to Stoner Investments; however, the patented device was never produced commercially.

About this same time Rod and Bill Phillips developed a machine for vending candy that was radically different from any previous machine. It combined in a novel yet practical design three existing vending machine features: stock rotation (known as "first-in, first-out"), a window to display the product to be vended, and a capacity for stocking mixed items in a single conveyance.<sup>3</sup> At Rod

<sup>3</sup> In 1959 when Stoner Manufacturing sold out to Vendo it was manufacturing a candy vending machine called a "drop shelf" machine. The Phillip's machine, which became known as the "Lektro-Vend" model, was an extension of the "drop shelf" model. After the purchase of the Stoner assets in April 1959, Vendo began experimenting with the same idea as that developed by the Phillipses. Two models were built. Vendo, however, considered the models defective in certain mechanical respects and too expensive to produce. The project was dropped.

Phillips's request Stoner agreed to finance the development of this new machine; however, neither Stoner nor Stoner Investments was to have any ownership or control over the venture. Interest-free loans aggregating \$200,000 were made by Stoner to the Phillipses during 1961-62. Stoner also made available a building in Aurora rent free.

By October 1962 prototypes of the machine developed by Rod and Bill Phillips had been constructed and were exhibited at a trade show in San Francisco. The machine won favorable interest in the industry. In the meantime Lektro-Vend Corporation had been organized. The original stockholders were Rod and Bill Phillips, Ruth Netray (Stoner's sister-in-law), and several employees of the corporation.

In December 1962 Mrs. Netray loaned the Phillipses \$350,000. The loan was later increased to \$525,000. The proceeds of those borrowings were used in part to pay off the \$200,000 loan made by Stoner. During that same month Stoner asked Vendo to be released from his employment contract, saying that he had an opportunity to invest in the Lektro-Vend venture. Vendo refused to accede to his request and Stoner was told that Vendo itself was interested in buying the Lektro-Vend machine. Stoner was asked to learn whether Rod Phillips was interested in selling and, if so, to arrange a meeting between Phillips and representatives of Vendo. Stoner reported that Rod Phillips was asking \$1,500,000.

Rod Phillips met with certain Vendo officials in January 1963 to show them the operation of the machine. Stoner was present, but took no part in the meeting. In March Stoner wrote Vendo's vice-president that he had told Phillips that he assumed in the absence of any word from Vendo that Vendo no longer had any interest in the patent. The vice-president responded that Vendo was still interested, but that the asking price was too high.



During the summer of 1963 Stoner had a conversation with Vendo's president. Upon inquiry from the latter as to the actual extent of Stoner's involvement with Phillips, Stoner said that his relationship was confined to loans which had been repaid by another person. He did not disclose that the other person was his sister-in-law.

In March 1964 Stoner Investments contracted to sell Lektro-Vend a new plant which had been built in Aurora by Stoner Investments during the previous year. The deal was financed through a bank loan which was subject to an agreement that Stoner Investments would repurchase the property in the event of default.

Stoner's contract of employment terminated June 1, 1964. During that same month Lektro-Vend issued 5,000 shares of stock to Mrs. Stoner and in July it issued 5,000 shares of stock to Stoner Investments. Stoner sent a letter to fifty vending machine operators in which he identified himself with the old Stoner Manufacturing Company and said that he was now interested in Lektro-Vend. He went to great lengths to recommend the Lektro-Vend product. Litigation followed.

Vendo sued Stoner and Stoner Investments in the Illinois state court in August 1965. In October 1965 Lektro-Vend, Stoner, and Stoner Investments sued Vendo in the federal court. The action in the state court was finally terminated in November 1974 when the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of its decision affirming judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc. in excess of \$7,000,000.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In an attempt to aid the reader to better understand this complex litigation and at the same time to shorten the opinion, a summary of the state court litigation follows.

*Vendo v. Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.*

The suit was filed in Kane County, Illinois on August 10, 1965; the complaint charged breach of noncompetition covenants; an

The complaint in the federal action alleged violations by Vendo of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26). The case lay dormant until June 1975 when the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction staying defendant's efforts to collect its state court judgments until the merits of the federal suit could be determined. That action precipitated the present appeal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).

<sup>4</sup> (Continued)

amended complaint also charged theft of trade secrets. After a bench trial the court on December 16, 1966 found for Vendo. Judgments against Stoner for \$250,000 and against both defendants for \$1,100,000 were granted. Stoner and Stoner Investments were enjoined from further acts of competition.

An appeal was taken to the Appellate Court of Illinois. That court entered its decision on January 30, 1969, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261. The court held that no trade secrets were involved, the noncompetition covenants were valid and enforceable, and the covenants had been breached by the defendants. The grant of injunctive relief was affirmed. The court also held that though the trial court erred in striking the affirmative defense based on the federal antitrust laws, it was correct in denying the defense based on the Illinois antitrust laws. The cause was remanded for a determination of damages and further proceedings.

Upon remand the defendant withdrew its affirmative defense asserted under the federal antitrust laws. The trial court, after hearing evidence, entered judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments which totaled \$7,363,500.

Upon a second appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the court decided, on September 12, 1973, 13 Ill. App. 3d 291, that the trial court erred in the measurement of damages. The case was remanded for assessment of damages in accordance with the Appellate Court's original opinion.

Upon appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court on September 27, 1974, 58 Ill. 2d 289, the appellate court was reversed and the trial court's judgments were affirmed. The Supreme Court in deciding the case constructed a different theory of recovery—the breach of a fiduciary obligation on the part of Stoner—then had been asserted by Vendo.

## I

The threshold question relates to the authority of a federal court to enjoin a proceeding pending in a state court. Specifically, the question is whether section 2283 of the Judicial Code<sup>5</sup> prevented the district court from issuing a preliminary injunction staying the efforts of Vendo to collect its state court judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.<sup>6</sup>

The underlying purpose of this section, grounded in federalism is "[T]o prevent friction between state and federal courts." *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940). The statute is to be strictly applied *Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.*, 348 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1955). Unless one of the three exceptions listed in the statute is evident, it constitutes an absolute ban upon a federal court injunction against a pending state court proceeding. *Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970).

In the instant case the district court held that both the "as expressly authorized" exception and the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception applied and issued the preliminary injunction. Since we are of the view that the judge was correct in holding the first exception applicable, we need not reach the question raised as to the second exception.

<sup>5</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

<sup>6</sup> The injunction preserved Vendo's lien and rights under the state court judgments. It also contained detailed provisions regulating the conduct of the judgment debtors during the pendency of the injunction.

Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 26) provides that any person is entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties against threatened loss or damage from violations of the antitrust laws. The complaint in the instant case alleges violations of section 7 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 7 and 2) and reads in part:

On or about August 10, 1965, Vendo filed suit in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois against Stoner and Stoner Investments. The full text of the complaint is attached to this complaint as Exhibit C. The complaint alleges that Stoner had breached his agreement not to compete of June 1, 1959 and that Stoner Investments had breached that portion of the April 3, 1959 contract of sale which sought to eliminate competition for 10 years throughout the world. As has been previously alleged, the world-wide non-competition covenants contained in the said contracts are illegal and in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The purpose of the said law suit is to unlawfully harass Stoner and Stoner Investments and to eliminate the competition of Stoner, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend. The lawsuit is part of Vendo's plan to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing business. The threats to enforce such non-competition covenants and the bringing of a suit in an attempt to enforce the illegal covenants are overt acts of Vendo in monopolization and constitute an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce in the State of Illinois among the several states and foreign countries in the manufacture of such vending machines. Lektro-Vend, Stoner and Stoner Investments have been injured in their business and property as a direct and proximate result of these overt acts of Vendo.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Other allegations specifically refer to the noncompetition covenants contained in the 1959 agreements.



The question before us is whether section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, should be interpreted as coming within the "expressly authorized" provision of section 2283 of the Judicial Code.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), provides guidance. In that case the Court held section 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, came within the meaning of the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute. The Court initially noted that, "Despite the seemingly uncompromising language of the anti-injunction statute prior to 1948, [it was] soon recognized that exceptions must be made to its blanket prohibition if the import and purpose of other Acts of Congress were to be given their intended scope." *Id.* at 233-34. The court also cataloged six separate instances in which it had found federal courts empowered to enjoin state court proceedings in carrying out the will of Congress "despite the anti-injunction statute." Mr. Justice Stewart observed that "[i]n addition to the exceptions to the anti-injunction statute found to be embodied in the various Acts of Congress, the Court [has] recognized other 'implied' exceptions to the blanket prohibition of the anti-injunction statute." *Id.* at 235. The relevant criteria to be applied in determining whether an Act of Congress comes within the "expressly authorized" exception were listed: (1) The "federal law need not contain an express reference" to the anti-injunction statute; (2) "[A] federal law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify as an exception"; and (3) "[A]n Act of Congress must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding." *Id.* at 237. Summarizing these criteria, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote: "The test . . . is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of

equity, could be given its intended scope only by a stay of a state court proceeding." *Id.* at 238.

Applying these criteria to section 16 of the Clayton Act, we are of the view that it falls within the "expressly authorized" exception. *Mitchum* noted that section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act "opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy" in vindicating basic federal rights. *Id.* at 239. So, too, does section 16 of the Clayton Act open the federal courts to private citizens offering a uniquely federal remedy as an important part of the enforcement provisions of the antitrust laws. The private enforcement of these laws by injunctive relief is vested exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This jurisdiction would be frustrated if federal courts did not have the power to enjoin a state court proceeding in an appropriate case. The present situation is a classic example. Here *Vendo* seeks to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged to be the very object of antitrust violations.

Several cases support our holding. In *Helfenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971), decided prior to *Mitchum*, the plaintiffs had filed suit seeking to recover treble damages for violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The loss or damages claimed in the federal suit were due to one plaintiff being forced into arbitration and other plaintiffs being evicted from leased premises—consequences which under the issues presented to the federal court were alleged to have resulted from antitrust violations. The court, in upholding the trial judge's determination to deny an injunction, stated that there was no authority under the federal antitrust laws to enjoin state enforcement or remedy for collection of ordinary debts. The court found that the plaintiffs had "only remotely allude[d] to their potential loss or damage under federal law." *Id.* at 1071. There had



been "no attempt in either the arbitration or eviction proceedings to enforce the very conduct . . . prohibited by the Clayton or Sherman Acts." *Id.* The court found that the loss or damage done to the plaintiffs was related to their defenses as provided under *state* law. The loss did not flow from any prohibition under *federal* laws—there was no evidence that the evictions resulted from their refusal to buy according to a "tie-in" agreement they had executed with the defendants. While the court did not expressly decide that injunctive relief would have been proper had the loss or damage been intricately connected to a federal antitrust claim, it is clear from the logic of the decision that this result would have been reached.

Another decision prior to *Mitchum* reached exactly this result. In *United States v. Bayer*, 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court held that a contract between Bayer and I. G. Farber violated the Sherman Act. As part of the afforded relief, the court enjoined an assignee of Faber from enforcing in state court royalty payments under the contract. In holding that section 2283 did not bar the injunction, the court said:

The answer [to section 2283] is that § 4 of the Sherman Act grants the United States District Court jurisdiction "to prevent and restrain violations" of the Act. The injunction is a necessary incident to the Court's power in order to effectuate its judgment that the Bayer contracts are illegal. Simply to declare the agreement illegal and at the same time permit recovery of the proceeds would render the decree of the court quite sterile. The purpose of the decree is not only to prevent repetition of past offenses but also "to prevent the defendants from acquiring any of the fruits of the condemned project." 135 F. Supp. at 73.

*Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), is also instructive. In an appeal by a stockholder from an order of the district court enjoining the use of other stock-

holder authorizations obtained without compliance with the proxy rules in a state court proceeding to obtain inspection of Studebaker's shareholders' lists, the Second Circuit held that section 2283 did not bar the injunction. The court distinguished the federal securities statutes which afford enforcement by private parties from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act which restrict the enforcement of its provisions to the National Labor Relations Board. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, stated: "Section 16 of the Clayton Act . . . affords a closer parallel, since there as here the private suit plays an important part in enforcement." 360 F.2d at 698. He concluded that "where the very act of prosecuting the state proceeding violated federal law . . .," section 2283 did not stand in the way of enjoining the state court action. *Id.*<sup>8</sup>

When Congress enacted the various antitrust laws it created federal rights and remedies enforceable by private parties in a federal court of equity. That such powers were vested exclusively in the federal courts reflect the Congressional belief that the national objectives of the antitrust laws will be effectuated if entrusted to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If federal courts are prohibited from enjoining state court proceedings which are part of an anticompetitive scheme in violation of the federal antitrust laws, the full scope and force of those laws will be seriously impaired. Moreover, the national interest in the preservation of competition—one of our most important public policies—would be frustrated. Accordingly, we hold that section 16 of the Clayton Act constitutes an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction provision of the Judicial Code.

Vendo further contends that even if the district court was not barred by section 2283 from issuing the injunction,

<sup>8</sup> *Gittlin* was cited in *Mitchum* (407 U.S. at 237, n. 25) in discussing the meaning of the "expressly authorized" exception.

principals of comity and federalism constitute a bar. The principle of comity has no applicability when the exclusive remedy for an injury lies in the federal court. We are in agreement with the trial court's observation:

Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of an injunction considering the peculiar nature of this case. The federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention. *Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Company*, 403 F. Supp. 527, 537 (N.D. Ill. 1975).

It is also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reverse, review, or revise the state court judgments in a collateral attack. While the district court conceded that it had no power to directly review cases from state courts, it went on to point out that here the plaintiffs' claim that "[T]he state court proceedings did not take account of Vendo's violations of antitrust law and were prosecuted in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act . . ." *Id.* at 529. Therefore, the "[S]tate court proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme." *Id.* at 532. The judge additionally commented: "The final Illinois Supreme Court opinion makes such a review imperative. The Illinois court expressly refused to consider the allegations that the state proceedings were part of an anti-competitive scheme. Plaintiffs, having never had a trial on this issue, must be heard in the only forum now available." *Id.* at 532, n. 4. We agree with these comments.

## II

In determining that interlocutory relief was appropriate, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits of their

claims. Defendant attacks this ruling by arguing that there was a total failure of proof. It says that the state court judgments are based on Stoner's violation of fiduciary duties and do not depend (contrary to the trial judge's findings) on the noncompetition covenants. Additionally, it is argued that the covenants are lawful when tested by antitrust standards.

In the first place, defendant's attack is overbroad. As we said in *Bath Industries v. Blot*, 427 F.2d 97, 111 (7th Cir. 1970), "[I]t is not necessary that the trial court find the certainty of a wrong, a likelihood is sufficient." Furthermore, since the grant of a temporary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, *Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.*, 262 U.S. 43 (1923), appellate review is narrow. *Scherr v. Volpe*, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).

Secondly, when the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgments on the unadvanced theory that Stoner had violated his fiduciary duties, it did not consider or decide any of the antitrust issues presented here. It did not and could not evaluate Vendo's alleged monopolistic scheme which included the enforcements of the noncompetition covenants. The district court found that the covenants were "overly broad" and that there was substantial evidence that Vendo had the "required specific intent to monopolize" in a relevant market. Given the limitations of our review, we cannot say the trial court erred.

The judge states in his memorandum opinion:

On the record as a whole, the Court finds that a preliminary injunction will prevent irreparable harm, protect the public interest, and will benefit plaintiffs more than it will burden Vendo. Continued efforts at collection will prevent Lektro-Vend Corporation from marketing a promising, newly-developed vending machine. The state court collection process places insurmountable barriers in the way of raising capital

for any expansion program. Moreover, collection of the state judgment will effectively place Lektro-Vend in the hands of—or at least at the disposition of—Vendo. Stoner Investments is controlled by Mr. Stoner; 78.57% of Lektro-Vend is owned by Stoner Investments. Needless to say, Vendo would also control Stoner Investments. The case or controversy requirement contained in Article III then would require dismissal of Lektro-Vend and Stoner Investments. Continued collection thus would eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein. Moreover, Mr. Stoner's ability to effectively prosecute this action would be severely limited by further execution of the state court case. This also amounts to irreparable harm. (Citations omitted.)

We are not prepared to say that the court erred in reaching these conclusions.

Defendant's last contentions are that laches, waiver, and collateral estoppel bar injunctive relief. Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be presented for the first time on appeal. *United States v. Tyrrell*, 329 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1964). As we noted in *Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States F. & G. Co.*, 508 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1975): "[A] trial court should not be reversed on grounds that were never urged or argued below." Defendant failed to raise these issues in the trial court. Regardless of this procedural defect, we are convinced that these contentions are without merit.

The grant of interlocutory relief is affirmed.

A true Copy:

Teste:

.....  
Clerk of the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

## APPENDIX B

Order and Judgment of the United States  
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 28, 1976

Before

Hon. LUTHER M. SWYGERT, Circuit Judge  
Hon. ROBERT A. SPRECHER, Circuit Judge  
Hon. ROBERT W. WARREN, District Judge\*

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., etc., et al.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

No. 75-1792 & 75-1793 vs.

THE VENDO COMPANY, etc.,  
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United  
States District Court  
for the Northern Dis-  
trict of Illinois East-  
ern Division No. 65 C  
1755

The Honorable  
Richard W. McLaren,  
Judge

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause appealed from be, and the same is hereby, **AFFIRMED**, with costs, in accordance with the opinion of this Court filed this date.

\* Honorable Robert W. Warren, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, is sitting by designation.



App. 18

**APPENDIX C**

Order of the United States Court of Appeals  
for the Seventh Circuit, On Rehearing

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS**

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

July 16, 1976

Before

Hon. LUTHER M. SWYGERT, Circuit Judge

Hon. ROBERT A. SPRECHER, Circuit Judge

Hon. ROBERT W. WARREN, District Judge\*

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP., etc., et al.,**  
**Plaintiffs-Appellees,**

No. 75-1792, 75-1793 vs.

**THE VENDO COMPANY, etc.,**  
**Defendants-Appellants.**

Appeals from the United  
States District Court  
for the Northern Dis-  
trict of Illinois, East-  
ern Division.

No. 65 C 1755

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion that it be reheard *en banc* filed in the above-entitled cause, no judge in active service having requested a vote thereon, nor any judge having voted to grant the suggestion, and all of the members of the panel having voted to deny a rehearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a rehearing in the above entitled cause be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

Note: Judges Cummings, Pell and Tone did not participate in the disposition of this petition.

\* The Honorable Robert W. Warren, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, is sitting by designation.

App. 19

**APPENDIX D**

Opinion of the United States District  
Court for the Northern District of Illinois

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware**  
**corporation, HARRY B. STONER**  
**and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,**  
**a Delaware corporation,**

Plaintiffs,

v.

**THE VENDO COMPANY, a**  
**Missouri corporation,**

Defendant.

No. 65 C 1755

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

**I.**

This is a complex antitrust action<sup>1</sup> by Lektro-Vend Corporation, Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.,

<sup>1</sup> Plaintiffs also assert a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming certain portions of the Illinois Supreme Court decisions violated procedural and substantive due process. The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this claim. *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); *Louis Ender Inc. v. General Foods Corp.*, 467 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1972); *Sarelas v. Slechan*, 326 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1963). As explained in *Adkins v. Underwood*, 370 F. Supp. 510, 514-15 (N.D.Ill. 1974):

"While lower federal courts were given certain power in the Judiciary Act of 1789, they were not given any power to directly review cases from state courts, and they have not been

(Footnote continued on following page.)

plaintiffs, against the Vendo Company, the defendant. Vendo recently obtained a \$7,345,500 state court judgment against Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments for violation of their purported fiduciary duties to Vendo. *Vendo v. Stoner*, 58 Ill.2d 289, N.E.2d (1974), *cert. denied*, U.S. (1975). Plaintiffs<sup>2</sup> now seek a preliminary injunction preventing Vendo from taking any further steps, pending a trial of this case, to collect its state court judgment, urging that the state court proceedings did not take account of Vendo's violations of antitrust law and were prosecuted in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. For the reasons and on the conditions stated below, the motion will be granted. Insofar as required, this opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 65(d).

(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

given such power since that time. . . . Only the Supreme Court is authorized to review on direct appeal the decision of state courts. From the beginning this country has had two essentially separate legal systems. Each system, federal and state, proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in the United States Supreme Court of federal questions raised in either system.

"Even if a state court decision is constitutionally wrong, that does not make the judgment void, it merely leaves it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding. Unless and until so reversed or modified, it would be an effective and conclusive adjudication. Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than the United States Supreme Court can entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a state court judgment which is in error."

<sup>2</sup> The motion for preliminary injunction only sought relief for Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments, not Lektro-Vend Corporation. It is clear, however, that the hearing litigated the interests of all three plaintiffs and that Vendo acquiesced in this procedure. Plaintiff's motion to amend the motion to include Lektro-Vend is therefore granted.

To demonstrate the necessity of a preliminary injunction a brief excursion into the history of the relationship between the parties is required. This action has its genesis in the 1959 purchase of Stoner Manufacturing Corp. by Vendo. This sale was occasioned primarily by Mr. Stoner's health problems. At that time Stoner Manufacturing was primarily a producer of candy vending machines throughout the United States. Vendo prior to 1959 was a manufacturer of beverage and ice cream vending machines. The record in the state court proceedings and here demonstrates that Vendo had two purposes in purchasing Stoner Manufacturing: expansion of its product line<sup>3</sup> and elimination of Mr. Stoner as a potential competitor in the vending machine market. The parties agree that Mr. Stoner was a design genius in creating innovative vending machine products.

The sale agreement between Vendo and Stoner Manufacturing provided that Vendo would pay the Stoner interests \$3,400,000 and deliver 60,000 shares of Vendo stock to Mr. Stoner. This made Mr. Stoner a major shareholder of Vendo. Mr. Stoner also became an officer and director of Vendo. His employment contract with Vendo had a five year term and his salary was \$50,000 per year. The 1959 agreements also provided that Stoner Manufacturing would not directly or indirectly participate in the management, ownership or control of a vending machine business for ten years in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo was doing business. Mr. Stoner's employment contract provided that for a period of five years following the termination of his employment, Mr. Stoner would not compete with Vendo in any territory in which Vendo was doing business or intended to do business.

<sup>3</sup> Federal Trade Commission approval was required before Vendo could purchase the Stoner vending machine interests. Apparently this was accomplished by misrepresenting to the Commission that Stoner Manufacturing and Vendo were not actual or potential competitors. The record demonstrates that at the least Vendo was a potential competitor of Stoner Manufacturing.

Shortly after the 1959 agreements were consummated Mr. Stoner and Vendo had a falling out. Mr. Stoner had been led to believe he would be able to take an active role in research and development and would be treated as chairman of the board with respect to operation of the purchased assets of Stoner Manufacturing. In actuality Mr. Stoner was virtually ignored or bypassed by the Vendo management. The Vendo management admittedly was thus only paying Mr. Stoner not to compete rather than employing him for performance of actual services.

The succeeding events are adequately set out in the first opinion of the Illinois Court of Appeals at 105 Ill.App.2d 261, 269-77. During the fall of 1960 Mr. Stoner began financing vending machine research and development by certain former Stoner Manufacturing employees. This work culminated in the development of a revolutionary first-in-first-out (FIFO) candy vending machine, called the Lektro-Vend machine. The first prototypes of the Lektro-Vend were exhibited at a trade show in October 1962. Vendo employees were present and made initial inquiries about purchasing the design. The inventors, however, decided to manufacture and market the machine on their own. Mr. Stoner was asked to join these efforts. Thus in December 1962 Mr. Stoner sought to be released from his Vendo employment contract stating that he wanted to invest in the Lektro-Vend machine. Mr. Stoner did not disclose at that time his previous backing of the Lektro-Vend project.

Vendo refused the release request because it did not want to compete with Stoner. Vendo officials stated that part of the consideration for the 1959 agreements was the non-competition clauses. Instead, Stoner was requested to help Vendo purchase the Lektro-Vend from the inventors. The inventors sought \$1,500,000; Vendo thought this price too high and declined to purchase the machine. Vendo also thought that there were inherent technical problems in the Lektro-Vend and that it was too costly to

produce. Mr. Stoner warned that was a serious mistake not to purchase the Lektro-Vend.

Some time shortly after the Vendo refusal to purchase the Lektro-Vend, Mr. Stoner revealed his financial support of the Lektro-Vend inventors. It appears, however, that Vendo was well aware of the Stoner involvement with Lektro-Vend as early as the 1962 trade show.

Mr. Stoner's and Stoner Investments' involvement with the Lektro-Vend inventors and the Lektro-Vend Corporation continued. Stoner Investments helped Lektro-Vend Corporation establish a production plant and further loans or loan guarantees were made by both Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments. Meanwhile Mr. Stoner's employment contract with Vendo terminated on June 1, 1964, although Mr. Stoner remained on the Vendo board until the spring of 1965. It is clear, however, that neither Mr. Stoner nor Vendo thought until late in the state court litigation that this relationship created for Mr. Stoner any further obligations beyond those duties purportedly contained in the non-competition covenants.

In March 1965 Lektro-Vend salesmen reported that Vendo salesmen were circulating rumors in the trade that Lektro-Vend was about to go out of business. Mr. Stoner responded with a letter to 50 vending machine operators. This letter, denominated by the parties as the "Dear Operator" letter, stated that Stoner was now "interested" in Lektro-Vend Corporation and would guarantee its continued existence.

Conflict between the parties sharpened in August 1965 when Vendo brought suit against Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments. The Court proposes to examine these proceedings only insofar as they may reflect illegal anti-competitive conduct by Vendo. The original Vendo complaint focused on alleged violation of the non-competition covenants in the employment and sales agreements and sought \$500,000 in damages. This complaint was amended to add



a charge of theft of trade secrets and the ad damnum was raised to \$1,500,000. An injunction against Stoner and Stoner Investments preventing further aid to Lektro-Vend running until July 1, 1969 was also sought. The Illinois Appellate Court opinion after the first trial reveals that the evidence during the first trial was directed to the covenants and the trade secrets issue. After the first trial, the Illinois trial court entered judgment against Mr. Stoner for \$250,000 for violation of the covenants and \$1,100,000 for theft of a trade secret. The Appellate Court at 105 Ill.App.2d 261 reversed as to the latter, stating that Vendo had no trade secret. It is clear from all the evidence that Vendo should have known that there was no theft of a trade secret; indeed, the first Illinois Court of Appeals' decision demonstrates that the effort by Vendo to prove theft of a trade secret amounted to vexatious litigation.

The Appellate Court remanded the case with directions for further hearings on damages. Before the second state trial, Vendo again raised the ad damnum, this time to \$7,345,500. At trial, however, Vendo attempted to prove the entirely new theory that Stoner was legally at fault for Vendo's failure to have a FIFO machine. On this basis, the trial court entered judgment against Stoner for \$170,835 for forfeiture of salary for the time in which he purportedly illegally competed, and for \$7,345,500 against Stoner and Stoner Investments for the lost profits for failure of Vendo to have a FIFO machine. Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments again appealed and the Appellate Court again reversed, stating that Vendo's failure to have a FIFO vending machine was not attributable to the Stoner interests. The salary forfeiture was affirmed. Each side was then granted leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgment, predicated liability on a corporate opportunity theory. It held that as a director of Vendo Mr. Stoner breached his fiduciary duty by failing to adequately disclose his financial involvement in the Lektro-Vend machine.

The court thus concluded that it could not say that Vendo would have declined to purchase the Lektro-Vend machine had adequate disclosure been made or a genuine opportunity to purchase existed. It affirmed the \$7,345,500 damage award on the Vendo lost profits theory. The Stoner interests sought a rehearing on the grounds that the corporate opportunity theory denied it substantive and procedural due process because Stoner was functionally denied a trial on this issue. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing and a petition for certiorari was subsequently denied by the United States Supreme Court. As noted above, the Court believes that it does not have jurisdiction to review the due process aspects of the state court proceedings; however, as will be more fully explained below, the state court proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme.<sup>4</sup>

## II.

Three legal issues are raised by the brief outline of facts just concluded: (1) Have plaintiffs established under the four usual requirements that a preliminary injunction is necessary? (2) Have plaintiffs met their special burden of establishing the necessity for enjoining a state court proceeding? (3) Assuming an injunction is necessary, what type of bond is appropriate?

### A.

The four factors usually examined to determine whether interlocutory relief is appropriate are:

- (1) likelihood of ultimately prevailing on the merits;

<sup>4</sup> The final Illinois Supreme Court opinion makes such a review imperative. The Illinois court expressly refused to consider the allegations that the state proceedings were part of an anticompetitive scheme. Plaintiffs, having never had a trial on this issue, must be heard in the only forum now available.



- (2) likelihood of irreparable harm;
- (3) balancing the hardships; and
- (4) protection of the public interest.

In the instant case, this Court believes that plaintiffs have demonstrated likelihood of ultimate success on both the section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act claims. The section 1 claim arises from the 1959 agreement. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, contracts which unreasonably restrain interstate commerce are void. The federal antitrust laws make covenants not to compete which are overly broad in geographical scope or in time unreasonable restraints of trade. Once antitrust jurisdiction is invoked, the validity of the challenged covenants is measured solely under federal law, regardless of legality under state law. *Schine Chain Theatres v. United States*, 334 U.S. 119 (1948).

Under federal law a non-competition covenant is legal under two conditions:

- (1) the covenant is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract;
- (2) the covenant is necessary to protect the legitimate property interests purchased by the covenantee. See *United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.*, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), *aff'd as modified*, 175 U.S. 211. Moreover, a covenant not to compete examined in light of other monopolistic practices can be declared illegal even if otherwise lawful if it can be shown that the object and the effect of the agreement was primarily directed at the elimination of competition. *Schine Chain Theatres v. United States*, *supra*; *Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lane, Inc.*, 299 F.Supp. 1080 (D.Md. 1969).

Here it appears that the covenants extracted were overly broad, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1959 agreement and subsequent activities demonstrate that their object (and effect) were primarily directed at the

elimination of competition rather than protection of good will. As drafted, the covenants were intended to protect the good will of Vendo where Vendo was doing or planning to do business; they were not limited to areas in which Stoner Manufacturing was operating. Under *Addyston Pipe* and similar cases this amounts to prima facie proof of illegality. Additionally, Vendo's president admitted the major purpose and intent of the employment contract was to obtain the anticompetitive benefits accruing from the covenants. It should also be noted even after Vendo received notice that Stoner was involved in the Lektro-Vend project it refused to terminate his employment as the contract allowed. It appears to the Court that this course of conduct was adopted by Vendo in an attempt to limit Mr. Stoner's activities for the full planned term of the post-employment agreement, showing that protection of good will was not a significant goal in obtaining the covenant. Since Mr. Stoner apparently was never called upon to perform significant services for Vendo the covenant amounted to a naked agreement not to compete, solely anticompetitive in purpose and effect.

Vendo argues that even if the covenants are illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the state court judgment did not rely on these contractual terms and therefore is unassailable. The section 1 claim does not rest alone on the theory that the state litigation was an essential part of an illegal anticompetitive scheme but rather depends on an analysis of the total circumstances surrounding creation of the 1959 agreements. The Court believes that viewed in this light the corporate opportunity theory relied on in the final state court decision cannot either in logic or as a matter of federal antitrust law be separated from the anticompetitive intent and effect of the covenants. Mr. Stoner's position as a director was dependent on the acquisition and employment contracts. He would not have become a corporate director of Vendo absent entry of the anticompetitive agreements. Additionally, his status as a director clearly was not intended to create additional

duties; it only encompassed duties already undertaken as an employee of Vendo. The general rule that where a contract is only partially illegal under the antitrust laws, the illegal portions can be severed, is therefore inapposite. Here the anticompetitive clauses are essential primary elements of the bargain and thus cannot be severed, making all elements of the 1959 agreements unenforceable. See *Superior Bedding v. Serta Assoc., Inc.*, 353 F.Supp. 1143 (N.D.Ill. 1972). See also *Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co.*, 8 F.R.D. 347 (D.N.J. 1948), *aff'd* 96 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1949). Vendo's reliance on the ultimate theory of the state court litigation thus is not well taken. The 1959 agreements were cut from one piece of anticompetitive cloth and cannot be snipped apart.

Plaintiffs also argue that a violation of the "attempt to monopolize" proscription of section 2 of the Sherman Act occurred here. To prove violation of section 2, plaintiffs must establish three elements of proof: (1) a dangerous probability of actual monopolization in a relevant market; (2) specific intent to establish a monopoly power; and (3) overt acts. Plaintiffs need not prove that Vendo has succeeded in establishing monopoly power but must merely show that Vendo has the capacity to make a serious attempt to acquire monopoly status. *Lorain Journal v. United States*, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); *Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc.*, 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971).

In the instant case the relevant market is a recognized sub-market within the vending machine industry—coin operated food and beverage vending machines. Lektro-Vend and Vendo are actual competitors in the sub-market, although the price structure of the industry prevents absolute congruity of competition. The geographic market is nationwide in scope. Within this market the number of competitors has been steadily declining. Between 1958 and 1966 the number of vending machine manufacturers was nearly halved and the number of competitors with sales over \$100,000, particularly in the candy bar section of the industry, became quite small. Within this increasingly con-

centrated market, Vendo maintained a significant market share. While it appears that the evidence is somewhat in conflict, Vendo's market share is most probably over 20%. The "attempt to monopolize" prohibition in section 2 was intended to "nip incipient monopolies in the bud"; with this congressional policy in mind, considering the structure of the vending machine industry, the Court believes that, unchecked, Vendo's alleged practices raise a dangerous propensity for creation of an actual monopoly.

The Court also finds that plaintiffs have produced substantial evidence that Vendo had the required specific intent to monopolize and that it performed overt acts intended to create a monopoly position. Prior to 1959, Vendo had an aggressive acquisition program to buttress its product line and market share. The courts have consistently held that such conduct, along with other evidence of anticompetitive conduct, is persuasive evidence of an attempt to monopolize. See *e.g.*, *United States v. Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). Vendo's uniform policy of extracting broad covenants not to compete—such as the ones involved in the instant litigation—also evidences specific intent to monopolize. In addition, there is evidence that Vendo used litigation as a method of harassing and eliminating competition.

The right to litigate commercial controversies comes within the penumbra of the first amendment. *Cf. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). However, if litigation is used as an integral part of a scheme attempting to monopolize and exclude competition from the marketplace, that litigation can lose its first amendment protection. *Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. Corp.*, 382 U.S. 172 (1965). As the Supreme Court stated in *California Motor Transport*:

"It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as



an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute . . . . If the end result is unlawful, it matters not what the means used in violation may be lawful." 404 U.S. at 5145

This holding was recently reaffirmed in *United States v. Otter Tail Power Co.*, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); *aff'd after remand*, 417 U.S. 901 (1974). Thus if plaintiffs can prove that Vendo's state court litigation against the Stoner interests was not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately, antitrust liability in the instant case under section 2 of the Sherman Act would follow. *Cf. Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford*, 74-1492 (7th Cir. April 2, 1975). See also *Mach-Tronics Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963) (antitrust liability arises from anticompetitive institution of state trade secret case); *Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.*, 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).

There is persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately. Its theft of trade secret claim was clearly non-meritorious and litigation of this claim might well be interpreted—considering the record as a whole—as an attempt to further harass the Stoner interests and limit the amount of aid Stoner could lend Lektro-Vend. The attempt to enforce the covenants not to compete by way of injunction and damages may be similarly indication of a violation of section 2. It may also be argued that, had this litigation been legitimately undertaken to protect good will or confidential information, Vendo would have exercised its right to terminate Mr. Stoner's employment as soon as it discovered Mr. Stoner's relationship with the Lektro-Vend project; instead it prolonged Mr. Stoner's employment for the full term even though he was given no duties. As noted above, the intent of this action appears to have been to lengthen the period for which the non-competition covenants would run. The purpose of this portion of the state litigation seems purely anticompetitive. If so, this

scheme was successful, for the state litigation severely hampered Lektro-Vend's development.

Despite the above stated line of reasoning, defendant contends that the Supreme Court's decisions in *Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co.*, 330 U.S. 743 (1947) and *Kelly v. Kosuga*, 358 U.S. 516 (1959) bar injunctive relief under the instant circumstances. These cases hold that the antitrust laws provide no defense for actions under state law for collection of debts for sale of goods and services:

"If the contract provisions sued on in the state court do not embody or further the anti-competitive practices, then there has been no irreparable loss or damage from violation of the antitrust law" requiring injunctive relief.

*Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc.*, 408 F.2d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1974).

However, when the precise conduct proscribed by the antitrust laws is sought to be furthered in a state court action, the antitrust defense and injunctive relief are available in federal court. *Continental Wallpaper Co. v. Lewis Voigt & Sons*, 212 U.S. 227 (1909). See also *Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.*, 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962). *Bruce's Juices* and *Kelly* therefore do not apply. If the state court litigation was itself part of the anti-competitive scheme, a judgment arising from such litigation is not an ordinary debt.

On the record as a whole, the Court finds that a preliminary injunction will prevent irreparable harm, protect the public interest, and will benefit plaintiffs more than it will burden Vendo. Continued efforts at collection will prevent Lektro-Vend Corporation from marketing a promising, newly-developed vending machine. The state court collection process places insurmountable barriers in the way of raising capital for any expansion program. Moreover, collection of the state judgment will effectively place Lektro-Vend in the hands of—or at least at the disposition



of—Vendo. Stoner Investments is controlled by Mr. Stoner; 78.57% of Lektro-Vend is owned by Stoner Investments. Needless to say, Vendo would also control Stoner Investments. The case or controversy requirement contained in Article III then would require dismissal of Lektro-Vend and Stoner Investments. *Cf. Mar Foods v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago*, 73 C 1959 (N.D.Ill. November 6, 1974). Continued collection thus would eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein. Moreover, Mr. Stoner's ability to effectively prosecute this action would be severely limited by further execution of the state court case. This also amounts to irreparable harm. *Milsen v. Southland*, 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972).

In the Court's view, the public interest also requires issuance of a preliminary injunction. Few public policies are more important than protection of competition. In the instant case, as previously mentioned, the number of competitors in the vending machine market is declining. Thus the courts have a duty to vigilantly protect the remaining competition. The balance of equities also favors plaintiffs. Vendo's state judgment is protected by judgment liens and security agreements. Stoner and Stoner Investments, despite Vendo's protestations to the contrary, have substantially complied with these agreements. Vendo has already realized over \$582,000 from an escrow trust agreement. If it is ultimately successful here, its only loss will be certain interest payments which the Stoner interests concededly cannot pay. On the other hand, the Stoner interests and Lektro-Vend's losses arising from denial of the preliminary injunction will be severe, as demonstrated above. See *Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford*, 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).

### B.

Because they seek an injunction against state court proceedings, plaintiffs are faced with a special burden. The anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits issuance of an injunction to stay proceedings, in a state court except

under three conditions: (1) when expressly authorized by an act of Congress, (2) where necessary in aid of jurisdiction, and (3) to protect or effectuate federal judgments. Moreover, the principles of comity and federalism militate against unnecessarily interfering with pending state court actions even if § 2283 is satisfied. *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

There is a paucity of authority on the issue of whether the injunction provisions contained in 15 U.S.C. § 26 provide express congressional authorization to grant injunctions against state court actions. *United States v. Bayer*, 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) indicates that express authorization is provided while *Helpenbein v. International Ind., Inc.*, 498 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971) states no such authority exists. The Supreme Court's decision in *Mitchum v. Foster*, *supra*, seems to clarify the issue. In *Mitchum*, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, the Court held that to qualify under the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, a federal law need not contain an express reference to § 2283 nor expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding. To qualify as an expressly authorized exception the statute would, however, have to create

"a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 237.

These tests are equally applicable to antitrust actions. When Congress passed the various antitrust laws it clearly created federal rights and remedies enforceable in a federal equity court. In fact, such power was exclusively vested in the federal court system, indicating congressional approval of enjoining certain state actions, if necessary. *Cf. Lemelson v. Ampex*, 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1974). This Court therefore holds that these laws, in the instant case, can only be given their intended scope by staying the state court proceedings and that § 2283 authorizes an injunction here

where the state court proceedings are part of the anti-competitive scheme.

The Court also holds that § 2283 authorizes an injunction here because further collection efforts would eliminate two plaintiffs, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corp., as parties under the case or controversy provisions of Article III since they would necessarily be controlled by Vendo. Vendo's offer to place the Stoner Investment and Lektro-Vend stock under control of the Court does not meet this problem because as a matter of substance Vendo would control both plaintiff and defendant, requiring dismissal under Article III. Thus the injunction is also necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Court. Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of an injunction considering the peculiar nature of this case. The federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention.<sup>5</sup>

## C.

Since the Court has determined that a preliminary injunction should issue, the terms and conditions of the injunction must be determined. The first issue is what type of security must plaintiffs produce pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 65(c). The amount of security required is within the sound discretion of the court and is intended to protect against such cost and damages as may be incurred by any party wrongfully restrained or enjoined. However, there is no liability for damages resulting from issuance of an injunction erroneously granted unless the suit was prosecuted maliciously and without probable cause. See 7 *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 65.10 at p. 98 and cases cited therein.

<sup>5</sup> The findings contained herein are interlocutory in nature necessarily based on an incomplete record. Of course, a complete trial specifically directed to the issues in this case might produce evidence requiring a different or more limited result.

Because the plaintiffs have placed considerable evidence in the record demonstrating illegal anticompetitive behavior on the part of Vendo, it seems unlikely that Vendo will be able to prove any compensable damage arising from issuance of this injunction. Moreover, since this injunction will not remove the pre-existing judgment liens, Vendo remains well protected. Accordingly, a nominal bond of \$2,500.00 (Twenty Five Hundred Dollars) will be required. See *Scherr v. Volpe*, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); *Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg.*, 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954).

The remaining issue concerns the scope of the preliminary injunction. Such an injunction should protect plaintiffs from harm due to collection of the state court judgment while preserving the Stoner interests' assets so that Vendo will be able to collect on the judgment if it is ultimately successful. The Court believes that these two goals can be accomplished by enjoining further collection efforts but leaving intact those portions of the state decrees (and liens) which prevent transfer of any of the Stoner assets. As previously indicated, Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments will be required to pay all taxes, utilities and maintenance from currently collected income to preserve the assets. Plaintiffs shall prepare and present on notice a draft order in conformance with the views expressed herein within ten (10) days.

IT IS SO ORDERED

ENTERED:

/s/ R. W. McLAREN

United States District Judge

DATED: May 29, 1975



**APPENDIX E**

**Preliminary Injunction Order of the  
United States District Court for the  
Northern District of Illinois**

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION**

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware  
corporation, **HARRY B. STONER**  
and **STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs,

No. 65 C 1755

v.

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a  
Missouri corporation,

Defendant.

**ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

THIS CAUSE COMING ON FOR HEARING on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the Court having considered the pleadings, the record, the evidence and argument and the post-trial briefs submitted by the parties, and the Court having made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, as more particularly appear in its Memorandum Opinion and Order dated May 29, 1975; and

**IT APPEARING TO THE COURT:**

1. That the plaintiffs have demonstrated likelihood of ultimately prevailing on the merits of their claims under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as alleged in Count I of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint;

2. That the balance of equities favors plaintiffs in that the harm to defendant from the issuance of the preliminary

injunction will be slight, whereas denial thereof would result in severe loss to plaintiffs;

3. That plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted in that the continued action of the defendant in collecting its state court judgments, hereinafter enjoined: (a) will prevent LEKTRO-VEND from marketing a promising, newly-developed vending machine, and put insurmountable barriers in the way of its raising capital necessary to the prosecution of its business; (b) will effectively place STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and LEKTRO-VEND CORP. under the control of defendant, which would require dismissal of the action under Article III of the Constitution of the United States as to said plaintiffs; and (c) will severely limit the ability of the individual plaintiff effectively to prosecute this action;

4. That the public interest in protection of competition requires the issuance of a preliminary injunction; that the paramount national interest requires court intervention by a preliminary injunction herein; that the failure to issue such injunction will deprive the Court of full and effective jurisdiction of the said federal antitrust claims set forth in Count I of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint and will impair, obstruct, or render fruitless the Court's determination of said claims; and that a preliminary injunction as provided herein is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of this Court; and

The Court being sufficient advised in the premises, It Is ORDERED:

1. That the liens of those certain judgments in the amounts of \$170,835 and \$7,345,000, plus costs of suit, entered on August 13, 1971, in the cause entitled *The Vendo Co. v. Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.*, General No. 65-2134, in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, and the two Bonds and the Security Agreement In Connection With Appeal Bonds, which Bonds and Agreement were dated and were



approved December 14, 1971, by the Honorable John S. Peterson, Circuit Judge, and which were entered into in connection with said judgments, remain in full force and effect. A copy of said Security Agreement is attached hereto and marked Exhibit A, and the parties thereto shall abide by the terms thereof, except that where said Security Agreement requires or permits application to the Court, such application shall hereafter be made to this Court. In order to preserve said assets subject to said judgment liens while this injunction is in force, HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. shall pay all taxes on, and bills for utilities and maintenance of said assets, including insurance presently covering said assets, from currently collected income.

2. That the enforcement of those certain supplementary Proceedings to Discover Assets Citations which defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, has caused to be issued in connection with said state court judgments, namely:

<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Date Issued</u>
Chicago Title & Trust Co.	December 20, 1974
Stoner Investment, Inc.	January 3, 1975
Valley National Bank	January 3, 1975
Dreyer, Foote & Streit Assoc.	January 21, 1975
Harry B. Stoner	January , 1975
Clifford Zabka	January 21, 1975

be and they are hereby stayed, provided, however, that VENDO may apply to the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, from time to time, for periodic extensions of said Citations, in order to prevent the automatic termination thereof, as provided by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(f), and plaintiffs may not object to such applications. All assets of STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. attached as the result of said Citations are released to the extent that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. may collect all rent, interest, dividends, salaries, bank deposits, or other amounts due and owing

to them from the entities and persons named in said Citations.

3. Nothing in said Security Agreement shall preclude STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., in the ordinary course of business, from:

(a) collecting rents, interest, dividends and other income deriving from its assets for use as funds for payment of taxes, maintenance, insurance, and utilities so as to conserve and protect its assets;

(b) opening, maintaining, and using checking and savings accounts in any federally or state chartered bank in Illinois (STONER INVESTMENTS shall give notice to defendant of the establishment of any new account).

(c) paying all trade and other creditors' obligations incurred in the ordinary course of business;

(d) paying to its employees, excepting HARRY B. STONER, their ordinary salaries and wages;

(e) agreeing with any bank to completely cancel or subordinate any accounts receivable, notes or obligations which were in existence prior to January 14, 1975, including interest thereon, owing to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. by LEKTRO-VEND CORP., to any loans to LEKTRO-VEND CORP. by such bank or other lender.

4. Plaintiffs shall be authorized to pay their reasonable attorneys fees for services and expenses in this case, but plaintiffs may not make payments therefor prior to the rendering of such services or the incurring of such expenses, and this Court's approval shall be required before any such fees or expenses are paid.

5. This order shall not be construed to prevent defendant or its agents or attorneys from participating in any pending contempt proceedings in Kane County, Illinois Circuit Court, provided that such participation is required by that Court and that the Kane County Court determines to proceed *sua sponte* with that action.

6. Until otherwise ordered by this Court, the defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, its agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, are enjoined from taking any further steps to enforce or collect, or attempt to enforce or collect, or commence or prosecute any related or supplementary actions or proceedings with regard to those certain judgments in the amount of \$170,835 and \$7,345,500, plus costs of suit, entered on August 13, 1971, in the cause entitled *The Vendo Company v. Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.*, General No. 65-2134, in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois.

7. Plaintiffs shall not dissipate any assets which may be subject to the above-described judgments and they shall make no expenditures or investments out of the ordinary course without Court approval.

IT IS, THEREFORE, FURTHER ORDERED that upon filing by plaintiffs of an undertaking in the sum of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars (\$2,500.00), in the form of a surety bond, or bond secured by the deposit of that sum in cash with the Clerk of this Court, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by defendant if it is found to have been wrongfully enjoined, there issue out of this Court, under the seal thereof, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, restricting said defendant, its agents, servants, employees and attorneys and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from doing any of the facts prohibited herein, unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

ENTERED:

R. W. McLAREN  
United States District Judge

DATED: June 27, 1975

APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS  
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
FROM THE  
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL  
CIRCUIT, KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

THE VENDO COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

HARRY B. STONER and  
STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 65. C-2134

SECURITY AGREEMENT  
IN CONNECTION WITH  
APPEAL BONDS

AGREEMENT between HARRY B. STONER, ANN M. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

WHEREAS, on August 13, 1971, the Court entered judgments in this case against the defendant, HARRY B. STONER, individually, and against defendants HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.; and,

WHEREAS, Notice of Appeal from said judgments was filed in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, on November 3, 1971; and,

WHEREAS, HARRY B. STONER, individually and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. have executed appeal bonds in connection with their appeal of said judgments; and,

WHEREAS, said Defendants-Appellants are unable to provide a surety company bond or schedule real or personal property as security for said bonds, yet are of the opinion

that they have good and meritorious grounds for appeal of said judgments; and,

WHEREAS, it is to the mutual benefit of the parties that this Security Agreement be executed by the Appellants to secure the Appellee and in order to permit the prosecution of said appeal without undue burden on the Appellants and without unduly jeopardizing the rights of Appellee to collect said judgments, if they are affirmed.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED between HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER, as shareholders, directors and officers of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., and by STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.:

1. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER represent that they are the sole stockholders of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., holding 245 shares and 155 shares, respectively, which shares are all of the stock issued and outstanding of an authorized issue of 1,000 shares; that HARRY B. STONER is President and ANN M. STONER is Assistant Secretary of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and, together, they comprise two of the three member Board of Directors.

2. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER represent they are duly authorized to execute this Agreement for and on behalf of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.; that the balance sheet for the year ended December 31, 1968 and the balance sheet as of September 30, 1971, attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, fairly reflect the financial condition of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. as of the dates stated. No material adverse change has since occurred.

3. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER hereby represent that STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. has made no investments in, advances to or guarantees of the obligations of any company, individual, or other entity, except those disclosed in said balance sheets.

4. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER agree that as a condition of the Court's approval of the said Appeal Bonds

signed by said STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and HARRY B. STONER that during the term of said bonds, less otherwise permitted by order of court, upon notice to plaintiff, and for good cause shown:

(a) They will continue to act in their said capacity as officers and directors of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

(b) Will not transfer or sell any of said shares of stock now owned by them; and

(c) Will not permit the issuance of any additional stock of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., or an increase in the membership of its Board of Directors.

5. STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., during the term of said bond, except as permitted by order of court, upon notice to plaintiff, and for good cause shown, will not:

(a) Sell or dispose of any of its assets below the fair value thereof.

(b) Purchase any shares of its stock.

(c) Declare or pay any dividends, except as required by good business or in order to prevent possible adverse tax consequences, if a dividend were not declared.

(d) Become a party to any merger or consolidation with any other company.

(e) Increase the aggregate compensation of its officers or directors in any fiscal year more than ten per cent (10%) above the compensation paid during the preceding fiscal year; and

(f) Make any material change in the management of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. or conduct its business other than in a good and businesslike manner.

6. Promptly after approval of this Security Agreement and the appeal bonds to which it is related, by the Circuit



Court of Kane County or by the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District or by the Supreme Court of Illinois, STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. will cause the trustees of all the land trusts of which STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. is the beneficial owner, to convey all the lands held by such trusts to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and the lien of said judgments will attach thereto.

7. STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. will enter into an Escrow Agreement with The Chicago Title and Trust Company, satisfactory to that company, which will provide for the deposit with The Chicago Title and Trust Company of the net proceeds of the sale of real estate sold by STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., or by any land trust of which STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. is the beneficial owner, which proceeds may be invested by The Chicago Title and Trust Company and which investments shall be held by Chicago Title and Trust Company and the income thereon accrued and added to the fund. The Escrow Agreement shall also provide that a portion of the net proceeds (not to exceed, in any one year, the lesser of (a) \$15,000, or, (b) the net proceeds deposited in that year), of sales of real estate so deposited are to be paid by The Chicago Title and Trust Company to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. to reimburse STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. for real property taxes, interest, penalties and costs levied and paid on unimproved property held directly or indirectly by STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

8. Defendants have made a disclosure of the terms of a certain lease entered into between Merchants National Bank, as Trustee under Trust No. 1824, and Stoner Shopping Center, Inc., dated May 1, 1971, by furnishing VENDO with a copy thereof, but nothing in this Security Agreement shall be construed as denying VENDO the right to claim that Defendants have a property interest in Stoner Shopping Center, Inc.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed this Agreement as of the 14th day of December, 1971, to become

effective upon the approval thereof by the Circuit Court of Kane County.

HARRY B. STONER  
Harry B. Stoner

ANN M. STONER  
Ann M. Stoner

STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

Attest: By HARRY B. STONER,  
Harry B. Stoner,  
*President*

ANN M. STONER  
Ann M. Stoner  
*Asst. Secretary*

Taken and approved by me this 14th day of December, 1971.

JOHN B. PETERSEN  
*Circuit Judge*

OCT 28 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

APPENDIX

IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-156

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
Petitioner,  
vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
a Delaware corporation,  
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court  
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FILED AUGUST 4, 1976  
CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 4, 1976

IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

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No. 78-156

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**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
Petitioner,

vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER** and **STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
a Delaware corporation,  
Respondents.

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On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court  
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

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**CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT  
DOCKET ENTRIES**

October 21, 1965

Filed complaint and one copy.

December 28, 1965

Filed defendant's motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement.

December 28, 1965

Filed suggestions in support of defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definite statement.

January 31, 1966

Filed plaintiffs' memorandum in response to defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

February 11, 1966

Filed reply to plaintiffs' suggestions in opposition to motion to dismiss.

April 7, 1966

Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint herein or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement considered and denied. Defendant is directed to answer complaint on or before twenty (20) days from date of this order.

November 23, 1970

Filed motion of plaintiffs for summary judgment.

November 23, 1970

Filed brief of plaintiffs in support of their motion for a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

January 15, 1971

Filed brief in answer to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment; exhibits.

February 5, 1971

Filed reply brief of plaintiffs in support of their motion for summary judgment.



February 2, 1971

Filed defendant's motion for summary judgment, with affidavit of Lambert M. Ochsenchlager and exhibits attached.

February 12, 1971

Filed brief in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment.

March 29, 1971

Filed brief of plaintiffs in opposition to motion of defendant for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

April 12, 1971

Filed reply brief of defendant in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment.

June 1, 1971

Pursuant to memorandum opinion and order entered this day, the motions of plaintiffs and defendant for summary judgment are hereby denied. The parties are ordered to brief the issue of whether plaintiff is now precluded from asserting his federal anti-trust claim in the federal court by the doctrine of res judicata on the briefing schedule set out in the memorandum opinion.

June 22, 1971

Filed defendant's memorandum.

July 1, 1971

Filed plaintiff's reply memorandum in opposition to the contention that they are precluded from asserting their federal anti-trust claim by the doctrine of res judicata.

July 27, 1971

Filed motion for leave to file instant its reply brief by defendant; stipulation; and reply brief of defendant regarding the preclusion of the plaintiffs from asserting their federal anti-trust claim by the doctrine of res judicata.

October 21, 1971

Filed Judge's Memorandum opinion.

March 10, 1972

Enter order defendant's motion to vacate order continuing status call to June 16, 1972 for a pretrial hearing, and for oral arguments and decision on the motions pending before the court is hereby denied.

June 28, 1973

It is ordered that this cause is hereby set for a pretrial conference on August 10, 1973 at 10:30 a.m. in the chambers of Judge McLaren, Room 1978.

August 10, 1973

Pretrial conference held. Cause is set for a further pretrial conference on October 19, 1973 at 9:30 a.m. at which time the parties are to submit a memorandum scheduling remaining discovery and setting a cut-off date thereon.

October 19, 1973

Pretrial conference held. Cause is continued to December 19, 1973 at 10:00 a.m. for a further report on status.

October 1, 1974

Enter order dated 10-1-74: Cause is continued to November 7, 1974 for a pretrial conference at 1:30 p.m. in the chambers of Judge McLaren, Room 1978.

November 1, 1974

Enter order dated 10-31-74: On the Court's own motion, it is ordered that this cause is hereby reset from November 7, 1974 to December 5, 1974 at 9:30 a.m. in the chambers of Judge McLaren, Room 1978, for a pretrial conference.

December 9, 1974

Enter order dated December 5, 1974: Pretrial conference held. The plaintiff is granted to January 21, 1975 (45 days) in which to amend complaint. The defendants are granted to February 20, 1975, (30 days) in which to file their answer or otherwise plead. Parties

are to serve a memorandum as to remaining discovery upon each other. Cause is set for a further pretrial conference on March 3, 1974 at 9:30 a.m.

January 2, 1975

Filed amended and supplemental complaint and one copy.

January 20, 1975

Filed memorandum of further discovery to be conducted by plaintiffs.

January 29, 1975

Filed plaintiffs' H. B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc. motion for preliminary injunction.

January 29, 1975

Filed affidavit of Harry B. Stoner.

January 29, 1975

Filed additional affidavit of James E. S. Baker.

January 29, 1975

Filed counter-affidavit of L. M. Ochsenchlager to additional affidavit of James E. S. Baker.

February 6, 1975

Filed defendant Vendo Co.'s answer to Amended and Supplemental Complaint.

May 29, 1975

Filed defendant-appellant's notice of appeal.

May 30, 1975

Enter order dated May 29, 1975. The court does this day hereby enter its memorandum opinion order. The plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is granted.

June 17, 1975

Filed defendant's additional memorandum regarding proposed injunction order and suggestion of proposed consent decree.

June 30, 1975

Enter order dated June 27, 1975. The motion for preliminary injunction is hereby granted.

July 16, 1975

Filed second notice of appeal on behalf of defendant-appellant.

May 28, 1976

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

May 28, 1976

Order and judgment of United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

June 11, 1976

Filed defendant-appellant's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc.

July 16, 1976

Order of United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on rehearing.

August 4, 1976

Filed Petitioner The Vendo Company's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

October 4, 1976

Order of United States Supreme Court granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

**Complaint in Vendo Co. v. Stoner (state court suit)**

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 16TH  
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

**No. 65-2134**

**THE VENDO COMPANY, a foreign corporation,**  
Plaintiff,

vs.

**HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,**  
a foreign corporation,  
Defendants.

**COMPLAINT**

(Filed August 10, 1965)

**COUNT I**

Now comes the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a foreign corporation, by Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy and Hupp, its attorneys, and for Count I of its Complaint against the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, alleges as follows:

1. That the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, is a resident of the City of Aurora, Kane County, Illinois.
2. That for many years prior to April 3, 1959, the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, was the chief executive officer and principal stockholder of Stoner Manufacturing Company, an Illinois corporation; that the aforesaid corporation was engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines in the City of Aurora, Kane County, Illinois; that by reason of mergers and changes of name the Stoner Manufacturing Company, of which the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, was the chief executive officer, has been succeeded by and is now known as Stoner Investments, Inc., a foreign corporation; that hereafter said company shall be referred to herein as Stoner Investments, Inc.

3. That on April 3, 1959, the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, and the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., entered into a contract by which the plaintiff purchased the assets of Stoner Investments, Inc., including the good will incident thereto.

4. That said contract provided in part, (the word "Company" meaning the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc.):

"From and after the closing, the Company will not own, directly or indirectly, manage, operate, join, control or participate in the ownership, management, operation or control of, or be connected in any manner with, any business engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines under any name similar to the Company's present name, and, for a period of ten (10) years after the closing, the Company will not in any manner, directly or indirectly, enter into or engage in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo or any affiliate or subsidiary is so engaged, in the manufacture and sale of vending machines or any business similar to that now being conducted by the Company. The Company also agrees that during its corporate existence it will, without incurring any financial obligation, cooperate with Vendo to prevent the use by others of the names 'Stoner' and 'Stoner Mfg. Corp.' in connection with any business similar to that now carried on by the Company and also agrees not to disclose to others, or make use of, directly or indirectly, any formulae or process now owned or used by the Company."

5. That incident to the aforesaid transaction plaintiff entered into a contract with Harry B. Stoner on June 1, 1959, whereby Stoner was employed by the plaintiff for a period of five (5) years from the date of the contract; that the aforesaid contract provided in part as follows:

"During the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following the termination of his employment hereunder, whether by lapse of time or



by termination as hereinafter provided, Stoner shall not directly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities, enter into or engage in the vending machine manufacturing business or any branch thereof, either as an individual on his own account, or as a partner or joint venturer, or as an employee, agent or salesman for any person, firm or corporation or as an officer or director of a corporation or otherwise, provided however that the Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates shall be excluded from the restrictions hereof and provided also that Stoner shall be permitted to own, hold, acquire and dispose of stocks and other securities which are traded in the investment security market whether on listed exchanges or over the counter."

6. That the plaintiff has fully performed on its part all of its obligations and duties pursuant to the aforesaid contract.

7. That the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, both during the term of his employment by the plaintiff and thereafter, but within the five (5) year period specified in the contract, violated and breached his duties and obligations thereunder in that he has both directly and indirectly entered into the vending machine manufacturing business individually, as a partner, officer, stockholder, or joint venturer, in the Lektro-Vend Corp., a foreign corporation; that plaintiff is unaware of the exact nature and extent of defendant Stoner's interest therein.

8. That the aforesaid corporation engages in the manufacture of vending machines in competition with the plaintiff, and in territories in which the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates have been, or are, conducting business at all times material herein.

9. That unless restrained by an Injunction of this Court, the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, will continue at his engagement in the aforesaid enterprises and cause continuing irreparable damages to the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, and will cause the plaintiff irreparable damages in the future.

10. That the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, has been damaged by the defendant, Harry B. Stoner's breach in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$500,000.00), together with the costs of this suit.

Wherefore, the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, prays as follows:

1. That it have judgment against the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$500,000.00), together with the costs of this suit.

2. That the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, be restrained by an Order of this Court during the pendency of the litigation, and thereafter by an Order of Injunction, restraining him from engaging in the vending machine manufacturing business, or any branch thereof, and particularly from participating in the operations of Lektro-Vend Corporation, a foreign corporation, as partner, stockholder, joint venturer, employee, agent, salesman, officer, or director.

## COUNT II

Now comes the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a foreign corporation, by Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy and Hupp, its attorneys, and for its Complaint against the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., a foreign corporation, alleges as follows:

1-6. For paragraphs 1 through 6, inclusive, of Count II, plaintiff repeats and realleges, and incorporates herein, paragraphs 1 through 6, inclusive, of Count I of its Complaint.

7. That the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, is still the chief executive officer and principal stockholder of Stoner Investments, Inc.

8. That the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., in violation of its obligations and duties pursuant to the aforesaid contract, has indirectly engaged and participated in the ownership, management, operation and control of the business of the manufacture and sale of vending machines by consenting to and actively permitting its facilities, officers, agents and employees to be used by said Lektro-Vend Corporation in the sale and manufacturing of vending machines in competition with the plaintiff, The Vendo Company.

9. That the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., has consented to and actively permitted the engagement of its chief executive officer and principal stockholder, Harry B. Stoner, in the vending machine manufacture and sale contrary to its duties and obligations pursuant to the aforesaid contract.

10. That the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., has allowed and encouraged the use of the name "Stoner" in connection with a business similar to that carried on by the plaintiff, to-wit, the manufacturing and sale of vending machines, in violation of its duties and obligations pursuant to the aforesaid contract.

11. That by virtue of the aforesaid breaches of contract by the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., the plaintiff has been deprived of its contractual benefits and of the good will attendant upon the aforesaid sale of assets.

All to the damage of the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$500,000.00), together with the costs of this suit.

Wherefore, the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a foreign corporation, demands judgment against the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., a foreign corporation, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$500,000.00), together with the costs of this suit.

/s/ REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER, MURPHY & HUPP  
Attorneys for Plaintiff

**Docket Entries in The Vendo Co. v. Stoner,  
et al., No. 65 C 1364, United States District  
Court for the Northern District of  
Illinois, Eastern Division**

**(Attempted Removal of State Case to Federal Court)**

August 16, 1965

Filed Petition for removal, Copy of complaint and summons from Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit Kane County, Illinois No. 65 C 2134

Filed Affidavit re General Rule 39

Filed Designation

Filed Notice by Defendant

Filed Removal Bond

August 20, 1965

Filed Objections to Petition for removal and petition for remand

September 2, 1965

Filed Reply of defendants to Plaintiff's Objections to Removal

September 2, 1965

Filed Answer, Separate Defenses and Counterclaims of defendants.

September 3, 1965

Filed Notice of Deposition of The Vendo Co. Plaintiff

September 9, 1965

Filed Reply to defendants reply to plaintiffs objections to removal (To Judge Will)

September 9, 1965

Filed Motion to strike notice of deposition by plttf.

September 22, 1965

Filed Stipulation

September 22, 1965

By stipulation order time for filing any responsive pleadings or other documents, by any party hereto, extended until 20 days following the entry of an order on plaintiffs petition for remand—DRAFT Will, J. Mld.Ntes. September 24, 1965

September 23, 1965

Plaintiffs' petition for remand granted. Order cause remanded to the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois—Will. J. Mld. Ntes. September 24, 1965

September 27, 1965

Letter mailed to Clerk of Circuit Court, Geneva, Ill.

**Reply to Plaintiff's Objections to Removal  
in Vendo Co. v. Stoner, *et al.* (state court suit)**  
(Filed September 2, 1965)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

In reply to the Objections to Petition for Removal and Petition for Remand filed by Plaintiff herein, there is no question that the requisite jurisdictional amount exists in this controversy and that there is diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Defendants. As Plaintiff is well aware, the filing of the subject lawsuit by Plaintiff again raises the question as to the propriety of Plaintiff's commercial conduct under the antitrust laws of the United States and the validity thereunder of the non-competition covenants sought to be enforced in such suit.

Since the antitrust laws of the United States will be involved, both in the way of defense to Plaintiff's action and as a separate cause of action on behalf of Defendants against Plaintiff, the suit was removed to this forum in an effort to avoid a needless duplication of lawsuits between the parties.

The objection raised by Plaintiff as to the application of Section 1441(b) is not jurisdictional. In an action removed from the state court, where diversity exists and the requisite jurisdictional amount is involved, the objection based on the second sentence of Section 1441(b) is an objection that may be waived without adversely affecting this Court's jurisdiction.

If Plaintiff, upon reflection, would prefer one lawsuit in this Court, rather than separate actions in both State and Federal Courts, it may waive its objections, and this action may proceed here. If Plaintiff is not willing to waive its objection based on Section 1441(b), and the Court orders the removal of this case, then Defendants will be



forced, by separate action, to enforce their rights under the antitrust laws of the United States.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES E. S. BAKER

James E. S. Baker

ROBERT A. DOWNING

Robert A. Downing

Of Counsel:

Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Smith  
11 South LaSalle Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60603  
STate 2-5400

[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OMITTED  
IN PRINTING]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware  
corporation, **HARRY B. STONER**,  
and **STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a  
Missouri corporation,

Defendant.

No. 65 C 1755

**COMPLAINT**

(Filed October 21, 1965)

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, JAMES E. S. BAKER and ROBERT A. DOWNING, complaining of defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, allege as follows:

1. These proceedings are instituted and the jurisdiction of this Court is based upon Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C., 15 and 26) and Section 1337 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. 1337) against defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY (hereinafter called "VENDO"), for violations as hereinafter alleged of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 and 2).

2. VENDO transacts business within the Northern District of Illinois.

3. Plaintiff, HARRY B. STONER (hereinafter called "STONER"), is an individual, resident of Aurora, Illinois. He has been in the business of designing and manufacturing vending machines in Aurora, Illinois for more than 25 years. Prior to 1959, he was the President and one of the principal owners of STONER MFG. CORP. (hereinafter called

"STONER MFG."), which company was an Illinois corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines. In 1959, said STONER MFG. sold substantially all of its operating assets to VENDO pursuant to a contract of sale, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A.

4. Plaintiff, STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation, (hereinafter called "STONER INVESTMENTS"), is a successor to the Illinois corporation, which prior to May, 1959, was named STONER MFG. CORP., which Illinois corporation was a party to the contract of sale (Exhibit A), which Illinois corporation, upon the sale of its principal assets to VENDO, in 1959, changed its name to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. In July, 1964, STONER INVESTMENTS purchased approximately 25% of the common stock of LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware corporation (hereinafter called "LEKTRO-VEND").

5. Plaintiff, LEKTRO-VEND, is and since September 1, 1963, has been a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Aurora, Illinois. This business was originally started as a sole proprietorship under the name and style R. W. PHILLIPS COMPANY in November, 1960 and later did business under the name and style LEKTRO-VEND MANUFACTURING COMPANY. Prior to incorporation the business was primarily that of research and design in the vending machine business. In and prior to November, 1962, as a result of the extensive research, a new, novel and improved vending machine was designed and developed. LEKTRO-VEND has been engaged in the continued improvement of its new machine and in the design, development, manufacture and sale of automatic merchandising equipment (vending machines), particularly vending machines for candy, cookies and crackers, packaged gum, pastry, potato chips, pretzels, and other multi-purpose food vending equipment. It is in competition with VENDO.

6. Defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri. It proclaims itself to be and it is the world's largest manufacturer of automatic merchandising equipment (vending machines). VENDO has manufacturing plants in Kansas City, Missouri; Aurora, Illinois; Pinedale, California; and Westbury, New York. VENDO has subsidiaries or affiliates in Mexico, Germany, Japan, Australia, Italy, France, Canada, and Belgium. VENDO sells such machines so produced in all 50 states and in more than 60 countries and territories. VENDO maintains offices for such sales in Los Angeles, California; Dallas, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey; Toronto, Ontario; Duesseldorf, West Germany; Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Sydney, Australia; Brussels, Belgium; Johannesburg, South Africa. VENDO has regional managers or representatives in California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

7. At the present time, VENDO has control of over 40% of the entire business of the manufacture of vending machines in the United States. VENDO has control of between 50% and 100% of the manufacture of vending machines for the vending of candy, pastry, milk and ice cream, and of multi-purpose (refrigerated and non-refrigerated) food vending machines, which is the field in which LEKTRO-VEND has attempted to compete with VENDO. In 1964, VENDO's sales of vending machines for hot and cold food, coffee, milk, ice cream, candy, pastries, and cigarettes exceeded \$28,000,000, an increase of approximately 15% over the preceding year and more than double the comparable sales for the year 1959. In the year 1964, the sales of the above-named products accounted for in excess of 40% of the total sales of VENDO. In 1964, sales of vending machines for

confections and foods of all manufacturing companies totaled approximately \$31,915,000.

8. VENDO has monopolized, and attempted to monopolize, the trade and commerce in the State of Illinois, among the several states and with foreign countries, in the business of manufacturing and selling vending machines, and has acquired as the result of its unlawful activities, control over so substantial a portion of such trade and commerce as to obtain the power to remove or to exclude competitors from the field. VENDO now possesses such power and has possessed such power for a number of years and has demonstrated its intent to remove or exclude competitors from the vending machine manufacturing business. For purposes of this complaint, the relevant geographic markets or parts of commerce and trade are:

- (1) the entire United States;
- (2) each of the six regional sales markets of VENDO, which are its Eastern, Southern, Central, Midwestern, Southwestern and Western Divisions;
- (3) commerce with Canada;
- (4) commerce with other countries than Canada;
- (5) the State of Illinois; where the STONER MFG. division is located.

For the purposes of this complaint, the relevant products or parts of trade or commerce are:

- (1) vending machines for food, beverages, confections and cigarettes;
- (2) vending machines for food, beverages and confections;
- (3) vending machines for food and confections;
- (4) vending machines for candy bars, excluding bulk vending equipment;

- (5) vending machines for packaged chewing gum;
- (6) vending machines for pastries, such as vending machines for sweet rolls, cupcakes and doughnuts;
- (7) vending machines for hot canned foods and soups;
- (8) vending machines for snacks, excluding candy bar vendors, such as machines for sale of cookies, crackers, biscuits, popcorn, ice cream, potato chips, pretzels, corn chips, or cheese sticks;
- (9) Multi-purpose, refrigerated and non-refrigerated vending machines for food, such as machines for sale of sandwiches and salads;
- (10) vending machines for confections, such as machines for candy, gum, mints, potato chips, corn chips, cheese sticks, pastry, sweet rolls, pies, cupcakes, doughnuts;
- (11) vending machines for coffee;
- (12) vending machines for soft drinks;
- (13) other vending machines for beverages, such as machines for sale of milk, hot chocolate and/or hot soup (except canned soup) not sold in a combination machine with coffee.

9. VENDO has engaged in numerous overt acts in an effort to establish, maintain, use and increase its monopoly power over the trade and commerce of vending machines in the State of Illinois, the several states and foreign countries. The intent of these acts is and has been to eliminate the competition of LEKTRO-VEND and other companies and to deter potential competitors from entering the field. These overt acts referred to above are alleged in succeeding paragraphs of this complaint.

10. On or about September 18, 1956, pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO acquired all the outstanding



capital stock, assets and business of VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a California corporation, including its patents and good will, in exchange for 267,464 shares of common stock of VENDO. Prior to the said acquisition, VENDO and the VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY were competitors in the production and sale of coin operated vending machines built to dispense bottled soft drinks in the United States. VENDO is, and prior to the said acquisition was, the largest manufacturer of coin operated vending machines built to dispense bottled soft drinks in the United States. The combined sales of VENDO and the VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY from 1955 to the present have accounted for and now account for in excess of 40% of the market involved. The VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY is now a division of VENDO. In 1964 the sales of beverage vending machines by VENDO exceeded \$28,000,000. The above alleged acts of VENDO demonstrate an intent to obtain and increase its monopoly power and to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing business.

11. Since the fall of 1958, and continuing to the present date, pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO has engaged in and actively participated in a conspiracy to steal valuable trade secrets from a company now named NATIONAL REJECTORS, INC., a subsidiary of the UNIVERSAL MATCH CORPORATION. UNIVERSAL MATCH CORPORATION is a principal competitor of VENDO. NATIONAL REJECTORS, INC. manufactures slug rejectors, a device used in all or substantially all coin operated machines, to detect, separate, and reject spurious coins and accept legitimate coins. Prior to VENDO's participation in the conspiracy, VENDO was the largest customer of NATIONAL REJECTORS, INC. On or about October 1, 1959, VENDO executed a contract with COIN ACCEPTORS, INC., a Missouri corporation, in which it was agreed that certain employees of COIN ACCEPTORS, INC. would design coin handling devices and VENDO would manufacture them. VENDO also obtained an option to purchase 50% of the COIN ACCEPTORS, INC. stock for a price of

\$200,000. When VENDO entered into the aforesaid contract, it knew that the principal officers, employees and shareholders of COIN ACCEPTORS, INC. were or had been former employees of NATIONAL REJECTORS, INC. and knew that these employees had stolen the valuable trade secrets of NATIONAL REJECTORS, INC. The various agreements, contracts and understandings between VENDO and COIN ACCEPTORS, INC. are in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in that they unreasonably restrain trade and constitute an attempt to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing industry, consistent with its intent and purpose as hereinbefore alleged. The aforesaid conspiracy further demonstrates VENDO's intent and purpose to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing industry and to eliminate competitors.

12. On or about April 3, 1959, pursuant to its plan and intent to monopolize, VENDO acquired substantially all of the assets of the STONER MFG. STONER INVESTMENTS is a corporate successor to STONER MFG. Unknown to the plaintiffs, HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, one of the reasons for the acquisition of the assets of the STONER MFG. was to utilize the facilities of the STONER MFG. for the manufacture of coin rejectors, pursuant to the illegal conspiracy between VENDO and COIN ACCEPTORS, INC. which has been alleged in the previous paragraph of this complaint. The facilities of STONER MFG. are now operated as a division of VENDO. STONER MFG. at the time of the acquisition of its operating assets by VENDO, was one of the leading manufacturers of vending machines for the sale of candy, pastry, cigarettes, coffee, hot food and other similar items. STONER MFG. division of VENDO has continued to manufacture such machines. Largely as a result of these monopolistic activities, VENDO now maintains control of between 50 and 100% of the manufacture of vending machines for the vending of candy, pastry, milk and ice cream and of multi-purpose (refrigerated and non-refrigerated) food vending machines, which is the field in which LEKTRO-VEND has attempted to compete with VENDO. This acquisi-

tion was made pursuant to VENDO's plan and scheme to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing business.

13. The contract of sale between VENDO and STONER MFG., Exhibit A attached hereto, contains an agreement that STONER MFG. would not directly or indirectly compete with VENDO in the United States or any foreign country in which VENDO or any affiliate or subsidiary is operating for a period of 10 years from the date of closing. The full text of the non-competition covenant is set forth in section 15 of the agreement. The said non-competition covenant constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, and the making and entering into of said non-competition covenant is an overt act of VENDO in monopolization and constitutes an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce among the several states and foreign countries in the manufacture of such vending machines. Said non-competition covenant is not reasonably related to the sale of assets referred to.

14. On or about June 1, 1959, a contract was executed between HARRY B. STONER and VENDO. The contract purported to employ the said STONER for a period of five years at a salary of \$50,000 per year. The agreement also provided that for a period of five years after the termination of the purported employment, STONER would not enter into or engage directly or indirectly in the vending machine manufacturing business in any of the territories in which VENDO or its subsidiaries or affiliates was conducting business or in which STONER knew VENDO may in the future conduct business. Section 5 of the contract, attached hereto as Exhibit B, contains the non-competition provision. The said non-competition covenant is an unreasonable restraint of trade in that it is not reasonably limited as to time or geographical extent. The said purported employment and election of STONER as a director of VENDO and as an officer of the STONER MFG. Co. division were devices of VENDO to prevent the said STONER from engaging in competition with the defendant, and for no other reason. During the term of such purported employment, the said STONER was neither

assigned nor permitted to perform any duties or responsibilities of an executive or advisory nature. He was informed that his employment by VENDO was a means or device to put him "on the shelf." During the term of said purported employment contract STONER did not learn and was not permitted to learn any trade secrets, know-how or other details of the business which would be of any value to a competitor or in the operation of a competitive business. In 1964, STONER was not re-elected as a director of VENDO and the relationship was terminated in June, 1964. The said non-competition covenant constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, and the making and entering into of the non-competition covenant is an overt act of VENDO in monopolization and constitutes an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce in the State of Illinois, among the several states and with foreign countries in the manufacture of vending machines, particularly food vending equipment.

15. In the period immediately preceding the negotiations for the sale of STONER MFG., STONER was seriously ill and unable to participate actively in the business. His physical condition was such that he could not be certain that he would ever be able to return to active business. In order to assure continued success of the business and to protect the interests of his family and other shareholders of STONER MFG., it was necessary for him to sell the assets of STONER MFG. In the negotiations, VENDO originally proposed a five-year covenant not to compete but during the final stages of negotiation, VENDO insisted that STONER MFG. agree not to compete with VENDO in any area where VENDO was doing business or intended to do business for a period of ten years. VENDO also insisted that STONER individually enter into an employment contract, containing a similar ten-year covenant not to compete. Because of the compelling necessity to STONER of completing the sale, STONER and STONER MFG. were forced to accede to VENDO's demands. The primary purpose of said employment contract, Exhibit B, was to prohibit the said STONER from competing with VENDO not only while payments were made



thereunder but for five years thereafter, which purpose was concealed from STONER at the time said contract was executed and for a substantial period thereafter. In fact, representations were made to STONER after said contract was executed assuring him that VENDO would not attempt to prevent him from entering into a competitive business, which representations were calculated to conceal VENDO's true intent from STONER and others. Said representations were relied upon by STONER. STONER, in or about December, 1962, and on other occasions, requested VENDO to release him from the illegal covenant not to compete, which release was refused by VENDO. On each such occasion, STONER informed VENDO that said covenant not to compete was invalid and unenforcible. Non-competition agreements world wide in geographic scope and for extended periods of time, are and have been weapons in VendO's arsenal of power and have been used to limit and eliminate competition and to extend and perpetuate its monopoly.

16. Since leaving VENDO in June, 1964, STONER has, without compensation, devoted some time and effort to assist LEKTRO-VEND, particularly in the area of the research and development of vending machines designed for use in the vending of candy bars, mints, and gum, which LEKTRO-VEND has sought to market in the State of Illinois and elsewhere under its name. STONER INVESTMENTS purchased approximately 25% of the common stock of LEKTRO-VEND in July, 1964.

17. On or about August 10, 1965, VENDO filed suit in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS. The full text of the complaint is attached to this complaint as Exhibit C. The complaint alleges that STONER had breached his agreement not to compete of June 1, 1959 and that STONER INVESTMENTS had breached that portion of the April 3, 1959 contract of sale which sought to eliminate competition for 10 years throughout the world. As has been previously alleged, the world-wide non-competition covenants contained

in the said contracts are illegal and in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The purpose of the said law suit is to unlawfully harass STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS and to eliminate the competition of STONER, STONER INVESTMENTS and LEKTRO-VEND. The lawsuit is part of VENDO's plan to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing business. The threats to enforce such non-competition covenants and the bringing of a suit in an attempt to enforce the illegal covenants are overt acts of VENDO in monopolization and constitute an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce in the State of Illinois among the several states and foreign countries in the manufacture of such vending machines. LEKTRO-VEND, STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS have been injured in their business and property as a direct and proximate result of these overt acts of VENDO.

18. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization within the past year, VENDO's sales representatives and employees have spread false and malicious rumors to the effect that LEKTRO-VEND was in financial difficulties, was unable to perform its contracts for the manufacture and sale of vending machines or to service such machines after delivery and was actually insolvent and on the verge of bankruptcy, and by other means of unlawful trade interference and unfair competition. LEKTRO-VEND's sales of vending machines substantially decreased as a proximate result of the false statements made by VENDO's employees and by other types of unlawful harassment. The purpose and intent of the VENDO's activities is and has been to eliminate competition in the manufacture of vending machines and, specifically, to eliminate the competition of LEKTRO-VEND.

19. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization and with the intent to monopolize, VENDO has threatened to sue and has sued competitors for alleged violations of contracts and alleged patent infringement. In great part these threats and suits have been without merit and solely for the purpose of harassment. The purpose and intent of the threats



to initiate expensive and time-consuming litigation with regard to certain narrow and weak patents held by VENDO and to enforce illegal non-competition covenants is and has been to eliminate competition and drive competitors out of business.

20. Pursuant to its plan to monopolize and with the intent to monopolize, on or about July 31, 1964, VENDO's wholly owned subsidiary, VENDO MANUFACTURING CORP. of New York, a New York corporation, organized on July 30, 1964, acquired all of the vending machine manufacturing assets and patents of CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP., an Indiana corporation, and CONTINENTAL APCO, INC., a New York corporation, and wholly owned subsidiary of CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP. The manufacturing facilities of the CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP. were at the time of purchase and are sufficient to assemble various types of automatic coin operated vending machines which dispense soft drinks, coffee, cigarettes, and ice cream. The trustees in bankruptcy from whom such assets were purchased were prepared to sell the assets to the KELSEY-HAYES CORP. a Delaware corporation, which is a major manufacturer of automobile and aircraft parts. In order to prevent KELSEY-HAYES CORP. or any other corporation from entering into competition with it, VENDO, to extend its monopoly and eliminate competition, outbid the prospective purchaser, thereby avoiding the entry of an additional competitor into the market.

21. Largely as a result of VENDO's unlawful monopolistic activities and practices as previously alleged, its net profit has increased from approximately \$840,000 in 1955 to \$3,500,000 in 1964. During the same period, VENDO's net sales increased from approximately \$20,800,000 to \$63,540,000, and its total assets increased from approximately \$10,950,000 to \$50,460,000. During the first six months of 1965, the VENDO's total sales were \$38,869,153, a 35% increase over the same six month period for the prior year. During the first six months of 1965, earnings

were \$2,456,150, an increase of 66% over the same period from the prior year. Sales made by the CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP. division made a substantial contribution to such sales and earnings. In or about July, 1965, VENDO put in effect a broad-based price increase, averaging around 10%. The purpose and intent of the aforesaid monopolistic practices is and has been to acquire sufficient economic power to exclude competitors from trade and commerce among the several states and foreign countries, to eliminate competition in the State of Illinois, and to deter potential competitors from beginning the manufacture of vending machines in the State of Illinois and elsewhere.

22. Largely as a proximate result of VENDO's unlawful monopolistic activities and practices and its attempts to monopolize the manufacture and sale of vending machines as previously alleged, VENDO has made it substantially more difficult to enter the vending machine manufacturing business and competition has substantially lessened, and eliminated in some instances, and there has been a dangerous probability of a monopoly in the manufacture of vending machines. In 1958, there were approximately 120 vending machine manufacturers. In 1963, this was substantially reduced to 76 such manufacturers, and in 1964, the number of manufacturers had been further reduced to 66. Of these 66 companies, 47 had sales in excess of \$100,000. In 1964, approximately 31 companies manufactured vending machines for confections and food, but only 16 of them had sales in excess of \$100,000. In 1964, twelve companies manufactured vending machines for candy bars; eight of these had sales in excess of \$100,000. LEKTRO-VEND has been seriously injured as a proximate result of VENDO's unlawful monopolistic practices, activities, and its exercise and attempted exercise of its monopoly power.

23. As a result of the commencement of the action in the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois and of the other acts as alleged previously, the plaintiffs, STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS have not been able to participate to the fullest

and have been unlawfully prevented from constructively utilizing their knowledge and abilities in the industry, to the damage of the industry as a whole, the consuming public, ~~LEKTRO-VEND~~, and themselves. The enforcement of the world-wide non-competition covenants contained in the contracts with VENDO should be enjoined as a violation of the United States Antitrust Laws, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and plaintiffs should be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

24. STONER has been unable, because of the existence of said non-competition covenant, to obtain suitable employment in the business of manufacture and sale of vending machines, since the termination of payments by VENDO in June, 1964, and will be unable to secure any such suitable employment in the industry, or to use his extensive knowledge and ability in the industry, until the threat of such unlawful covenant is removed. STONER could reasonably expect to earn upwards of \$75,000 per year in such employment. As a direct consequence thereof, and of the pendency of the Illinois action, for the defense of which STONER has been forced, and will in the future be forced, to make substantial expenditures, STONER has sustained damages of in excess of \$100,000 to date.

25. STONER INVESTMENTS has been unable, because of the existence of said world-wide non-competitive covenant, to invest in or otherwise participate in the business of the manufacture and sale of vending machines. Had it been free to participate in such business and to invest funds therein, it could have realized a profit from such participation and investment of in excess of \$200,000 per year. It requested its release from the illegal covenants not to compete in or about December, 1962, which release was refused by VENDO. As a proximate result thereof, and as a direct result of the pendency of the Illinois action, for the defense of which it has been forced, and in the future will be forced, to make substantial expenditures of money and

utilize the time of its employees, STONER INVESTMENTS has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$500,000.

26. As a direct and proximate result of the violations heretofore set forth LEKTRO-VEND has been substantially injured in its business and property, to wit: LEKTRO-VEND has been deprived of the services of STONER and the financial assistance of STONER INVESTMENTS; its sales and profits have been seriously impaired and reduced; it has suffered an immense loss of good will and reputation; and the value of its business has been substantially reduced; all to the damage of LEKTRO-VEND. The precise amount of damage is not presently known to LEKTRO-VEND, but is believed to be in excess of \$3,000,000.

27. Plaintiffs, and each of them, allege that the foregoing violations of the antitrust laws by VENDO are presently continuing, and further irreparable loss and damage are threatened to plaintiffs, and each of them, unless VENDO is restrained by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray:

1. That this Court adjudge and decree that the acts of VENDO as hereinabove described have been and continue to be in violation of the antitrust laws, including Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act;

2. That this Court issue a permanent injunction against VENDO restraining it from continuing the unlawful practices alleged herein;

3. That STONER be awarded damages against VENDO in the amount of \$100,000 to be trebled to \$300,000 as provided by law;

4. That STONER INVESTMENTS be awarded damages against VENDO in the amount of \$500,000 to be trebled to \$1,500,000 as provided by law;

5. That LEKTRO-VEND be awarded damages against VENDO in the amount of \$3,000,000 to be trebled to \$9,000,000 as provided by law;



6. That plaintiffs, and each of them, be awarded attorneys' fees, costs and interest as provided by law.

7. That plaintiffs, and each of them, have such other, further and different relief as the Court shall deem just.

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware corporation, HARRY B. STONER, and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation,

By: .....  
James E. S. Baker

.....  
Robert A. Downing  
Their Attorneys

Of Counsel:

SIDLEY, AUSTIN, BURGESS & SMITH  
11 South La Salle Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60603  
STate 2-5400

**Answer, Separate Defenses And  
Counterclaim In  
Vendo Co. v. Stoner (state court suit)  
(Filed October 25, 1965)**

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. . . . .

**SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE**

The non-competition covenants referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint sought to be enforced by the complaint are invalid and unenforceable because they are in violation of the United States antitrust laws (Title 15, U.S. Code, Sec. 1-8, *et seq.*), particularly Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, in that such covenants are not reasonably related to the sale of assets referred to, nor to the employment of the individual defendant. The plaintiff, The Vendo Company, has monopolized, and attempted to monopolize, the trade and commerce among the several states in the business of manufacturing and selling automatic coin merchandising machines, generally known as vending machines, and has acquired as the result of its activities control over so substantial a portion of such trade and commerce as to obtain the power to remove or to exclude competitors from the field of manufacture of vending machines. That it now possesses such power and that its bringing of this suit in an attempt to enforce the non-competition covenants referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, demonstrates its intent to exercise its power to remove or exclude competitors from competition in the vending machine manufacturing business. At the present time plaintiff has control of over 40% of the entire vending machine manufacturing business of the United States and has control of the manufacturing of between 50% to 100% of the vending machines for the vending of candy, pastry, milk, and ice cream, and of multi-purpose, refrigerated and non-refrigerated, food vending machines, which is the field in which Lektro-Vend Corp. has attempted to compete with



plaintiff. The making and entering into of the purported non-competition covenants referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, the reiteration of threats of enforcement of such covenants, and the bringing of the present action in an effort to enforce such covenants, are overt acts of plaintiff in monopolization and attempts to monopolize the trade or commerce among the several states in the field of manufacture of such vending machines. Such purported non-competition covenants constitute contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce among the several states and are, therefore, invalid and unenforceable.

Wherefore, defendants, and each of them, demand that the complaint and each Count thereof should be dismissed and that they should be awarded their costs.

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**Amendment To Complaint In  
Vendo Co. v. Stoner (state court suit)  
(Filed January 28, 1966)**

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

COUNT I

7. That the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, both during the term of his employment by the plaintiff and thereafter, but within the five (5) year period specified in the contract, violated and breached his duties and obligations thereunder in that he has both directly and indirectly entered into the vending machine manufacturing business individually, as a partner, officer, stockholder, or joint venturer, in the Lektro-Vend Corp., a foreign corporation; that plaintiff is unaware of the exact nature and extent of defendant Stoner's interest therein; that the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, during the term of his employment, stole valuable trade secrets of the plaintiff, including design concept for vending machines, which he appropriated during the term of his employment and thereafter to his own use and that of the Lektro-Vend Corp.; that during the term of his employment, and thereafter, through the provision of financing, advice and the use of facilities, entered into the vending machine manufacturing business with Lektro-Vend Corp., a foreign corporation.

8-1/2. That the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, is a man of substantial means and has income from investments in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$50,000.00) per year; that compliance with the terms of his contract with the plaintiff, heretofore referred to, will not in any way prevent him from earning a livelihood or from enjoying the standard of living to which he has become accustomed.

COUNT II

8. That the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., in violation of its obligations and duties pursuant to the afore-

said contract, has indirectly engaged and participated in the ownership, management, operation and control of the business of the manufacture and sale of vending machines by consenting to and actively permitting its facilities, officers, agents and employees to be used by said Lektro-Vend Corp. in the sale and manufacturing of vending machines in competition with the plaintiff, The Vendo Company; that the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., in violation of its contractual obligations, managed, operated, controlled and participated in the ownership, management, operation and control of the Lektro-Vend Corp., a foreign corporation, by the provision of financing, advice and the use of facilities afforded the aforesaid Lektro-Vend Corp.; that through its officer and agent, Harry B. Stoner, the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., stole valuable trade secrets of the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, including the design for certain vending machines, which it appropriated to its own use and that of Lektro-Vend Corp.

/s/ REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER, MURPHY & HUPP  
Attorney for Plaintiff

[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
OMITTED IN PRINTING]

**Amendment To Complaint In  
Vendo Co. v. Stoner (state court suit)**

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

**MOTION TO AMEND**  
(Filed June 26, 1966)

Now comes the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a foreign corporation, by Reid, Ochsenchlager, Murphy and Hupp, its attorneys, and moves the Court for leave to amend the Complaint instantan upon its face for the purpose of adding the following language at the end of Count II:

The plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a foreign corporation, further prays that the defendant, Stoner Investments, Inc., be restrained by an Order of this Court during the pendency of this litigation and thereafter by an Order of Injunction from owning, directly or indirectly, managing, operating, joining, controlling or participating in the ownership, management, operation or control of, or from being connected in any manner with, and from directly or indirectly entering into or engaging in the manufacture and sale of vending machines in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo, or any affiliate or subsidiary, is so engaged until June 1, 1969.

/s/ REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER,  
MURPHY & HUPP  
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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## ORDER

This matter coming on to be heard on the plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint on its face, instant, and the Court being fully advised in the premises,

It Is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows:

1.) That the plaintiff is hereby granted to leave to file the amendment proposed to the Complaint instant and on its face.

2.) That the defendants are hereby granted 10 days within which to answer or otherwise plead.

Enter This 23 day of June, 1966.

/s/ CHARLES G. SEIDEL  
Judge

Opinion Of The Trial Court In  
The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, *et al.*, No. 65-2134,  
In The Circuit Court For The 16th Judicial  
Circuit, Kane County, Illinois

[The trial court, on December 16, 1966 after hearing closing arguments, delivered the following oral opinion from the bench and ruled on the case, as follows:]

The Court: Well, this has been a lengthy case, but it is not the only lengthy case that I have just concluded. I am reminded of the common instruction that we give all juries, that we are to exercise our common sense and good judgment gained from our observation and experience in the affairs of life.

I take it that applies to judges who try cases involving corporation against corporation and their various methods of buying their competitors' products for the purpose of analysis and comparison, and duplication, and many other things that had never occurred to me, perhaps, prior to having such litigation presented in front of me.

But in this case I have had the benefit of competent counsel who have worked hard and diligently in preparing the Briefs. I did read some of the actual testimony previously. But, as I requested you gentlemen during the summer to collaborate and come up with an Abstract of testimony which would eliminate a great deal more work on my part, I am most grateful for your having done so. It was very illuminating to me to read and reread certain portions of that Abstract.

I think I should also comment on one other feature that is apparent in every case and that is: The Court or the Jury has the sole responsibility of judging the credibility of the witnesses and the manner in which they testify, their interest, lack of candor, and general appearance in the courtroom, where I am sure that the appeals courts are never fully aware of the facemaking or head shaking that goes on during the course and conduct of a trial.



I am also aware that as counsel sit at the counsel table that they are not always aware of what goes on in back of them, whether it is to their favor or to their disfavor. But the Court quite frequently follows the witnesses in their spoken word as well as observing the expressions that appear and mannerisms in the courtroom.

I have been thoroughly interested in the Briefs that you have prepared and the material covering the law.

I think as the record now stands I have previously ruled that I didn't think your Affirmative Defenses of the anti-trust phase of this case, either the application of the Federal act or the State act, had any applicability in this case.

I don't know whether that is reflected in an Order or not, but it should be.

Mr. Baker: We had no Order dismissing it.

The Court: Well, I wanted to repeat myself so there would be no doubt about the status of the record.

Now, in reviewing the testimony that was given, there are a number of conflicting statements. Mr. Ochsenschlager has characterized the conduct of Mr. Stoner—or the theory of the Stoner defense as unbelievable. I presume everyone has the prerogative of using whatever descriptive language he sees fit to use, but it is a little amazing to me.

I might say that I have had the experience of being a corporate director and also being a corporate president. So I think I have some understanding of what is the responsibility of an officer, and I am sure I am fully aware of the responsibility of a director.

It was always my feeling that I was acting in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of all stockholders. And even though I, in one instance, wanted to make a complete disbursement of all of the assets of a company, I felt that I couldn't undertake to do this because if I were to do it I'd be assuming a personal responsibility to a very contingent creditor that I just couldn't afford to assume.

But in this case when you consider the testimony as to the entering into of this agreement of sale and the employment agreement, I take into consideration that neither counsel engaged in the trial of this case were present or participated in these agreements. And as has been pointed out, each case must stand upon its own particular set of facts.

The very case which Mr. Baker has cited in the prior arguments which I recall and have had occasion to reread a number of times was the Parish v. Schwartz case. There they cite with approval the Lanzit case, which, again, Mr. Baker commented on. And you will find in that case the statement which says that a contract which is only in partial restraint of trade will be held valid if it is reasonable and has a valuable consideration to support it.

I don't remember whether Counsel cited the case or whether the Court did, but I have always been conscious of Justice Schaefer's opinion in the case of Bauer v. Sawyer. That was the doctors' case where he had agreed to practice medicine in Kankakee and the one doctor saw fit to withdraw. And as I remember the language there, the Justice said that he didn't think it would make too much difference if there was one less doctor practicing in Kankakee.

It is my understanding that these agreements are enforceable if they are reasonable both as to area that they purport to cover and as to the time that they purport to cover.

In this case, the time was fixed, it is my recollection, for a ten-year period. Counsel cite the case of Reuben H. Donnelly Corporation v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 747, and it is my understanding that in that case a ten-year period was held not to be unreasonable.

Now, there have been many discussions in the last year in seminars that I have attended, both here in Illinois and elsewhere, about perhaps changing the dead-man statute to

permit testimony if someone is deceased. In this particular case, Mr. Stoner has seen fit to characterize these contracts as void and not worth the paper they are written on. But having been admitted to the Bar of the State of Illinois with the late Ed Streit, never having tried a case with him but having tried enumerable cases on the opposite side of the counsel table from him, I recognize his ability and his integrity as an attorney.

But even in that statement if we were to accept that statement as being truthful, I think I should also point out the absolute contradictory statement of Mr. Stoner when he goes to the Vendo corporation according to his testimony and states that some of the men thought that he would be released from his contract. But then he appeared at the last board of directors' meeting that he did attend and requested the release of his employment contract and was told by Mr. Pierson that perhaps that was a matter that the board would have to pass on and that it would be his recommendation as the president that he not be released from the terms of his employment contract, which to me is only consistent with an obligation that a president would have in any corporation. While it wasn't spelled out letter for letter, I take it the consensus of the Board meeting was that Mr. Stoner was not released from his agreement.

So you have those inconsistent statements in the record. Then you have the conduct of the defendant, Mr. Stoner, himself. And it is coincidental, the men who were employed by Mr. Stoner in the Stoner Manufacturing Company; namely, Mr. Jack Stewart, who was well known to, I think, all of the lawyers in Aurora having been the operator of a downtown clothing store for many years and a rather affable gentleman. Some of the other men were unknown to us, Mr. Lazzara, Mr. Phillips, Jr. and Sr. Mr. Kaman was only there a short while, but did not go with the Stoner Investments, Inc., but went with the Skil Corporation it was my recollection.

And then when you consider the testimony in the light of the Phillips going into the business of making a coin changer and vending machine and the several meetings that took place between the planing department of Vendo and those engaged in the Stoner Company and the similarity of the devices, which was apparent to me—I am not a patent lawyer—, it didn't seem to me to take any great ingenuity to come up with an idea of making something that would be usable and, perhaps, saleable.

As to the loans by Mr. Stoner to the Phillips, Mr. Baker will say, "A mere loan is not violating the terms of an agreement." And I take it that that would be a correct statement of the law if it were strictly a personal loan not for the purpose of engaging in a like or similar business venture of one you had just sold your business to.

Another factor that I think is somewhat amazing is the fact that Mr. Stoner knew of this undertaking of the Phillips to put together a vending machine and his discussion with The Vendo Company as to the possibility of their acquiring this particular machine.

I have searched this record and the evidence to ascertain whether I had missed something; but nowhere, did I find out any disclosure by Mr. Stoner that he had financed this undertaking, unless, perhaps, if at all, I think Mr. Stoner's words were that he didn't think that he told anyone.

But I asked myself the question: What is the responsibility of a man who is in a position of trust and a fiduciary capacity to the stockholders? Some of these stockholders were members of his own family at one time or another. I find it most difficult to come up with an answer that that sort of conduct is conducive and in compliance with the responsibility as a director of a corporation.

Now, there is another matter of evidence which none of you gentlemen have touched on today. I doubt that you did before because I am sure the witness had not previously testified. And that was the witness Mr. Cayne, whose testi-



mony was to the effect that he had represented Stoner. He said, "Stoner"; he didn't say, "company." But it is my understanding that he also represented Mr. William Phillips, Mr. Rod Phillips, and Mr. William Callahan, who was, likewise, an employee of Stoner and Vendo, in prosecuting and procuring a patent for an electrically operated merchandise vending machine. That was found at page 1331 of the testimony and page 288 of the Abstract.

On page 299 of the Abstract and at page 1384 of the testimony, Mr. Cayne testified that he had known Harry Stoner since 1930, and he knew Rod Phillips, and he worked for Stoner, and he knew William Phillips, and he handled the prosecution of the electronic coin detecting device for Bill Phillips. (Reading )

"I did it for him, he was the one who came to me, and I think it was for the Phillips Company. He did not tell me when he first came to me that this was going to be assigned to Stoner Investments, Inc. I prepared the document of assignment of the patent from William Phillips to Stoner Investments, Inc., having been told of the assignment by either Bill Phillips or Rod Phillips."

Now, I don't think that a Judge or a Jury can put their head in the sand and ignore statements in the evidence that you hear.

But the fact of these loans, the fact of the sale of a business—or not of a business, but of a building, the testimony of a disinterested witness of the visits of Mr. Stewart, and Mr. Lazzara, and the Phillips to the building before it was completed, I think in one case the statement was made it was being erected for the Phillips Company which apparently is known as Lektro-Vend—I find myself asking a number of questions of myself:

Whether or not the conduct of the individual defendant is consistent with his obligations as a director in a corporation which wasn't paying him a nominal salary. In fact,

it is a salary that is much more than you find in other like endeavors, although I guess today some corporate presidents and sales managers are paid astronomical figures. But \$50,000.00 a year is not exactly a nominal salary. And as one of the men from Missouri stated—I like to refer to those individuals as show-me boys because I guess that is what they call the people that come from that state—one of them said, "We sort of felt we ought to get a quid pro quo," which comes back to some of our basic concepts of contractual duties.

Being mindful that this is an equity case in which the burden of proof is not the same as in a criminal case or perhaps in a strict case of law, but it is addressed to the equitable conscience of the Court, I have pointed out that I didn't think a ten-year period was out of line based upon decisions. I have pointed out that the restraint of trade—partial restraint of trade, if any, is something that I don't find myself giving too much concern.

I think you gentlemen can understand the reasoning for that because in the record here it is replete with various names, many of which I can't recall at this moment; but there was Seeburg, there was U-Select-It, there was Rowe, there was Canteen I believe. And, again, as I say, you don't set aside your observation and experience in life. And as you drive around the streets of a town or village, sometimes you see signs of buildings that advertise people who are making canteens or vending machines. So that I don't believe that I should bother myself with the possibility of the public being injured in such a case as has been presented to me.

Again, Mr. Stoner in his testimony referred to the fact that Vendo was making a lot of money. And if you are to follow his suggestion or innuendo, they would have made more money.

But again you can't overlook the testimony of Mr. Popp, whose testimony as I recall it was that he received a tele-



phone call from Mr. Stoner and that he stopped at Mr. Stoner's mother's home. And quoting the words of Mr. Popp, "Mr. Stoner felt that he had made a bad deal and he wanted to get out of it."

Then within a week as I recall, Mr. Popp received a telephone call from the late Edward Streit that they were taking out various items of tools or equipment out of the Stoner then Vendo Company and that he, Popp, went to the company and that he, Popp, called the Vendo Corporation in Kansas City to inquire of them what, if anything, they were going to remove and as I recall the testimony it was a shear.

Now, in these cases, I think both in the Parish case and in the doctor case, the Court commented upon the fact that it was a difficult question to arrive at a damage figure. And I have asked myself the question, "What would twelve people do if they had heard this case and they were called upon to arrive at a damage figure?"

We have valuations placed on this machine by Mr. Stoner. In fact, he recommended the payment of a million and a half dollars to Vendo for the Phillips machine. On the other hand, I think it was Mr. Andrews who testified that in his judgment it would cost somewhere between three and four hundred thousand dollars to do the tooling and designing to produce this particular machine. I am satisfied the record is replete with statements. I believe Mr. Childers made the statement that they were interested in this machine as an adjunct to their existing line of equipment, but not at the figure of a million and a half dollars.

Mr. Ochsenschlager has suggested the loans by Mr. Stoner of \$250,000.00 for the tooling and designing to put this machine together. Those are figures that a Jury might take into consideration.

I think while I am commenting on it, I should also comment that it is unusual that you do find people who loan money without interest. I have never been in that category.

And then coupled with that, the sale of this building and the sale to a new corporation with no sales experience and the guarantee—I have forgotten whether that was the personal guarantee of Mr. Stoner or the guarantee of Stoner Investments, Inc.

But taking those factors into consideration together with the payment of the salaries to these men while they were working on this machine which the defendant Stoner attempted to sell to the company that he was a director in to me just seems to run contrary to my concept of equity and good conscience and my concept of what constitutes a legal and binding agreement, an agreement for the sale of a business and an employment agreement.

Mr. Baker pointed out that this agreement was worldwide and that that was primarily for the benefit of Vendo corporation. But in the same breath in fairness to Mr. Baker, he did point out in fairness to me that the Stoner corporation was doing business throughout the United States and had had some foreign negotiations. Whether they had ripened into licensing agreements from which there was money coming, I am not certain from a reading of the record.

I take it first I should grant the prayer to amend your Complaint for ad damnum. My understanding is under the Practice Act that can be done either before or after a jury verdict or after the Court's decision.

So that it is my finding that an injunction will issue against Harry Stoner and against Stoner Investments, Inc.

There will be a judgment of \$250,000.00 against Harry Stoner personally and a judgment of \$1,100,000.00 against Stoner Investments, Inc., and Harry Stoner.

If you gentlemen will, collaborate on the order. When you have done that, prepare it and it will be signed.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: Okay; suppose we continue it for the draft order. Or do you want that done today?

The Court: Whatever your pleasure is.

Mr. Baker: I'd like to have a chance to look it over and see it.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: Your Honor, we'd like to ask it be continued for the order. And we will submit it to Mr. Baker in the meantime.

The Court: All right; you want it continued to a day certain?

Mr. Ochsenschlager: A week from today?

Mr. Baker: A week from today is the day before the Christmas Holiday. I suggest it not be a week from today. Sometime the first week in January, maybe that would be reasonable or between the holidays.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: Judge, let us continue it until supposing next Wednesday. Mr. Baker, by that time we will agree. We will submit it to you and whatever time we can agree on after that; but you won't have to be out here on that day.

Which Were All Of The Proceedings Had On The Hearing Of Said Cause.

[CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER  
OMITTED IN PRINTING]

**First Judgment In Vendo Co. v. Stoner**

(Entered December 27, 1966)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE  
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT  
KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

**THE VENDO COMPANY**

VS.

**HARRY B. STONER  
and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**

No. 65-2134

**JUDGMENT**

This matter coming on for a hearing on the merits, and the Court having heard testimony and having received evidence, and having heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,

It Is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged And Decreed as follows:

1. That the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a Missouri corporation, do have and recover of and from the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$250,000) and costs, and have execution therefor.

2. That the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a Missouri corporation, do have and recover of and from the defendant, Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., a Delaware corporation, the further sum of One Million One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$1,100,000) and costs, and have execution therefor.

3. That defendant Harry B. Stoner be, and he is hereby, restrained and enjoined from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the vending machine manufacturing business, individually or as a partner, employee or agent, anywhere in the United States or in

any foreign country in which The Vendo Company engaged in such business (as of June 1, 1959), until June 1, 1969.

4. That defendant Stoner Investments, Inc., be and it hereby is, restrained and enjoined from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the manufacture and sale of vending machines in the United States and in any foreign country in which The Vendo Company engaged in such business (as of June 1, 1959), until June 1, 1969.

5. That the issuance of any execution or writ of injunction pursuant hereto is stayed for a period of 30 days from the date hereof.

Enter this 27th day of December, A.D., 1966.

/s/ John S. Petersen  
Judge

**Opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court for the  
Second Judicial District in Vendo Co. v. Stoner,  
105 Ill. App. 2d 261, 245 N.E. 2d 263 (1969)**

THE VENDO COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Foreign Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.

GEN. NO. 68-1.

Second Judicial District.

January 30, 1969.

Rehearing denied March 24, 1969.

MR. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD delivered the opinion of the court.

Defendants, Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., appeal from judgments in a suit for breach of a sales and employment contract and for injunctive relief, heard without a jury.

Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: (1) against Harry B. Stoner in the amount of \$250,000; (2) against Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., in the amount of \$1,100,000; (3) against Harry B. Stoner, restraining him from "engaging, directly or indirectly, in the vending machine manufacturing business, individually or as a partner, employee or agent, anywhere in the United States or in any foreign country in which the Vendo Company engaged in such business (as of June 1, 1959), until June 1, 1969; and (4) against Stoner Investments, Inc., restraining it in similar terms."



A question is also raised on the pleadings, arising out of the court's order striking certain defenses and counterclaims based upon the Federal and State Antitrust laws.

In April, 1959, the defendant corporation was principally engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling candy vending machines throughout the United States, and was about to license a company to sell its machines in England. This corporation will herein be referred to as Stoner Investments, its present name, notwithstanding that it was named Stoner Mfg. Corp. in 1959. The corporate shares of Stoner Investments were owned in 1959 by defendant Harry B. Stoner, his wife, his mother and his sister-in-law, Ruth Netrey. Mr. Stoner was, without dispute, the principal officer and in control of the management of the corporation.

The Vendo Company, in 1959, had been one of the leading manufacturers and sellers of vending machines for hot and cold beverages, ice cream and certain other products. The company did not manufacture or sell vending machines for candy, cigarettes, hot sandwiches and instant coffee and tea at that time, but such machines had been considered and were in various stages of research and development. Vendo machines were then being sold in 58 countries in every continent. Clearly, Vendo was a considerably larger and more diversified company than Stoner Investments.

On April 3, 1959, a contract was executed by which Vendo agreed to purchase Stoner Investments' assets, excluding real estate and improvements thereon, cash on hand or on deposit, and receivables. In essence, Vendo was to pay \$3,400,000 in cash, subject to certain adjustments, deliver 60,000 shares of its fully paid and nonassessable common stock, pay a portion of its profits in excess of \$250,000 in any calendar year from the assets being purchased for a period of ten years, pay 25% of monies received from sales outside the United States of Stoner Investments' products, also for a period of ten years, assume responsibility for the collection of accounts receivable, and pay all debts, obliga-

tions and liabilities of Stoner Investments. The sales agreement imposed the following restriction on the selling corporation:

"Section 15. From and after the closing, the Company [Stoner Investments] will not own, directly or indirectly, manage, operate, join, control or participate in the ownership, management, operation or control of, or be connected in any manner with, any business engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines under any name similar to the Company's present name, and, for a period of ten (10) years after the closing, the Company will not in any manner, directly or indirectly, enter into or engage in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo or any affiliate or subsidiary is so engaged, in the manufacture and sale of vending machines or any business similar to that now being conducted by the Company."

In addition to the sales agreement, an employment contract was executed whereby Mr. Stoner would serve Vendo in an executive capacity for five years, or until June 1, 1964, at an annual salary of \$50,000. This agreement also contained a noncompetition clause which reads as follows:

"5. During the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following the termination of his employment hereunder, whether by lapse of time or by termination as hereinafter provided, Stoner shall not directly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities, enter into or engage in the vending machine manufacturing business or any branch thereof, either as an individual on his own account, or as a partner or joint venturer, or as an

employee, agent or salesman for any person, firm or corporation or as an officer or director of a corporation or otherwise, provided however that the Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates shall be excluded from the restrictions hereof and provided also that Stoner shall be permitted to own, hold, acquire and dispose of stocks and other securities which are traded in the investment security market whether on listed exchanges or over the counter."

The employment contract provided that Mr. Stoner "shall regulate his own hours of employment and shall determine the amount of time and effort which he shall devote" to Vendo, and that the value of his services are not to be measured by the time and effort he devotes to the business, but by his advice, counsel, know-how and experience. The contract further provided, inter alia, that Vendo "shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon thirty (30) days' notice in the event of the substantial violation of the terms hereof by Stoner."

There was evidence offered to show that Mr. Stoner, after the signing of the sales agreement but before the closing of the transaction, had second thoughts about the wisdom of the sale. He made statements to this effect to the business representative of the union for the plant's employees, intimating at the time that many of the employees would be losing their jobs and that equipment was being moved out of the plant. It does not appear that the union took any action—other than to investigate—as a result of these conversations.

Almost immediately after the take-over by Vendo, several points of friction developed between Mr. Stoner and certain of Vendo's other executives. Essentially, Mr. Stoner complained that his services were not being utilized, that he was being treated as nothing more than a "figurehead," and that the procedures and employees of Vendo were ineffectual.

For several years prior to the sale to Vendo, R. W. Phillips (Rod) had been the Stoner plant superintendent, and his son, William Phillips (Bill), had been assistant superintendent. Rod was liaison engineer between the engineering and production departments, and participated in design work on a day-to-day basis. Bill had a degree in aeronautical engineering and Navy training in electronics.

Bill resigned from Vendo in June or July of 1960, ostensibly because he was no longer in line to become the plant manager, and because he purportedly disagreed with Vendo's philosophy and attitude concerning product quality. Within two months of his resignation, Bill met with Mr. Stoner and proposed that the latter finance the development by Bill of an electronic coin detecting device which he had conceived, and which would be of considerable value in the vending machine as well as in other industries. That discussion concluded with the agreement that Stoner Investments would pay Bill a salary of \$650 per month to develop such a device, and any patents thereon would belong to Stoner Investments. Bill's father, Rod Phillips, was present at the time of this conversation.

Working primarily in his basement at home, Bill nearly completed the coin detector by the end of 1960. A patent was issued in October of 1961, and was assigned to Stoner Investments. Except for a "breadboard" model, the coin detector was never produced. Bill received a total of \$3,250 as salary from Stoner Investments for his work on the coin detector, and in addition was reimbursed nearly \$1,000 for expenses.

Rod Phillips also resigned from Vendo in mid-1960, at about the same time as Bill resigned. Rod's stated reason for leaving was that he resented "spying" on the progress of another company which manufactured slug-rejectors. Rod spent approximately six months after his resignation in retirement, and it was during this period



of time that his son, Bill, was designing the electronic coin detector with the financial aid of Stoner Investments.

In late 1960 or early 1961, when Bill's design of the coin detector was virtually completed, Rod approached Mr. Stoner with the request that Stoner provide sufficient funds to enable Rod to engineer and develop a particular type of vending machine. Mr. Stoner agreed to have Stoner Investments make noninterest bearing loans to Rod for that purpose. According to the testimony of defendants, neither Mr. Stoner nor Stoner Investments was to have any ownership or control in Rod's venture, it being their position that Rod was entitled to this consideration for his many years of loyal service to Stoner Investments. During 1961 and 1962, Stoner Investments loaned Rod Phillips a total of \$206,000.

In addition to making the above loans to Rod, Mr. Stoner made available to Rod and Bill in early 1961 an old milk plant building known as the Middle Avenue Building. Rod was charged no rent, but made repairs to the building with materials purchased by Mr. Stoner.

In August of 1961, two other former employees of Stoner Investments — and then employees of Vendo — resigned from Vendo and joined Rod and Bill. Their combined salaries of \$1,150 per month were paid by Stoner Investments until December of 1962. One of these men had between fifteen and twenty years of design experience with Stoner Investments prior to the sale to Vendo, and the other had served as a toolmaker.

The vending machine developed by Rod and Bill Phillips was to be used for the vending of candy. There were three characteristics of this machine which contributed to its eventual popularity and acceptance, namely: (1) positive stock rotation, known as first-in first-out, or FIFO, where the first product stocked in the machine would be the first one sold, thus reducing the chance of vending or discarding stale candy; (2) continuous display through a window of the actual product next to be vended; and (3) capacity for

stocking mixed products in a single conveyor, and consequent elimination of the usual necessity to sell out the product before restocking with a different product. Although machines having those features had been on the market for many years, none had incorporated all three of the above characteristics, and in fact no practical machine with all these characteristics had ever been developed previously.

It is one of Vendo's contentions herein that Mr. Stoner's financial participation in the development of this machine amounted to the appropriation of a trade secret of Vendo.

It is uncontroverted that Vendo, before the acquisition of the Stoner plant, had been taking steps with a view toward the development of a FIFO candy vending machine that incorporated a window displaying the actual product to be vended, and which would permit the stocking of mixed products in a single conveyor. The authority for an expenditure on such a project was first assigned by Vendo in December of 1958. This project led to the fabrication of two "developmental mechanisms." Neither of these models included the vend-the-bar-you-see window, although an artist's sketch of a complete machine, having such windows in front of each conveyor, was prepared. There was evidence to show that artist's sketches of Vendo's contemplated machine were shown to Mr. Stoner and Rod and Bill Phillips in early June, 1959, almost immediately after Vendo's acquisition of the Stoner plant.

One of these models was exhibited at a products planning meeting at the Stoner plant on August 3, 1959, at which Mr. Stoner and Rod Phillips were present. At that meeting, the Stoner Division sales manager said the machine was deficient in three respects: (1) the product would have to be stocked upside down; (2) the machine could tip over during loading because all of the conveyors would have to be swung out; and (3) production of the machine would be unduly expensive. The minutes of that meeting stated that the Sales Department "feels the objectives of stock



rotation and visual display are sound but the particular design in question is not acceptable because of loading and inventory problems." These minutes went on to state that Vendo's Research and Engineering Department "is to continue research as to how to basically improve the stock rotation idea so that it can be made practical."

In January, 1960, Vendo's Vice-President in charge of Research and Engineering made a handwritten notation on an interoffice memorandum, stating: "I agree on the need for rotation of stock, but not on [this] unit. I think a better one could be devised." Neither of these models was patented, and a Vendo executive had written patent counsel that "we do not intend to commercialize" these models. In September and October of 1960, Vendo sent both models to Vendo's "morgue" which, according to our reading of the record, is the destination for nonactive—but not necessarily abandoned—projects.

The machine developed by Rod and Bill Phillips was called the Lektro-Vend machine, and while incorporating the three characteristics of first-in first-out, a vend-the-bar-you-see window, and mixed stock in a single conveyor, it differed in many basic respects from the models developed by Vendo. For example, the Lektro-Vend machine was electrically powered while Vendo's was to be mechanically powered; Vendo's machine required approximately 4,000 screws for the shelving mechanism, while the Lektro-Vend machine eliminated these by using a series of L-shaped shelves interconnected with pins; the conveyor in the Lektro-Vend machine moved in a track guided by plastic wheels, while Vendo's conveyor unitized bicycle chain affair with hooks; and the Lektro-Vend machine was loaded by tilting out the conveyor within the machine's center of gravity, thus avoiding the objectionable swing-out loading requirement of Vendo's machine. More significantly, the Lektro-Vend machine was functionally and economically successful, while many undesirable features of the Vendo machine rendered its production impractical.

The first prototypes of the Lektro-Vend machine were exhibited in October, 1962, at a trade show in San Francisco. This machine was accepted so well that another company took its own stock rotation (FIFO) machine off display. In fact, certain officers and directors of Vendo were so impressed with the machine that one of them approached Rod Phillips at the show and discussed the possibility of Vendo purchasing the machine.

It appears that, prior to the show, Rod Phillips had intended to sell the Lektro-Vend design and tooling, but the industry's response to the machine led to Rod's and Bill's decision to manufacture and sell the machine themselves. After returning from the show, Rod discussed the response to his machine with Mr. Stoner, and invited Stoner to join with him in his plan to manufacture and sell the Lektro-Vend machine generally.

In December of 1962, immediately before the Vendo Board of Directors' meeting, Mr. Stoner told the Board Chairman that he, Stoner, would like a release from his employment contract, for the reason that he had an opportunity to invest in the Lektro-Vend machine and to participate with Rod Phillips in its manufacture and sale. He was requested to submit his request in writing for the Board to consider. Mr. Stoner made no mention of his previous financial aid toward the development of the Lektro-Vend machine. In short, Mr. Stoner was told that with his capital and experiences, he would be a formidable competitor, and that part of the consideration for the sales and employment contracts was that Vendo would not be competing with Mr. Stoner or his company.

While his release from his contract was denied, he was requested to act on behalf of Vendo in looking into the purchase of the Lektro-Vend machine from the Phillipses. Stoner discussed the matter with Rod Phillips, and then arranged a meeting in January, 1963, which was attended by Stoner, Rod Phillips and certain of Vendo's officers. The Lektro-Vend machine was demonstrated and explained at

that time, with Stoner taking no active part. Although price was not discussed at the meeting, Stoner later reported to Vendo that Rod Phillips was asking \$1,500,000. Stoner testified that the Seeburg Corporation had shown an interest in purchasing the Lektro-Vend machine at that price.

Although Stoner recommended that Vendo purchase the machine, Vendo would not agree to pay such an amount. Instead, in March of 1963, in reply to an inquiry from Stoner, Vendo's Vice-President in charge of operations wrote that Vendo would only pay for out-of-pocket costs, "plus a fair profit to Rod and his associates; taking into consideration the amount of time, money and ingenuity which they had expended on the project, but that it was my feeling that this wouldn't add up to anything like \$1,500,000."

Back in December, 1962, at about the time that Stoner was asking to be released from his employment contract with Vendo, his sister-in-law, Ruth Netrey, made a loan of \$350,000 to Rod Phillips on his personal note bearing 4½% interest. Defendant's evidence is that Stoner in no way persuaded or influenced Mrs. Netrey to make this loan, which within one year was increased to \$525,000. Mrs. Netrey had been one of the shareholders of Stoner Investments at the time of the sale of assets to Vendo, but had since sold her stock in that corporation, as did Mr. Stoner's mother, leaving only Mr. Stoner and his wife as shareholders of the defendant corporation.

In March or April of 1963, Stoner Investments had completed the construction of a general purpose office and manufacturing building on Sullivan Road in Aurora, where it had owned 370 acres of vacant land. The original purpose for constructing this building was allegedly to enable Stoner to prefabricate homes in the winter and to start the development of an industrial park. Its first and only occupants, however, were Rod and Bill Phillips who used the building for the manufacture of the Lektro-Vend machine. There was evidence tending to show that Stoner and the Phillipses

knew before the end of 1962 that the Sullivan Road Plant would be used by them for this purpose.

Admittedly, Mr. Stoner never advised Vendo until the Spring of 1963 as to his arrangements with Bill and Rod Phillips. He testified that while he made no attempt to conceal these arrangements, he did not regard them as being of consequence to Vendo.

The Lektro-Vend Corporation was organized on September 18, 1963, at which time its shareholders and the number of shares owned by each were as follows: Rod Phillips—2,875 shares; Glen Phillips—750 shares; Bill Phillips—1,125 shares; William Callahan (one of the former Stoner and Vendo employees who resigned from Vendo in August, 1961, and helped in the development of the Lektro-Vend machine)—250 shares; Ruth Netrey—5,000 shares.

On March 21, 1964, Stoner Investments contracted with Lektro-Vend Corporation to sell the Sullivan Road Plant to the latter. To finance the purchase, Lektro-Vend made a 100% short-term loan from a Chicago bank, which the bank would do only upon Stoner Investments' guarantee to repurchase the property in the event of a default. The loan had since been extended on several occasions, with Lektro-Vend paying the interest thereon.

Mr. Stoner's employment contract with Vendo terminated by lapse of time on June 1, 1964, and was not renewed although Stoner was retained on Vendo's Board of Directors until the Spring of 1965. In that same month, Mr. Stoner's wife was issued 5,000 shares of stock in Lektro-Vend Corporation, and in the following month Mr. Stoner himself was issued an additional 5,000 shares. On June 30, 1964, Stoner made a personal loan of \$100,000 to Lektro-Vend, and this was repaid in 1965 from the proceeds of a \$185,000 loan to Lektro-Vend from Stoner Investments. During 1965 and 1966, a total of \$402,000 was loaned to Lektro-Vend from Stoner Investments and Stoner Shopping Center, Inc., all evidenced by demand notes bearing 4½% interest.



In March, 1965, Lektro-Vend salesmen reported that Vendo's salesmen were circulating rumors to the effect that Lektro-Vend was about to go out of business. When this was reported to Stoner, he wrote a letter on Lektro-Vend stationery to fifty vending machine operators. This letter, referred to throughout these proceedings as the "Dear Operator" letter, stated that Stoner was "now interested in the new Lektro-Vend Corp.," and "if Lektro-Vend can depend on your confidence . . . I guarantee that Lektro-Vend Corp. will be here for a very, very long time."

It appears from the evidence that Mr. Stoner has never been active in the day-to-day management of Lektro-Vend, and that he does not maintain a desk or office on the corporation's premises. The frequency with which he comes onto the premises varies—sometimes every day for a week, and sometimes not at all for a month. He is, however, consulted on financial and other matters.

Vendo filed its complaint herein on August 10, 1965, charging that Stoner and Stoner Investments breached their respective covenants against competition, which covenants are set forth above. An amendment to the complaint was filed on January 28, 1966, alleging that both defendants stole valuable trade secrets of Vendo, including the design for certain vending machines, which they appropriated for their own use and for the use of Lektro-Vend Corporation. The complaint, as amended, prayed for damages of \$1,500,000 and for injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from engaging in the vending machine business. Neither Lektro-Vend nor either of the Phillipses was made a defendant.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court entered judgment against Stoner in the amount of \$250,000, and against both Stoner and Stoner Investments in the amount of \$1,100,000. In addition, both defendants were enjoined from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the business of manufacturing (and, in the case of Stoner Investments,

selling) vending machines until June 1, 1969 in the United States and in any foreign country in which Vendo was engaged in such business on June 1, 1959.

In support of this appeal, defendants urge the following grounds: (1) that Vendo did not possess a trade secret; (2) that in any event there was no appropriation of such a trade secret, assuming it existed; (3) that the covenants against competition are invalid; (4) that in any event the covenants were not violated; (5) that damages were improperly assessed; (6) that the injunctive relief granted was unwarranted because of an insufficient showing of irreparable damage, and because it was vague and beyond the prayer of the complaint; and (7) that the trial court erred in striking the affirmative defenses and counterclaim based on the plaintiff's alleged violation of the Federal and Illinois Anti-trust laws.

#### The "Trade Secrets"

[1] We agree that plaintiff has not proven the appropriation of a trade secret, if indeed it has been shown that plaintiff even possessed a trade secret. Plaintiff had nothing more than a goal in mind—the goal of economically producing a FIFO machine with a see-the-bar-you-vend feature. However, plaintiff had not discovered a means of achieving this goal, and without this discovery plaintiff had nothing. There was no evidence offered to show that Vendo's goal or overall desire to produce such a machine was novel. Furthermore, the individual features which Vendo wanted to combine in a single machine were long and widely used in the industry.

If Vendo had discovered the *means* for achieving its goal, we might well have had a different view as to whether Vendo had a trade secret. But trade secrets evolve from the means—not the end. According to the American Law Institute Restatement, Torts, § 757, Comment b, a trade secret may consist "of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information. . . ." *Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc.*,



33 Ill2d 379, 385, 212 NE 2d 865 (1965), cert den, 383 US 959, states:

"The controlling definition of a trade secret in Illinois is supplied by *Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff*, 299 Ill 532, 540, 132 NE 806, where this court said that it is *a secret plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound* known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it." (Emphasis added.)

We know of no authority for the proposition that an ultimate goal or purpose, as distinguished from the means of achieving it, can be classified as a trade secret. On the contrary, the authorities teach us that the trade secret must be in the plaintiff's "know-how," and Vendo simply did not "know how" to construct the particular machine it desired. This is evident from the record, where we see minutes of a Vendo meeting stating that the machine design "is *not acceptable* because of loading and inventory problems," and that the corporation "is to continue research as to how to basically improve the stock rotation idea *so that it can be made practical*." (Emphasis added.)

[2] Apart from our conclusion that Vendo could not claim a trade secret in its models, the vast difference between these models and the Lektro-Vend machine, in terms of technology and design, is in itself sufficient to preclude recovery on the theory of the appropriation of a trade secret. The more essential differences are set forth above, and the success and acceptance of the Lektro-Vend machine, compared to the unacceptability of Vendo's speak for the materiality of these differences. And Vendo's theory of appropriation can hardly stand in the face of its previous attempts to purchase the Lektro-Vend machine and pay some amount of money for the "ingenuity which [the Phillipses] had expended on the project." The fact that the Phillipses worked for approximately eighteen months on the Lektro-Vend machine before their prototypes were ready is, in itself, evidence that they did not "steal" Vendo's methodics.

[3, 4] A final observation should be made on the question of whether defendants appropriated a trade secret. Before such a cause of action will lie, it must be shown that the secret was disclosed to or learned by the defendant while in a position of trust and confidence. *Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff*, 299 Ill 532, 548, 132 NE 806 (1921). In our opinion, the record before us falls far short of showing wherein the Vendo design was disclosed to or learned by Mr. Stoner. Sometime after the acquisition of the Stoner plant, Mr. Stoner was shown pictures of a manual FIFO candy machine which did not have a stock display window. Stoner replied that this machine was similar to an Orange Crush machine which his corporation had built in 1940. While Mr. Stoner was present at the products planning meeting on August 3, 1959, where the Vendo model was shown, he was at the meeting for no longer than a few minutes. One witness, who is no longer employed by any of the parties, testified that Mr. Stoner was at that meeting for somewhere between thirty seconds and three minutes. It further appears that Mr. Stoner's presence at the meeting was for other purposes, and that the meeting was in fact suspended during his brief appearance. In the words of a Vendo employee, it was then and there that the Vendo machine was "kind of" explained to Stoner.

[5] It cannot seriously be contended that these brief glimpses and glances could be the foundation for the development of a revolutionary design that would take several skilled people eighteen months to develop. The only other evidence of disclosure relates to the Phillipses, not to Stoner. Thus, Rod and Bill Phillips were shown artists' sketches of the machine at about the time of the acquisition, or about one year prior to the Phillipses' resignations from Vendo, and fully 1½ years before Rod began work on what was to become the Lektro-Vend machine. While Rod was at the products planning meeting on August 3, 1959, he was there only to help answer the question of whether such a machine could be produced at the Stoner plant. Neither the Phillipses nor the Lektro-Vend Corporation was made

party to this suit. Although that, standing alone, would be no defense to Stoner, for one may not employ others to appropriate trade secrets which he himself might not appropriate (e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Products, Inc., 230 F2d 855, 864 (4th Cir 1956), cert den, 352 US 843 (1956), reh den, 352 US 913 (1956), we simply fail to see where sufficient information was disclosed to or learned by the Phillipses to enable them to design and develop the Lektro-Vend machine. The evidence does not indicate that they were shown measurements, tolerances, materials, and the like, nor is there evidence that they made or were given pictures or drawings of what they were briefly shown.

#### The Covenants Not To Compete

Defendants next contend that the covenants against competition by Stoner and Stoner Investments are invalid and unenforceable as constituting unreasonable restraints of trade, and that these covenants, even if valid, were not breached by defendants.

[6, 7] The general rule is that a covenant against competition, ancillary to the sale of a business or an employment contract, will be upheld if the restraint on trade is reasonable in terms of time and territory, with the question of reasonableness depending on the circumstances of each case. E.g., Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill 643, 184 NE 868 (1933); Parish v. Schwartz, 344 Ill 563, 176 NE 757 (1931); Lanyon v. Garden City Sand Co., 223 Ill 616, 79 NE 313 (1906); Andrews v. Kingsbury, 212 Ill 97, 72 NE 11 (1904); Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 Ill 420, 61 NE 1038 (1901); Lanzit v. J. W. Sefton Mfg. Co., 184 Ill 326, 56 NE 393 (1900); Hursen v. Gavin, 162 Ill 377, 44 NE 735 (1896). This general rule has been interpreted in Illinois by a line of cases beginning with Parish v. Schwartz (supra), to mean that any such restraint covering the *entire* State of Illinois is, on its face, unreasonable and therefore void. The rationale of this rule is that no person should be required to leave the state in order to pursue his regular occupation,

nor should the people of the state be totally deprived of his labors. It is on this proposition which defendants rely.

However, in spite of the widespread acceptance of this general rule, the courts of this and other jurisdictions have come to recognize an exception, which we believe applicable here, where the restraint lasts during the contractual relationship of the parties. Stated differently, the territory covered by a covenant against competition, otherwise unreasonably broad, will not invalidate the covenant to the extent that it exists during the terms of the employment, lease, franchise agreement, etc.

The earliest case known to us which recognizes this exception to the general rule is Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 116 F 304 (7th Cir 1902). There the defendant had agreed that *during the term of his employment* he would not work for any glucose manufacturer other than the plaintiff within a 1,500 mile radius of Chicago, an area encompassing practically the entire United States. The court held the covenant valid and enjoined its violation. In distinguishing this *in-term* covenant case from those involving *post-term* covenants—i.e., covenants not to compete *after* employment or *after* the sale of a business—the court said (at p 310):

“Here the restriction is limited to the period of service engaged for. The appellant left without cause and to enter the service of a rival. There was no acquiescence by appellee . . . . Clearly, under such circumstances no public policy would be violated in upholding the covenant. He is not deprived of the opportunity to obtain the means of subsistence or of giving to the public the benefit of his skill in the business to which he has been accustomed. He has only to perform the duty which he engaged to perform to render himself and his family comfortable. We know of no public policy which requires us to sanction the bald violation of a contract lest the public should be deprived of the peculiar skill



of the appellant because he will not exercise that skill where he has engaged to exercise it."

The distinction between in-term and post-term covenants was similarly recognized in *Saul v. Thalish*, 156 F Supp 408, 411 (DCDC 1957), where the court stated:

"... this case involves an agreement of employment for a fixed term containing a covenant which restricts the employee from engaging in a competing business during the term of employment fixed by the agreement. The validity of such covenant cannot be questioned so long as the employee remains in the employ of the employer."

In *Good v. Modern Globe, Inc.*, 346 Mich 602 78 NW2d 199 (1956), an employment contract provided that the employee, "for the above specified period [the term of employment] . . . will not, without prior written consent of the company, become employed, directly or indirectly, by any manufacturer of knitted goods or products presently manufactured by the company . . ." The Michigan Supreme Court sustained the validity of this covenant, even though Michigan had a sweeping statute invalidating all contracts not to engage in business.\* The court stated (at p 204):

"The plain language of this contract indicates that it is a contract of employment, not a contract whereby Good undertook not to engage in employment. A provision therein which forbade Good to become employed by any knitted goods manufacturer of products competitive to Globe's, is a provision which any employer

\* Mich. Stats. Ann. § 28.61 (1948): "All agreements and contracts by which any person, co-partnership or corporation promises or agrees not to engage in any avocation, employment, pursuit, trade, profession or business, *whether reasonable or unreasonable*, partial or general, limited, or unlimited, are hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void." (Emphasis added.)

would certainly have a right to contract for from any employee *for the duration of his employment*. The contract is not void under CL 1948, § 445.761, Stat Ann 28.61." (Emphasis supplied.)

In 1963, this court was squarely faced with the question of whether to follow or reject the "in-term—post-term" distinction, and we chose to follow it. *McDonald's Systems, Inc. v. Sandy's Inc.*, 45 Ill App2d 57, 195 NE2d 22 (1963). In *McDonald's*, the individual defendants had been granted a ten-year franchise by the plaintiff to operate a single drive-in restaurant in Urbana, Illinois. Paragraph 8 of the franchise agreement provided essentially as follows:

"*During the effective term of this agreement*, Second Party [defendants] shall not, except with the consent of First Party [plaintiff], engage in any business the same as or similar to the business covered by this agreement at any place other than the premises heretofore described in the State in which said premises are located or at any place in a state contiguous to said State . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Notwithstanding this covenant, the defendants, during the term of the franchise, organized a corporation to own and operate a similar drive-in restaurant in Peoria. In a suit brought by the plaintiff to enjoin the continued violation of the covenant and for damages, the trial court held that the restraint was unreasonably broad and that the covenant was therefore void. The opinion of this court reviewed the authorities discussed above (*Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co.* (supra); *Saul v. Thalish* (supra), and *Good v. Modern Globe, Inc.* (supra, at p 75)) and reversed the trial court, stating:

"Under these and other authorities *the extent of the territorial restriction is a factor which affects the validity of a post-term covenant only*. In the instant case the covenant is an in-term, not a post-term, cove-



nant, and as long as appellees seek to avail themselves of the beneficial provisions of their franchise contract, they should not be permitted to disregard or refuse to abide by the several obligations they assumed. The contract was not of unlimited duration, and when the franchise term is ended, either by cancellations, or by the expiration of time, appellees are free to engage in similar business elsewhere without any franchise. There is nothing illegal in such an agreement, and the obligations of the respective parties should be respected and enforced." (Emphasis added.)

Other Illinois decisions have recognized the distinction between in-term and post-term covenants not to compete. In *Ellis Electrical Laboratory Sales Corp. v. Ellis*, 269 Ill App 417 (1933), the court upheld the agreement of a supplier of goods not to sell such goods to others during the term of the agreement. In *Southern Fire Brick & Clay Co. v. Garden City Sand Co.*, 223 Ill 616, 79 NE 313 (1906), the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a lessor's covenant not to compete with his lessee during the term of the lease, notwithstanding that the restriction was statewide. In *Match Corp. of America v. Acme Match Corp.*, 285 Ill App 197, 1 NE2d 867 (1936), the court enforced the defendant's promise that it would not, during the term of the contract, sell book matches in competition with the plaintiff, with no area limitation.

[8] Under the precedent thus established, we are constrained to hold that the covenant before us is valid and enforceable. The covenant of Mr. Stoner was unquestionably in-term during the first five years, since that was the duration of his employment contract with Vendo. It was within that period of time that he violated his covenant. During the post-employment period, or the additional five years, Stoner's activities were simply an affirmation of his prior violation—a retention of the fruits of his breach—and upholding his post-employment activities would be tantamount to our sanctioning his earlier breach. That the

post-term aspects of the covenant might, if standing alone, be unnecessarily broad, is therefore irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal. In any event, Stoner Investments, the corporation through which Stoner chose to exercise his breach, was his alter ego, and Stoner Investments entered into a covenant of its own which we characterize as in-term. The sale of assets to Vendo contemplated a ten-year relationship with Stoner Investments as well as with Mr. Stoner. The contract required Vendo to pay Stoner Investments, for a period of ten years from January, 1959, all profits in excess of \$250,000 earned by Vendo from the assets sold. In addition, Stoner Investments was to be paid during this same ten-year period 25% of all monies Vendo was to receive from foreign production of products then under development by Stoner Investments. As we said in *McDonald's* (supra at p 75), during that period of time which defendants "seek to avail themselves of the beneficial provisions of their . . . contract, they should not be permitted to disregard or refuse to abide by the several obligations they assumed." Surely under these facts, and in view of the complete ownership of Stoner Investments by Stoner and his wife, and Stoner's complete dominion of the corporation, we must consider the covenants of each to be coextensive to be meaningful. In short, the sale of assets to Vendo represented a transaction which the parties contemplated would take ten years to consummate. The ten year restraints are therefore "in-term" under the teaching of *McDonald's* and other cases, and are valid and enforceable.

Defendants argue that the noncompetition clauses were not in fact violated by their conduct. They reason that the conduct complained of consisted only of paying salaries, making loans, furnishing sites and facilities, and holding stock, and that such activities, since not specifically prohibited, are authorized. Indeed, cases are cited for the proposition that the lending of money to plaintiff's competitor does not violate the lender's covenant not to compete (*Battershell v. Bauer*, 91 Ill App 181, 182 (1900);

*Sineath v. Katzis*, 218 NC 740, 12 SE2d 671, 681 (1941), *Gallup Elec. Light Co. v. Pacific Improvement Co.*, 16 NM 86, 113 P 848, 850 (1911)), that the granting of a lease to a competitor is likewise not tantamount to engaging in competition (*Wineter v. Kite* (Mo App), 397 SW2d 752, 759 (1965); *Ericsen v. Jayette*, 149 Fla 82, 5 So2d 453, 454 (1942), and that both lending *and* leasing is not a violation of such a covenant (*McKeighan Wachter Co. v. Swanson*, 138 Wash 682, 245 P 10, 11 (1926)), *affd* 141 Wash 694, 250 P 353.

[9] Defendants, however, have done considerably more than merely make loans and leases to a competitor. They literally paid the salaries of the competitor and its employees, they furnished a building rent-free and guaranteed the loan by which the competitor could purchase another building from them, they took a sizeable amount of stock in the competing venture within days of the time they thought they could legally do so, and they made several large loans at no or low interest. Clearly, these activities show that defendants were closer than arm's length to the development of the Lektro-Vend machine. To suggest otherwise attributes a great deal of naiveté to this court. Even the cases cited by defendants are expressly limited to those situations where the defendant lender or defendant-lessor does not encourage and has no interest in the business of the competitor. E. g., *Gallup Elec. Light Co. v. Pacific Improvement Co.* (supra at p 851); *Sineath v. Katzis* (supra); *McKeighan Wachter Co. v. Swanson* (supra); *Wineteer v. Kite* (supra).

We sustain the trial court's finding that defendants' activities amounted to the direct or indirect entering into or engaging in the vending machine business.

#### The Assessment of Damages

As noted above, the trial court entered judgment against Stoner and Stoner Investments for \$1,100,000, and against Stoner alone for \$250,000. The larger judgment was based

upon evidence tending to show that the value of the Lektro-Vend machine was approximately \$1,500,000 that Stoner himself believed this to be what the machine was fairly worth and that the approximate cost necessary to develop such a machine would be \$400,000. The machine thus represented a potential profit to its developers, as it then stood, of \$1,100,000. The \$250,000 judgment represented a return of the entire salary Stoner received during his five years of employment by Vendo.

Although the judgment order did not specifically apply these judgments between the two theories of recovery set forth in Vendo's complaint, as amended, the briefs and arguments of the parties in this court have treated the \$1,100,000 judgment as arising out of the trade secret theory, and the \$250,000 as applicable to the breach of the covenants not to compete. We agree that this appears to have been the reasoning of the trial court.

Our conclusion that Vendo has not proven a theft or appropriation of a trade secret precludes any recovery on that theory. We are thus limited to ascertaining the proper measure of damages for the breach of the covenants not to compete.

[10] At the outset, we agree that such a breach of Stoner's fiduciary undertaking as an employee in the instant case requires a forfeiture of salary during the period that the breach was occurring. *Ely v. King-Richardson Co.*, 265 Ill 148, 153, 106 NE 619 (1914); *National Lock Co. v. Aldeen*, 271 Ill App 37, 40 (1933); *Evangelista v. Queens Structure Corp.*, 27 Misc2d 962, 212 NYS2d 781 (1961); *Harry R. Defler Corp. v. Kleeman*, 19 App Div2d 396, 243 NYS2d 930, 938 (1963). In fact, none of the parties seriously question this general rule, their main dispute being to define the period of the breach. Plaintiff contends that the breach began immediately after the signing of the sales and employment agreements, but before the take-over, when Stoner spoke to the business representative of the union representing the plant employees for the alleged purpose of



frustrating the sale. Plaintiff thus urges that all of Stoner's salary during his five-year employment, or \$250,000, should be recoverable. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that even if a breach existed, it cannot be traced prior to about January, 1961, the time when defendants began making loans to Rod Phillips. It is our opinion that defendants' view is the more reasonable in this respect.

Nothing came of Stoner's brief conversations with the union representative, even construing them in their worst light, and we attach no legal significance to them. We have more trouble justifying the events of mid-1960, when Bill Phillips began receiving financial aid from defendants to develop his electronic coin detecting device. Even here, however, we cannot conclude that Stoner's activities were a part of his overall breach. A coin detecting device has so many uses outside the vending machine industry (slot machines, coin counters for busses and telephone companies, toll road collectors, parking meters, etc.), that its development is not necessarily a step toward "engaging" in such industry. In any event, this detector was never built or put to use, and its development, as far as the record discloses, did not contribute materially to the evolution of the Lektro-Vend machine. Defendants' breach, therefore, originated at the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, when the extensive loans to Rod Phillips started, when defendants began paying salaries to Rod Phillips' employees, when the Middle Avenue Building was made available for the Phillips' use, and, in short, when the first breaths were blown into the Lektro-Vend machine.

When did the breach end? Defendants say the breach, assuming it existed at all, ended in December, 1962. But defendants would have us overlook the fact that in 1963 they gave the Phillipses the use of the Sullivan Road Plant, and in 1964 they in effect guaranteed the loan which enabled the Phillipses to purchase this plant. This transaction was completed within a few weeks of the end of Stoner's employment contract.

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendants' breach lasted throughout 1961, 1962, 1963, and through May, 1964, a total of approximately three years and five months. Inasmuch as this cause will be remanded for reasons stated below, the trial court will be in a position to make a more precise determination as to the period of the breach and salary forfeiture, having this opinion in mind.

[11, 12] In addition to the recovery of the salary paid Stoner during the breach, Vendo would be entitled to recover any damages to its business occasioned thereby. This would be the measure of lost profits to Vendo during the period of the breach, plus the diminution of its business at the end of the period covered by the covenants. *Mirkovich v. Maravich*, 206 Ill App 463 (1917) (Abst). Other Illinois decisions holding that the measure of damages in such a case is the provable loss to the covenantee, and not the gain accruing to the covenantor by reason of his breach, include *Henry's Drive-In, Inc. v. Anderson*, 37 Ill App2d 113, 125, 185 NE2d 103 (1962); *Stewart v. Challacombe & Ramsey*, 11 Ill App 379, 383 (1882); *Bauwens v. Goethals*, 187 Ill App 563, 567, 568 (1914). See also the annotation in 127 ALR 1152 (1940), where cases from all jurisdictions are cited in support of this general rule.

Conceding the difficulty of ascertaining such damages, we repeat what was said in *Stewart v. Challacombe & Ramsey* (supra, at p 382):

"This difficulty [of ascertaining damages] has long been recognized, and it is for this reason that courts of equity interfere by injunction to restrain parties from entering into trade in violation of such contracts, and for the same reason it has become usual to insert in such agreements a sum certain to be paid in case of violation, as liquidated damages. Such considerations, however, cannot authorize a change of the fundamental rules of law. As was said in *Terry v. Eslora*, 1 Porter, 273, such difficulties 'are intrinsic in the subject about



which the parties have chosen thus loosely to contract.' "

The foregoing language was cited favorably in *Bauwens v. Goethals* (supra. at p. 569), where the court added:

"A party may not sell a prospect for a valuable consideration received and on breach of his contract defend on the ground that the subject-matter is of too uncertain value to permit its measurement in a court of law."

Applying these precedents to the case before us, we see that the value of the Lektro-Vend machine, which the trial court found to be \$1,100,000 after deducting estimated development costs, is neither an element nor a yardstick of damages for a breach of the noncompetition covenants. While this figure may represent the gain to Stoner and his associates, it does not necessarily reflect the damage to the plaintiff. We hold instead that Vendo should be permitted to recover an amount equal to the net profits it lost and might reasonably be expected to lose, plus the amount by which the value of its business will have been diminished as of June 1, 1969, because of defendants' wrongful competition.

[13] On remand, the trial court should determine the extent of these damages. To the extent that the record is wanting of proof on this issue, the court below will entertain further evidence of such damages. A similar situation developed in the appeal of *Henry's Drive-In, Inc. v. Anderson* (supra, at p. 128), where it was said:

"Where a material question is in controversy upon a material issue and the record discloses that all the evidence on that issue has not been produced, this court has the power to reverse the judgment and remand the cause for the taking of further evidence, on the part of either or both of the parties, upon the issues. [Citing cases.] In this case the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court in order that loss of net profits may be proved."

[14] Defendants argue that no damages whatsoever can be assessed against Mr. Stoner, even if he were found to have breached a valid noncompetition covenant, because the employment contract provided that Vendo "shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon thirty (30) days' notice in the event of the substantial violation of the terms hereof by Stoner." Thus, defendants maintain that this provision constitutes an implied waiver by Vendo of its right to damages in the event of a breach, and that Vendo in effect agreed that its only remedy for a substantial breach would be termination of the employment contract. We cannot accept this argument. We see nothing in the contract to suggest that Vendo intended to waive its remedial rights by expressing its right to terminate an employment contract breached by its employee, a right that it would have even without such a provision. Suppose Stoner had literally stolen a large amount of cash from Vendo; would defendants argue that Vendo's only remedy would be to discharge Stoner, and that it would have no right to recover the stolen cash?

#### The Injunctive Relief

The injunctions granted below restrained Stoner and Stoner Investments "from engaging, directly or indirectly" in the vending machine business until June 1, 1969, in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo engaged in such business as of the date of the acquisition of the Stoner plant.

[15] In opposition to this injunctive relief, defendants first argue that there were no allegations or proof as to Vendo's irreparable damage. As respects defendant Stoner, however, we believe a sufficient allegation of irreparable damage is made in paragraph 9 of the complaint, which provides:

"9. That unless restrained by an Injunction of this Court, the defendant, Harry B. Stoner, will continue at his engagement in the foresaid enterprises and cause

continuing irreparable damages to the plaintiff, The Vendo Company, and will cause the plaintiff irreparable damages in the future."

The complaint also prays for injunctive relief against defendant Stoner.

[16] On the other hand, Count II of the complaint, directed against Stoner Investments, is totally silent both as to an allegation of irreparable damage and as to a prayer for injunctive relief. As long as decisions of this court have been reported, it has been held that "a party . . . seeking relief by way of injunction, must specifically pray for such relief, otherwise the court will not aid him." *Willett v. Woodhams*, 1 Ill App 411, 413 (1877). Inasmuch as plaintiff has made no motion to amend either the allegations or the prayer of its complaint in these respects, the court erred in ordering an injunction against the corporate defendant.

[17, 18] As against the individual defendant, Mr. Stoner, we conclude that the injunctive relief was justified. The evidence showing that Lektro-Vend machine's impact on the vending machine industry, coupled with the proof of Stoner's influence in the development of that machine, is ample to warrant the finding, implicit in the issuance of the injunction, that Vendo suffers actual or threatened irreparable injury from Stoner's wrongful activities. Further, we are of the opinion that the scope of the injunction granted is reasonable in light of the evidence adduced at the trial, and is consistent with the allegations and prayer of the complaint. The restraint imposed by the injunction is no more broad than the restraint imposed by Stoner's employment contract, and since we have already concluded that the latter is reasonable in view of the facts before us, we must conclude that the injunction is equally reasonable.

In any event, the injunction is not now in force by reason of the failure to file a bond, and by its terms is to terminate on June 1, 1969. In these circumstances, further comment on this aspect of the appeal is at best gratuitous.

### The Antitrust Defenses and Counterclaim

By way of affirmative defense, it was alleged that the contracts sued upon violated the Illinois and Federal Antitrust laws and were therefore invalid and unenforceable. Defendants also counterclaimed under the Illinois Antitrust laws for treble damages. The trial court, reasoning that a state court has no jurisdiction to hear a federal antitrust defense, struck the defense founded on the federal statutes. The defense and counterclaim based on the Illinois Antitrust law of 1891, which was in force at the time of the contract between the parties, was stricken on the theory that the statute related only to agreements to fix prices and production, neither of which was alleged in these proceedings, and also because the commerce involved was interstate rather than intrastate. The 1965 Illinois Antitrust law was held inapplicable for the additional reason that it had not been enacted until after execution of the agreements sued upon.

In our review of the striking of these pleadings, we shall consider first the defense asserting the federal laws, and thereafter the defense and counterclaim based on the Illinois statutes.

### The Federal Antitrust Defense

[19] It was held below that the Illinois courts are without jurisdiction to consider a defense created by the federal antitrust statutes. We are aware of no Illinois precedent which would support this holding. On the contrary, it appears that the Illinois courts have on more than one occasion passed upon the merits of a defense based on the federal antitrust laws.

In *Corn Products Refining Co. v. Oriental Candy Co.*, 168 Ill App 58 (1912), a contract provided that the plaintiff would, on December 31, deliver a price rebate to the defendant if the latter purchased all of its annual requirements of unmixed corn syrup from the plaintiff. On December



24, the defendant unilaterally deducted the amount of such rebate from a payment due plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit for the amount of the deduction, alleging that the defendant had purchased certain of its syrup requirements from others, and that in any event the rebate was not earned until December 31. As a defense, defendant alleged that the plaintiff was a monopoly in restraint of trade in violation of federal and Illinois law. Although affirming a decision in favor of the plaintiff, the court observed at page 589:

"... if it be a fact that defendant in error was and is an unlawful combination and had violated the Federal Anti-Trust Laws, as charged by plaintiff in error, such fact would not defeat the defendant in error in its suit for the recovery of the purchase price of property sold by it under a contract collateral to such wrong committed by it. In order for such a defense to prevail, the contract sought to be enforced must have been made to further the objects of the illegal combination. This was the rule under the common law, and it is also the rule under The Federal Anti-Trust Law, as declared by the Federal Courts, and by those decisions the courts of this state are bound."

The holding of the Corn Products case is that where the contractual provision sued upon is itself a violation of the federal statutes, the Illinois courts will entertain such a defense, but that the antitrust defense does not afford a defense where it is collateral to the provision sued upon. In any event, the mere fact that the defense is predicated on the federal statutes does not in itself deprive the state court of jurisdiction to hear and pass upon it.

*Merchants Service Corp. v. Libby, McNeill & Libby*, 314 Ill App 121, 40 NE2d 835 (1942), is another case supporting our view that the court below erred in striking the federal antitrust defense on the pleadings. There, in a suit for unpaid brokerage commissions, the defense asserted that

the payment of the commissions would violate the Robinson-Patman Act, the federal law prohibiting certain pricing discriminations. While the contract between the parties predated the federal act, the sales giving rise to the disputed commissions were made after the legislation. The court stated that the principal question was the applicability of the statute where the sales contracts were initiated before the sales completed after the effective date of the act. After holding that Congress intended to cover such transactions, and that this would not violate the Constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts, the court reversed the trial court and entered judgment in favor of the defendant, saying at page 129:

"... defendant could not pay and plaintiff could not receive or accept the commissions or price discounts for which this action is brought without violating the plain provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act."

See also, *Cummings-Landau Laundry Mach. Co. v. Koplin*, 316 Ill App 306, 44 NE2d 613 (1942) (Abst), *affd in part and revd in part on other grounds*, 386 Ill 368, 54 NE2d 462 (1944).

On the strength of the foregoing Illinois authorities, in opposition to which the plaintiff has not cited a single Illinois case, we hold that the trial court erred in striking the federal antitrust defense without a hearing. Plaintiff's reliance on *Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.*, 330 US 743 (1947), is misplaced, since that decision in no way considered a state court's jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate a federal antitrust defense to a contract action. Instead, that case dealt only with the specific remedies afforded by the Robinson-Patman Act, and in no way distinguished between the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts.

#### The Illinois Antitrust Defenses and Counterclaim

[20] The principal question here is not whether the Illinois Antitrust laws have been violated, but instead



whether the interstate nature of the parties' businesses renders these state laws inapplicable under the doctrine of federal preemption. If the question be resolved in the negative, it would be necessary to consider the merits of the defenses and counterclaim based thereon.

We believe that *Kosuga v. Kelly*, 27 F2d 48 (7th Cir 1958), affd 358 US 516 (1959), rehearing den, 359 US 962, is dispositive of this question in favor of plaintiff. In *Kosuga*, the plaintiff brought suit for the purchase price of onions sold by it to the defendant. The allegation that the contract violated the Illinois Anti-trust laws was pleaded as an affirmative defense. The District Court struck this as well as other defenses, and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In affirming the striking of this defense, the Court of Appeals announced at page 55:

*"The Illinois Act as the substantive law of the State is applicable only to intrastate commerce. Defendant apparently so recognizes and argues that such commerce was involved inasmuch as the contract of sale was made and was to be performed in the State of Illinois. Defendant makes this argument in spite of the apparently so recognizes and argues that such frequent allegations in his pleadings that 'said onions which were the subject of said agreement and contract were a part of interstate commerce.' In 15 CJS Commerce § 133(b), it is stated that 'state anti-trust laws do not apply to transactions involving interstate commerce . . . .' It is hardly open to doubt but that the transaction in issue involved interstate commerce. It is, therefore, our view that the Illinois Act is without application."* (Emphasis added.)

Nowhere have defendants pleaded or argued that the commerce involved here is anything but interstate. Indeed, the business covered by the contracts before us is not only interstate, it is international. It follows, under the doctrine announced in *Kosuga*, that the trial court properly struck

the affirmative defenses and counterclaim founded on alleged violations of the Illinois Anti-trust laws.

It should be noted that defendants attempted without success to distinguish *Kosuga* by arguing in their brief that "the only reason the Seventh Circuit held the Illinois Anti-Trust Act inapplicable was because it *was not* pleaded as a defense to the action." (Emphasis in original.) Not so. The opinion of that court specifically states in at least two passages that the defendant's reliance on the Illinois Anti-trust laws was before the court by way of "affirmative defense." (See pages 50, 55.) We read nothing in the opinion to suggest that this defense was not pleaded, contrary to defendants' assertion without citation.

Our conclusion that the Illinois Antitrust laws are inapplicable renders unnecessary any discussion as to the interpretation of these laws and the remedies which they provide either by way of counterclaim or affirmative defense.

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  
MORAN, P. J. and ABRAHAMSON, J., concur.

**Transcript Of Proceedings In  
Vendo Co. v. Stoner (state court suit)**

[Trial hearings (second trial) before Judge John S. Petersen began April 9, 1971.]

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

[3003] (Pursuant to notice previously served on plaintiff's attorneys, Mr. Sheridan moved to dismiss without prejudice defendants' sixth affirmative defense as amended, that is, the federal anti-trust defense. There being no objection, the Court entered its order that the motion be granted.)

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION**

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<b>LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware corporation, HARRY B. STONER, and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation,</b>	}	
	Plaintiffs,	
v.		
<b>THE VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri corporation,</b>	}	
	Defendant.	

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No. 65 C 1755

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

(Filed June 1, 1971)

On August 10, 1965, suit was instituted in the state court by the Vendo Company, charging Harry B. Stoner and the Stoner Investments Company with breach of contract. The specific grievance concerns two non-competition for ten year clauses, which formed the part of a sale of business between these parties. The complaint alleged a breach in that Stoner and the Stoner Investments Company had given financial aid and advice to the Lektro-Vend Corporation. Lektro-Vend and Vendo sell vending machines. As part of their answer, Stoner and Stoner Investments asserted a federal anti-trust defense. 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 2.

On October 21, 1965, Stoner and Stoner Investments, plus Lektro-Vend, instituted a federal anti-trust suit in this court. The facts and issues are substantially identical with the state court proceeding.

Circuit Court Judge Peterson struck the federal anti-trust defense on the grounds that he had no jurisdiction over the defense. This decision was reversed by the Appellate Court. *The Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill. App.2d 261,

296-7 (1969). The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination of the contract cause of action in light of the federal anti-trust defense. The case now presents a conflict in the comity between our bipartite judicial system. A single issue is now before two courts for resolution, the only ostensible difference being that damages are sought in this court on the anti-trust claim, while the anti-trust allegation in the state court is raised as a defense.

### I

The plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment based on the theory that the two non-competition clauses, since they apply wherever Vendo does business, are unreasonable and thus a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. Section 1. However, even if they are unreasonable, this may not be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. *Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F.T.C.*, 321 F.2d 825, 837 (7th Cir. 1963). In this case, we have the further problem that plaintiffs want the court to presume the required motive and intent from the scant evidence it presents. But summary procedures should not be used to dispose of a complicated anti-trust case, especially where motive and intent play a leading role. *Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System*, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); *Granader v. Public Bank*, 417 F.2d 75, 83 (6th Cir. 1969). The court is of the opinion that there are still triable issues concerning the alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1, and summary judgment is not appropriate.

### II

Defendant has moved for summary judgment based on three theories.

The first theory is that the Illinois Appellate Court decided that the clauses in question were not in restraint of trade. *The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, supra*. The defendant, therefore, asserts that the plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. But as is clear from the opinion,

the Illinois court never reached the merits of the federal anti-trust issue. Rather than that, the court remanded the issue to the trial court. *Vendo, supra*, pp. 297, 299. Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply.

The second ground asserted is that the president of Lektro-Vend, Mr. Phillip, stated that his company is not in competition with the defendant. While this is seemingly a damaging admission, this court cannot hold that it is conclusive. This issue will be better resolved by a trial on the merits.

Finally, the defendant attacks the standing of the plaintiffs to bring this suit. The defendant alleges that there is no proof of any damages since Lektro-Vend received financial aid and advice from Stoner. This defense goes to the merits and is an inappropriate basis for summary judgment.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' motion and the defendant's motion for summary judgment are hereby denied.

### III

Counsel for the plaintiffs have recently brought to our attention the fact that they have withdrawn their federal anti-trust defense in the state court. This was undoubtedly done in consideration of this court's expressed reluctance to consider the cause of action here while the same issue was pending between the same parties in the state court case. But this withdrawal of the issue does not completely eliminate the problem of res judicata. A time honored United States Supreme Court opinion by Justice Field stated:

In the former case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or



*demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose....* Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever. *Cromwell v. County of Sac*, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876). (Emphasis added)

See also *Granader v. Public Bank*, *supra*.

This court views the theory of res judicata as an attempt "to require a plaintiff to try his whole cause of action and his whole case at one time." *Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips*, 274 U.S. 316, 320 (1927). This duty is equally incumbent upon the defendant, for he should not split up his alleged claim and assert part of it as an affirmative defense and another part of it for affirmative relief. Clearly, Vendo could not do this as plaintiff in the state court, so neither should the defendants. *Phillips, supra*.

The court views the facts of this case as a bipartite litigation of one cause of action. The one element which separates this from the normal situation is that plaintiffs are defendants in the state court. What we have here is a single contract which the plaintiffs Stoner and Stoner Investments claim violates their legal rights. Thus, they claim, the contract should be declared null and void, or if enforced, then damages are due them. This is one cause of action because "a cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show." *Phillips, supra*, at 321. See also *Hurn v. Oursler*, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Therefore, under the present fact situation, Stone and Stoner Investments had an alleged right to not only seek to defend against the contract, but also to seek recompense for any actual damages sustained, through the state court proceeding.

Rather than decide this issue *sua sponte*, the court directs the parties to brief the issue of whether plaintiff is now precluded from asserting his federal anti-trust claim in the

federal court by the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, defendant The Vendo Company is given fifteen (15) days from the date of this order to submit a brief on this issue, plaintiffs Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments fifteen (15) days to answer, and defendant ten (10) days to reply.

ENTER:

/s/ FRANK J. MCGARR  
United States District Judge

DATED: June 1, 1971

**MINUTE ORDER**

(Entered June 1, 1971)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

Pursuant to memorandum opinion and order entered this day, the motions of plaintiffs and defendant for summary judgment are hereby denied. The parties are ordered to brief the issue of whether plaintiff is now precluded from asserting his federal anti-trust claim in the federal court by the doctrine of res judicata on the briefing schedule set out in the memorandum opinion. —DRAFT

/s/ McGARR, J.

**Second Judgment In Vendo Co. v. Stoner (state court suit)**  
**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTEENTH**  
**JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS**

**THE VENDO COMPANY,**  
 a foreign corporation,

Plaintiff

v.

**HARRY B. STONER and**  
**STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,**  
 a foreign corporation,

Defendants

No. 65-2134

**JUDGMENT**

(Filed August 13, 1971)

This cause coming on to be heard on the remand from the Appellate Court of the Second District, in accordance with the Mandate of that Court filed herein and being guided by the Opinion of the Appellate Court (*The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, et al.*, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261), which Opinion and Mandate are the law of this case, and referring particularly to the language of the Appellate Court as found on pages 290 and 291 of said opinion, this trial court will not go into detail as to all of the cases cited by Counsel on both sides in the respective motions and briefs and oral arguments.

But this trial court, constantly laboring in the vineyard of litigation and being fully aware of our adversary proceedings with all Counsels' desire to win for their respective clients, is fully aware that none of the spoken words of the witnesses in print will ever portray the feelings, animosity, and almost venom that the Court's attaches and the trial judge witnessed, the hostility that prevails in many cases; and in this case even to observe one defense witness; namely, John Brothers, who had documented his testimony and was reading from his notes, could but give one firm impression to this trial judge, that notwithstanding the trial court's original hearing of the testimony and findings,

the Appellate Court's affirmation of liability, the refusal of the Supreme Court to accept the appeal leaves the trial court with one definite conclusion: That notwithstanding the aforesaid is the defendants' desire to relitigate the question of liability. The only saving feature for the trial judge is the factor that Counsel for the defendants, as well as Counsel for the plaintiff, being officers of this Court, did exercise the expertise of competent Counsel, even though the defendant and defendant's witnesses wanted to relitigate liability previously fixed.

Counsel for the defendant and defendants, as officers of the Court, waited until the last moment before this remand hearing commenced, although the case had been set at numerous times at Defense Counsels' convenience, to finally announce to the trial court that the defendants were withdrawing their Sixth Affirmative Defense, which point is forcibly brought out on page 38 of the oral argument, wherein Defense Counsel and the trial court discuss the Sixth Affirmative Defense. And it would appear that Defense Counsel agrees with the trial court on that particular defense, thereby leaving the question of liability and damages on three points, again referred to on pages 290 and 291 of the aforesaid Appellate Court Opinion.

And this Court, as it appeared in one of the cases cited by Plaintiff, quoting Defense Counsel referred to the instruction found in practically all civil cases:

"In considering the evidence in this case, you are not required to set aside your own observation and experience in the affairs of life, but you have a right to consider all of the evidence in the light of your own observation and experience in the affairs of life."

And having admitted the testimony of experts in this case and in the case entitled Merchants National Bank of Aurora, Appellee, v. The Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company, et al., Appellants, in which the Appellate Court affirmed this trial judge and to find the Supreme Court

likewise affirmed the Appellate and Trial Courts on the admission of expert testimony, and having considered the evidence offered, while not being in full accord with the Appellate Court's directive as to the length of time of the Defendant Stoner's breach of his contract, but feeling bound by the Appellate Court directive, This Court Does Find from a preponderance of credible evidence as to each item of damage in favor of the Plaintiff, The Vendo Company, and that the Plaintiff, The Vendo Company, sustained damages to its business occasioned by Stoner and Stoner's alter ego, Stoner Investments, breach as follows:

(1) The salary forfeiture is the sum of \$170,835.00;

(2) That the loss of profits to the Plaintiff Vendo during the period of the breach and by the reason thereof are \$2,135,000.00; and

(3) That the diminution in the value of Vendo's business as of June 1, 1969, by reason of the breach is \$5,210,500.00.

Whereby It is Ordered, Adjudged And Decreed as follows:

(1) That the Plaintiff Vendo Company does have and recover of the Defendant Harry B. Stoner the sum of \$170,853.00;

(2) That the Vendo Company does have and recover of the Defendant Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., a corporation, the sum of \$7,363,500.00; and

(3) That the Plaintiff Vendo Company does have and recover its costs as to each judgment aforesaid and that execution issue forthwith.

Entered: August 13, 1971.

/s/ JOHN S. PETERSEN

Judge



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware corporation, HARRY B. STONER, and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation,	} Plaintiffs,	No. 65 C 1755
v.		
THE VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri corporation,	} Defendant.	

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

[Filed October 21, 1971]

This is a complex anti-trust case involving allegations of monopoly and restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 2. Plaintiffs Stoner and Stoner Investments are defendants in a state court breach of contract suit filed by the defendant Vendo. As an affirmative defense to the state suit, Stoner and Stoner Investments claimed that the contract sued on violated the anti-trust laws. The state court struck the defense, but was reversed. *The Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill. App.2d 261, 296-97 (1969). After this decision was rendered, Stoner withdrew the defense in the state court. The case presently before this court encompasses issues which are broader than any presented in the anti-trust defense.

This court was concerned about the res judicata implications of the state breach of contract suit vis-a-vis the federal anti-trust issues, and asked the parties to brief the question. It is clear that the plaintiff cannot be precluded from asserting its anti-trust cause of action in the federal court. The allegations in this suit transcend the allegations in the state court suit, and the relief sought is more

extensive. A less obvious determination is whether the plaintiffs are now precluded from offering as an element of damages any part of a possible state court award. The court is now satisfied, based in large part on its own research, that the two causes of action involved here are sufficiently dissimilar to negate any application of the doctrine of res judicata.

ENTER:

/s/ FRANK J. MCGARR  
United States District Judge

DATED: October 21, 1971

Opinion of Illinois Appellate Court for the  
Second Judicial District in *Vendo Co. v. Stoner*,  
13 Ill. App. 3d 291, 300 N.E. 2d 632 (1973)

THE VENDO COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARRY  
B. STONER *et al.*, Defendants-Appellants.

(No. 71-396; Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and  
remanded.)

Second District—May 29, 1973.

*Rehearing denied September 12, 1973.*

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon.  
JOHN S. PETERSEN, Judge, presiding.

MR. JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON delivered the opinion of the  
court:

Plaintiff ("Vendo") brought this action in August 1965 in the circuit court of Kane County to recover damages for defendants' breach of non-competition covenants. By amendments to the complaint filed a few months later, Vendo alleged theft by defendants of valuable trade secrets and appropriation of them to their own use and to that of Lektro-Vend Corporation. Following a bench trial the court entered judgment against both defendants, Harry Stoner ("Stoner") and Stoner Investments, Inc. ("Stoner Investments") for \$1,100,000 and costs and against Stoner for \$250,000. (An injunction was also entered which is not now an issue.) On appeal, after holding that Vendo had no trade secret and was therefore not entitled to any damages for its theft, we affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to determine damages for breach of the covenants not to compete consistent with the views expressed in our opinion. *Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill.App.2d 261.

At the conclusion of the trial on remand the court entered judgment against both defendants for \$7,345,500 and costs and against Stoner, individually, for \$170,835 and costs.

Our opinion on the prior appeal presents the relevant facts and sets forth the pertinent non-competition provisions of the sales agreement and the employment contract. (*Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill.App.2d at 267-268.) Therefore they need not be restated here. However, we will advert in this opinion to evidence adduced at the trial on remand.

The principal question presented is whether the judgment against both defendants for \$7,345,500 is contrary to the law of the case established by the prior appeal, and whether it is outside of the issues framed by the complaint.

It would unduly prolong this opinion to set forth in detail the evidence as to damages received by the court (over defendants' objections).<sup>1</sup> We will confine ourselves to summarizing the evidence when necessary. Perhaps the nature of Vendo's evidence as to damages on remand can be succinctly indicated by Vendo's counsel's own words in his opening statement as being: (a) "What Vendo lost by way of sales by not having this (Lektro-Vend) machine, if that resulted from the conduct of Mr. Stoner," and (b) "the depreciation—or the diminution of the value of the company as of 1969 as a result of Mr. Stoner's activity and the failure to have the Lektro-Vend machine if that resulted from Mr. Stoner's activity."

In its complaint Vendo pleaded two theories of liability: (a) theft of a trade secret, and (b) breach of the covenants not to compete by directly or indirectly entering into the vending machine business through Lektro-Vend. In the first appeal we held that Vendo had no trade secret, and that the judgment which was predicated upon the theory of its theft was erroneous. However, we held that the non-competition covenants were valid and that they were breached by defendants, stating: "We are thus limited to ascertaining the proper measure of damages for breach of

<sup>1</sup> The record in this case is voluminous; the abstract of the record alone of the trial on remand consists of 598 pages; the book of exhibits on re-trial is about 2" thick.



the covenants not to compete." (*Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill. App.2d at 288.) We further stated at page 291: "[T]he value of the Lektro-Vend machine, [upon which the earlier judgment of \$1,100,000 was based] \* \* \* is neither an element nor a yardstick of damages for a breach of the non-competition covenants," and held instead that "Vendo should be permitted to recover an amount equal to the net profits it lost and might reasonably be expected to lose, plus the amount by which the value of its business will have been diminished as of June 1, 1969, because of defendants' wrongful competition."

At the trial on remand Vendo made no attempt to prove lost profits caused by defendants' "wrongful competition". Instead, it relied principally on the testimony of two experts, both of whom acknowledged that their theory for the computation of damages was loss of sales from the absence of a FIFO<sup>2</sup> machine and that Stoner was responsible for Vendo's lack of such machine. These experts relied substantially on a report made by Vendo's manager of business research making estimates of percentage of the confection vendor market taken over by FIFO vendors as distinguished from the older drop-shelf type. This very report warned that it did not include a sufficient number of operators to make a determination, and that therefore "inferences concerning competitive positions within the total market should be avoided." The figures of both experts on lost profits and on diminution of the value of the business were premised on Vendo's failure to have FIFO, and on Stoner's responsibility for such failure.

Neither the evidence in the first trial nor in the trial on remand establishes that Stoner was responsible for Vendo's failure to have FIFO. Our prior opinion describes Vendo's unsuccessful efforts to build a FIFO in 1959-60 (*Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill. App.2d at 271-273), and, at page 274,

<sup>2</sup> FIFO equals "first-in-first-out", i.e. a machine where the first product stocked would be the first one sold.

Stoner's recommendation in March 1963 for Vendo's purchase of Lektro-Vend's FIFO machine. When Stoner's recommendation was rejected, he told Vendo that the future will show that Vendo's failure to acquire it was "a serious mistake". Vendo had decided against developing a FIFO twice before that occasion.

After 1963 Vendo continued to reject the development of a FIFO machine, even after repeated urging by its salesmen. At the time of the trial on remand, April-May, 1971, Vendo was finally almost ready to begin production with a FIFO snack vender. This development resulted as a spin-off from its contract with Lance Company, a large buyer of vending machines on a bid contract basis.

1 Vendo's failure to have a FIFO vending machine is not attributable to defendants. The computation of damages for a loss of profits during defendants' breach and the diminution in the value of its business was not based on defendants' "wrongful competition" and therefore did not conform to the decision and mandate of this court. (*Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill. App.2d at 291.) On reversal of a judgment and remand by a court of appellate jurisdiction the trial court can take only such proceedings as conform to the judgment of the reviewing court. *People ex rel. Bauer v. Henry*, 10 Ill.2d 324; *Berry v. Lewis*, 27 Ill.2d 61, 62-63; *Fiore v. City of Highland Park*, 93 Ill. App.2d 23, 34.

2, 3 Lost profits in a non-competition case are those which were diverted from the plaintiff as a result of defendants' sales as plaintiff's competitor (*Long v. O'Bryan*, 28 Ky. L.Rep. 1062, 91 S.W. 659, 660; *Stewart v. Challacombe & Ramsey*, 11 Ill. App. 379, 382), and plaintiff's damages must be such as were sustained by defendant's breach of contract and were a "normal and proximate consequence of the breach \* \* \*" (*Hitchcock v. Anthony*, 83 F. 779, 783.) Although liberality may be used in estimating damages after it has been shown that they were caused by illegal acts, "this liberality does not extend to proof that the damages were caused by the illegal acts." (*Dantzler v.*



*Dictograph Products, Inc.*, 309 F.2d 326, 330, *cert. denied*, 372 U.S. 970.) The fact that Vendo suffered losses subsequent to defendants' breach of the non-competition covenants does not of itself establish a casual connection. The damages recoverable by Vendo are only those which are a normal and proximate consequence of defendants' breach of those covenants.

4, 5 Diminution in the value of the business is the amount by which the value of the good will of the business has been impaired at the end of the term of the non-competition covenants. (*Bauwens v. Goethals*, 187 Ill.App. 563, 572; see also, *McCook Window Co. v. Hardwood Door Corp.*, 52 Ill. App.2d 278, 287-288.) If upon remand Vendo fails or is unable to prove any lost profits or diminution of business "because of defendants' wrongful competition" it would be entitled to recover only nominal damages. *Maren v. Wolmer*, 343 Ill. App. 353 (abstract opinion); *Scotton v. Wright*, 32 Del. 192, 121 A. 180, 185; *Shaw v. Jones, Newton & Co.*, 133 Ga. 446, 66 S.E. 240, 242.

A further contention of defendants is, in effect, that because of additional facts adduced after remand, the judgment of \$170,835 entered against Stoner individually is erroneous. A discussion of defendants' argument will not serve any useful purpose and would only prolong this opinion. We need only state that in entering that judgment the trial court complied with our mandate on the prior appeal as it was bound to do. (*Sawicki v. Clemons*, 411 Ill. 28, 30; *People v. Militzer*, 301 Ill. 284, 287.) Defendants had ample opportunity to introduce at the first trial any pertinent evidence relative to the facts upon which that liability was predicated. They did not do so. There must be an end of litigation somewhere and the judgment of \$170,835 is affirmed.

Defendant further argues that the trial court (before the trial on remand) should have allowed defendants' motion to reinstate their Illinois anti-trust defenses and counterclaim. In our prior opinion we affirmed the trial court's

striking of these affirmative defenses and counterclaim bounded on alleged violation of Illinois anti-trust laws. (*Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill.App.2d at 298,299.)<sup>3</sup> Subsequent to this court's prior opinion the Illinois legislature enacted section 7.9 amending the Illinois Antitrust Act, effective July 1, 1969 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, sec. 60—7.9) to provide as follows:

"No action under this Act shall be barred on the grounds that the activities or conduct complained of in any way affects or involves interstate or foreign commerce."

The Attorney General of Illinois, as *amicus curiae*, supports plaintiff's argument on this point.

6 Even if it be assumed that the State legislature had the authority to enact this amendatory provision, we are unable to ascribe to it retroactive application to contracts entered into five years earlier. Our affirmance in the prior opinion of the trial court's dismissal of the State antitrust defense and counterclaim became the law of the case on remand. The trial court properly refused to allow reinstatement of the defense and counterclaim based on the amendment of the Illinois Antitrust Act.

In view of our decision we regard it as unnecessary to discuss other contentions of the parties.

The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

GUILD, P. J. and T. MORAN, J., concur.

<sup>3</sup> In that opinion we also held at page 297 that the trial court erred in striking the federal antitrust defenses without a hearing. Before trial on remand defendants by leave of court dismissed that defense without prejudice. *Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 105 Ill. App.2d 261, 297.

**Opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in *Vendo Co. v. Stoner*,  
58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E. 2d 1 (1974)**

(No. 46228, 46231 cons.—Appellate court reversed;  
circuit court affirmed.)

THE VENDO COMPANY, Appellant and Appellee, v.  
HARRY B. STONER *et al.*, Appellants and Appellees.

*Opinion filed Sept. 27, 1974.—Modified on denial of  
rehearing Nov. 27, 1974.*

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District;  
heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of  
Kane County; the Hon. John S. Petersen, Judge, presiding.

MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is the outgrowth of litigation which commenced in 1965 with the filing of a complaint in the circuit court of Kane County by plaintiff, The Vendo Company, against Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., a company of which Stoner is the president and whose sole stockholders are Stoner and his wife.

The case was tried without a jury and resulted in a judgment against Stoner in the amount of \$250,000 and a judgment against Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., of \$1,100,000. An appeal was taken by defendants to the Appellate Court for the Second District, and that court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the cause for further hearings with respect to the amount of damages properly recoverable by the plaintiff. (*Vendo Co. v. Stoner* (1969), 105 Ill. App. 2d 261.) Plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal which was denied by this court.

Following the hearings on remand the circuit court entered a judgment against Stoner for \$170,835 and a judgment against both defendants for \$7,345,500. The case was again appealed to the appellate court by defendants. That court affirmed the judgment awarding damages against Stoner individually, but it reversed the judgment rendered

against the two defendants jointly for \$7,345,500, and remanded the cause for additional hearings as to the amount of damages. (*Vendo Co. v. Stoner* (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 291.) Each party filed a petition for leave to appeal, and each petition was allowed.

The intricate and prolonged litigation now before us concerns the development and marketing of a new and successful type of candy-vending machine by a concern called Lektro-Vend, allegedly with the active support of each defendant, during the period when Stoner was an employee and a director of plaintiff. Before discussing the two decisions hitherto rendered and the contentions now made by the parties, it is necessary to review various events which took place in 1959 and thereafter.

In April of 1959 the defendant Harry B. Stoner was the president and the controlling owner of Stoner Manufacturing Corporation, an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Aurora, Illinois, and a predecessor of the corporate defendant here. Stoner Manufacturing Corporation had been engaged for many years in the business of making and selling candy-vending machines throughout the United States. The plaintiff, a Missouri corporation located in Kansas City, Missouri, was at that time engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling vending machines designed to handle beverages, ice cream, and various other products. It did not make a machine for vending candy, but at least as early as 1958 it had considered the possibility of making a candy-vending machine, and had undertaken some research into that matter.

In April, 1959, plaintiff and Stoner Manufacturing Corporation entered into a contract for the purchase by plaintiff of the assets of the corporation, including inventions, patents, drawings, designs, and research and development work. Plaintiff's purpose in making the acquisition was in part to add a candy-vending machine to its line. So far as Harry B. Stoner was concerned, the motive for the sale



appears to have arisen from a concern that the poor state of his health would prevent him from continuing in the active direction of his company.

Under the sale agreement plaintiff was to pay the Stoner Manufacturing Corporation \$3,400,000 in cash and to deliver to it 60,000 shares of plaintiff's stock. The land and the property constituting the Stoner Manufacturing Corporation plant was leased to plaintiff at a stipulated rental for 10 years with an option of renewal for a like period. Plaintiff was also given an option to purchase the property on or after December 31, 1961.

Plaintiff agreed to pay annually, for a period of 10 years or until such time as it might exercise its option to purchase the plant, all profits in excess of \$250,000 realized from the use of the assets being purchased. Any amount theretofore paid by plaintiff out of profits was to be credited upon the purchase of the plant. Plaintiff further agreed to pay, for a period of 10 years, 25% of the income received from foreign sales realized from the use of the assets being purchased.

The corporation agreed to use its best efforts to preserve its business organization intact, and to keep available to plaintiff the services of its present officers and employees.

The sales contract contained several restrictions on competition by the selling corporation. The contract specified:

"From and after the closing, the Company [i.e., Stoner Manufacturing Corporation] will not own, directly or indirectly, manage, operate, join, control or participate in the ownership, management, operation or control of, or be connected in any manner with, any business engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines under any name similar to the Company's present name, and, for a period of ten (10) years after the closing, the Company will not in any manner, directly or indirectly, enter into or engage in

the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo or any affiliate or subsidiary is so engaged, in the manufacture and sale of vending machines or any business similar to that now being conducted by the Company. The Company also agrees that during its corporate existence it will, without incurring any financial obligation, co-operate with Vendo to prevent the use by others of the names 'Stoner' and 'Stoner Mfg. Corp.' in connection with any business similar to that now carried on by the Company and also agrees not to disclose to others, or make use of, directly or indirectly any formulae or process now owned or used by the Company."

On June 1, 1959, Stoner executed an employment contract with plaintiff. The contract recited plaintiff's desire to employ Stoner's services, and it stated that the value of his services consisted of his "advice and counsel in the operation of the Aurora, Illinois, facility, and his know-how, experience and reputation in the vending machine field."

A paragraph of the employment contract also contained a limitation on competition. It provided:

"5. During the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following the termination of his employment hereunder, whether by lapse of time or by termination as hereinafter provided, Stoner shall not directly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company [i.e., the Vendo Company] or its subsidiaries or affiliates is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities, enter into or engage in the vending machine manufacturing business or any branch thereof, either as an individual on his own account, or as a partner or joint venturer, or as an employee, agent or salesman for any person, firm or corporation or as an officer or director of a corpo-



ration or otherwise, provided however that the Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates shall be excluded from the restrictions hereof and provided also that Stoner shall be permitted to own, hold, acquire and dispose of stocks and other securities which are traded in the investment security market whether on listed exchanges or over the counter."

The candy-vending machine which was being manufactured by Stoner Manufacturing Corporation at the time it sold its assets to plaintiff in 1959 was a model which is called a "drop shelf" machine in the jargon of the trade. The "Lektro-Vend" model subsequently developed by the Lektro-Vend Company possessed three significant advantages over the drop-shelf model which made it popular and successful with companies, known as "operators," who purchase and service vending machines. The first of these advantages was that the machine could sell candy bars in the same order in which it had been stocked, a method called "FIFO," standing for first-in, first-out. The FIFO design produced savings to the operator by reducing the risk of having to vend or to discard stale items, and reducing the frequency of service calls to restock the machine. The second advantage of the Lektro-Vend model was that it permitted a continuous visible display of the item which was next to be vended. Thirdly, the Lektro-Vend employed a type of construction which permitted more than one type of product to be stocked on a single conveyor, thus eliminating the need to exhaust one product line before replacing it with a second. While each of these traits had been in existence for some years, Lektro-Vend was the first to combine all of them in a single machine having a practical design.

As a result of research into the possibility of developing a vending machine of this character, plaintiff, in August, 1959, had built two developmental models, sketches of which were shown to Stoner. Representatives of plaintiff, while agreeing on the desirability of developing a machine with

such capabilities, considered his particular prototype to be defective in certain mechanical respects and also as being too expensive to produce. The research project for the machine was accordingly shelved.

In mid-1960, two engineering employees of plaintiff, Rod Phillips and his son William, each of whom had been employed by the Stoner Manufacturing Corporation prior to the date of the sale of its assets to plaintiff, became dissatisfied with their job situation with plaintiff and resigned. At this time certain disagreements had developed between Stoner and plaintiff as to Stoner's role in plaintiff's operations, which Stoner considered should be more than the merely advisory function to which plaintiff had, in his view, assigned him.

No evidence was introduced to show that Stoner played any part in inducing the resignation of either of these employees of plaintiff, but each of them approached Stoner after his resignation, and solicited his financial support in the design and development of certain devices. William Phillips, in mid-1960, induced Stoner to pay him a salary while he designed an electronic coin-detecting device. The machine, as the appellate court concluded, had no functional relation with the subsequent development of the Lektro-Vend machine, and consequently has no bearing on the claim made by plaintiff against defendants.

In late 1960 or early 1961, however, Rod Phillips approached Stoner with a request that Stoner provide financial support to cover the development of a vending machine, of the new type which has already been described, and Stoner agreed to do so. Stoner testified that the understanding was that Phillips would own the machine, if it were developed, and would be entitled to any profits earned from it. There is no confirmation of Stoner's testimony in this regard. Rod Phillips was not called as a witness because of a medical representation that his physical condition was unsatisfactory. While a stipulation was entered on the record as to what his testimony would have been

had he appeared, the stipulated testimony did not refer to the prospective ownership of the machine.

Interest-free loans which aggregated some \$200,000 were made to Philips by Stoner Investments during 1961 and 1962. Some of these funds were used to buy equipment necessary for the engineering of the machine. Stoner also made available rent-free a building owned by him for use in conducting the development work. In 1961, when two more former employees of Stoner Construction Corporation, who had had experience in design and toolmaking, resigned from employment with plaintiff, they joined Rod and William Phillips on the research and development project. They received monthly salaries aggregating \$1,150 from Stoner Investments.

By October, 1962, the developmental work on the new machine had progressed to the point where a prototype could be exhibited at a trade show held in San Francisco. The model shown differed in many important respects from and was a major improvement upon the device which plaintiff had worked on in 1958 and 1959, and it won a very favorable reaction in the industry.

Following the trade show, which had been attended by several of plaintiff's personnel, and the return of Rod Phillips to Illinois, several important developments took place. Their sequence and the exact dates when they occurred are not made wholly clear by the evidence, but in main outline they can be summarized as follows.

Shortly before December 18, 1962, on which date plaintiff's board of directors was to meet, Stoner asked the chairman, Elmer Pierson, to be released from his employment contract, stating that he had an opportunity to invest in the manufacture and sale of the Lektro-Vend machine. Stoner did not disclose that he had already been giving support to the development of Lektro-Vend.

Plaintiff refused to release Stoner from his contract. A letter dated January 2, 1963, from Pierson explained the refusal in the following language:

"I have always felt that one of the major advantages of the Stoner acquisition contract, from our standpoint, was the fact that it guaranteed that your design genius and experience would never be coupled with our money to put a new and most formidable competitor into the business against Vendo. I can assure you that nothing has happened in recent years to change our position on this matter in any way. I am sure you will understand."

Pierson went on to say that plaintiff itself had an interest in buying the Lektro-Vend. He asked Stoner to ascertain if Phillips had any interest in selling it, and if so, to set up a meeting between Phillips and representatives of plaintiff. Stoner then wrote one of plaintiff's vice-presidents, Spencer Childers, that Phillips would be willing to sell if the price were high enough. Stoner told plaintiff that Phillips wanted \$1,500,000, and that a third company had expressed a willingness to pay that amount.

A meeting did take place between Phillips and representatives of plaintiff in the later part of January, 1963. The purpose of the meeting was to show plaintiff's representatives how the Lektro-Vend worked, and the record does not indicate that price was discussed. In March, Stoner informed plaintiff that he had told Phillips that he assumed, in the absence of further word from Childers, that plaintiff no longer had had an interest in making the purchase. Childers wrote back on April 9 stating that plaintiff did still have such an interest, but that the asking price of \$1,500,000 was too high. Plaintiff stated that it was, however, prepared to pay a lower price which would be enough to cover development costs and return a fair profit to Phillips and his associates. The record does not indicate whether this counteroffer was transmitted to Phillips. In any event Stoner testified that the "negotiations" between Phillips and plaintiff terminated at this time.



It must be added that the record casts some doubt on whether at this time Phillips seriously entertained any intention of selling the Lektro-Vend design at all, rather than going into the manufacture and sale of these machines himself. Mrs. Ruth Netrey, Stoner's sister-in-law, testified that back in December, 1962, Phillip's had called her to request a loan to assist him in connection with the manufacture of a vending machine he was developing. Mrs. Netrey initially lent Phillips \$350,000, which was later increased to \$525,000, at an interest rate of 4½%. No payment was made on either principal or interest until September, 1963, at which time Mrs. Netrey received a note for the amount due her from the Lektro-Vend Corporation, which had just been organized. The proceeds of the loan were used in part to pay off the loan due Stoner, as Mrs. Netrey and Stoner each knew. Stoner testified that his notes were repaid because he had to "withdraw his support" when Phillips wanted to go into manufacturing.

During 1963 Rod Phillips proceeded with his plans to set up a manufacturing operation, and in March or April Stoner Investments completed the construction of a building in Aurora which was made available to Phillips for this purpose.

Stoner had a further conversation with Pierson in the spring or summer of 1963, in which Pierson inquired as to the actual extent of Stoner's involvement with Phillips. Stoner told him that the relationship had been confined to loans and that these had since been repaid by another person. Stoner did not disclose that this other person was his sister-in-law. This conversation marked the first occasion on which Stoner disclosed any involvement with Lektro-Vend, and the disclosure was far from complete.

The Lektro-Vend Corporation was formed in September. Its original stockholders were Rod Phillips and William Phillips, certain other employees, and Mrs. Netrey, who held 50% of the stock. Neither Stoner personally nor Stoner Investments was a stockholder at that time.

In March, 1964, shortly before Stoner's contract with plaintiff was to lapse, Stoner Investments contracted to sell to Lektro-Vend the new plant which had been built by Stoner Investments during the previous year. The purchase was made with the proceeds of a bank loan which was advanced subject to an agreement by Stoner Investments to guarantee the repurchase of the property in the event of a default on the loan.

Stoner's contract of employment terminated June 1, 1964, and it was not renewed. Although the appellate court in its first opinion states that Stoner remained on the board of plaintiff until the spring of 1965, defendants refer us to testimony by Stoner that he ceased being a director in March or April of 1964, and that testimony was corroborated by testimony of plaintiff's secretary.

On June 10, 1964, Lektro-Vend issued 5,000 shares of stock to Mrs. Stoner, and on July 15 it issued 5,000 shares of stock to Stoner Investments. In the years of 1965 and 1966, loans exceeding \$350,000 were made to Lektro-Vend by Stoner Investments or another company controlled by Stoner.

In March, 1965, Stoner sent a letter to 50 vending-machine operators in which he identified himself as the longtime former president of the old Stoner Manufacturing Corporation, and stated that he was now interested in Lektro-Vend. The letter contained the following passage:

"I believe that I can lay claim to having personally initiated the design and production of more vending machines still in use than any other one man in the history of vending. I believe that vending machines of my design still in use are making operators better than a million dollars a week right now and I am willing to risk my reputation as a vending machine designer and manufacturer to say that the LEKTRO-VEND products will set new highs in earnings to operators and will be the standard of comparison for the next 50 years."



The letter was plainly intended not only to associate Lektro-Vend with Stoner, but to convey to a reader the impression that Lektro-Vend would receive the benefits of the skill and reputation which Stoner had enjoyed as the head of Stoner Manufacturing Corporation.

Plaintiffs' original complaint contained two counts, the first directed against Stoner individually and the second against Stoner Investments. Each count alleged a breach of the covenants not to compete contained in the sales and employment contracts, and each sought recovery in the amount of \$500,000. Plaintiff subsequently amended each count to include additional allegations seeking recovery for the theft of a trade secret, a claim predicated on Stoner's having seen in 1959 the sketches of the prototype developed by plaintiff. The amount of the *ad damnum* was also raised to \$1,500,000 on each count, and later to \$7,000,000.

As previously noted, the trial court entered a judgment against Stoner individually for \$250,000 and a judgment against Stoner and Stoner Investments jointly for \$1,100,000. As viewed by the appellate court in its first opinion the first judgment was intended to represent a forfeiture of Stoner's salary during a 4-year period during which his breach of duty was occurring. The larger sum represented the damages allowable on the trade-secret theory, calculated on the basis of the \$1,500,000 which Stoner had said Lektro-Vend was worth in 1962, less \$400,000 for the estimated costs of developing it.

The appellate court rejected the claim based on the theft of a trade secret, on the grounds that in 1959 plaintiff was in possession only of an idea or a goal which had not been reduced to a specific means of accomplishment, that any disclosure to Stoner had been incomplete, and that the substantial differences between the plaintiff's prototype and the Lektro-Vend made it unlikely that the knowledge of the former could have contributed to the development of Lektro-Vend. The appellate court did hold, however, that plaintiff was entitled to damages over and above the

\$250,000 to the extent that there were lost profits which were attributable to the breach of the covenants and diminution of its business, and the court remanded the cause to the circuit court for further evidence on this issue.

The principal issue which now divides the parties is whether the trial court on the remanded hearing measured damages according to the proper standard. Plaintiff makes the claim, which the trial court accepted, that plaintiff is entitled to a sum equal to what its profits would have been had plaintiff been the owner of Lektro-Vend. Defendants maintain plaintiff can recover only those lost profits attributable to the fact that the products which plaintiff did in fact make and sell had to compete with the Lektro-Vend machine. The latter figure, each party appears to assume, would be much smaller than the former, for it would be necessary to exclude from it any losses attributable to other causes, such as competition from companies other than Lektro-Vend, the inferiority of plaintiff's dropshelf machines as compared to the Lektro-Vend, and the fact that the market for candy-vending machines contains several submarkets, some of which were not served by both plaintiff and Lektro-Vend to the same extent.

Quite apart from any liability which may be predicated upon a breach of the covenants against competition contained in the sales agreement and the employment contract, it is clear that Stoner violated his fiduciary duties to plaintiff during the period when he was a director and an officer of plaintiff. Beginning in 1960 or 1961 and continuing up until just before he ceased to be employed by plaintiff he contributed substantial financial support, either directly or through Stoner Investments, Inc., to the development of a superior machine which would be competitive with the older and less satisfactory model produced by plaintiff. Stoner testified that up until a date shortly before the Lektro-Vend was publicly exhibited he did not see the models, and Phillip's testimony confirms this. Stoner also testified that until that time he did not even know that

Phillips was working on such a machine. This latter testimony, however, was contradicted both by testimony given by Stoner on his deposition and by Phillips. In view of the substantial amounts which he was spending on Phillip's research project, moreover, Stoner's testimony that he never inquired as to Phillip's activities or visited the plant to inspect the work in progress is highly implausible. We conclude, as the trial court must have concluded, that Stoner was fully aware of the nature of the device which was being developed and also of its competitive potential. Indeed, Stoner himself testified that when he first observed the finished Lektro-Vend he called it "the vending machine of the future," and predicted that it would render other models obsolete.

Stoner was hired by plaintiff on the basis of the skill and experience which he could bring to plaintiff. Defendants contend that plaintiff did not take advantage of Stoner's talents and gave him the role of a mere figurehead. Assuming that plaintiff, whether prudently or imprudently, failed to make the best use of Stoner's abilities, such a failure certainly did not release Stoner from his duty not to assume a position which would be adverse to that of his employer.

In addition to his prior and subsequent support of Phillip's development of Lektro-Vend, Stoner's actions in respect to plaintiff's unsuccessful attempts in late 1962 and early 1963 to purchase the design violated his fiduciary obligations. In view of Stoner's prior expression of a desire to leave plaintiff's employment so that he could become associated with Phillips, it was perhaps naive of plaintiff to assign Stoner himself as its intermediary. Had he disclosed the extent of his financial involvement in the Lektro-Vend, it may be doubted whether plaintiff would have done so, rather than dealing with Phillips directly or through some other agent.

Stoner had a foot in each camp. Not only did his undisclosed individual interest in controlling the further development and ultimately the manufacture and sale of the Lektro-

Vend create the possibility of his taking an unfair advantage of plaintiff, but the evidence gives strong indication that he actually misled plaintiff while he was purportedly acting as plaintiff's agent with regard to plaintiff's possible acquisition of the Lektro-Vend. The information given plaintiff that Phillips wanted a price of \$1,500,000 for the Lektro-Vend came only from Stoner. Whether Phillips might have been willing to sell at a lower figure acceptable to plaintiff is unknown.

We recently had occasion in *Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Association* (1974), 58 Ill.2d 20, to consider the obligation upon a director or officer to make full disclosure to his corporation. In that case, involving the appropriation of a business opportunity, the defense was made that the plaintiff, a savings and loan association, lacked the legal power to engage in the business which defendants were carrying on, which was the operation of an insurance agency. We rejected that defense for the reason that the association had never been given the opportunity to decide that question for itself. We said:

"... if the doctrine of business opportunity is to possess any vitality, the corporation or association must be given the opportunity to decide, upon full disclosure of the pertinent facts, whether it wishes to enter into a business that is reasonably incident to its present or prospective operations. If directors fail to make such a disclosure and to tender the opportunity, the prophylactic purpose of the rule imposing a fiduciary obligation requires that the directors be foreclosed from exploiting that opportunity on their own behalf." 58 Ill.2d at 28.

See also the discussion of the fiduciary duties of officers and directors by the appellate court in *Paulman v. Kritzer* (1966), 74 Ill. App. 2d 284, 289-295, which was specifically endorsed by this court in our affirmance of that decision. *Paulman v. Kritzer* (1967), 38 Ill.2d 101, 104; cf. *Lerk v.*



*McCabe* (1932), 349 Ill. 348, 360-362; Restatement (Second) of Agency secs. 387, 389, 391, 393, 394 (1958).

Plaintiff was not, as defendants urge, limited to the recovery of the profits which accrued to Lektro-Vend. (See Restatement (Second) of Agency secs. 399, 401, 407 (1958).) The limitation on a plaintiff's recovery proposed by defendants would mean that a fiduciary could violate his duty without incurring any risk. For if his misconduct were discovered the most that he could lose would be the profit gained from his illegal venture; the law would have operated only to restore him to the same position he would have been in had he faithfully performed his duties.

Defendants repeatedly state that the failure of plaintiff to develop a FIFO-type machine showed a lack of interest on its part. We have reviewed the testimony and we conclude that plaintiff did have and retained an interest in having such a machine. Its failure to develop one itself initially rested on problems in the design of the particular model which had been developed. The instances in which plaintiff, after 1962, failed to develop such a machine seem in part to be explained by a concern that several other companies had by then developed similar machines and that it might be too late for plaintiff to successfully enter the market. We are not called on here to review the business prudence of plaintiff's decisions, however, and we cannot say that plaintiff would have declined an offer to purchase the Lektro-Vend, with its advanced technology, or to seek to develop such a machine itself had a genuine opportunity to do so been extended to it.

Defendants assert that the evidence introduced by plaintiff on the remand and the theory on which it was offered did not comport with the law of the case as established by the first opinion of the appellate court nor with the court's mandate. Plaintiff disputes defendants' interpretation of the first opinion of the appellate court. We need not consider this point, however, since the doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable to this court in reviewing the

judgment of the appellate court. *Sjostrom v. Sproule* (1965), 33 Ill.2d 40.

Defendants also urge that the plaintiff has impermissibly changed the theory of its case from that on which it relied in the first trial. We think that defendants' contention represents an artificial analysis. In some situations there could be, of course, a violation of a covenant not to compete without the breach of a fiduciary duty, as would be the case if Stoner had not been an officer and director of plaintiff. In the present case, however, the acts of defendants in misappropriating the Lektro-Vend and their use of it to compete against plaintiff are intertwined, the latter being, so to speak, the means by which the former was brought to bear against plaintiff.

We are not confronted here with the situation in which a litigant attempts to interject on appeal a theory never advanced in the trial court. Plaintiff made its theory quite explicit in the trial on remand. It is a familiar principle, moreover, that when an appeal is taken the appellee may defend the judgment below on any ground appearing of record. (*Shaw v. Lorenz* (1969), 42 Ill.2d 246, 248.) We fail to see how defendants have suffered any prejudice from any supposed change in the theory on which plaintiff has presented its case.

The remark made in *People ex rel. Modern Woodmen of America v. Circuit Court* (1931), 347 Ill. 34, 47, relating to piecemeal litigation, on which defendants rely, was made in a discussion of the extent to which matters which had been or could have been litigated in one suit are barred by *res judicata* from being relitigated in a second suit involving the same subject matter. The case is not in point here.

Finally, defendants contend that the evidence offered on the remand and the judgment of the trial court are not in conformity with the allegations of the complaint, since the complaint charges defendants only with breach of the covenants not to compete. For the reasons given above, we do



not think the defendants' point is well taken. In any event, so far as the complaint might be thought to be deficient, plaintiff, before submission of this case for decision, filed a motion under Rule 362 to amend the complaint in order to conform it to the proof. Defendants filed objections to the motion, and we took the motion with the case. Essentially the proposed amendment adds to the existing allegation that Stoner indirectly and directly entered into the vending-machine manufacturing business through the provision of financing, advice and use of facilities, the further allegation that Stoner did so as an officer and as a director and that his actions were "for the development of an economically and functionally successful vending machine complementary to the product line of the plaintiff corporation, all of which was done without the knowledge, consent, or approval of the plaintiff corporation." The motion to amend is accordingly allowed.

Defendants also contend that the covenants against competition contained in the sale agreement and the employment contract were illegal restraints of trade. The basis for this claim is that each covenant covered an excessively broad geographical area, namely an area coterminous with all areas in which plaintiff was doing business, and, in the case of the employment contract, any additional areas into which plaintiff, to Stoner's knowledge, planned to extend its operations. Defendants state that the covenants were broader than the protection necessary to plaintiff warranted and should have been confined to those areas in which the predecessor of Stoner Investments had been functioning.

Defendants further claim that the covenants were in fact not breached, since the activities of defendants fell short of directly or indirectly entering into the vending-machine business. The appellate court concluded, in our opinion correctly, that defendants' activities directed toward the development and thereafter the marketing of the Lektro-Vend, consisting of substantial financial aid, and the provision of

physical facilities, as well as defendant's ownership interest in the Lektro-Vend enterprise, were so substantial as to go beyond the limits established by the covenants.

Regardless of the appellate court's disposition of those restraint-of-trade issues, the defendants may, as we have pointed out, be held liable on the ground of a breach of fiduciary obligation on the part of Stoner. Although arguing in their brief that the covenants not to compete are wholly invalid, defendants somewhat inconsistently maintain in this connection that those same covenants were effective limitations upon what might otherwise be the full sweep of their fiduciary duties. In this connection defendants rely on *Anderson v. Dunnegan* (1933), 217 Iowa 672, 250 N.W. 115. That case, like this one, involved a charge that business opportunities of an enterprise had wrongfully been diverted to an outside concern. The business there involved was originally conducted as a partnership and later incorporated. The decision rendered against plaintiffs, however, was based on the court's finding that a majority of the other partners, subsequently stockholders in the corporation when the latter was formed, had knowingly acquiesced in the diversion. No such elements play a role here.

At the original trial defendants raised as an affirmative defense and by way of counterclaim a charge that the sale agreement and the employment contract violated both the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 60-1 *et seq.*) and the Federal antitrust laws (15 U.S.C. sec. 1 *et seq.*). The latter charge was withdrawn by defendants on the remand, and references in the record indicate that at some point a suit was filed against plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois relating to the alleged violations of Federal law.

With respect to the State antitrust claim the appellate court on the first appeal affirmed the action of the trial court in striking the affirmative defense and counterclaim. On the remand defendants unsuccessfully sought to reinstate their defenses and counterclaim, and the appellate

court again affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this respect. By leave of court the State of Illinois has filed a brief supporting defendants' position on this issue.

There is some dispute between the parties as to whether the first opinion of the appellate court was based on the theory that the Illinois act was preempted by the Federal antitrust laws or upon the inapplicability of the Illinois act because of the absence of a substantial impact in Illinois arising out of the acts complained of.

We prefer to dispose of this issue on another ground, namely that the Illinois act, having been enacted in 1965, long after the contracts here in question were entered into, cannot properly form the basis of a counterclaim by defendants. It is familiar doctrine that statutes will ordinarily not be construed so as to produce retroactive application, absent some clear expression of an intention to do so. The rule is peculiarly applicable, for constitutional reasons, where a criminal statute is involved. Such is the case here with the Illinois Antitrust Act, even though the particular portion of the Act being relied on is the section creating a right in private parties to bring a civil suit for damages, including in some instances treble damages. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 60-7.

Various challenges are made by defendants to the evidence of damages which was adduced by plaintiff with respect to the \$7,345,000 judgment entered against both defendants jointly. To a large extent defendants' objections represent no more than a rejection of the underlying theory of liability which we have held is applicable, namely, that plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the difference between the profits which it could reasonably be expected to make if it had been the owner of the Lektro-Vend and the profits which it did in fact earn from the sale of candy-vending machines.

In our consideration of this facet of the appeal we are mindful of two limiting factors. The first is that the loss of

profits, whether past or future, claimed to arise out of exclusion from a market is customarily not susceptible of detailed or direct proof, and that unless proof of an inferential character is permitted, the result would be to immunize a defendant from the consequences of his wrongful acts. That principle has been frequently enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the context of actions to recover damages resulting from violations of the Federal antitrust laws. (See *Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc.* (1946), 327 U.S. 251, 264-265, 90 L. Ed. 652, 660; *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.* (1969), 395 U.S. 100, 123-124, 23 L. Ed. 2d 129, 148-149, 89 S. Ct. 1562). The principle is equally applicable where the claim of lost profits arises from a violation of fiduciary obligations or breach of contract. See *Schatz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.* (1972), 51 Ill.2d 143, 147-149.

The second limiting factor is that, as noted in the *Schatz* decision (51 Ill.2d at 149), the assessment of damages by a trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless it is manifestly erroneous.

The judgment of \$7,345,000, according to the trial court, was the sum of the profits lost to plaintiff between 1962 and June 1969, during the period of defendants' breach (\$2,135,000), and the diminution in the value of plaintiff's business as of June, 1969, attributable to defendants' activities (\$5,210,500).

The former figure was derived from data showing the sales of vending machines, obtained from surveys conducted for plaintiff, corporate records of plaintiff and publications of the United States Department of Commerce.

The sales data showed that plaintiff, after acquiring the assets of the Stoner Manufacturing Corporation, had a share of the candy-vending market, calculated in terms of the dollar amount of sales, of about 31%, and that for the 10-year period from 1959 to 1969 plaintiff had approximately the same share of the market for vending machines



other than those used for vending candy. Between 1962, just before the Lektro-Vend machine came on the market, and 1969, plaintiff's share in the candy-vending machine market shrank to slightly over 16%, whereas its share of the noncandy-vending-machine market remained stable. Plaintiff's actual sales of candy-vending machines in 1962 amounted to about \$5,400,000. In 1969 they were \$4,166,000. By way of contrast the sales of Lektro-Vend rose from \$48,000 realized in 1963, its first year of production, to \$2,298,000 in 1969. Its sales for the entire period aggregated about \$7,000,000.

The theory on which plaintiff proceeded was based on the proposition that if plaintiff had had the Lektro-Vend, it would have continued to hold the same market share that it had before defendants entered the market. By way of illustration plaintiff estimated that it had lost sales of \$18,490,000 over the period from 1962 to 1969. After calculating the difference between the sales volume which could be anticipated on that assumption and the actual sales volume, a profit ratio was then applied so as to arrive at the lost profits.

The second component of the judgment, referred to as the diminution in the value of plaintiff's business as of June, 1969, was intended to reflect the fact that after June, 1969, a number of years would be required for plaintiff to regain its former market position. One of plaintiff's expert witnesses calculated this element of plaintiff's damages by making a comparison between the future sales which could be anticipated with plaintiff's share restored and the sales which could be anticipated without such restoration. A profit ratio was then applied to translate the sales figures into lost profits, and the latter figure was discounted so as to reflect present value. A second expert witness employed a somewhat different method whereby he capitalized the amount of what he determined to be the average annual lost profits prior to 1969.

Defendants contend that the underlying data concerning plaintiff's sales volume is based in part upon a survey which, according to defendants, did not cover a representative sample. Defendants' criticism is blunted, however, by their failure to object to the admission of the exhibits containing the information in question.

Moreover, while defendants advert to the substantial difference in amount between the judgment given on the first trial and that given in the second, defendants' brief fails to charge that the latter was excessive. The amount of the second judgment appears to fall within the range of estimates given by plaintiff's expert witnesses on loss of profits and diminution of value of plaintiff's business. The difference, in any event, is explainable in part by the lapse of time between the first and second trials. Judgment in the first was entered in December, 1966. The hearing of evidence in the second did not commence until April, 1971. Some evidence regarding the extent of plaintiff's damages which was available for the second trial would not have been available in 1965 and 1966.

Defendants also argue that it was improper to award damages for lost profits attributable to a period following the expiration of the covenants not to compete. We have held, however, that defendants' liability is not measured exclusively by these covenants but rests as well on a breach of fiduciary obligations.

In their appeal defendants also challenge the judgment of \$170,835 against Stoner individually. That judgment represented the forfeiture of his salary for three years and five months, the period during which the court found that he had breached his fiduciary duties, starting with the loans to Phillips in 1961 and ending with his guarantee of the bank loan to Phillips in 1964.

Defendants' initial contention is that plaintiff's sole remedy against Stoner was to terminate its contract with him, and that in any event plaintiff waived any right to



other relief which it may have had by failing to discharge him. The appellate court in each of its opinions rejected this line of argument, and we do so as well. The insertion in an employment contract of an express provision for termination is not to be looked upon as a relinquishment of rights which plaintiff would have had without that provision. Nor do we see in what manner the failure of plaintiff to bring suit against defendants earlier than it did barred it from recovering damages, even assuming, contrary to what the evidence shows, that plaintiff was aware of defendants' breach.

Defendants next contend that the forfeiture of Stoner's salary in addition to the allowance of damages for plaintiff's lost profits constitutes an improper double recovery. The judgment against Stoner did not represent a forfeiture of his total salary but only for the period of time beginning with the breach of his duty of loyalty. In this respect the case at hand differs from *Ely v. King-Richardson Co.* (1914), 265 Ill. 148, where employees who had been discharged for setting up a competitive business were held to be entitled to moneys owed them for a period antedating that action. It borders upon the frivolous for defendants to claim a right to retain the compensation which the judgment restored to plaintiff.

Defendants' final point is that the trial court "had no jurisdiction to enter two final judgment against Harry Stoner on one count." We have examined the brief filed by defendants in the appellate court on this appeal, and we are in some doubt as to whether the question now under discussion was raised before that court. We are, moreover, unable to discern the meaning of this assertion or to perceive any manner in which defendants have been prejudiced by the fact that two separate judgments were entered. As we have stated, the smaller judgment, entered only against Stoner individually, was designed to recover the salary paid him by plaintiff. The larger judgment was designed to compensate plaintiff for its lost profits. That judgment

was entered against both defendants because each had participated in the pattern of wrongful acts on which this suit was founded. Stoner Investments, Inc., is wholly owned by Stoner and his wife, and we do not understand that satisfaction of the judgment for \$7,345,000 would require a separate payment of this amount by each defendant.

For the reasons discussed in this opinion the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and that of the circuit court is affirmed.

*Appellate court reversed,  
circuit court affirmed.*

**AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT**

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

(Filed January 2, 1975)

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, BARNABAS F. SEARS and JAMES E. S. BAKER, complaining of the Defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, allege as follows:

**COUNT I.**

(Federal Antitrust Law)

1. These proceedings are instituted and the jurisdiction of this Court is based upon Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15 and 26) and Section 1337 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. 1337) against Defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY (hereinafter called "VENDO"), for violations as hereinafter alleged of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 and 2).

2. VENDO transacts business within the Northern District of Illinois.

3. Plaintiff, HARRY B. STONER (hereinafter called "STONER"), is an individual, resident of Aurora, Illinois. Prior to 1959, he had been active in the business of designing and manufacturing vending machines in Aurora, Illinois for more than 25 years. In 1959, he was the President and one of the principal owners of STONER MFG. CORP. (hereinafter called "STONER MFG."), which company was an Illinois corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines. In 1959, said STONER MFG. sold substantially all of its operating assets to VENDO pursuant to a contract of sale, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

4. Plaintiff, STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Aurora, Illinois, (hereinafter called "STONER INVESTMENTS"), is a successor to the Illinois corporation, which prior to May, 1959, was named STONER MFG. CORP. Upon the sale of its

principal assets to VENDO, in 1959, STONER MFG. CORP. changed its name to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. In July, 1964, STONER INVESTMENTS purchased approximately 25% of the common stock of LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware corporation (hereinafter called "LEKTRO-VEND"). During 1965-1974, STONER INVESTMENTS loaned to LEKTRO-VEND in excess of \$1,742,000. In 1970, \$1,162,000 of these advances were converted from loans to common stock and 58,100 additional shares of common stock of LEKTRO-VEND were issued to STONER INVESTMENTS therefor. As of December 30, 1974, STONER INVESTMENTS owns 63,900 shares of common stock of LEKTRO-VEND, which constitutes 61% of the equity and 78.57% of the voting power of LEKTRO-VEND. STONER INVESTMENTS also owns demand notes of LEKTRO-VEND in the amount of \$580,000.

5. Plaintiff, LEKTRO-VEND, is and since September 1, 1963, has been a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Aurora, Illinois. This business was originally started as a sole proprietorship under the name and style R. W. PHILLIPS COMPANY in November, 1960 and later did business under the name and style LEKTRO-VEND MANUFACTURING COMPANY. Prior to incorporation the business was primarily that of research and design in the vending machine business. In and prior to November, 1962, as a result of extensive research, a new, novel and improved vending machine (more particularly described in paragraph 18 hereof) was designed and developed by R. W. PHILLIPS. LEKTRO-VEND became the owner thereof upon its incorporation. LEKTRO-VEND has been engaged to the extent possible, by reason of VENDO's harassment activities hereinafter alleged, in the continued improvement of its new machine and in the design, development, manufacture and sale of automatic merchandising equipment (vending machines), particularly vending machines for candy, cookies and crackers, packaged gum, pastry, potato chips, pretzels and other multi-purpose food vending equipment. It has also developed and is selling a coffee vending machine utilizing

freeze-dried coffee. LEKTRO-VEND sells its machines in interstate commerce, in competition with VENDO.

6. Defendant, VENDO, is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri. It proclaims itself to be and it is the world's largest manufacturer of automatic merchandising equipment (vending machines). VENDO has manufacturing plants in Kansas City, Missouri, Aurora, Illinois, Pinedale, California and Westbury, New York. VENDO has subsidiaries or affiliates in Mexico, Germany, Japan, Australia, Italy, France, Canada and Belgium. VENDO sells such machines so produced in all 50 states and in more than 60 countries and territories. VENDO maintains offices for such sales in Los Angeles, California, Dallas, Texas, Chicago, Illinois, Cleveland, Ohio, Atlanta, Georgia, Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, Toronto, Ontario, Duesseldorf, West Germany, Paris, France, Milan, Italy, Sydney, Australia, Brussels, Belgium, and Johannesburg, South Africa. VENDO has regional managers or representatives in California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

7. At the time of the filing of the original Complaint herein, VENDO had control of over 40% of the entire business of the manufacture of vending machines in the United States. VENDO then had control of between 50% and 100% of the manufacture of vending machines for the vending of candy, pastry, milk and ice cream, and of multi-purpose (refrigerated and non-refrigerated) food vending machines, which is the field in which LEKTRO-VEND has attempted to compete with VENDO. In 1964, VENDO's sales of vending machines for hot and cold food, coffee, milk, ice cream, candy, pastries and cigarettes exceeded \$28,000,000, an increase of approximately 15% over the preceding year and more than double the comparable sales for the year 1959. In the year 1964, the sales of the above named products

accounted for in excess of 40% of the total sales of VENDO. In 1964, sales of vending machines for confections and foods of all manufacturing companies totaled approximately \$31,915,000. As of December 30, 1974, VENDO's market share of the vending machine manufacturing business of the United States was in excess of 30%. Its sales over the last several years have been in excess of \$100,000,000 a year.

8. VENDO has monopolized, and attempted to monopolize, the trade and commerce in the State of Illinois, among the several states and with foreign countries in the business of manufacturing and selling vending machines, and has acquired as the result of its unlawful activities, control over so substantial a share of such trade and commerce as to obtain the power to remove or to exclude competitors from the field. VENDO now possesses such power and has possessed such power for a number of years and has demonstrated its intent to remove or exclude competitors from the vending machine manufacturing business. For purposes of this Amended and Supplemental Complaint, the relevant geographic markets or parts of commerce and trade are:

- (1) the entire United States;
- (2) each of the six regional sales markets of VENDO, which are its Eastern, Southern, Central, Midwestern, Southwestern and Western divisions;
- (3) the State of Illinois, where the STONER MFG. division is located.

For the purposes of this Amended and Supplemental Complaint, the relevant products or parts of trade or commerce are:

- (1) vending machines for food, beverages and confections;
- (2) vending machines for food and confections;
- (3) vending machines for candy bars, excluding bulk vending equipment;



- (4) vending machines for packaged chewing gum;
- (5) vending machines for pastries, such as vending machines for sweet rolls, cupcakes and doughnuts;
- (6) vending machines for hot canned foods and soups;
- (7) vending machines for snacks, excluding candy bar venders, such as machines for sales of cookies, crackers, biscuits, popcorn, ice cream, potato chips, pretzels, corn chips, or cheese sticks;
- (8) multi-purpose, refrigerated and non-refrigerated vending machines for food, such as machines for sale of sandwiches and salads;
- (9) vending machines for confections, such as machines for candy, gum, mints, potato chips, corn chips, cheese sticks, pastries, sweet rolls, pies, cupcakes and doughnuts;
- (10) vending machines for coffee;
- (11) vending machines for soft drinks;
- (12) other vending machines for beverages, such as machines for sale of milk, hot chocolate and/or hot soup (except canned soup) not sold in a combination machine with coffee.

9. VENDO has engaged in numerous overt acts in an effort to establish, maintain, use and increase its monopoly power over the trade and commerce of vending machines in the State of Illinois, the several states and foreign countries. The intent of these acts is and has been to eliminate the competition of LEKTRO-VEND and other competitors of VENDO and to deter potential competitors from entering the field. These overt acts are alleged in succeeding paragraphs of this Amended and Supplemental Complaint.

10. On or about September 18, 1956, pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO acquired all the outstanding

capital stock, assets and business of VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a California corporation, including its patents and good will, in exchange for 267,464 shares of common stock of VENDO. Prior to the said acquisition, VENDO and the VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY were competitors in the production and sale of coin operated vending machines built to dispense bottled soft drinks in the United States. VENDO is, and prior to the said acquisition was, the largest manufacturer of coin operated vending machines built to dispense bottled soft drinks in the United States. The combined sales of VENDO and the VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY from 1955 to the present have accounted for and now account for in excess of 40% of the market involved. The VENDORLATOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY is now a division of VENDO. In 1964 the sales of beverage vending machines by VENDO exceeded \$28,000,000. The above alleged acts of VENDO demonstrate an intent to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing business.

11. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO acquired, beginning in 1959, COIN ACCEPTORS, INC., a Missouri corporation, which acquisition made it independent of other sources for its necessary supply of slug rejectors, a device used in all, or substantially all, coin operated machines, to detect, separate and reject spurious coins and accept legitimate coins. VENDO now has the capacity to manufacture all of its own slug rejectors and controls over 40% of the production of slug rejectors in the vending machine industry.

12. On or about April 3, 1959, pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO acquired substantially all of the assets of the STONER MFG. The facilities of STONER MFG. are now operated as a division of VENDO. Prior to the acquisition, STONER MFG. was the leading manufacturer of vending machines for the sale of candy, producing and selling approximately 70% of such machines in the United States. VENDO's purpose in the acquisition was to further

its plan to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing business by adding a candy vending machine to its vending machine line, which, until the time of such acquisition, did not include a candy vending machine, and removing STONER MFG. as a competitor. STONER MFG. division of VENDO has continued to manufacture such machines. Largely as a result of these monopolistic activities, VENDO, during the years 1962 to date, maintained control of between 20% to 40% of the manufacture of vending machines for vending of candy, pastry, milk and ice cream and of multi-purpose (refrigerated and non-refrigerated) food vending machines, which is the field in which LEKTRO-VEND has attempted to compete with VENDO.

13. As a condition of its acquisition of substantially all the assets of STONER MFG., VENDO exacted from STONER INVESTMENTS a covenant that STONER INVESTMENTS would not directly or indirectly compete with VENDO in the United States or any foreign country in which VENDO or any affiliate or subsidiary was operating for a period of 10 years from the date of closing. The full text of the non-competition covenant is set forth in Section 15 of the Agreement of Sale (Exhibit A hereto). The said non-competition covenant constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, in and of itself, and, in the circumstances in which it was exacted, it constituted an independent violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1). It bore no reasonable relation to the assets sold or the protection of the good will of STONER MFG. which was transferred to VENDO in connection with the acquisition. Nor was said non-competition covenant ancillary to any other legitimate business purpose of VENDO. Its purpose and effect was rather to assure the elimination of STONER INVESTMENTS from competition with VENDO, without regard to the limited nature of the transaction between the parties. The making, entering into and exaction of said non-competition covenant is an overt act of VENDO in monopolization and constitutes an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce among the several states and foreign countries in the manufacture of such vending machines.

14. On or about June 1, 1959, a contract was executed between HARRY B. STONER and VENDO. The contract purported to employ STONER for a period of five years at a salary of \$50,000 per year. VENDO exacted from STONER a covenant that for a period of five years after the termination of the purported employment, STONER would not enter into or engage directly or indirectly in the vending machine manufacturing business in any of the territories in which VENDO or its subsidiaries or affiliates was conducting business or in which STONER knew VENDO may in the future conduct business. Section 5 of the contract, attached hereto as Exhibit B, contains the non-competition provision. The said non-competition covenant is an unreasonable restraint of trade in that it is not reasonably limited as to time or geographic extent. The said non-competition covenant was not designed to protect VENDO's trade secrets or its good will. Both the contract of employment itself, and the covenant not to compete, which VENDO exacted from STONER in connection therewith, in and of themselves, and in the circumstances in which they were executed, constituted independent violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1). They bore no reasonable relation to any of VENDO's legitimate business interests. Their purpose and effect was rather to eliminate STONER from competition with VENDO in any part of its worldwide markets.

15. In reality, the said purported employment and subsequent election of STONER as a director of VENDO and as an officer of the STONER MFG. division, as well as the non-competition covenant, were devices of VENDO to prevent STONER from engaging in competition with the defendant, and for no other reason. During the term of such purported employment, STONER was neither assigned nor permitted to perform any duties or responsibilities of an executive or advisory nature. He was informed that his employment by VENDO was a means or device to put him "on the shelf" and that he should function solely as a "senior citizen." In particular, during the term of said purported employment contract STONER was never assigned to or permitted



to meet with VENDO's Product Planning Committee. He did not learn and was not permitted to learn any trade secrets, know-how or other details of the business which would be of any value to a competitor or in the operation of a competitive business. In March, 1964, STONER was not re-elected as a director of VENDO and the employment relationship was terminated on June 1, 1964. The said non-competition covenant constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade, and the making and entering into and exaction of the non-competition covenant is an overt act of VENDO in monopolization and constitutes an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce in the State of Illinois, among the several states and with foreign countries in the manufacture of vending machines, particularly food vending equipment.

16. In the period immediately preceding the negotiations for the sale of STONER MFG., STONER was seriously ill and unable to participate actively in the business. In order to assure continued success of the business and to protect the interests of his family and other shareholders of STONER MFG., it was necessary for him to sell the assets of STONER MFG. Because of the compelling necessity to STONER of completing the sale, STONER and STONER MFG. were forced to accede to VENDO's unreasonable demand for broad anti-competitive covenants.

17. Representations were made to STONER after said employment contract was executed assuring him that VENDO would not attempt to prevent him from entering into a competitive business, which representations were false and were calculated to conceal VENDO's true intent from STONER and others. Said representations were relied upon by STONER. STONER, in or about December, 1962, and on other occasions, requested VENDO to release him from the illegal covenant not to compete, which release was refused by VENDO. On each such occasion, STONER informed VENDO that said covenant not to compete was invalid and unenforceable. Non-competition agreements worldwide in geo-

graphic scope and for extended periods of time are and have been weapons in VENDO's arsenal of power and have been used to limit and eliminate competition and to extend and perpetuate its monopoly.

18. During the term of STONER's purported employment by VENDO, beginning January, 1961, STONER INVESTMENTS made loans to R. W. PHILLIPS which were used by R. W. PHILLIPS to finance the research and development of a first-in, first-out electrically operated vending machine ("FIFO") of novel design. A prototype of this FIFO vending machine became known as the "Lektro-Vend Machine" at the October, 1962 exhibit of the National Automatic Merchandising Association in San Francisco, California and received much favorable comment. PHILLIPS then considered entering into the manufacture and sale of vending machines rather than selling the design to some vending machine manufacturer. He invited STONER to join him in this enterprise if he could secure his release from VENDO. After the five-year term of STONER's employment contract with VENDO ended June 1, 1964, STONER has, without compensation, devoted some time and effort to assist LEKTRO-VEND financially and particularly in the area of research and development of vending machines designed for use in the vending of candy bars, mints and gum, which LEKTRO-VEND has sought to market in the State of Illinois and elsewhere under its name. STONER INVESTMENTS purchased approximately 25% of the common stock of LEKTRO-VEND in July, 1964. STONER INVESTMENTS has continued, since June, 1964, to advance monies to LEKTRO-VEND and now owns 78.57% of the common stock of LEKTRO-VEND.

19. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization, on or about July 31, 1964, VENDO's wholly owned subsidiary, VENDO MANUFACTURING CORP. of New York, a New York corporation (organized on July 30, 1964), acquired all of the vending machine manufacturing assets and patents of CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP., an Indiana corporation, and of CONTINENTAL APCO, INC., a New York corporation,



a wholly owned subsidiary of CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP. The manufacturing facilities of the CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP. were at the time of purchase sufficient to assemble various types of automatic coin operated vending machines which dispense soft drinks, coffee, cigarettes, and ice cream. The trustees in bankruptcy from whom such assets were purchased were prepared to sell the assets to the KELSEY-HAYES CORP., a Delaware corporation, which is a manufacturer of automobile and aircraft parts. In order to prevent another corporation from entering into competition with it, VENDO, to extend its monopoly and eliminate competition, outbid the prospective purchaser. Subsequent to the acquisition of the CONTINENTAL APCO assets, the plants acquired were closed, and the manufacture and sale of the vending machines previously made by CONTINENTAL APCO were discontinued, thereby eliminating CONTINENTAL APCO as a competitor and preventing KELSEY-HAYES CORP. from entering into and becoming a competitor of VENDO in the manufacture and sale of vending machines.

20. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization, on or about August 10, 1965, VENDO filed suit in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS. The full text of the original complaint in said suit is attached hereto as Exhibit C. The complaint alleged that STONER had breached his agreement not to compete of June 1, 1959 and that STONER INVESTMENTS had breached its agreement of April 3, 1959, both of which sought to eliminate competition for 10 years throughout the world. As has been previously alleged, the worldwide non-competition covenants contained in the two contracts are illegal and in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 and 2). The actual but intentionally concealed purpose of said lawsuit and VENDO's subsequent conduct in connection with said lawsuit was to eliminate the competition of LEKTRO-VEND, as well as the competition of STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, by unlawfully

harassing STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, the main source of financial support of LEKTRO-VEND. VENDO knew full well that by unlawfully harassing STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS it would succeed in financially destroying LEKTRO-VEND. The threats to enforce such non-competition covenants, the bringing of a suit in an attempt to enforce the illegal covenants and VENDO's conduct in connection with such suit, are overt acts of VENDO in monopolization and constitute an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce in the State of Illinois, among the several states and foreign countries in the manufacture of such vending machines. Specifically, these overt acts of VENDO include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) The designed and wilful bringing of the lawsuit against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS in spite of the fact that VENDO knew at the time it brought such suit that: 1) The noncompetition covenants were illegal and 2) neither STONER nor STONER INVESTMENTS breached their respective illegal, non-competition covenants. The purpose of bringing this suit was to destroy its competitor LEKTRO-VEND. VENDO concealed this purpose by designedly failing to join LEKTRO-VEND or R. W. PHILLIPS in its suit.

(b) VENDO's designed and wilful amendment of its complaint on January 28, 1966 at the first trial of its case, alleging that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS stole a valuable trade secret (design concept of vending machines), notwithstanding VENDO knew both at the time it filed its lawsuit and at the time it amended its complaint that neither STONER nor STONER INVESTMENTS could possibly have stolen a trade secret. A copy of VENDO's Amendment to Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Said Amendment was filed notwithstanding the fact that at the August 3, 1959 VENDO products planning meeting, at which the FIFO machine of VENDO design was discussed. STONER was only present from somewhere between thirty (30) seconds

and three (3) minutes, with the meeting being suspended during his brief appearance, while VENDO did not sue R. W. PHILLIPS, then an employee of VENDO, and who was a member of the committee and was present during the entire meeting and actually discussed the possibility of whether a FIFO machine of VENDO design could be produced by the STONER MFG. plant. The \$1,100,000 judgment that VENDO recovered against STONER INVESTMENTS at the first trial, based solely on its theory of a theft of a trade secret, was set aside by the Appellate Court of Illinois on January 20, 1969, the Court holding that VENDO did not have a trade secret and that the LEKTRO-VEND machine was a product of the ingenuity of PHILLIPS and not based on ideas acquired from VENDO. The Court remanded the cause for the assessment of damages based on a theory of breach of the illegal covenants and damages therefrom through the competition of LEKTRO-VEND. A copy of the Appellate Court's opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

(c) Notwithstanding that its Petition for Leave to Appeal from the said Appellate Court's judgment of January 20, 1969 had been denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the law of the case on remand thereby fixed and binding upon the parties, VENDO blatantly ignored said mandate by presenting on remand, over STONER's and STONER INVESTMENTS' constant objections, a new theory outside the scope of the pleadings, namely what VENDO lost by way of sales by its failure to have a FIFO machine, which resulted from the fault of STONER. This new theory was presented even though VENDO knew that STONER was not responsible for VENDO's not having a FIFO machine. The trial court on remand entered judgment against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS of \$7,345,500 on VENDO's new theory that its loss from failure to have a FIFO machine was the fault of STONER, which theory was outside the mandate

of the Appellate Court. On the second trial, the Appellate Court of Illinois, on May 29, 1973, reversed this judgment, specifically holding that the evidence adduced by VENDO was not based on defendants' wrongful competition and therefore did not conform to the Appellate Court's first decision and mandate or the pleadings and that neither the evidence at the first trial nor the evidence on remand established that STONER was responsible for VENDO not having a FIFO machine. A copy of this second opinion by the Appellate Court is attached hereto as Exhibit F. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Court and affirmed the award of damages in the amount of \$7,345,000 against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, basing its affirmance on its finding that STONER had breached his fiduciary duty as an officer or director of VENDO, a theory outside the pleadings in the state court action, and the Appellate Court's mandate which was binding on the parties and the trial court on remand. A copy of the opinion filed by the Illinois Supreme Court on November 27, 1974 is attached hereto as Exhibit G.

(d) VENDO's misrepresentations of the record before the Appellate Court of Illinois and the Illinois Supreme Court with respect to STONER's and STONER INVESTMENTS' Fifth Separate Defense and their Counterclaim, which alleged that VENDO's restrictive covenants, its suits to enforce them, and certain other practices and activities of VENDO were violative of the Illinois Antitrust Act, which became effective July 21, 1965. On April 16, 1966 the trial court ordered these defenses and counterclaim stricken and dismissed. The Appellate Court of Illinois in its first opinion (Exhibit E) stated that these defenses and counterclaim were rendered inapplicable under the doctrine of federal preemption because VENDO's business was interstate, and thus that it was not necessary to consider the merits of the defenses and counterclaim. The Appellate



Court also stated, contrary to the record, that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS did not plead or argue that the commerce involved was anything but interstate. VENDO well knew that the counterclaim alleged wrongful acts of VENDO in Illinois intrastate commerce and remained silent when STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS' Petition for Rehearing unsuccessfully called that to the Appellate Court's attention.

(e) VENDO misrepresented the record before the Supreme Court of Illinois by arguing that the Appellate Court in its first opinion (Exhibit E) did not actually decide the issue of the applicability of the Illinois Antitrust Act on the grounds of preemption by the Federal Antitrust Laws because of the parties' interstate activities, but had decided that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS had insufficiently alleged the impact of VENDO's illegal and monopolistic acts on intrastate commerce. The result was that the Illinois Supreme Court in its opinion of November 27, 1974 (Exhibit G, 309-10) erroneously stated that there had been some dispute between the parties as to whether "the first opinion of the Appellate Court was based on the theory that the Illinois act was preempted by the Federal antitrust law or upon the inapplicability of the Illinois act because of the absence of a substantial impact in Illinois arising out of the acts complained of" by STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS.

(f) VENDO's misrepresentation of the record before the Supreme Court by again arguing that the Illinois Antitrust Act could not be applied retroactively, knowing that various of its illegal and monopolistic acts in Illinois occurred subsequent to July 21, 1965, the effective date of the Act, and that the Counterclaim so alleged. The result was that the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the Illinois antitrust act was not retroactively applicable and could not form "the basis of a counterclaim" (Exhibit G, 310), even as to acts committed by VENDO *after* the passage of the 1965 Act.

21. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization in the course of the prosecution of the state court litigation, VENDO has insisted upon oppressive terms as a condition for the stay of execution pending appeal, which has resulted in the tying up of funds of STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS which would have otherwise been available for the financial support of LEKTRO-VEND and has made a number of efforts to acquire ownership of LEKTRO-VEND. The effect of the State court litigation and its conduct by VENDO has been to harass and impede the competition of LEKTRO-VEND and to eliminate or suppress its competition and further VENDO's unlawful plan of monopolization.

22. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO has prematurely commenced efforts to collect its State court judgment. VENDO well knows that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Illinois Supreme Court alleging that the judgment of that court denied it procedural and substantive due process, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States, as more particularly set forth in said Petition for Rehearing; that said Petition for Rehearing was denied on November 27, 1974; and that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS intend to and will file in the United States Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court within the time permitted by law. On December 14, 1971, as a condition of staying enforcement of the State court judgment, among other things, a certain Escrow Trust Agreement was executed by the Chicago Title and Trust Company, as escrow trustee, and STONER INVESTMENTS, and VENDO, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit H, the conditions of which have been fully performed by STONER INVESTMENTS. Said Escrow Trust Agreement provides "all proceedings regarding said judgment and enforcement thereof shall be stayed until this escrow trust is terminated," which under the terms of paragraph 12 thereof is to occur "after the complete and final determination of said appeal." Notwithstanding, upon the issuance, on December

5, 1974, of the mandates of the Supreme Court of Illinois, affirming the state court judgments, VENDO, on December 9, 1974, demanded that Chicago Title and Trust Company immediately pay to it the monies in said escrow, aggregating approximately \$650,000. Notwithstanding that VENDO was advised by the Chicago Title and Trust Company on December 18, 1974 that there had been no complete and final determination of said appeal, VENDO instituted supplementary proceedings in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, causing a Citation to Discover Assets to issue on December 20, 1974 directed to the Chicago Title and Trust Company, which also called for the production of documents, including any pertaining to Stoner Shopping Center, Inc. Such premature enforcement efforts are intended as further harassment of STONER, STONER INVESTMENTS and LEKTRO-VEND. VENDO has further attempted to harass the plaintiffs by efforts on or about December 20, 1974 to impede the making of a loan and a mortgage of certain property owned by Stoner Shopping Center, Inc., a corporation not a party to the litigation nor owned in whole or in part by STONER or STONER INVESTMENTS.

23. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO's sales representatives and employees have spread malicious rumors to the effect that LEKTRO-VEND was in severe financial difficulties, was unable to perform its contracts for the manufacture and sale of vending machines, was unable to service such machines after delivery and was actually insolvent and on the verge of bankruptcy. LEKTRO-VEND's sales of vending machines substantially decreased and its growth was impeded as a result of these rumors. VENDO has used publicity about developments in the state court litigation favorable to it to disparage and harass LEKTRO-VEND.

24. Pursuant to its plan of monopolization, VENDO has threatened to sue and has sued competitors for alleged violations of anti-competitive contracts. These threats and suits have been without merit and solely for the purpose of harassment. The purpose and intent of the threats to

initiate expensive and time-consuming litigation with regard to certain narrow and weak covenants is and has been to eliminate competition and drive competitors out of business.

25. Largely as a result of VENDO's unlawful monopolistic activities and practices as previously alleged, its net profit has increased from approximately \$840,000 in 1955 to \$3,500,000 in 1964, to \$6,500,000 in 1966. During the same period, VENDO's net sales increased from approximately \$20,800,000 in 1955 to \$63,540,000 in 1964, and its total assets increased from approximately \$10,950,000 to \$50,460,000. During the first six months of 1965, the total sales of VENDO were \$38,869,153, a 35% increase over the same six month period for the prior year. During the first six months of 1965, earnings were \$3,456,150, an increase of 66% over the same period from the prior year. Sales made by the CONTINENTAL VENDING MACHINE CORP. division made a substantial contribution to such sales and earnings. By 1971 VENDO's sales had increased to the point where its sales for 1971 were \$91,900,000, for 1972 were \$110,800,000 and for 1973 were \$113,400,000.

26. As a result of VENDO's attempts to monopolize the manufacture and sale of vending machines as alleged, VENDO has made it substantially more difficult to enter the vending machine manufacturing business and competition has substantially lessened. In 1958, there were approximately 120 vending machine manufacturers. In 1963, this was substantially reduced to 76 such manufacturers, and in 1964, the number of manufacturers had been further reduced to 66. Of these 66 companies 47 had sales in excess of \$100,000. In 1964, approximately 31 companies manufactured vending machines for confections and food, but only 16 of them had sales in excess of \$100,000. In 1964, twelve companies manufactured vending machines for candy bars; eight of these had sales in excess of \$100,000. By 1974 there were even fewer manufacturers of vending machines for candy sales left in the United States.



27. As a result of the prosecution of the action in the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois and of the other acts as alleged, the plaintiffs, STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, have not been able to participate to the fullest and have been unlawfully prevented from constructively utilizing their knowledge and abilities in the industry, to the damage of the industry as a whole, the consuming public, LEKTRO-VEND, and themselves. The growth of LEKTRO-VEND as a competitor in the candy vending machine industry and as a competitor of VENDO has been seriously impaired. LEKTRO-VEND has been seriously injured as a proximate result of VENDO's unlawful monopolistic practices, activities and its exercise and attempted exercise of its monopoly power. The enforcement or attempted enforcement of the judgments in said action threatens to wipe out STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS as a source of financial support for LEKTRO-VEND and to deliver control of LEKTRO-VEND into the hands of VENDO, its competitor.

28. As a direct consequence of VENDO's actions as alleged, and of the pendency of the Illinois action, for the defense of which STONER has been forced, and will in the future be forced, to make substantial expenditures, STONER has sustained damages of in excess of \$500,000 to date, in addition to the potential liability upon the state court judgments of \$170,835 against STONER individually and \$7,345,500 against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS.

29. STONER INVESTMENTS has been unable, because of VENDO's actions as alleged, to invest in or otherwise participate fully in the business of the manufacture and sale of vending machines. Had it been free to participate in such business and to invest funds therein, it could have realized a profit from such participation and investment of in excess of \$200,000 per year. Because of the need to devote large amounts of executive time to the defense of said action and because of the terms of the appeal bonds, security agreements and escrow trust agreements exacted by VENDO as a condition to a stay of judgment pending appeal,

STONER INVESTMENTS has been unable to participate fully in its major enterprise of land development. As a proximate result thereof, and as a direct result of the pendency of the Illinois action, for the defense of which it has been forced, and in the future will be forced, to make substantial expenditures of money and utilize the time of its employees, STONER INVESTMENTS has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$3,000,000, plus the potential liability upon the judgment of \$7,345,500 and costs obtained in said action.

30. As a direct and proximate result of the violations heretofore set forth, LEKTRO-VEND has been substantially injured in its business and property, to-wit: LEKTRO-VEND has been deprived of the services of STONER and the full financial assistance of STONER INVESTMENTS; its sales and profits have been seriously impaired and reduced; it has suffered an immense loss of good will and reputation; and the value of its business has been substantially reduced; all to the damage of LEKTRO-VEND. The precise amount of damage is not presently known to LEKTRO-VEND, but is believed to be in excess of \$10,000,000, and is increasing.

31. Plaintiffs, and each of them, allege that the foregoing violations of the antitrust laws by VENDO are presently continuing. VENDO is threatening to collect the state court judgments it has procured, the effect of which will be to render STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS penniless and enable VENDO, by acquisition of control of LEKTRO-VEND, to terminate its operations. Further irreparable loss and damage is threatened to plaintiffs, and each of them, unless VENDO is restrained by this Court from taking any steps to collect its said judgments or to continue its anti-competitive activities directed at LEKTRO-VEND.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray the following relief with respect to Count I:

1. That this Court adjudge and decree that the acts of VENDO as hereinabove described have been and continue to

be in violation of the antitrust laws, including Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 and 2).

2. That this Court issue a permanent injunction against VENDO as hereinabove described have been and continue to tices alleged herein.

3. That STONER be awarded damages against VENDO in the amount of \$500,000 plus \$170,835 plus \$7,345,500, a total of \$8,016,335, to be trebled to \$24,049,005, as provided by law.

4. That STONER INVESTMENTS be awarded damages against VENDO in the amount of \$3,000,000 plus \$7,345,500, a total of \$10,345,500, to be trebled to \$31,036,500, as provided by law.

5. That STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS be awarded further damages in the amount of the attorneys' fees and cash disbursements and costs they have incurred in the defense of the state court action, such sum to be trebled as provided by law.

6. That LEKTRO-VEND be awarded damages against VENDO in the amount of \$10,000,000 to be trebled to \$30,000,000, as provided by law.

7. That Plaintiffs, and each of them, be awarded attorneys' fees, costs and interest, as provided by law.

8. That Plaintiffs, and each of them, have such other, further and different relief as the Court shall deem just.

## COUNT II.

### (Civil Rights and Due Process)

1. This action arises under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and under federal law, particularly Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983. This Court has jurisdiction of this cause under and by virtue of §§1331 and 1343 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343, and the

amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$10,000, exclusive of interests and costs.

2. Plaintiff, HARRY B. STONER, (hereinafter called "Stoner"), is an individual, resident of Aurora, Illinois. Prior to 1959, he had been active in the business of designing and manufacturing vending machines in Aurora, Illinois for more than 25 years. In 1959, he was the President and one of the principal owners of STONER MFG. CORP. (hereinafter called "STONER MFG."), which company was an Illinois corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines. In 1959, said STONER MFG. sold substantially all of its operating assets to VENDO pursuant to a contract of sale, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

3. Plaintiff STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Aurora, Illinois (hereinafter called "STONER INVESTMENTS"), is a successor to the Illinois corporation, which prior to May, 1959, was named STONER MFG. CORP. Upon the sale of its principal assets to VENDO, in 1959, STONER MFG. CORP. changed its name to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

4. Defendant, VENDO, is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri. It proclaims itself to be and it is the world's largest manufacturer of automatic merchandising equipment (vending machines). VENDO transacts business within the Northern District of Illinois.

5. On or about August 10, 1965, VENDO filed suit in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS. The full text of the original complaint in said suit is attached hereto as Exhibit C. The complaint alleged that STONER had breached his agreement not to compete of June 1, 1959 and that STONER INVESTMENTS had breached its agreement of April 3, 1959, both of which sought to eliminate competition for 10 years throughout the world.



6. VENDO amended its complaint on January 28, 1966, alleging that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS stole a valuable trade secret, (design concept of vending machines), notwithstanding VENDO knew both at the time it filed its lawsuit and at the time it amended its complaint that neither STONER nor STONER INVESTMENTS could possibly have stolen a trade secret. A copy of VENDO's Amendment to Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Said Amendment was filed notwithstanding the fact that at the August 3, 1959 VENDO products planning meeting, at which the FIFO machine of VENDO design was discussed, STONER was only present from somewhere between thirty (30) seconds and three (3) minutes, with the meeting being suspended during his brief appearance.

7. The \$1,100,000 judgment that VENDO recovered against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS at the first trial, based solely on its theory of a theft of a trade secret, was set aside by the Appellate Court of Illinois on January 20, 1969, the Court holding that VENDO did not have a trade secret and that the LEKTRO-VEND machine was a product of the ingenuity of PHILLIPS and not based on ideas acquired from VENDO. The Court remanded the cause for the assessment of damages based on a theory of breach of the illegal covenants and damages therefrom through the competition of LEKTRO-VEND. A copy of the Appellate Court's opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

8. Notwithstanding that its Petition for Leave to Appeal from the said Appellate Court's judgment of January 20, 1969 had been denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the law of the case on remand hereby fixed and binding upon the parties. VENDO blatantly ignored said mandate by presenting on remand, over STONER's and STONER INVESTMENTS' constant objections, a new theory outside the scope of the pleadings, namely what VENDO lost by way of sales by its failure to have a FIFO machine which resulted from the fault of STONER. This new theory was presented even though VENDO knew that STONER was

not responsible for VENDO's not having a FIFO machine. The trial court on remand entered judgment against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS of \$7,345,500 on VENDO's new theory that its loss from failure to have a FIFO machine was the fault of STONER, which theory was outside the mandate of the Appellate Court and which theory and the damages based thereon were totally without credible and rational evidence in the record to support said judgment.

9. On the second appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois, on May 29, 1973, reversed this judgment, specifically holding that the evidence adduced by VENDO was not based on defendants' wrongful competition and therefore did not conform to the Appellate Court's first decision and mandate or the pleadings; that neither the evidence at the first trial nor the evidence on remand established that STONER was responsible for VENDO not having a FIFO machine; and that VENDO's survey upon which it based its damages was patently deficient and non-probative. A copy of this second opinion by the Appellate Court is attached hereto as Exhibit F.

10. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Court and affirmed without remanding the judgment of \$7,345,000 against STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS. A copy of the opinion filed by the Illinois Supreme Court on November 27, 1974 is attached hereto as Exhibit G. The Court's first opinion was based upon STONER's breach of a fiduciary duty as an officer or director of VENDO amounting to the misappropriation of a corporate opportunity. When defendants STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS on petition for rehearing pointed out that the judgment could not be based upon that theory (which allows recovery only for defendant's gain), the Court then arbitrarily and capriciously denied rehearing, changing its opinion to breach of fiduciary duty generally. Said opinion relating STONER's breach of fiduciary duty to VENDO's failure to have a FIFO is utterly without credible or rational evidence to support it, as is the survey evidence

upon which the claimed damages were based. As to the survey evidence, the Court arbitrarily and capriciously gave it probative force because it was not objected to when such evidence had no probative force and the damage estimates which were based upon said survey were objected to. All such actions were outside the pleadings and contrary to the judgment and mandate of the Appellate Court governing the trial of the case and from which judgment the Supreme Court had denied VENDO leave to appeal.

11. VENDO misrepresented the record before the Appellate Court of Illinois and the Illinois Supreme Court with respect to STONER's and STONER INVESTMENTS' Fifth Separate Defense and their counterclaim which alleged that VENDO's restrictive covenants, its suits to enforce them, and certain other practices and activities of VENDO were violative of the Illinois Antitrust Act, which became effective July 21, 1965. On April 16, 1966 the trial court ordered these defenses and counterclaim stricken and dismissed. The Appellate Court of Illinois in its first opinion (Exhibit E) stated that these defenses and counterclaim were rendered inapplicable under the doctrine of federal preemption because the parties' business was interstate, and thus it was not necessary to consider the merits of the defenses and counterclaim. The Appellate Court also stated, contrary to the record, that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS did not plead or argue that the commerce involved was anything but interstate. VENDO well knew that the counterclaim alleged wrongful acts of VENDO in Illinois intrastate commerce and remained silent when STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS' Petition for Rehearing unsuccessfully called that to the Appellate Court's attention. VENDO misrepresented the record before the Supreme Court of Illinois by arguing that the Appellate Court in its first opinion (Exhibit E) did not actually decide the issue of the applicability of the Illinois Antitrust Act on the grounds of its preemption by the Federal Antitrust Laws because of the parties' interstate activities but had decided that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS had insufficiently alleged the im-

pact of VENDO's illegal and monopolistic acts on intrastate commerce. The result was that the Illinois Supreme Court in its opinion of November 27, 1973 (Exhibit G, 309-10) erroneously stated that there had been some dispute between the parties as to whether "the first opinion of the Appellate Court was based on the theory that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Federal antitrust laws or upon the inapplicability of the Illinois Act because of the absence of a substantial impact in Illinois arising out of the acts complained of" by STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS.

VENDO misrepresented the record before the Supreme Court by again arguing that the Illinois Antitrust Act could not be applied retroactively, knowing that various of its illegal and monopolistic acts in Illinois occurred subsequent to July 21, 1965, the effective date of the Act, and that the Counterclaim so alleged. The result was that the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the Illinois Antitrust Act was not retroactively applicable and could not "form the basis of a counterclaim," (Exhibit G, 310), even as to acts committed by VENDO *after* the passage of the 1965 Act.

12. VENDO has prematurely commenced efforts to collect its State court judgment. VENDO well knows that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Illinois Supreme Court alleging that the judgment of that court denied it procedural and substantive due process, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States, as more particularly set forth in said Petition for Rehearing; that said Petition for Rehearing was denied on November 27, 1974; and that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS intend to and will file in the United States Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court within the time permitted by law.

13. On December 14, 1971, as a condition of staying enforcement of the state court judgment, among other things, a certain Escrow Trust Agreement was executed between the Chicago Title and Trust Company, as escrow trustee, and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and THE VENDO COMPANY



a copy of which is attached as Exhibit H. Said Escrow Trust Agreement provides "all proceedings regarding the said judgments and enforcement thereof shall be stayed until this Escrow Trust is terminated," (Paragraph 13) which under the terms of Paragraph 12 thereof is to occur "after the complete and final determination of said appeal."

14. Notwithstanding, upon the issuance on December 5, 1974 of the mandates of the Supreme Court affirming the State Court judgments, VENDO, on December 9, 1974, demanded that Chicago Title and Trust Company immediately pay to it the monies in said escrow, aggregating approximately \$650,000 and notwithstanding that VENDO was advised by the Chicago Title and Trust Company on December 18, 1974 that there had been no complete and final determination of said appeal, VENDO instituted supplementary proceedings in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, causing a Citation to Discover Assets to issue on December 20, 1974, directed to the Chicago Title and Trust Company, which also called for the production of documents, including any pertaining to Stoner Shopping Center, Inc. On December 31, 1974 VENDO obtained an order upon said Citation, directing the Escrow Trustee to turn over all funds in said Escrow Trust to VENDO.

15. Plaintiffs have been deprived and will be deprived of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and of their Civil Rights under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the actions of VENDO under color of state law in attempting to effect collection of said state court judgments, in that:

a. The judgments entered by the Supreme Court of Illinois, upon a new theory and legal premise (breach of fiduciary duty by appropriation of a corporate opportunities or breach fiduciary duty, generally) which was never pleaded in the lower courts and which was

contrary to the mandate of the Appellate Court and to the law of the case governing the trial court on remand, denied plaintiffs the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard and present their evidence relating thereto, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, with respect to said new matters, upon which said Court affirmed said judgments, contrary to procedural due process of law.

b. The judgments of the Supreme Court of Illinois were in violation of a clear and unambiguous state statute, namely, the Illinois Antitrust Act, and denied plaintiffs a clear and unambiguous remedy provided by said statute. Such judgments were therefore arbitrary and capricious, without warrant in law, and denied plaintiffs substantive due process and equal protection of the laws.

c. The judgment of the Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the Appellate Court, which was based on a finding that STONER was not responsible for VENDO's failure to have FIFO, and its affirmance of the trial court's judgment for \$7,345,500 against plaintiffs is totally refuted by the evidence in the record, there being no evidence in the record which rationally supports said Supreme Court judgment. Said judgment is therefore arbitrary and capricious and denies plaintiffs due process.

16. VENDO is threatening to, and unless restrained or enjoined by this Court, will collect the State court judgments it has wrongfully procured in the derogation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, to the irreparable harm and detriment of plaintiffs.

17. VENDO's conduct and activity was wilful and wanton and in conscious disregard of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS pray the following relief with respect to Count II:

1. That this Court issue preliminary and permanent injunctions against VENDO restraining it from continuing the unlawful practices alleged herein, including restraining VENDO from enforcing or collecting, or attempting to enforce or collect, the State court judgments.

2. That plaintiffs be awarded damages in the amount of the attorneys' fees and cash disbursements and costs they have incurred in the defense of the State court action.

3. That plaintiffs be awarded punitive damages in an amount of \$200,000.

4. That plaintiffs be awarded attorneys' fees, costs and interests for this suit.

5. That plaintiffs have such other and further relief as the Court shall deem just.

LEKTRO-VEND CORP.  
HARRY B. STONER and  
STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

By BARNABAS F. SEARS  
Barnabas F. Sears

By JAMES E. S. BAKER  
James E. S. Baker  
Their Attorneys

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[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
OMITTED IN PRINTING]

### Exhibit A To Amended And Supplemental Complaint

AGREEMENT made the 3rd day of April, 1959, by and between STONER MFG. CORP., an Illinois Corporation, having its principal place of business at Aurora, Illinois, (hereinafter referred to as the "Company"), and THE VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation having its principal place of business at 7400 East Twelfth Street, Kansas City, Missouri, (hereinafter referred to as "Vendo").

. . . . .

SECTION 15. From and after the closing, the Company will not own, directly or indirectly, manage, operate, join, control or participate in the ownership, management, operation or control of, or be connected in any manner with, any business engaged in the manufacture and sale of vending machines under any name similar to the Company's present name, and, for a period of ten (10) years after the closing, the Company will not in any manner, directly or indirectly, enter into or engage in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo or any affiliate or subsidiary is so engaged, in the manufacture and sale of vending machines or any business similar to that now being conducted by the Company. The Company also agrees that during its corporate existence it will, without incurring any financial obligation, cooperate with Vendo to prevent the use by others of the name 'Stoner' and 'Stoner Mfg. Corp.' in connection with any business similar to that now carried on by the Company and also agrees not to disclose to others, or make use of directly or indirectly any formulae or process now owned or used by the Company.

. . . . .



**Exhibit B To Amended And Supplemental Complaint****EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT**

AGREEMENT made and entered into this 1st day of June, 1959, by and between the VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation having its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", and HARRY B. STONER, of the City of Aurora, Kane County, Illinois, hereinafter referred to as "Stoner".

**WITNESSETH THAT**

WHEREAS, Stoner is the President, the principal executive, officer and directing heard of Stoner Mfg. Corp., an Illinois Corporation with its principal office located at 328 Gale Street, Aurora, Kane County, Illinois, and

WHEREAS, the Company and said Stoner Mfg. Corp have heretofore entered into an agreement dated the 3rd day of April, 1959, providing for the sale by Stoner Mfg. Corp. and the purchase by the Company of the major portion of the assets of Stoner Mfg. Corp. all of which said assets are located at Aurora, Illinois, and are proposed to be operated as a manufacturing facility by the Company and

WHEREAS, one of the reasons among others inducing the said Stoner Mfg. Corp. to enter into such agreement aforesaid was the physical condition of said Stoner and

WHEREAS, it has not been determined whether said Aurora, Illinois, facility so purchased shall be operated as a division of the Company or as a separate subsidiary corporation, but in either event the Company desires to employ the services of Stoner in connection with the operation of said Aurora, Illinois, facility and in connection with other operations of the Company and Stoner desires to enter into the employ of the Company,

Now THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained herein, the parties hereto do hereby contract and agree as follows:

1. The Company hereby employs Stoner for a period of five (5) years from the date hereof as an officer or in such other executive or advisory capacity with the subsidiary corporation if the Company decides that the Aurora, Illinois, facility shall be operated as a subsidiary corporation.

2. Stoner accepts such employment and agrees to serve as an officer or in such other executive or advisory capacity with the Company or such subsidiary corporation as aforesaid as the Company may request and as Stoner's physical condition will permit for said period of five (5) years and also agrees to serve without additional compensation except the compensation herein provided as a director of the Company or of any of the company's subsidiary corporations as the Company or its stockholders may determine.

3. Stoner shall regulate his own hours of employment and shall determine the amount of time and effort which he shall devote to such service and employment for the Company, it being understood that the value of Stoner's services to the Company are not measured by the amount of time or effort devoted to the business by Stoner but by the value of his advice and counsel in the operation of the Aurora, Illinois, facility, and his know-how, experience and reputation in the vending machine field. In his employment for the Company Stoner shall not be required to move his place of residence from Aurora, Illinois.

4. As compensation for his services during the term of this agreement in whatever capacity rendered the Company shall pay Stoner a salary of Fifty Thou-

sand Dollars (\$50,000.00) per year payable in monthly installments.

5. During the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following the termination of his employment hereunder, whether by lapse of time or by termination as hereinafter provided, Stoner shall not directly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities, enter into or engage in the vending machine manufacturing business or any branch thereof, either as an individual on his own account, or as a partner or joint venturer, or as an employee, agent or salesman for any person, firm or corporation or as an officer or director of a corporation or otherwise, provided however that the Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates shall be excluded from the restrictions hereof and provided also that Stoner shall be permitted to own, hold, acquire and dispose of stocks and other securities which are traded in the investment security market whether on listed exchanges or over the counter.

6. This agreement shall terminate five (5) years from the date hereof or upon the death of Stoner whichever shall occur sooner. In the event of the death of Stoner during the term hereof the Company shall be obligated to pay to Stoner or to his estate compensation only to the date of his death.

7. The Company shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon thirty days (30) notice in the event of the substantial violation of the terms hereof by Stoner.

8. Stoner may cancel and terminate this agreement at any time on thirty (30) days notice in the event he

shall feel that he is not physically able to perform his duties hereunder.

9. In the event of the termination as provided in paragraph 7 and 8 above, the Company shall be obligated to pay Stoner compensation only to such date of termination.

10. Any notice required to be given pursuant to the provisions of this agreement shall be in writing and by registered mail and shall be mailed to the parties at the following addresses:

The Company, 7400 East 12th Street, Kansas City, 26, Missouri

Stoner, 1530 Garfield, Aurora, Illinois

provided, however, that either of the parties hereto may from time to time change such mailing addresses by notice to the other party.

11. It is understood that this agreement may be assigned by the Company to any subsidiary, parent, successor or any affiliated person, firm or corporation and in such event Stoner's employment shall continue to be subject to each and all of the terms and conditions of this agreement and this agreement shall be considered an obligation and liability of the person, firm or corporation to whom this agreement may be so assigned but the Company shall nevertheless remain liable as a principal under this agreement.

12. This agreement may be amended at any time by agreement in writing executed by the parties hereto.

13. This agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto their respective heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns including transferees of the assets of the Company.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this agreement to be executed in its corporate name and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed and attested and Stoner has hereunto set his hand and seal all as of the day and year first above written.

THE VENDO COMPANY  
A Missouri Corporation

By /s/ ROBERT W. WAGSTAFF  
Vice Chairman of the Board  
and Executive Vice President

ATTEST:

/s/ GILBERT CARBAUGH II  
Assistant Secretary

/s/ HARRY B. STONER  
Harry B. Stoner  
(SEAL)

**Exhibit C to Amended and Supplemental Complaint**

[Complaint in The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, et al. (state court case). This document is reproduced at pp. 6-10, *supra*.]

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**Exhibit D to Amended and Supplemental Complaint**

[Amendment to Complaint filed January 28, 1966, by Plaintiff in The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, et al. (state court case). This document is reproduced at pp. 33-34, *supra*.]

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**Exhibit E to Amended and Supplemental Complaint**

[Opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261 (2d Dist. 1969). This document is reproduced at pp. 49-81, *supra*.]

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**Exhibit F to Amended and Supplemental Complaint**

[Opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 13 Ill. App. 3d 291 (2d Dist. 1973). This document is reproduced at pp. 94-99, *supra*.]

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**Exhibit G to Amended and Supplemental Complaint**

[Opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in The Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289 (1974). This document is reproduced at pp. 100-123, *supra*.]

• • • • •

**Transcript of Proceedings  
Before the Honorable Richard W. McLaren  
on January 23, 1975, at 10:00 a.m.**

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

[2] THE CLERK: 65 C 1755, Lektro-Vend Corporation v. The Vendo Company. This is a motion to quash subpoena or, in the alternative, for a protective order.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Lambert Ochsenchlager. I represent Vendo Company with Mr. Wayne Weiler.

That motion, I would suggest, be deferred until Mr. Baker's motion, which is up at the same time, is heard first.

THE COURT: That motion is for preliminary injunction against the defendant, The Vendo Company, from taking any further action to collect its judgment of August 13, 1971, and for a stay until there can be a hearing on said motion.

MR. BAKER: Good morning, your Honor. James Baker, attorney for the claimant in this case.

Here with me are Mr. Barnabas Sears and Mr. Clifford Yuknis.

I would like to hand up to the Court an additional affidavit bearing on the question of the preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Has the other side been furnished a copy?

MR. BAKER: Yes, sir, I gave them a copy this morning; two copies, actually. We think there is an emergency, and it is right now, your Honor. That is why we are here, as you know. If your Honor wishes to read the affidavit, I will subside.

[3] THE COURT: It looks like that might take a little time. I understand in general what this is about. Your

state court judgment has now become final, and Vendo wants seven and a half million dollars.

MR. BAKER: It has become final, except that we have in preparation a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. It is not due in there until February 27th. Mr. Sears has been working diligently on that. So that is part of it. So that it isn't final in the sense that—

THE COURT: It doesn't seem to me that you ought to be getting a stay from me in this case in order that you can take that case to the United States Supreme Court. You go either to the Illinois Court or the United States Supreme Court.

MR. BAKER: That is what I would like to explain, your Honor. As you know, there is this judgment, and we can't get a bond or a stay for certiorari. We applied to Judge Schaefer, and he refused to grant it.

We have an escrow trust agreement with The Vendo Company in which the Title Company was holding almost six hundred thousand dollars of funds, and that provided that there would be a stay of any proceedings regarding the judgment until final determination of the case.

Mr. Ochsenchlager has gone in before Judge Peterson in the citation proceeding and against the Title [4] Company, and got Judge Peterson to construe that agreement as meaning that the Supreme Court of Illinois decision is the final determination. We don't think that is so, and we argued against it, and that is on appeal in the Appellate Court for the 2nd District.

In the meantime, in the courtroom the other day out there in Geneva, the Title Company turned over a check for \$582,000, so they have got that much money.

The problem is that we think we have a good antitrust case here, your Honor, but if they go ahead with their supplementary proceedings, and they have four of them pending now, we are not going to be able to prosecute it.



I think I don't need to go into the motion for summary judgment and the holding of Judge McGarr, but I think it is implicit from his opinion he thinks we have got a good case. We didn't have it per se; there were questions of motive and intent that required a trial, and we want to try this issue. We have almost overwhelming evidence of anti-competitive motive and intent. But we are not here today to try that on its merits. We hope to persuade the Court to use its power under the Clayton Act and under the All Writs Act to protect its jurisdiction.

Let me explain why this is very significant here. There are three plaintiffs. There is Lektro-Vend Corporation; there is Stoner Investments; and there is Harry Stoner. [5] Now, Lektro-Vend Corporation is owned 79 percent by Stoner Investments and Stoner Investments, in turn—well, Stoner Investments is the largest creditor of Lektro-Vend Corporation.

Lektro-Vend is the company that is in competition with Vendo, the defendant. Stoner Investments is the largest creditor of Lektro-Vend as well. And Stoner Investments is 61 percent controlled by Harry Stoner. And the judgment which Vendo is seeking to collect is now over nine million dollars, and it is against Stoner whose principal asset is the stock in Stoner Investments, and it's against Stoner Investments, whose principal asset is its interest in Lektro-Vend. And if Vendo is permitted to continue the supplementary proceedings to collect the judgment, it will strip both Stoner and Stoner Investments of all their assets, including this 79 percent of Lektro-Vend. So Vendo will then control two of the three plaintiffs in this lawsuit, and could terminate this suit at once insofar as those two plaintiffs are concerned and will have stripped Stoner of his assets so he can't prosecute this action or pay his counsel.

There is a case which I would like to refer to either now or when your Honor will, if your Honor will, give me a

chance to present some of the reasons why I think we are entitled to a preliminary injunction, in which the [6] fact that the defendant would be deprived of the income out of which it could pay its counsel and prosecute the action was the reason why a preliminary injunction was entered.

Now, those are the factors that have weighed heavily with courts in granting preliminary injunctions in antitrust cases. And I ask that your Honor set this motion for preliminary injunction for hearing as soon as possible if your Honor will.

And in support of my further request that your Honor grant a stay, perhaps a temporary restraining order, pending that hearing, I would file these three affidavits.

The first affidavit that is attached to the motion is the Harry Stoner affidavit, and that accomplishes this. He swears to the complaint, so we have, in effect, a sworn Amended and Supplemental Complaint.

My first affidavit, which is filed with the motion papers, identifies the citation proceedings that have been commenced against Stoner Investments in the Circuit Court in Kane County.

My second affidavit which I have just handed up to your Honor sets forth, I hope, in summary form here what I have said, that is, the control by Stoner Investments of Lektro-Vend, and the fact that it is a creditor, and that it has voting control of Lektro-Vend, and that Stoner has [7] voting control of Stoner Investments. Those are the facts which are alleged in the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, and I set them forth in this Affidavit so they would be in logical form here.

Now, they have commenced several supplementary proceedings. One against the Chicago Title & Trust Company and that had been commenced before we filed the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, and we refer to that in the

Amended and Supplemental Complaint. And the fact that the money has been turned over and that we have appealed has happened since that Amended Complaint was filed, and the affidavit refers to that. It states the basis for our motion to vacate, which was lack of jurisdiction of that court under Section 73 to control or I mean to construe that escrow trust agreement or to order the turnover of those funds, and that that is now on appeal.

We also recite in the affidavit that this check for \$582,126.09 was actually turned over to Vendo, to counsel for Vendo, Mr. Ochsenschlager.

Also, the affidavit recites the commencement of further supplementary proceedings by the issuance of a citation against Stoner Investments. Mr. Sears filed a motion or a petition for a change of venue before Judge Peterson in the court at Kane County, and he denied that. And then we filed a motion to quash the citation. We also [8] filed a motion to dismiss the citation. We argued those before Judge Peterson, and they are now under advisement there.

They have also started supplementary proceedings against the Valley National Bank in Aurora, and they have caused the citation to be issued. I have got a copy of that citation attached to the affidavit.

A motion for change of venue was filed in that citation proceeding by the attorneys for the Valley National Bank, and it was allowed, and that is pending before Judge Boyle. Actually, it is set for tomorrow on a motion for a turnover order that Mr. Ochsenschlager has filed.

They have found that the Valley National Bank has some \$6,800 belonging to The Vendo Company and some \$6600 belonging to Stoner Investments, that the building in which the Valley National Bank is located is owned by Stoner Investments, and they are paying rent under a lease, and Mr. Ochsenschlager wants that rent turned over to The Vendo Company. He turned up that Harry Stoner owns 50 shares of stock, and he wants all the dividends on that.

So they are busy stripping all of the plaintiffs in this case of their assets. They have also started, they tell us, further supplementary proceedings by the issuance of a citation directed to Harry Stoner, and that citation has not yet been served.

[9] THE COURT: That would be to get his Lektro-Vend stock?

MR. BAKER: That would be to get his Stoner Investments stock and through control of Stoner Investments to get all of his Lektro-Vend stock that is held by Stoner Investments. That would give Vendo control.

I think one of the early cases—until your Honor gave us a hearing here, I didn't want to get into these cases, but one of the early cases in this field is called Hamilton Watch against Benrus where that is exactly why the preliminary injunction was issued, that the defendant would get control of the plaintiff in the antitrust case if the injunction were not issued.

Also, in addition, as I set forth in Paragraph 7 of the affidavit, we furnished Mr. Ochsenschlager with certain papers relating to the ownership of Stoner Shopping Center which is another entity in which the Stoner family is interested, but which was not a defendant in the state court proceeding, and there is no judgment against it or any of its property.

Now, it may be that Mr. Ochsenschlager has some theories that he may be able to follow that transaction back from 1958 on. But basically, it is owned by Harry Stoner's wife and by his son. The real equity is by his son. But that doesn't say that the property is owned by Stoner Shopping Center; it is not owned by them.

[10] But anyway, Mr. Ochsenschlager apparently has attempted to interfere in some financing that is under way. The Stoner Shopping Center is building a new store—I think it is for Jewel out there—and they had an arrange-



ment with Philipsborn & Company for a mortgage loan of well over a million dollars, and he has called both the mortgage company and the Chicago Title & Trust Company, and in effect what I used to call "slander of title," but anyway he told them they had better look into this transaction carefully before they make any loan.

The Chicago Title & Trust Company on January 17th informed Mr. Sears through its General Counsel that Mr. Ochsen-schlager had questioned the propriety of the issuance of a title guaranty policy on this loan for Stoner Shopping Center. Then further on the—

THE COURT: Mr. Baker, what was the seven and a half million dollar judgment for? What was the cause of action? Is that under the state antitrust laws?

MR. BAKER: No, sir. They struck the state antitrust counts from our complaint, and would not permit us to defend or to file a counterclaim. Now, that was based—the original suit was for the violation of some covenants not to compete. Now, that is the heart of our case, the employment of, or I mean, the use of these covenants, their invalidity under the federal law, which, as your Honor has stated [11] before, is a new ballgame over here so far as those covenants are concerned, and this complaint alleges not only that the covenants, but that the entire employment agreement of Harry Stoner and the way they treated him was a device to put him on the shelf, an anti-competitive device. We think we have excellent evidence that is already in this record in connection with our motion for summary judgment which shows that we have a strong likelihood of prevailing before your Honor on that claim. The ties that they—

THE COURT: So that the seven and a half million and the state action substantive issues were directly related to the matter in this court?

MR. BAKER: Yes, sir.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I beg your pardon.

MR. BAKER: Directly related to the matter in this court.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Your Honor, I would just like to disagree with that. It is on a breach of fiduciary duty, and the Supreme Court opinion clearly states that.

MR. BAKER: Well, on the Supreme Court opinion, Mr. Sears wants to speak for a moment if he may, your Honor.

MR. SEARS: I don't want to interrupt your Honor if you have a question.

THE COURT: No, I was going to ask Mr. Ochsen-schlager to go ahead and respond, but you go ahead.

[12] MR. SEARS: I just want to say that—

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Before I respond to the Judge's question?

MR. SEARS: Whichever the Judge prefers.

THE COURT: Let Mr. Sears go ahead.

MR. SEARS: I want to say about the judgment that was entered, it was obviously entered—the case was tried on a breach of covenants with respect to noncompetitive activities. All through the lawsuit, the case was tried on that basis.

The Appellate Court in the first opinion fixed the law of the case which governed the second trial, and they shifted the theory of their case, claiming that the reason why they didn't have FIFO was the fault of Stoner, which was completely outside of the pleadings.

They tried it on that theory. It went to the Appellate Court the second time. The Appellate Court held that they had completely ignored their mandate. And, incidentally, the Supreme Court had denied leave to appeal from the

judgment which made that mandate final and binding on the parties. And then we get into the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the Supreme Court of Illinois says that it has the power to change the law which governed that trial, that it can ex post facto change the law and affirm the judgment on the basis of a violation of a fiduciary duty amounting to [13] a corporate opportunity when the case was never tried on that basis at all.

THE COURT: What has been said brings back to my mind the basic issues in the state case. Let me hear from Mr. Ochsenchlager.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: If the Court please, Mr. Sears couldn't be more in error. I respect him, but the case was always the breach of fiduciary duty. From the very first day it was filed, it was a breach of fiduciary duty, the misconduct of Harry Stoner as an officer, and director, and employee of The Vendo Company and the things he did to create and build this company that is now called Lektro-Vend, and designed a machine that completely put the machine that he sold to Vendo, just made it obsolete, and that is where all of these damages came.

The theory that we pursued all through the trial in the trial court and the Appellate Court was the conduct of Harry Stoner, and the wrongful conduct as a fiduciary.

The Supreme Court of Illinois went into that in great detail, and they have held that was a fact and they held that this judgment, the original judgment, was proper.

If the Court please, I don't think that it is proper to start a new avenue of appeal; when someone is dissatisfied with the construction of the case in the Illinois Supreme Court, that they should evade their right to [14] certiorari, and come in to a federal court for a review of the basic issues decided by the Illinois Supreme Court.

When we were before Judge Schaefer, he denied them the 30-day stay of mandate. They asked for a two-day

stay, and he denied that, and pointed out that they well knew that if they thought they had merit to it, they should go to the United States Supreme Court and ask for a stay of enforcement of the judgment until such time as they could file their petition for certiorari. This they knew; they have not done. They say here about a bond. The Supreme Court has the right if it wants to to grant that without a bond if the merits of the case so justify.

This case—and I know that we are not supposed to argue here the merits of the antitrust suit that was filed here, but may I just say—

[15] THE COURT: No, let's not get into that.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: May I just say in response to what Mr. Baker said that the case is wholly without merit. It was filed only because we had our state case going and it has been nine, close to ten years it has been sitting here without any effort by them to move on it.

THE COURT: You haven't done very much to move it either.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: If the Court please—

THE COURT: I have tried to move this case for about three years.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I just trust you are not saying it was my fault. I have never been unwilling to go ahead on it.

THE COURT: I didn't say it was your fault. I say you haven't done anything either.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: No, of course I haven't. They are the plaintiffs. If they want to move their case, I think they should do it.

May I suggest—

THE COURT: The first move is going to be a lot of discovery from your client, as you know.



MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: We are very willing to do that.

[16] THE COURT: You have been very happy to let discovery rest while you finished up with your State Court proceedings and I—

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I am sorry if I am to blame for that, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't suggest anybody is to blame for anything but this matter is ten years old. They have a right to a trial on the charges that are made in it.

Why haven't you gone to the Supreme Court for a stay?

MR. SEARS: I will answer that, your Honor.

I have been so busy with these supplementary proceedings and getting this petition for certiorari ready—we have been relying upon an agreement we made where we deposited this money in the Chicago Title and Trust Company. As the evidence will show, upon a hearing for preliminary injunction, we changed title to some twenty-five—don't hold me as to the amount because I may be wrong about that—which were held in the name of a trustee to the name of one or both of the judgment debtors so that their lien would attach upon those judgment. That agreement specifically says that the escrow is not to terminate and we sold property and deposited all of this money on the faith of this [17] escrow agreement which specifically said that it wasn't to terminate until there had been a complete and final determination of the appeal.

Now it didn't say complete and final determination of the appeal by—

THE COURT: It seems to me that is over the dam, Mr. Sears.

Are you going to go to the Supreme Court for a stay or not?

MR. SEARS: Well, if we get these papers ready, but we need a stay now, your Honor, and I think we need—I think your Honor is, without regard to whether we are going to seek a stay from the Supreme Court of the United States, that your Honor has the power in the circumstances of this case and in the light of the claimed—

THE COURT: It seems to me that if you had handled it properly, you will play out the string in the litigation that has the seven and a half million dollar judgment in it and that would mean that you would exhaust all of your possibilities of getting a stay in those proceedings and I would think that it would not take very much to prepare a request for a stay and go down and see Justice Rehnquist and see if you can get a stay [18] from him on that matter while you get your case ready. If he then denies the stay, then you are, I can see, up against the situation that you are talking about this morning. But as of the moment it doesn't seem to me that you have exhausted all of the possibilities that are available to you in that other litigation.

MR. SEARS: With all deference to your Honor, and I certainly have a great respect for your Honor's judgment, we didn't feel that it was necessary to do that in view of the plenary jurisdiction invested in this court as a chancellor to protect the right, but if you think that we should first—and we didn't even—we toyed with the question of whether or not we were required to file a petition for certiorari as a condition of coming in before your Honor to seek the relief that we are asking for, but we didn't want to have that question arise and so therefore we concluded that we would go the petition for certiorari route to protect it because I don't think there is much question about the fact that insofar as the Fourteenth Amendment rights are concerned, to say nothing about protecting the jurisdiction of this court in antitrust matters, that the District Court has the plenary jurisdiction to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights notwithstanding what

the [19] Supreme Court of a particular state has said about those rights because it is not the Supreme Court of the state that decides whether or not—finally decides whether or not there has been an invasion of federally-protected rights and deprivation—

THE COURT: It just seems to me that the orderly procedure would be to go and exhaust that possibility, Mr. Sears.

MR. SEARS: Well, can we have—

THE COURT: I am going to continue the present motion for temporary restraining order and I want you to go and see what you can get from the Supreme Court. If you can't get relief there, I would give you an immediate hearing on the preliminary injunction. I am going to, I think, start a jury case this morning that will take four or five days which would put us into the middle of next week and at that time if you have not been able to get your stay in the Supreme Court, why we will have a preliminary injunction hearing in this case on the question of—

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Your Honor, I am a little hard of hearing. You say we would then have a hearing of the request for a preliminary injunction?

THE COURT: That is right.

[20] MR. SEARS: What happens in the interim, your Honor?

THE COURT: In the interim I am continuing the motion for temporary restraining order because I don't want to act on this until you have exhausted your possibilities in that other case and I think that last step hasn't been taken.

MR. SEARS: What about the State Court proceedings that are pending now?

THE COURT: I am not going to enjoin all of them.

MR. SEARS: What—

THE COURT: I am not going to enjoin all of them at this state. I don't imagine very much is going to happen in them between now and the early part of next week.

MR. BAKER: They have a turnover set for tomorrow morning, your Honor, to get all of the assets that the Valley National Bank has. That is set before Judge Boyle tomorrow morning. That is why we are in here today. That is one of the reasons.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: We have much more to say about the preliminary injunction when that time comes and part of it is that they haven't shown that they will be irreparably damaged. There is no showing that this money is going to be wasted or disposed of out of their presence or not available for them if they should succeed in [21] certain—

THE COURT: You can argue all of that later.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: It is a question of jurisdiction.

THE COURT: You can argue all of that on the preliminary injunction.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I just didn't want to remain silent while they were arguing the motion.

MR. BAKER: Your Honor, we will go to Justice Rehnquist asking for a stay but I think that whether he gave it out and whether or not the Supreme Court affirms us or not, our complaint is here in the antitrust case. We need protection now from these people. These people are going to have all of our assets by next week if they continue these proceedings that they have pending in the supplementary proceedings. They have got \$580,000 already. They have got a proceeding against the Valley National Bank in which they have asked for a turnover tomorrow and I imagine Judge Peterson will decide the citation motions



that are pending before him in the proceeding against Stoner Investments and will probably enter a turnover. That is where the harm will come, if he enters a turnover Monday and Tuesday and orders Stoner Investments to turn over the Lektro-Vend stock.

[22] MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: May I reply to that?

Under the proceedings of citation in the court, they don't turn over the stock in Lektro-Vend to us. They turn it over to the Sheriff and have it sold.

Now we don't know who will get it. We don't want it.

THE COURT: You are arguing the merits now.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I am sorry, sir. I only did it because of the remarks he made.

THE COURT: I don't think that any of these courts are going to issue forthwith orders when you tell them that you are requesting a stay from the United States Supreme Court and are currently in the process of doing that and that failing it you are asking preliminary relief from this court. I don't think that that is going to happen.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: If the Court please, when we are out there tomorrow, if we have an argument, this is not a direction from this court, it is just your thought on it, is that correct?

THE COURT: I can enjoin the carrying-out of that order just as well afterwards as beforehand provided that the additional steps have been taken and the Supreme Court has had its opportunity to consider the State of [23] Illinois proceedings.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: If the Court please, they undoubtedly take into consideration the fact that they have had from December 9th to make this request and in the meantime they did a 50-page supplemental complaint and many other activities, they went to the Appellate Court in Illinois, to the Chief Justice first, they were denied the

same thing they are asking here. They went to the full panel of the Appellate Court and were denied it. They were denied it in the Supreme Court, they were denied it again in the trial court, and now they are in here. Now they have had this time to ask the Supreme Court for this.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, you ought to have a tenth birthday for this case.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes, your Honor.

The other matter that is up, we will try to be very brief with that. It is just very simple. They want to take my deposition. I know that they can call me as a witness but I would like some protection as to the area of my privilege as attorney for Vendo. If it perhaps is proper that that be raised at the time of the interrogation, that would be understandable, but I do think there should be some protection in there, and, [24] most important, we live and reside and have our offices in Kane County. They want to say that because they are in Chicago, they are asking that—they are directing me to appear in Mr. Sears' office to have this deposition taken. Certainly we are in the same district, in this district, but in Kane County. Kane County is in the same district as Cook County.

THE COURT: When is this deposition set for?

MR. SEARS: It is set for either Monday or Tuesday but we will have to put it over because we are not going to have time to take it if we make an application to Mr. Justice Rehnquist.

If he wants to take it out in his office, that is all right with us.

THE COURT: We will continue that.

MR. SEARS: We are not going to stand on the—

THE COURT: We will continue this motion and dispose of it later on. I think probably once we get these

other questions worked out, you gentlemen ought to be able to work out the details on taking the deposition.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I expect you are going to be back in here if you don't get your relief from Mr. Justice Rehnquist or whoever you see. However, if the matter [25] has not otherwise jelled up to that point, we will set this over until ten o'clock next Wednesday, the 29th of January.

MR. BAKER: Thank you, your Honor, for listening to us.

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[CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER OMITTED  
IN PRINTING.]

# **MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

(Filed January 23, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. Plaintiffs in the above entitled action, move the Court for a preliminary injunction against the Defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, enjoining the said THE VENDO COMPANY from taking any further steps to collect its judgments of August 13, 1971 obtained in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, pending further order of this Court.

DATED: January 13, 1975.

HARRY B. STONER and STONER  
INVESTMENTS, INC., Plaintiffs

By .....

Of Counsel:

Barnabas F. Sears

BOODELL, SEARS, SUGRUE,

GLAMBALVO & CROWLEY .....

One IBM Plaza

James E. S. Baker

Chicago, Illinois 60611

Their Attorneys

(312) 222-9400

SIDLEY & AUSTIN

One First National Plaza

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 329-5400

[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OMITTED  
IN PRINTING]



**AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES E. S. BAKER**

(Filed January 29, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

STATE OF ILLINOIS }  
 COUNTY OF COOK } ss.

JAMES E. S. BAKER, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says that he is counsel for the Plaintiffs, HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., in the above entitled action; that he also is of counsel for said Plaintiffs in the case of *THE VENDO COMPANY v. HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.*, in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, General Number 65-2134, in which case the said HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. are Defendants.

That on or about January 6, 1975 there was received in the office of the Plaintiff, STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., in Aurora, Illinois, a copy of a Citation in Supplemental Proceedings to Discover Assets, entitled in said action, which had attached an Exhibit A, three pages in length, which purported to require the production of various documents for the years 1957 through 1975, copy of which Citation and Exhibit A thereto are annexed hereto as Exhibit 1.

JAMES E. S. BAKER  
 James E. S. Baker

[JURAT OMITTED IN PRINTING]

[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OMITTED  
 IN PRINTING]

**Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of James E. S. Baker**

CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 16th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

County of Kane }  
 State of Illinois } s.s.

THE VENDO COMPANY, A Foreign Corporation  
 PLAINTIFF

VS.

HARRY B. STONER and  
 STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,  
 A Foreign Corporation  
 DEFENDANT

Gen. No. 65-2134

Date of judgement:  
 Month August Day 13 Year 1971

Amount of Judgement: Plus interest;  
 \$7,516,335.00 Plus costs of suit

Amount of judgement not satisfied:  
 \$7,516,335.00 plus interest and costs

Citation directed to:

☐ Defendant ☐ Third Party

Name: Stoner Investments, Inc.

c/o Harry B. Stoner

Address: 900 North Lake Street

City: Aurora, Illinois 60506

To appear:

Date: Tuesday, January 14, 1975

Time: 9:30 a.m.

Room No. 304

Before Judge: John S. Petersen

Attorney: Lambert M. Ochsenschlager

Name: Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy &amp; Hupp

Address: 75 S. Stolp, P. O. Box 1368

City: Aurora, Illinois 60507

Phone: (312) 892-8771

Description of Documents:

SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED

Supplementary Proceedings To  
Discover Assets

CITATION

THE CLERK OF THE COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED  
TO ISSUE THIS CITATION.

/s/ JAMES E. BOYLE  
(Judge)

WHEREAS a judgement was entered in favor of the above named plaintiff and against the above named defendant for the amount and costs shown herein and the amount shown herein remains unsatisfied: and

WHEREAS the judgement creditor believes that the party to whom this citation is directed has or owns property of or is indebted to the above named defendant:

NOW THEREFORE the party to whom this Citation is directed is hereby cited and required to appear at the time and place stated herein at Kane County Court House Geneva, Ill., for examination concerning the property or income of or indebtedness due the defendant.

You are hereby further cited and required to produce at said time and place the documents described herein and all books, papers or records in your possession or control which may contain information concerning the property or income of, or indebtedness due the judgment debtors.

WITNESS, JAN CARLSON, Clerk of said court, and the seal thereof, at his office at Geneva in said Kane County, this day of Jan. 3, 1975.

(COURT SEAL)  
/s/ JAN CARLSON  
Clerk of the Circuit Court

NOTICE TO PARTY CITED

YOU ARE PROHIBITED from making or allowing any transfer or other disposition of, or interfering with, any property not exempt from execution or garnishment belonging to the judgement debtor or to which he may be entitled or which may be acquired by or become due to him and from paying over or otherwise disposing of any money not so exempt, which is due or becomes due to him, until the further order of court or termination of the proceedings. You are not required to withhold the payment of any money beyond double the amount of the judgement.

The attorney who has requested this citation is listed above. Any questions regarding your knowledge of the subject matter or testimony in the case at hand should be directed to him. As a further assistance to you, he has listed the judge and room number where you are to appear.



## EXHIBIT "A"—STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

You are hereby further cited and required to produce at said time and place the documents described herein and **all books, papers or records** in your possession or control described hereafter as follows:

1. All certificates of deposit, bank statements, bank books, demand account statements and the like evidencing amounts of money on deposit or held on behalf of Stoner Investments, Inc., either solely or in joint tenancy, by any and all banks, savings institutions or depositories wherever located for the years 1957 through 1975 inclusive.

2. Any and all state and federal income, gift or inheritance tax returns, depreciation schedules, financial statements or other documents filed with or used in the preparation of said tax returns by Stoner Investments, Inc., for the year 1957 through 1975 inclusive.

3. Any and all real estate tax bills, personal property tax bills, depreciation schedules, tax returns and the like for any and all assets so taxed or depreciated for the year 1957 through 1975 inclusive.

4. Any and all financial statements, ledgers, accounts receivable, mortgages, chattel mortgages, financial statements, security agreements, judgments or the like in the name of Stoner Investments, Inc., or to which Stoner Investments, Inc., was a party either individually or in any capacity for the years 1959 through 1975 inclusive.

5. Any and all documents or memorandums pertaining to deeds, trust deeds, assignments of beneficial interests, real estate mortgages, financial reports or loan agreements and the like pertaining to any real property owned or in the name of Stoner Investments, Inc., located within the State of Illinois or located in any other state or country for the years 1958 through 1975 inclusive.

6. Any and all Declaration of Trust, trusts, or other documents evidencing any trust or arrangement in which

assets, real or personal, tangible or intangible, were or are held by or on behalf of Stoner Investments, Inc., for the years 1958 through 1975 inclusive.

7. Any and all documents describing the assets or corpus of any trusts or similar arrangements described in the preceding paragraph.

8. Any and all documents evidencing conveyances, transfer or sales of any and all real or personal property by Stoner Investments, Inc., either individually or in any capacity, exceeding the amount of One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) for the years 1958 through 1975 inclusive.

9. Any additional papers or documents containing any information as to the location or identification of income or assets of Harry B. Stoner or Stoner Investments, Inc., whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, mixed or the like whether held individually or jointly, or in which any interest whatsoever of value is or was owned or held whether in the expectancy, reversion, remainder or any other capacity recognized at law.

10. Any and all stock certificates, transfer invoices, bond certificates, bond interest coupons, limited partnership agreements, joint venture agreements and the like owned or in the name of Stoner Investments, Inc., for the years 1958 through 1975 inclusive.

11. Any and all patents, patent applications, unfilled patent applications, licensing agreements, licenses for the manufacture, design, modification or production of any mechanical or electrical devices owned by or in the name of Stoner Investments, Inc., for the years 1959 through 1975 inclusive.

12. Any and all bills of lading, accounts receivable, warehouse receipts, bills of exchange, drafts, commercial paper and the like owned by or in the name of Stoner Investments, Inc., for the years 1959 through 1975 inclusive.

13. Any and all copyrights, trademarks, trade names or documents evidencing the sale or licensing of same by Stoner Investments, Inc., for the years 1959 through 1975 inclusive.

14. Any documents or memorandums indicating any choses in action, expected or pending litigation in which Stoner Investments, Inc., is a party in interest for the years 1959 through 1975 inclusive.

15. Any lists, inventories or the like of personal assets of whatever kind and nature furnished to any insurance company for the purposes of insuring said items for loss by fire, calamity, casualty and the like together with the names, addresses and policy numbers pertaining thereto.

16. The names and addresses of any employers, agents, independent contractors, corporations, partnerships or individuals paying Stoner Investments, Inc., any salary, wages, commissions, bonuses and the like for the years 1959 through 1975 inclusive together with any W-2 forms or income tax statements prepared for said years.

17. Any and all documents, books, papers, records, correspondence, notes, security agreements evidencing any gift from Stoner Investments, Inc., or indebtedness to Stoner Investments, Inc., on the part of any person in whatever capacity, including but not limited to the following:

ANN M. STONER;  
DAVID STONER;  
RUTH LAWRENCE NETREY;  
ROD W. PHILLIPS;  
WILLIAM PHILLIPS;  
GLENN PHILLIPS;  
FIRST NATIONAL BANK  
OF BATAVIA, ILLINOIS;  
MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK,  
AURORA, ILLINOIS;  
LEKTRO-VEND CORPORATION,  
STONER SHOPPING CENTER, INC.

# **AFFIDAVIT OF HARRY B. STONER**

(Filed January 29, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

STATE OF FLORIDA }  
COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH } SS:

HARRY B. STONER, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and states as follows:

1. That he is one of the Plaintiffs in the above entitled action and is the President and majority shareholder of the Plaintiff, STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.; that he has read and is familiar with the contents of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint filed in said action on January 2, 1975; that the allegations of said Amended and Supplemental Complaint are true in substance and in fact.

2. That subsequent to the filing of said Amended and Supplemental Complaint, STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. has been served with a Citation in Supplementary Proceedings to Discover Assets in the case of *The Vendo Company v. Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.*, in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, which Citation is returnable Tuesday, January 14, 1975, at 9:30 a.m.; that compliance with said Citation would be extremely burdensome and would require the undivided attention of all of the employees of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. for an extended period of time; that the production of the documents called for would strip STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. of all of its files and records which are needed in the conduct of its business and would prevent affiant from devoting the necessary time and effort to the prosecution of this antitrust case.

3. That affiant believes that said citation proceeding is intended by THE VENDO COMPANY as a method of harassment of your affiant and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and constitutes a further effort to harass and destroy LEKTRO-VEND CORP.

HARRY B. STONER  
Harry B. Stoner

[JURAT OMITTED IN PRINTING]



**ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES E. S. BAKER**

(Filed January 29, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

STATE OF ILLINOIS }  
COUNTY OF COOK } ss:

JAMES E. S. BAKER, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys for HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., Plaintiffs in the above entitled cause; that he has personal knowledge of the matters hereinafter set forth and states as follows:

1. As set forth in the Amended and Supplemental Complaint herein, the Plaintiff STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. owns 63,900 shares of the common stock of LEKTRO-VEND CORP., also a Plaintiff herein, which ownership constitutes 61% of the equity and 78.57% of the voting power of LEKTRO-VEND. STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. also owns demand notes of LEKTRO-VEND CORP. in the amount of \$580,000, as set forth in paragraph 4 of said Amended and Supplemental Complaint. STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., therefore, has voting control of LEKTRO-VEND CORP. and is also its largest creditor.

2. HARRY B. STONER, plaintiff herein, owns 245 shares of the stock of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., which represents 61.25% of the voting power of said corporation. The only other shareholder of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. is ANN STONER, wife of HARRY B. STONER, who owns 155 shares thereof. Plaintiff HARRY B. STONER, therefore, has voting control of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

3. Commencing in December 1974, THE VENDO COMPANY, Defendant herein, instituted several supplementary proceedings under Section 73 of the Civil Practice Act in an effort to collect its judgments of \$7,345,000 against HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. The commencement of such proceedings and the entry of the turnover

order of December 31, 1974 are referred to in Count II, Paragraph 14, of the said Amended and Supplemental Complaint. Subsequent to December 31, 1974, THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY filed a motion to vacate the turnover order entered December 31, 1974 and a motion to vacate said turnover order, based on lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter in the Court, under Section 73 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, to construe or terminate said Escrow Trust Agreement, or to order the turnover of said funds contrary to the terms of said Agreement, was also filed and argued under a special and limited appearance by Plaintiffs HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. Judge Peterson of the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, on January 10, 1975, denied such motions to vacate and THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY delivered to the attorneys for Defendant in open court check for \$582,126.09, representing all but \$400 of the funds held in the Escrow Trust Agreement referred to in Paragraph 14 of Count II of said Amended and Supplemental Complaint. An immediate notice of appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District was filed and a stay of said turnover order pending appeal was denied by the Appellate Court on January 14, 1975.

4. Defendant THE VENDO COMPANY has also commenced supplementary proceedings by the issuance of a citation against STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. under date of January 3, 1975, returnable January 14, 1975, which citation is referred to in the affidavit of HARRY B. STONER dated January 10, 1975 heretofore filed herein and a copy of which is annexed to the affidavit of JAMES E. S. BAKER dated January 8, 1975. A Petition for Change of Venue in said citation proceeding was presented to Judge Peterson on January 14, 1975 and denied; a motion to quash the said citation was filed on January 14, 1975 and argued on January 15, 1975 before Judge Peterson, at the conclusion of which said motion was taken under advisement and decision thereon is now pending. Also on January 15, 1975,

HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. filed their motion to dismiss said citation proceeding based on the agreement for the stay of all proceedings pending final determination, which was provided in the Escrow Trust Agreement between STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and THE VENDO COMPANY, with THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY as Escrow Trustee, on December 14, 1971, which constitutes Exhibit H to the Amended and Supplemental Complaint herein (Paragraphs 12 and 13 thereof). Said motion to dismiss was also argued and taken under advisement by Judge Peterson on January 15, 1975.

5. Defendant THE VENDO COMPANY has started other supplementary proceedings against VALLEY NATIONAL BANK, Aurora, Illinois. Said Defendant caused a citation to be issued January 3, 1975, directed to said VALLEY NATIONAL BANK, returnable January 14, 1975. A copy of said citation is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 1. A motion for a change of venue was filed in said citation proceeding by VALLEY NATIONAL BANK on January 14, 1975 before Judge Peterson and the proceeding was transferred to Judge James E. Boyle, another judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois. A motion to quash or, in the alternative, for a limitation of said citation, was filed by VALLEY NATIONAL BANK and the matter has been set for further hearing before Judge Boyle on January 24, 1975, at 9:30 a.m., in Geneva, Illinois. Subsequent thereto, THE VENDO COMPANY has filed a motion for a turn-over order returnable before Judge Boyle at 9:30 a.m. on January 24, 1975, requesting that VALLEY NATIONAL BANK be directed to turn over to THE VENDO COMPANY the balance of \$6,875.48 in the personal checking account of HARRY B. STONER and the balance of \$6,604.22 in the checking account of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. The building in which VALLEY NATIONAL BANK is located is owned by STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.; the said motion for turn-over order requests that rent payments due monthly under the lease of such premises be turned over to THE VENDO COMPANY. Said motion further

requests the Court to pay any dividends which may accrue on 50 shares of the capital stock of VALLEY NATIONAL BANK held in the name of HARRY B. STONER be paid to THE VENDO COMPANY. A copy of said motion for a turn-over order is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

6. The attorneys for THE VENDO COMPANY have also stated that further supplementary proceedings have been commenced by the issuance of a citation directed to HARRY B. STONER but that said citation has not as yet been served.

7. On or about December 9, 1974, affiant and BARNABAS F. SEARS, counsel for plaintiffs HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., furnished LAMBERT M. OCHSENSCHLAGER, attorney for THE VENDO COMPANY, with copies of certain documents theretofore requested by him, including a memorandum entitled, "Details on Stoner Shopping Center" and a copy of the *inter vivos* trust dated December 31, 1958 between HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER and THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BATAVIA. A copy of the letter of transmittal from Mr. Sears to Mr. Ochsenchlager, dated December 9, 1974, is attached hereto as Exhibit 3; the memorandum dated December 9, 1974 concerning the Stoner Shopping Center is attached hereto as Exhibit 4; and copy of the Trust Agreement of December 31, 1958 is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 5.

However, notwithstanding the furnishing of such information with respect to Stoner Shopping Center, affiant is informed that the said LAMBERT M. OCHSENSCHLAGER has attempted to interfere in a pending financial transaction involving a mortgage loan for Stoner Shopping Center, Inc. A memorandum dated December 26, 1974 from David W. Stoner to Barnabas F. Sears and your affiant, reporting such interference is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.

On January 17, 1975, THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY, through its general counsel, John P. Turner, advised BARNABAS F. SEARS that Mr. Ochsenchlager had ques-



tioned the propriety of the issuance by THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY of a mortgage loan guarantee policy on a loan to Stoner Shopping Center. Mr. Turner further advised Mr. Sears on January 21, 1975 that THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY had refused to issue a mortgage loan guarantee policy, without an order from the said Judge Peterson permitting it to do so, notwithstanding that the title to the property involved was clearly in Stoner Shopping Center, Inc. and not subject to the lien of the judgments against STONER AND STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

8. Affiant is informed that rumors of a pending takeover of LEKTRO-VEND CORP. by THE VENDO COMPANY in the course of its satisfying its judgments against STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and HARRY B. STONER have been circulated in the trade, as a result of which the orders received by LEKTRO-VEND in recent weeks have slowed to a mere trickle. LEKTRO-VEND's orders for the entire month of December, 1974 were equal to the production for three days at normal capacity.

9. Affiant has also been informed by an officer of Harris Trust & Savings Bank, one Roy J. Funkhouser, Assistant Vice President of said bank, that the bank had under consideration the extension of its mortgage loan to LEKTRO-VEND CORP., secured by a mortgage on LEKTRO-VEND's facilities on Sullivan Road, in North Aurora, Illinois and also had under consideration a loan application for funds needed for its operations. Mr. Funkhouser asked affiant if there was to be a hearing on January 16 or 17 with respect to the pending motion for preliminary injunction and stay pending hearing thereof in this case. Mr. Funkhouser informed affiant that if such stay were not granted or the proceeding delayed, the Harris Trust & Savings Bank might well decide that the further financing of LEKTRO-VEND CORP. would be unwise and it might thus refuse to extend said mortgage and make said operating loan.

10. Affiant is informed and believes that a continuation or proliferation of said supplementary proceedings to col-

lect said state court judgments will leave the Plaintiffs HARRY B. STONER AND STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. without funds or assets with which to prosecute this case and will result in the acquisition by THE VENDO COMPANY, in partial satisfaction of said judgments, of control, through stock ownership, of the Plaintiffs STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and LEKTRO-VEND CORP.

JAMES E. S. BAKER  
James E. S. Baker

[JURAT OMITTED IN PRINTING]

**Exhibit 1 to Additional Affidavit of James E. S. Baker**  
**CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 16th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT**

STATE OF ILLINOIS }  
 COUNTY OF KANE } s.s.

THE VENDO COMPANY, A Foreign Corporation  
 VS. PLAINTIFF

HARRY B. STONER and  
 STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.  
 A Foreign Corporation

DEFENDANT

Gen. No. 65-2134

Date of judgement:

Month August Day 13 Year 1971

Amount of judgement: Plus interest;  
 \$7,516,335.00 Plus costs of suit.

Amount of judgement not satisfied:  
 \$7,516,335.00 plus interest and costs.

Citation directed to:

☐ Defendant ☒ Third Party

Name: Valley National Bank

Address: 900 North Lake Street

City: Aurora, Illinois

To appear:

Date: Tuesday, January 14, 1975

Time: 9:30 a.m.

Room No. 304

Before Judge: John S. Petersen

Attorney: Lambert M. Ochsenschlager

Name: Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy & Hupp

Address: 75 S. Stolp, P. O. Box 1368

City: Aurora, Illinois 60507

Phone: (312) 892-8771

Description of Documents:

SEE EXHIBIT "A"

**Supplementary Proceedings To  
 Discover Assets**

**CITATION**

THE CLERK OF THE COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED  
 TO ISSUE THIS CITATION.

/s/ JAMES E. BOYLE  
 (Judge)

WHEREAS a judgement was entered in favor of the above named plaintiff and against the above named defendant for the amount and costs shown herein and the amount shown herein remains unsatisfied: and

WHEREAS the judgement creditor believes that the party to whom this citation is directed has or owns property of or is indebted to the above named defendant:

NOW THEREFORE the party to whom this Citation is directed is hereby cited and required to appear at the time and place stated herein at Kane County Court House Geneva, Ill., for examination concerning the property or income of or indebtedness due the defendant.

You are hereby further cited and required to produce at said time and place the documents described herein and all books, papers or records in your possession or control which may contain information concerning the property or income of, or indebtedness due the judgement debtors.

WITNESS, JAN CARLSON, Clerk of said court, and the seal thereof, at his office at Geneva in said Kane County, this day of Jan. 3, 1975.

(HOUSE SEAL)

/s/ JACOBSON  
 Clerk of the Circuit Court



## NOTICE TO PARTY CITED

YOU ARE PROHIBITED from making or allowing any transfer or other disposition of, or interfering with, any property not exempt from execution or garnishment belonging to the judgement debtor or to which he may be entitled or which may be acquired by or become due to him and from paying over or otherwise disposing of any money not so exempt, which is due or becomes due to him, until the further order of court or termination of the proceedings. You are not required to withhold the payment of any money beyond double the amount of the judgement.

The attorney who has requested this citation is listed above. Any questions regarding your knowledge of the subject matter or testimony in the case at hand should be directed to him. As a further assistance to you, he has listed the Judge and room number where you are to appear.

I certify that I served this Citation on defendants as follows:

## (a)—(Individual defendants-personal):

By leaving a copy with each individual defendant personally, as follows:

Name of defendant	Date of service
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

## (b)—(Individual defendants-abode):

By leaving a copy at the usual place of abode of each individual defendant with a person of his family, of the age of 10 years or upwards, informing that person of the citation and also by sending a copy of the citation in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed to

each individual defendant at his usual place of abode, as follows:

Name of defendant	Person with whom left	Date of service	Date of mailing
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

## (c)—(Corporation defendants):

By leaving a copy with the registered agent officer, or agent of each defendant corporation, as follows:

Defendant corporation	Registered agent, officer or agent	Date of service
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

## (d)—(Other service):

....., Sheriff of ..... County  
By ....., Deputy

## SHERIFF'S FEES

Service and return ..... \$.....  
Miles.....  
Total ..... \$.....  
Sheriff of ..... County

## EXHIBIT "A"—VALLEY NATIONAL BANK

You are hereby further cited and required to produce at said time and place the documents described herein and all books, papers or records in your possession or control as follows:

1. Any and all papers, documents, correspondence or records containing any information as to the location or identification of income or assets of Harry B. Stoner or Stoner Investments, Inc., whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, mixed or the like, whether held individually, jointly in trust or in which any interest whatsoever of value is or was owned or held whether in the expectancy, reversion, remainder or any other capacity recognized at law for the years 1959 through 1975, inclusive.

2. Any and all documents containing any information as to any right, title or interest held by Harry B. Stoner or Stoner Investments, Inc., in the Valley National Bank.

3. Any and all records or statements of accounts, deposits, escrows, safe deposit boxes or any other assets or personal property now held by the Valley National Bank in the name of or on behalf of Harry B. Stoner or Stoner Investments, Inc.

## Exhibit 2 to Additional Affidavit of James E. S. Baker

STATE OF ILLINOIS }  
COUNTY OF KANE } ss.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTEENTH  
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

**THE VENDO COMPANY,**  
a foreign corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

**HARRY B. STONER**  
and **STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,**  
a foreign corporation,

Defendants.

and

**VALLEY NATIONAL BANK,**  
Third Party Respondent to  
Citation Proceedings.

General No. 65-2134

Supplemental  
Proceedings to  
Discover Assets

## MOTION FOR TURNOVER ORDER

Now COMES The plaintiff, The Vendo Company, a foreign corporation and shows to the Court the following:

1. That pursuant to a Citation served upon the Valley National Bank, the said bank by and through its duly authorized agent Paul Manning produced information as to the following income and indebtedness due by the Valley Bank to the defendants herein:

(a) A certain checking account numbered 4-9002-4 held in the name of Harry B. Stoner which bears a present balance of \$6,875.48.

(b) A certain checking account numbered 7-9002-8 held in the name of Stoner Investments, Inc. and carrying a present balance of \$6,604.22.



(c) A certain Lease Agreement whereunder the Valley National Bank pays monthly rentals to Stoner Investments, Inc. as follows: the sum of \$20,000.00 for each lease year payable in monthly installments of \$1,666.66 on the first day of each lease month, in advance; and in addition the said Valley National Bank shall pay each year when ascertained, a sum equal to one-eighth of one percent of the said bank's average deposit liability for the preceding year in excess of \$9,000,000.00, computed monthly.

(d) The defendant Harry B. Stoner appears to hold fifty (50) shares of capital stock in the said Valley National Bank; the defendant Stoner Investments, Inc. may also own certain capital stock in the said bank. The said bank has in the past and is now paying dividends to its said shareholders.

2. No other person claims any right, title or interest to any of the said indebtedness or income.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, The Vendo Company prays as follows:

1. That the Court enter an order directing the Valley National Bank to turnover to the plaintiff herein the proceeds in its Account No. 4-9002-4 as of the date of its order to be applied on the judgment held herein.

2. That the Court direct the Valley National Bank to turnover to the plaintiff herein the proceeds in its Account No. 7-9002-8 as of the date of said order to be applied on the judgment held herein.

3. That the Court order the Valley National Bank to pay all future rent payments due under the Lease Agreement between the Valley National Bank as lessee and Stoner Investments, Inc. as lessor dated June 5, 1961, and as thereafter amended, to the plaintiff herein to apply on the judgment held in this cause.

4. That the Court order the Valley National Bank to pay all the future dividends due to Harry B. Stoner and/or Stoner Investments, Inc. as shareholders of the said bank to the plaintiff herein to be applied on the judgment held in this cause.

5. That the Court provide such other relief as may appear proper from time to time during the course of the said Citation proceedings pending against the Valley National Bank.

REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER, MURPHY & HUPP  
Reid, Ochsenchlager, Murphy and Hupp  
Attorneys for The Vendo Company

REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER, MURPHY AND HUPP  
75 South Stolp Avenue, P. O. Box 1368  
Aurora, Illinois 60507  
Telephone: 312 892 8771

**Exhibit 3 to Additional Affidavit of James E. S. Baker**

December 9, 1974

REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER, MURPHY &amp; HUPP

75 Stolp Avenue

Post Office Box 1264

Aurora, Illinois 60504

Attention: LAMBERT OCHSENSCHLAGER, Esquire

Re: VENDO V. STONER, et al.

Gentlemen:

As we indicated to you the other day, enclosed you will find the following:

- 1—Financial statement of Stoner Investments, Inc. dated November 30, 1974, consisting of four pages;
- 2—Financial statement of Harry B. Stoner dated December 8, 1974, consisting of one page;
- 3—Financial statement of Lektro-Vend Corporation dated October 31, 1974, consisting of three pages; and
- 4—Details of Stoner Shopping Center dated December 9, 1974, consisting of two pages, with *inter vivos* Trust dated December 31, 1958 relating to said Center, consisting of five pages.

We are holding ourselves ready to meet with you in Aurora on Friday, December 13, 1974. We understand you will call us the afternoon of the 12th to fix the time for such meeting.

Very truly yours,

BOODELL, SEARS, SUGRUE,  
GIAMBALVO & CROWLEY

Barnabas F. Sears

BFS:sgr  
Enc.

**Exhibit 4 to Additional Affidavit of James E. S. Baker**

December 9, 1974

**DETAILS ON STONER SHOPPING CENTER**

The Stoner Shopping Center was organized as a corporation August 30, 1955. The land, owned in joint tenancy by Harry and Ann Stoner, was transferred to Stoner Shopping Center, Inc. upon its incorporation, and each of the founders were issued 10,000 shares of common stock at \$1.00 par value.

The land was vacant except for some sewer improvements and remained so at the time of the creation of the irrevocable *inter vivos* trust between Harry and Ann Stoner and the First National Bank of Batavia as Trustee, executed December 31, 1958, a copy of which is attached.

On December 19, 1958, the Articles of Incorporation were amended to reclassify the existing common stock as Class A Common, 1.00 par, and to authorize Class B stock of \$10 par value. Class B stock was issued in two increments, one on December 31, 1958, referred to in the *inter vivos* trust. The first issue was 2,000 shares, with a par value of \$10.00 per share, purchased by Ann and Harry Stoner for \$20,000 and transferred to the Trustee, as recited in the Trust Agreement. On April 5, 1962, an additional 2,000 shares of Class B stock was purchased by Ann and Harry Stoner, for an aggregate of \$20,000 and transferred to the trust.

In the Spring of 1971, Harry Stoner sold the 10,000 \$1.00 par value shares to Ann for \$80,000.00, represented by a note, of which she has paid off \$30,000.00, leaving a balance of \$50,000.00.

On November 9, 1971, when David Stoner became 25, the trust was terminated and all of its assets were delivered to him by the trustee.

At the present time,  $\frac{2}{3}$  of Stoner Shopping Center, Inc. is in David Stoner and  $\frac{1}{3}$  is in Ann Stoner, with David having  $16\frac{2}{3}\%$  of the voting rights and Ann having  $83\frac{1}{3}\%$  of the voting rights.



**Exhibit 5 to Additional Affidavit of  
James E. S. Baker**

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this 31st day of December, 1958 by and between HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER, both of the City of Aurora, County of Kane, State of Illinois, hereinafter called the "donors", and the FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BATAVIA, Batavia, Illinois, a national banking corporation, hereinafter called the "trustee",  
WITNESSETH:

THAT WHEREAS the donors are the parents of DAVID WAYNE STONER:

AND WHEREAS the donors have heretofore been the sole stockholders of STONER SHOPPING CENTER, INC., an Illinois corporation;

AND WHEREAS the donors have purchased 2,000 shares of the Class B stock of STONER SHOPPING CENTER, INC., and have caused the said shares to be issued in the name of the trustee;

AND WHEREAS the donors propose hereafter that the said STONER SHOPPING CENTER, INC., shall construct and operate a shopping center on land owned by said corporation, and said donors desire that their said son, DAVID WAYNE STONER, shall participate in the profits arising out of the construction and operation of such a shopping center by and through this trust agreement,

NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the acceptance by the trustee of the trust hereby created and the delivery by the donors to the trustee of Certificate No. 1B for 2,000 shares of Class B common stock of STONER SHOPPING CENTER, INC., of the par value of \$10.00 per share, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged by the trustee, the trustee agrees to hold, manage and disburse the same as a trust estate upon the following terms and conditions:

**ARTICLE I.**

A. The entire beneficial interest in the trust estate shall immediately vest in DAVID WAYNE STONER, son of the donors, subject to the provisions of this agreement.

B. The trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the said DAVID WAYNE STONER as much of the net income and principal of the trust estate as the trustee shall consider necessary or advisable to assure the comfort, care, support, maintenance, education and medical attention of the said DAVID WAYNE STONER until he shall attain the age of 25 years, or until the earlier termination of this trust as herein provided, or until his death prior to attaining such age. Such payments may be made:

1. Directly to said DAVID WAYNE STONER;
2. To the legal guardian of the said DAVID WAYNE STONER;
3. To a relative of said DAVID WAYNE STONER for the benefit of said DAVID WAYNE STONER, or
4. Directly by the trustee for the benefit of said DAVID WAYNE STONER.

Any income not paid to or for the benefit of said DAVID WAYNE STONER shall be added to the principal of the trust estate.

C. On the date that said DAVID WAYNE STONER attains the age of 25 years, or on direction in writing to the Trustee from the donors or the survivor of them on or after the date when the said DAVID WAYNE STONER attains the age of 21 years, the trustee shall pay and disburse the principal and any accumulated income of the trust estate to him. On the death of the said DAVID WAYNE STONER prior to such payment, the trustee shall pay and distribute the principal and any accumulated income of the trust estate to the person or persons legally entitled thereto either by appointment by said DAVID WAYNE STONER in his last Will and

Testament designating the person or persons and the amounts of such trust estate to be delivered to such persons by the trustee, or, in the absence of the exercise of such power of appointment by said DAVID WAYNE STONER, to the heirs at law of said DAVID WAYNE STONER as determined by the Illinois Statute of Descent.

D. No distribution, charge or encumbrance of the income or of the principal of said trust estate or any part thereof by said DAVID WAYNE STONER by way of anticipation shall be of any validity or legal effect or be in any wise regarded by the trustee, and no such income or principal or any part thereof shall, in any wise be liable to any claim of any creditor of said DAVID WAYNE STONER.

## ARTICLE II

The trustee is hereby authorized, ordered and directed to retain the shares of STONER SHOPPING CENTER, INC., as an investment of this trust so long as the donors or the survivor of them, or such person or persons as the donors or the survivor of them may leave their stock of STONER SHOPPING CENTER, INC., under their last wills shall retain their stock in such corporation. Should the donors or the survivor of them, or their said beneficiaries dispose of their interest in the said corporation, then the trustee, in its sole discretion, may either retain or dispose of the shares of stock in said corporation held by it.

With the exception of the direction to retain the Class B stock of STONER SHOPPING CENTER contained in the paragraph immediately preceding this paragraph, the trustee is hereby given full power to invest trust funds in any security or property, including common or preferred stocks, it deems wise without being limited to any statute or rule of law regarding investments by trustees; to retain any of said investments or any property hereafter assigned, transferred and delivered to the trustee as long as it deems wise, to sell, exchange, mortgage and lease trust property; to

participate in and hold the property resulting from reorganizations, consolidations and other changes in the financial structure of corporations or other organizations whose securities are held hereunder; to vote or issue general or limited proxies; to vote stocks or other securities having voting rights; to register or hold property in the name of the trustee, in the name of a nominee or in bearer form; to determine whether receipts and disbursements shall be credited to or charged against income or principal; but income on bonds and similar securities shall be charged to principal and not amortized, and stock dividends and subscription rights shall be considered as principal whether sold or exercised. The trustee shall also have such other powers and discretions as shall at any time be needed to best accomplish the objects of this trust and shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the services in the administration and distribution of the trust estate.

## ARTICLE III

A. The donors hereby expressly declare that it is their intention that this instrument and the trust hereby created shall in all respects and for all purposes be governed, controlled and regulated by the laws of the State of Illinois, and that all questions regarding the construction, interpretation or validity of this trust instrument or any of its provisions shall be determined solely by the laws of that state. Additions of property may be made to the trust by the donors or either of them or by any other persons.

B. Any trustee may resign by instrument in writing delivered to the parents of said DAVID WAYNE STONER, or either of them, or to any legally appointed guardian of said DAVID WAYNE STONER, should the parents both be deceased or legally incapacitated; and said parents or either of them, or said guardian, shall have the right at any time, by instrument in writing delivered to the trustee, to remove any trustee, to approve the accounts of, and give a full and complete release and discharge to any resigned or removed



trustee hereunder, and to appoint any bank or trust company having a qualified trust department, wherever situate, as successor trustee hereunder.

#### ARTICLE IV

The trust hereby created is hereby declared to be irrevocable and not subject to any modification, alteration or amendment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the donors have hereunto set their hand and seals and the trustee has caused this agreement to be executed by its duly authorized officer the day and year first above written.

HARRY B. STONER

ANN M. STONER  
Donors

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BATAVIA,  
Batavia, Illinois

By BRUCE HANCOCK  
President

#### Exhibit 6 to Additional Affidavit of James E. S. Baker

December 26, 1974

#### MEMO

To: JAMES E. S. BAKER  
and  
BARNABAS SEARS

On the afternoon of December 24, 1974, I talked with Harry Stern of H. F. Philipsborn & Company, who is arranging some financing for us at Stoner Shopping Center Inc. Mr. Stern advised me that Mr. Oxie had called both Harry Stern and Chicago Title & Trust and advised them that they should make an extra check to make sure that Stoner Shopping Center Inc. had a clear title or right to mortgage the premises in order to secure the loan. The loan is to be secured by the new Jewel Food building, which was the former Community Discount Store. This building is owned, free and clear, by Stoner Shopping Center Inc. and was not, and is not, subject to any other mortgage or financing that may be in force for any other area of the shopping center. Apparently Mr. Oxie made it specifically clear that the amount of the judgment was to be in excess of \$9,000,000.00 when interest and all other charges were added. Inasmuch as the litigation to date has not been against Stoner Shopping Center Inc., it appear to be nothing more than a harassment maneuver. This new financing is to be used for some remodelling and additional space to be added for new stores in Stoner Shopping Center Inc.

DAVID W. STONER  
David W. Stoner

**COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF L. M. OCHSENSCHLAGER  
TO  
ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES E. S. BAKER**

(Filed January 29, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

State of Illinois }  
County of Kane }ss:

L. M. OCHSENSCHLAGER, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says that he is one of the attorneys for The Vendo Company, Defendant in above entitled case; that he has personal knowledge of the matters set forth and states the following:

1. The stock ownership in Lektro-Vend Corp. and owned by Stoner Investments, Inc., as stated in the Additional Affidavit of James E. S. Baker, filed herein and dated the 22nd day of January, 1975 does not reflect the ownership interest as stipulated to by the same James E. S. Baker in the trial of the case of Vendo v. Stoner, Gen. No. 65-2134 in the Circuit Court of Kane County. On page 377 of the Abstract of that case on appeal to the Appellate Court of the Second District of Illinois, such interest of Stoner Investments, Inc. in Lektro-Vend Corp. was but 25%.

2. Vendo does not now and never has had a desire to acquire Lektro-Vend as a company, but in the process of obtaining satisfaction of its judgment against Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc., does desire to recover the money these debtors have invested in Lektro-Vend.

3. Affiant is informed and believes that Harry Stoner has invested heavily in Lektro-Vend in recent years with the hope he could shelter such assets from being applied to the substantial Vendo judgment.

4. To dispel and refute the contention contained in the said affidavit of James E. S. Baker this affiant has caused to be mailed to the attorneys for Harry B. Stoner and Stoner

Investments, Inc., a letter, a copy of which is attached hereto and the contents made a part of this affidavit.

5. Affiant is informed and believes that Harry B. Stoner raises the issue of his interest in Lektro-Vend, through his alter ego, Stoner Investments, Inc., for the main interest of forestalling or preventing the satisfaction of the Vendo judgment from the millions of dollars worth of his assets completely unrelated to Lektro-Vend, and if this court should grant his request for a stay of enforcement of the state court judgment, he would accomplish his objective.

.....  
L. M. Ochsen-schlager

[JURAT OMITTED IN PRINTING]

[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
OMITTED IN PRINTING]

(Letter attached to Counter-Affidavit of L. M. Ochsen-  
schlager to Additional Affidavit of James E. S. Baker)

January 28, 1975

Mr. James E. S. Baker  
Sidley & Austin  
One First National Plaza  
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Mr. Barnabas F. Sears  
Boodell, Sears, Sugrue,  
Giambalvo & Crowley  
One IBM Plaza  
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Re: Lektro-Vend Corp., Harry B. Stoner & Stoner  
Investments, Inc.

vs.

The Vendo Company  
No. 65 C 1755

Gentlemen:

I am shocked at the unwarranted representation you made to Judge McLaren last week when you claimed the purpose and motivation of Vendo in this litigation was for



it to gain ownership or voting control of Lektro-Vend. Nothing could be further from the truth.

You both are aware that in the first trial of the case Mr. Baker stipulated in the record (Page 377 of the Abstract) that Stoner Investments, Inc. owned but 25% of the Lektro-Vend stock and Harry B. Stoner individually owned none. You now claim Stoner Investments, Inc. owns 80% of Lektro-Vend. It was only after the likelihood of a large judgment against Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc. became apparent that Harry B. Stoner attempted to insulate and shelter his assets from being used to satisfy that anticipated judgment by heavily investing in Lektro-Vend.

Vendo has never had, nor does it now, any desire or intent to acquire ownership or voting control of Lektro-Vend. Its only interest whatsoever in LEKTRO-VEND is the collection of the money judgment affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. Accordingly, I am authorized by Vendo to agree, by way of contract or even a consent decree of injunction, as follows:

(1) Should Vendo be the successful purchaser of stock at sale, Vendo will agree, and the consent decree may provide, for divesting at the fair market value but not less than the actual price paid, at the earliest reasonable date. The court would determine the fair market value if the parties were unable to agree.

(2) To assure the absence of any voting power in Vendo at any time should it acquire stock (subject to such obligation of divesting), it shall be immediately placed in a voting trust pending divestiture. If we cannot agree on a trustee, the court issuing the injunction can appoint one.

We invite a response to this letter.

Very truly yours,

REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER,  
MURPHY and HUPP

LAMBERT M. OCHSENSCHLAGER  
Lambert M. Ochsenchlager

LMO/lv

**DEFENDANT THE VENDO COMPANY'S  
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

(Filed January 29, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

Defendant objects to the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction for the following reasons:

As to Count I:

(1) Plaintiffs have totally failed to show that they have even the remotest chance of prevailing in their contention that the actions of the Supreme Court of Illinois in affirming a money judgment for damages in favor of The Vendo Company and against Stoner Investments and Harry B. Stoner (*Vendo v. Stoner*, 58 Ill. 2d 289 (1974)); the denial of a Stay of Mandate by Justice Walter V. Schaefer on December 4, 1974; the refusal of the Circuit Court of Kane County to stay collection proceedings on January 10, 1975; and the denial of a Motion to Stay Proceedings by the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District on January 14, 1975, could have caused the lessening of competition between The Vendo Company and Lektro-Vend, which was not a party to the state court action. (See accompanying affidavit).

(2) Section 26, Ch. 15, U.S.C.A., pursuant to which this Motion is brought, confers no authority on the federal courts to enjoin state enforcement of its collection proceedings. *Helpfenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971). See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283.

(3) The Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the plain reading of 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 that a bond be required for any preliminary injunction sought thereunder. See also Rule 65, F. R. Civ. P.

(4) The Plaintiffs, Stoner and Stoner Investments, have totally failed to show in what manner the collection of monies lawfully owing the Defendant by reason of a final judgment constitutes "a violation of the anti-trust laws" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. § 26.

As to Count II:

(1) The Plaintiffs have failed to join the real parties in interest to this lawsuit, being the Supreme Court of Illinois, Circuit Court of Kane County and Second District Appellate Court, for it is the action of those state courts about which Plaintiffs complain deprived them of their civil rights;

(2) Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law, being the request to the United States Supreme Court to stay the Mandates relating to the state court judgments.

(3) As a matter of law the Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendant was acting "under color of" state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. A § 1983. See *U. S. v. Price*, 383 U. S. 787 (1966); *Dixon v. Gaty*, 363 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Fla. 1973).

(4) As a matter of law the federal courts will not enjoin enforcement of a valid judgment of the courts of the State of Illinois. See *McGee v. Budget Premium Finance Co.*, 340 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1965).

(5) Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 65, F. Cir. R. P., relating to the posting of a bond.

LAMBERT M. OCHSENSCHLAGER

REID, OCHSENSCHLAGER, MURPHY and HUPP  
75 South Stolp Avenue—P.O. Box 1368  
Aurora, Illinois 60507  
Telephone: (312) 892-8771

[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OMITTED  
IN PRINTING]

**Transcript of Proceedings  
Before the Honorable Richard W. McLaren,  
On Wednesday, January 29, 1975**

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

[2] THE CLERK: 65 C 1755, Lektro-Vend Corp., et al., v. The Vendo Company; for preliminary injunction against the defendant Vendo Company from taking any further action to collect its judgment of August 13, 1971 and for a stay until there can be a hearing on said motion. There is also a motion to quash.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: My name is Lambert Och-senschlager representing the Vendo Company.

MR. SEARS: Barnabas Sears.

My name is Barnabas Sears and this is Mr. Baker representing the Stoner Investments and Harry Stoner.

THE COURT: Also Lektro-Vend.

MR. SEARS: And Lektro-Vend, your Honor.

Since we were here last we worked day and night over the week-end and concluded a petition for certiorari which we filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court on Monday and an accompanying motion to stay. Now the old practice was you used to call the Justice up and I remember years ago I had a hearing on a motion to stay before Mr. Justice Clark and all I had to do was call him, serve notice on opposing counsel and in we went.

THE COURT: You mean they don't do that anymore?

MR. SEARS: They don't do that anymore. That's why—no, they don't do that anymore. You file your motion in the Clerk's office and the Clerk I guess assigns it to the [3] Circuit Justice who in this case, as you know, is Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Then Mr. Ochsenschlager has an opportunity to answer the motion, and that is the status of it now.



He served us this morning with objections that he has to the motion to stay and we asked for a hearing, an oral hearing before Mr. Justice Rehnquist.

We haven't heard anything yet so that is the status of it.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: If the Court please, to complete the status, Mr. Baker kindly cooperatively delivered papers to me Sunday evening in Aurora.

MR. SEARS: I forgot that.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I immediately got to work yesterday, Monday and Tuesday, and today, as of about now, our response has been filed by messenger in the United States Supreme Court.

Their arguments and ours both involve this case as well as the other one. They brought that into it and we responded so everybody might be enlightened somewhat from it.

THE COURT: I am afraid that there is liable to be a "granted" or "denied" but without an opinion, so how much enlightenment we will get I don't know.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I might also add, your Honor, [4] that we have voluntarily continued anything pending out in Kane County. We have not asked for any turnovers. We have asked the Court to continue even the matters up tomorrow and Friday for one week and it may be that we have served an additional citation, I don't know as to the exact time, but we are assuring your Honor on the record that we are voluntarily not planning to take any action out there that would in any way result in a turnover and we intend to stay that out there until we hear from the United States Supreme Court, and certainly we would intend to abide by any decision your Honor makes here.

THE COURT: I think that is a very civilized way of handling it, Mr. Ochenschlager.

I will continue this, then, and you let me know what happens with Justice Rehnquist and as soon as you find that out we will set this down. I will make time and we will get into a preliminary injunction hearing and it will be up to Mr. Sears and Mr. Baker to convince me that I ought to stay this judgment in order that they can proceed in their antitrust case.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: When we were here last time, your Honor, Mr. Baker and Mr. Sears filed an affidavit by Mr. Baker. He delivered it to me just before your Honor came onto the bench and I would like to ask leave to file a counteraffidavit by me to the additional [5] affidavit of James E. S. Baker for the record in which I respond to some of the matters that they have there.

I would also like to ask the Court if it would be appropriate in view of the fact that this is going to come up anyway, even though the stay is denied before your Honor—would it be appropriate if we were each allowed to or ordered to furnish some briefs on the question of jurisdiction of this Court under the circumstances and the propriety or lack of necessity of a bond in the event the injunction were granted here because we have—

THE COURT: I have really no question in my mind about either one. I am sure I have jurisdiction and I am sure that there would have to be a substantial bond.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: If your Honor has decided, then of course—

THE COURT: Do you gentlemen disagree with that?

MR. SEARS: I think your Honor doesn't have to require a substantial bond. I think we would want to argue that on the application for preliminary injunction. I have read some of the cases and maybe I read them erroneously, that has happened many times, but I think that the matter of the bond where your Honor is acting as a chancellor, the matter of the bond depends upon the particular and pecu-

liar exigencies of the case and it is a matter within the discretion of your Honor. I believe the cases hold [6] that.

THE COURT: I think the rule kind of indicates, though, that in the normal case you do require a bond.

MR. SEARS: That is right. I agree with your Honor. I think that is correct.

THE COURT: I think we are crossing a bridge here before we have to.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: The only thing I was suggesting, your Honor, I realize we are here this morning, we are here on Wednesday, and I am not as competent as these lawyers and I pretty much in the short time I am allowed here cannot present my authorities as well as I could by way of a brief.

Now on this question of the bond, I completely disagree with the man I respect so greatly, Mr. Sears, but I can furnish cases which say that that statutory provision, the Court rules and everything else means a bond, and in this case it would be a substantial one in view of the large judgment.

THE COURT: Yes, but that is something we would decide in connection with the injunction and we don't even reach it until we decide that a preliminary injunction should be issued.

So I will grant you leave to file the additional affidavit that you want to file and then what shall we do, [7] put this over for a week just to have a date on it?

MR. SEARS: That is all right.

THE COURT: Then you gentlemen can notice it up if you hear anything earlier and we will see what we can work out timewise.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: A week from today we will report to you what has happened and then set a date for the other—

THE COURT: I recognize that this is a long trip in for you from Aurora and if nothing has happened it would be perfectly satisfactory to simply telephone the Clerk and tell him nothing has happened and ask for an extension and we will just put it over by telephone.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I am sure we will cooperate in getting in here and not delaying, either one, in the event they want to raise this question again.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

THE CLERK: 2-5 and is the date contingent on their notifying me?

THE COURT: The 2-5 date is there subject to being continued if they haven't heard from the Supreme Court.

MR. SEARS: In other words, if we hear from the Supreme Court in the interim, does your Honor want us to communicate with you then or to communicate the fact next week when we come in.

THE COURT: I think that the earlier you can come in [8] the better because I will have to start making some time, figuring out how to make some time to hear this. I think that the hearing on preliminary injunction is going to take some time.

MR. SEARS: That is right.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Let's communicate with the Clerk the minute we hear from the Supreme Court.

MR. SEARS: All right. Then we will communicate with the Clerk and it may be that your Honor will hear it before the week is up and we can come in on that day and have the whole thing set, is that right?



THE COURT: Right. That will be to set for a certain time because I do have trials set and other counsel bringing in witnesses, and so on, and so we will just have to find time as soon as possible.

I want to say again I think this is a very civilized way of handling it. I appreciate your holding off, Mr. Ochsen-schlager, until we can really get down to the merits of this thing.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yesterday it was a matter of a change of venue where one of the persons cited in requested that and all we did was a young man went over to Judge Peterson and did not oppose the change of venue. But we didn't move beyond that so that we now will have the right Judge handling it.

[COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE OMITTED IN PRINTING]

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(Filed April 16, 1975)

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[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

[2] THE CLERK: 65 C 1755. Lektro-Vend v. Vendo Corporation. Ruling on motion for preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: You gave me a real hot potato in this case.

I have finally come to the conclusion that in order to protect the jurisdiction of this court that I will issue a stay order. All of the liens and escrows and all of these things that are now in effect will remain in effect and we will ask the plaintiffs for a nominal bond, I think \$25,000, since everything else seems to be pretty well tied up anyway, and it may be that we are going to have to have a somewhat more elaborate restraining order to cover exactly how things will work, including a continuation of my order that the plaintiffs see that the title isn't clouded by failure to pay taxes and things like that.

I have a memorandum of opinion of some length that is in preparation and we will get it to you just as soon as we can.

In the meantime you may consider that the state proceedings or further action in the state proceedings are stayed. I want you gentlemen to start taking a look at this case in terms of getting it ready to try. [3] It is the oldest case I have got and I suppose you are going to have to have supplemental discovery. I want you to get that done promptly over the summer if possible and see if we can't get this thing to trial in the fall.

MR. BAKER: We filed a memorandum of discovery that we intended to take.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Your Honor, you say you have a memorandum opinion that we will receive today?

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[4] MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: You will date it today. That is what I was concerned about. So that we can designate it as an order of today in our notice of appeal.

THE COURT: All right, gentlemen.

In consideration of your intentions on that score, I think it is probably idle to set any further dates at this point or try to schedule anything until we find out what the fellows upstairs have to say about my analysis.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Do I understand correctly, Judge—I am a little hard of hearing—do I understand that you [5] have set a bond of \$2500?

THE COURT: Yes, with all of the other liens and the escrow agreement and so on to stand. I understand that pretty well all of the assets are tied up.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: The escrow agreement? I don't understand.

THE COURT: What do you say?

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: The escrow agreement?

THE COURT: That was already paid out.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes. There is nothing to that any more.

THE COURT: No, but that would apply, of course, against the judgment, and the very basis of the decision, of course, is to protect this court's jurisdiction and to leave the plaintiffs with some money to prosecute this case. If I had them put up the kind of a bond that you might normally expect where there is a \$7,000,000 judgement, I think I might be defeating the purpose of the basic ruling. So you may want to include that in your appeal.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware  
corporation, HARRY B. STONER  
and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,  
a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE VENDO COMPANY, a  
Missouri corporation,

Defendant.

No. 65 C 1755

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

(Filed May 30, 1975)

I.

This is a complex antitrust action<sup>1</sup> by Lektro-Vend Corporation, Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.,

<sup>1</sup> Plaintiffs also assert a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming certain portions of the Illinois Supreme Court decisions violated procedural and substantive due process. The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this claim. *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); *Louis Ender Inc. v. General Foods Corp.*, 467 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1972); *Sarelas v. Slechan*, 326 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1963). As explained in *Adkins v. Underwood*, 370 F. Supp. 510, 514-15 (N.D.Ill. 1974):

"While lower federal courts were given certain power in the Judiciary Act of 1789, they were not given any power to directly review cases from state courts, and they have not been

(Footnote continued on following page.)

plaintiffs, against the Vendo Company, the defendant. Vendo recently obtained a \$7,345,500 state court judgment against Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments for violation of their purported fiduciary duties to Vendo. *Vendo v. Stoner*, 58 Ill.2d 289, N.E.2d (1974), cert. denied,

U.S. (1975). Plaintiffs<sup>2</sup> now seek a preliminary injunction preventing Vendo from taking any further steps, pending a trial of this case, to collect its state court judgment, urging that the state court proceedings did not take account of Vendo's violations of antitrust law and were prosecuted in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. For the reasons and on the conditions stated below, the motion will be granted. Insofar as required, this opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 65(d).

(Footnote continued from preceding page.)

given such power since that time. . . . Only the Supreme Court is authorized to review on direct appeal the decision of state courts. From the beginning this country has had two essentially separate legal systems. Each system, federal and state, proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in the United States Supreme Court of federal questions raised in either system.

"Even if a state court decision is constitutionally wrong, that does not make the judgment void, it merely leaves it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding. Unless and until so reversed or modified, it would be an effective and conclusive adjudication. Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than the United States Supreme Court can entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a state court judgment which is in error."

<sup>2</sup> The motion for preliminary injunction only sought relief for Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments, not Lektro-Vend Corporation. It is clear, however, that the hearing litigated the interests of all three plaintiffs and that Vendo acquiesced in this procedure. Plaintiff's motion to amend the motion to include Lektro-Vend is therefore granted.

To demonstrate the necessity of a preliminary injunction a brief excursion into the history of the relationship between the parties is required. This action has its genesis in the 1959 purchase of Stoner Manufacturing Corp. by Vendo. This sale was occasioned primarily by Mr. Stoner's health problems. At that time Stoner Manufacturing was primarily a producer of candy vending machines throughout the United States. Vendo prior to 1959 was a manufacturer of beverage and ice cream vending machines. The record in the state court proceedings and here demonstrates that Vendo had two purposes in purchasing Stoner Manufacturing: expansion of its product line<sup>3</sup> and elimination of Mr. Stoner as a potential competitor in the vending machine market. The parties agree that Mr. Stoner was a design genius in creating innovative vending machine products.

The sale agreement between Vendo and Stoner Manufacturing provided that Vendo would pay the Stoner interests \$3,400,000 and deliver 60,000 shares of Vendo stock to Mr. Stoner. This made Mr. Stoner a major shareholder of Vendo. Mr. Stoner also became an officer and director of Vendo. His employment contract with Vendo had a five year term and his salary was \$50,000 per year. The 1959 agreements also provided that Stoner Manufacturing would not directly or indirectly participate in the management, ownership or control of a vending machine business for ten years in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo was doing business. Mr. Stoner's employment contract provided that for a period of five years following the termination of his employment, Mr. Stoner would not compete with Vendo in any territory in which Vendo was doing business or intended to do business.

<sup>3</sup> Federal Trade Commission approval was required before Vendo could purchase the Stoner vending machine interests. Apparently this was accomplished by misrepresenting to the Commission that Stoner Manufacturing and Vendo were not actual or potential competitors. The record demonstrates that at the least Vendo was a potential competitor of Stoner Manufacturing.

Shortly after the 1959 agreements were consummated Mr. Stoner and Vendo had a falling out. Mr. Stoner had been led to believe he would be able to take an active role in research and development and would be treated as chairman of the board with respect to operation of the purchased assets of Stoner Manufacturing. In actuality Mr. Stoner was virtually ignored or bypassed by the Vendo management. The Vendo management admittedly was thus only paying Mr. Stoner not to compete rather than employing him for performance of actual services.

The succeeding events are adequately set out in the first opinion of the Illinois Court of Appeals at 105 Ill.App.2d 261, 269-77. During the fall of 1960 Mr. Stoner began financing vending machine research and development by certain former Stoner Manufacturing employees. This work culminated in the development of a revolutionary first-in-first-out (FIFO) candy vending machine, called the Lektro-Vend machine. The first prototypes of the Lektro-Vend were exhibited at a trade show in October 1962. Vendo employees were present and made initial inquiries about purchasing the design. The inventors, however, decided to manufacture and market the machine on their own. Mr. Stoner was asked to join these efforts. Thus in December 1962 Mr. Stoner sought to be released from his Vendo employment contract stating that he wanted to invest in the Lektro-Vend machine. Mr. Stoner did not disclose at that time his previous backing of the Lektro-Vend project.

Vendo refused the release request because it did not want to compete with Stoner. Vendo officials stated that part of the consideration for the 1959 agreements was the non-competition clauses. Instead, Stoner was requested to help Vendo purchase the Lektro-Vend from the inventors. The inventors sought \$1,500,000; Vendo thought this price too high and declined to purchase the machine. Vendo also thought that there were inherent technical problems in the Lektro-Vend and that it was too costly to



produce. Mr. Stoner warned that was a serious mistake not to purchase the Lektro-Vend.

Some time shortly after the Vendo refusal to purchase the Lektro-Vend, Mr. Stoner revealed his financial support of the Lektro-Vend inventors. It appears, however, that Vendo was well aware of the Stoner involvement with Lektro-Vend as early as the 1962 trade show.

Mr. Stoner's and Stoner Investments' involvement with the Lektro-Vend inventors and the Lektro-Vend Corporation continued. Stoner Investments helped Lektro-Vend Corporation establish a production plant and further loans or loan guarantees were made by both Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments. Meanwhile Mr. Stoner's employment contract with Vendo terminated on June 1, 1964, although Mr. Stoner remained on the Vendo board until the spring of 1965. It is clear, however, that neither Mr. Stoner nor Vendo thought until late in the state court litigation that this relationship created for Mr. Stoner any further obligations beyond those duties purportedly contained in the non-competition covenants.

In March 1965 Lektro-Vend salesmen reported that Vendo salesmen were circulating rumors in the trade that Lektro-Vend was about to go out of business. Mr. Stoner responded with a letter to 50 vending machine operators. This letter, denominated by the parties as the "Dear Operator" letter, stated that Stoner was now "interested" in Lektro-Vend Corporation and would guarantee its continued existence.

Conflict between the parties sharpened in August 1965 when Vendo brought suit against Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments. The Court proposes to examine these proceedings only insofar as they may reflect illegal anti-competitive conduct by Vendo. The original Vendo complaint focused on alleged violation of the non-competition covenants in the employment and sales agreements and sought \$500,000 in damages. This complaint was amended to add

a charge of theft of trade secrets and the ad damnum was raised to \$1,500,000. An injunction against Stoner and Stoner Investments preventing further aid to Lektro-Vend running until July 1, 1969 was also sought. The Illinois Appellate Court opinion after the first trial reveals that the evidence during the first trial was directed to the covenants and the trade secrets issue. After the first trial, the Illinois trial court entered judgment against Mr. Stoner for \$250,000 for violation of the covenants and \$1,100,000 for theft of a trade secret. The Appellate Court at 105 Ill.App.2d 261 reversed as to the latter, stating that Vendo had no trade secret. It is clear from all the evidence that Vendo should have known that there was no theft of a trade secret; indeed, the first Illinois Court of Appeals' decision demonstrates that the effort by Vendo to prove theft of a trade secret amounted to vexatious litigation.

The Appellate Court remanded the case with directions for further hearings on damages. Before the second state trial, Vendo again raised the ad damnum, this time to \$7,345,500. At trial, however, Vendo attempted to prove the entirely new theory that Stoner was legally at fault for Vendo's failure to have a FIFO machine. On this basis, the trial court entered judgment against Stoner for \$170,835 for forfeiture of salary for the time in which he purportedly illegally competed, and for \$7,345,500 against Stoner and Stoner Investments for the lost profits for failure of Vendo to have a FIFO machine. Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments again appealed and the Appellate Court again reversed, stating that Vendo's failure to have a FIFO vending machine was not attributable to the Stoner interests. The salary forfeiture was affirmed. Each side was then granted leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgment, predicating liability on a corporate opportunity theory. It held that as a director of Vendo Mr. Stoner breached his fiduciary duty by failing to adequately disclose his financial involvement in the Lektro-Vend machine.

The court thus concluded that it could not say that Vendo would have declined to purchase the Lektro-Vend machine had adequate disclosure been made or a genuine opportunity to purchase existed. It affirmed the \$7,345,500 damage award on the Vendo lost profits theory. The Stoner interests sought a rehearing on the grounds that the corporate opportunity theory denied it substantive and procedural due process because Stoner was functionally denied a trial on this issue. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing and a petition for certiorari was subsequently denied by the United States Supreme Court. As noted above, the Court believes that it does not have jurisdiction to review the due process aspects of the state court proceedings; however, as will be more fully explained below, the state court proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme.<sup>4</sup>

## II.

Three legal issues are raised by the brief outline of facts just concluded: (1) Have plaintiffs established under the four usual requirements that a preliminary injunction is necessary? (2) Have plaintiffs met their special burden of establishing the necessity for enjoining a state court proceeding? (3) Assuming an injunction is necessary, what type of bond is appropriate?

### A.

The four factors usually examined to determine whether interlocutory relief is appropriate are:

- (1) likelihood of ultimately prevailing on the merits;

<sup>4</sup> The final Illinois Supreme Court opinion makes such a review imperative. The Illinois court expressly refused to consider the allegations that the state proceedings were part of an anticompetitive scheme. Plaintiffs, having never had a trial on this issue, must be heard in the only forum now available.

- (2) likelihood of irreparable harm;
- (3) balancing the hardships; and
- (4) protection of the public interest.

In the instant case, this Court believes that plaintiffs have demonstrated likelihood of ultimate success on both the section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act claims. The section 1 claim arises from the 1959 agreement. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, contracts which unreasonably restrain interstate commerce are void. The federal antitrust laws make covenants not to compete which are overly broad in geographical scope or in time unreasonable restraints of trade. Once antitrust jurisdiction is invoked, the validity of the challenged covenants is measured solely under federal law, regardless of legality under state law. *Schine Chain Theatres v. United States*, 334 U.S. 119 (1948).

Under federal law a non-competition covenant is legal under two conditions:

- (1) the covenant is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract;

(2) the covenant is necessary to protect the legitimate property interests purchased by the covenantee. See *United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.*, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), *aff'd as modified*, 175 U.S. 211. Moreover, a covenant not to compete examined in light of other monopolistic practices can be declared illegal even if otherwise lawful if it can be shown that the object and the effect of the agreement was primarily directed at the elimination of competition. *Schine Chain Theatres v. United States*, *supra*; *Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lane, Inc.*, 299 F.Supp. 1080 (D.Md. 1969).

Here it appears that the covenants extracted were overly broad, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1959 agreement and subsequent activities demonstrate that their object (and effect) were primarily directed at the



elimination of competition rather than protection of good will. As drafted, the covenants were intended to protect the good will of Vendo where Vendo was doing or planning to do business; they were not limited to areas in which Stoner Manufacturing was operating. Under *Addyston Pipe* and similar cases this amounts to prima facie proof of illegality. Additionally, Vendo's president admitted the major purpose and intent of the employment contract was to obtain the anticompetitive benefits accruing from the covenants. It should also be noted even after Vendo received notice that Stoner was involved in the Lektro-Vend project it refused to terminate his employment as the contract allowed. It appears to the Court that this course of conduct was adopted by Vendo in an attempt to limit Mr. Stoner's activities for the full planned term of the post-employment agreement, showing that protection of good will was not a significant goal in obtaining the covenant. Since Mr. Stoner apparently was never called upon to perform significant services for Vendo the covenant amounted to a naked agreement not to compete, solely anticompetitive in purpose and effect.

Vendo argues that even if the covenants are illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the state court judgment did not rely on these contractual terms and therefore is unassailable. The section 1 claim does not rest alone on the theory that the state litigation was an essential part of an illegal anticompetitive scheme but rather depends on an analysis of the total circumstances surrounding creation of the 1959 agreements. The Court believes that viewed in this light the corporate opportunity theory relied on in the final state court decision cannot either in logic or as a matter of federal antitrust law be separated from the anticompetitive intent and effect of the covenants. Mr. Stoner's position as a director was dependent on the acquisition and employment contracts. He would not have become a corporate director of Vendo absent entry of the anticompetitive agreements. Additionally, his status as a director clearly was not intended to create additional

duties; it only encompassed duties already undertaken as an employee of Vendo. The general rule that where a contract is only partially illegal under the antitrust laws, the illegal portions can be severed, is therefore inapposite. Here the anticompetitive clauses are essential primary elements of the bargain and thus cannot be severed, making all elements of the 1959 agreements unenforceable. See *Superior Bedding v. Serta Assoc., Inc.*, 353 F.Supp. 1143 (N.D.Ill. 1972). See also *Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co.*, 8 F.R.D. 347 (D.N.J. 1948), *aff'd* 96 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1949). Vendo's reliance on the ultimate theory of the state court litigation thus is not well taken. The 1959 agreements were cut from one piece of anticompetitive cloth and cannot be snipped apart.

Plaintiffs also argue that a violation of the "attempt to monopolize" proscription of section 2 of the Sherman Act occurred here. To prove violation of section 2, plaintiffs must establish three elements of proof: (1) a dangerous probability of actual monopolization in a relevant market; (2) specific intent to establish a monopoly power; and (3) overt acts. Plaintiffs need not prove that Vendo has succeeded in establishing monopoly power but must merely show that Vendo has the capacity to make a serious attempt to acquire monopoly status. *Lorain Journal v. United States*, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); *Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc.*, 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971).

In the instant case the relevant market is a recognized sub-market within the vending machine industry—coin operated food and beverage vending machines. Lektro-Vend and Vendo are actual competitors in the sub-market, although the price structure of the industry prevents absolute congruity of competition. The geographic market is nationwide in scope. Within this market the number of competitors has been steadily declining. Between 1958 and 1966 the number of vending machine manufacturers was nearly halved and the number of competitors with sales over \$100,000, particularly in the candy bar section of the industry, became quite small. Within this increasingly con-



centrated market, Vendo maintained a significant market share. While it appears that the evidence is somewhat in conflict, Vendo's market share is most probably over 20%. The "attempt to monopolize" prohibition in section 2 was intended to "nip incipient monopolies in the bud"; with this congressional policy in mind, considering the structure of the vending machine industry, the Court believes that, unchecked, Vendo's alleged practices raise a dangerous propensity for creation of an actual monopoly.

The Court also finds that plaintiffs have produced substantial evidence that Vendo had the required specific intent to monopolize and that it performed overt acts intended to create a monopoly position. Prior to 1959, Vendo had an aggressive acquisition program to buttress its product line and market share. The courts have consistently held that such conduct, along with other evidence of anticompetitive conduct, is persuasive evidence of an attempt to monopolize. See *e.g.*, *United States v. Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). Vendo's uniform policy of extracting broad covenants not to compete—such as the ones involved in the instant litigation—also evidences specific intent to monopolize. In addition, there is evidence that Vendo used litigation as a method of harassing and eliminating competition.

The right to litigate commercial controversies comes within the penumbra of the first amendment. *Cf. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). However, if litigation is used as an integral part of a scheme attempting to monopolize and exclude competition from the marketplace, that litigation can lose its first amendment protection. *Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. Corp.*, 382 U.S. 172 (1965). As the Supreme Court stated in *California Motor Transport*:

"It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as

an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute . . . . If the end result is unlawful, it matters not what the means used in violation may be lawful." 404 U.S. at 5145

This holding was recently reaffirmed in *United States v. Otter Tail Power Co.*, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); *aff'd after remand*, 417 U.S. 901 (1974). Thus if plaintiffs can prove that Vendo's state court litigation against the Stoner interests was not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately, antitrust liability in the instant case under section 2 of the Sherman Act would follow. *Cf. Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford*, 74-1492 (7th Cir. April 2, 1975). See also *Mach-Tronics Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963) (antitrust liability arises from anticompetitive institution of state trade secret case); *Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.*, 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).

There is persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately. Its theft of trade secret claim was clearly non-meritorious and litigation of this claim might well be interpreted—considering the record as a whole—as an attempt to further harass the Stoner interests and limit the amount of aid Stoner could lend Lektro-Vend. The attempt to enforce the covenants not to compete by way of injunction and damages may be similarly indication of a violation of section 2. It may also be argued that, had this litigation been legitimately undertaken to protect good will or confidential information, Vendo would have exercised its right to terminate Mr. Stoner's employment as soon as it discovered Mr. Stoner's relationship with the Lektro-Vend project; instead it prolonged Mr. Stoner's employment for the full term even though he was given no duties. As noted above, the intent of this action appears to have been to lengthen the period for which the non-competition covenants would run. The purpose of this portion of the state litigation seems purely anticompetitive. If so, this

scheme was successful, for the state litigation severely hampered Lektro-Vend's development.

Despite the above stated line of reasoning, defendant contends that the Supreme Court's decisions in *Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co.*, 330 U.S. 743 (1947) and *Kelly v. Kosuga*, 358 U.S. 516 (1959) bar injunctive relief under the instant circumstances. These cases hold that the anti-trust laws provide no defense for actions under state law for collection of debts for sale of goods and services:

"If the contract provisions sued on in the state court do not embody or further the anti-competitive practices, then there has been no irreparable loss or damage from violation of the antitrust law" requiring injunctive relief.

*Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc.*, 408 F.2d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1974).

However, when the precise conduct proscribed by the antitrust laws is sought to be furthered in a state court action, the antitrust defense and injunctive relief are available in federal court. *Continental Wallpaper Co. v. Lewis Voigt & Sons*, 212 U.S. 227 (1909). See also *Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.*, 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962). *Bruce's Juices* and *Kelly* therefore do not apply. If the state court litigation was itself part of the anti-competitive scheme, a judgment arising from such litigation is not an ordinary debt.

On the record as a whole, the Court finds that a preliminary injunction will prevent irreparable harm, protect the public interest, and will benefit plaintiffs more than it will burden Vendo. Continued efforts at collection will prevent Lektro-Vend Corporation from marketing a promising, newly-developed vending machine. The state court collection process places insurmountable barriers in the way of raising capital for any expansion program. Moreover, collection of the state judgment will effectively place Lektro-Vend in the hands of—or at least at the disposition

of—Vendo. Stoner Investments is controlled by Mr. Stoner; 78.57% of Lektro-Vend is owned by Stoner Investments. Needless to say, Vendo would also control Stoner Investments. The case or controversy requirement contained in Article III then would require dismissal of Lektro-Vend and Stoner Investments. Cf. *Mar Foods v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago*, 73 C 1959 (N.D.Ill. November 6, 1974). Continued collection thus would eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein. Moreover, Mr. Stoner's ability to effectively prosecute this action would be severely limited by further execution of the state court case. This also amounts to irreparable harm. *Milsen v. Southland*, 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972).

In the Court's view, the public interest also requires issuance of a preliminary injunction. Few public policies are more important than protection of competition. In the instant case, as previously mentioned, the number of competitors in the vending machine market is declining. Thus the courts have a duty to vigilantly protect the remaining competition. The balance of equities also favors plaintiffs. Vendo's state judgment is protected by judgment liens and security agreements. Stoner and Stoner Investments, despite Vendo's protestations to the contrary, have substantially complied with these agreements. Vendo has already realized over \$582,000 from an escrow trust agreement. If it is ultimately successful here, its only loss will be certain interest payments which the Stoner interests concededly cannot pay. On the other hand, the Stoner interests and Lektro-Vend's losses arising from denial of the preliminary injunction will be severe, as demonstrated above. See *Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford*, 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).

## B.

Because they seek an injunction against state court proceedings, plaintiffs are faced with a special burden. The anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits issuance of an injunction to stay proceedings, in a state court except



under three conditions: (1) when expressly authorized by an act of Congress, (2) where necessary in aid of jurisdiction, and (3) to protect or effectuate federal judgments. Moreover, the principles of comity and federalism militate against unnecessarily interfering with pending state court actions even if § 2283 is satisfied. *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

There is a paucity of authority on the issue of whether the injunction provisions contained in 15 U.S.C. § 26 provide express congressional authorization to grant injunctions against state court actions. *United States v. Bayer*, 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) indicates that express authorization is provided while *Helpenbein v. International Ind., Inc.*, 498 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971) states no such authority exists. The Supreme Court's decision in *Mitchum v. Foster*, *supra*, seems to clarify the issue. In *Mitchum*, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, the Court held that to qualify under the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, a federal law need not contain an express reference to § 2283 nor expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding. To qualify as an expressly authorized exception the statute would, however, have to create

"a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 237.

These tests are equally applicable to antitrust actions. When Congress passed the various antitrust laws it clearly created federal rights and remedies enforceable in a federal equity court. In fact, such power was exclusively vested in the federal court system, indicating congressional approval of enjoining certain state actions, if necessary. *Cf. Lemelson v. Ampex*, 372 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1974). This Court therefore holds that these laws, in the instant case, can only be given their intended scope by staying the state court proceedings and that § 2283 authorizes an injunction here

where the state court proceedings are part of the anti-competitive scheme.

The Court also holds that § 2283 authorizes an injunction here because further collection efforts would eliminate two plaintiffs, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corp., as parties under the case or controversy provisions of Article III since they would necessarily be controlled by Vendo. Vendo's offer to place the Stoner Investment and Lektro-Vend stock under control of the Court does not meet this problem because as a matter of substance Vendo would control both plaintiff and defendant, requiring dismissal under Article III. Thus the injunction is also necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Court. Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of an injunction considering the peculiar nature of this case. The federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention.<sup>5</sup>

### C.

Since the Court has determined that a preliminary injunction should issue, the terms and conditions of the injunction must be determined. The first issue is what type of security must plaintiffs produce pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 65(c). The amount of security required is within the sound discretion of the court and is intended to protect against such cost and damages as may be incurred by any party wrongfully restrained or enjoined. However, there is no liability for damages resulting from issuance of an injunction erroneously granted unless the suit was prosecuted maliciously and without probable cause. See 7 *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶ 65.10 at p. 98 and cases cited therein.

<sup>5</sup> The findings contained herein are interlocutory in nature necessarily based on an incomplete record. Of course, a complete trial specifically directed to the issues in this case might produce evidence requiring a different or more limited result.



Because the plaintiffs have placed considerable evidence in the record demonstrating illegal anticompetitive behavior on the part of Vendo, it seems unlikely that Vendo will be able to prove any compensable damage arising from issuance of this injunction. Moreover, since this injunction will not remove the pre-existing judgment liens, Vendo remains well protected. Accordingly, a nominal bond of \$2,500.00 (Twenty Five Hundred Dollars) will be required. See *Scherr v. Volpe*, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); *Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg.*, 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954).

The remaining issue concerns the scope of the preliminary injunction. Such an injunction should protect plaintiffs from harm due to collection of the state court judgment while preserving the Stoner interests' assets so that Vendo will be able to collect on the judgment if it is ultimately successful. The Court believes that these two goals can be accomplished by enjoining further collection efforts but leaving intact those portions of the state decrees (and liens) which prevent transfer of any of the Stoner assets. As previously indicated, Mr. Stoner and Stoner Investments will be required to pay all taxes, utilities and maintenance from currently collected income to preserve the assets. Plaintiffs shall prepare and present on notice a draft order in conformance with the views expressed herein within ten (10) days.

IT IS SO ORDERED

ENTERED:

/s/ R. W. McLAREN

United States District Judge

DATED: May 29, 1975

**DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED  
FORM OF ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY  
INJUNCTION AS SUBMITTED BY  
THE PLAINTIFFS**

(Filed June 16, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

**INTRODUCTION**

The Vendo Company has set forth in its brief opposing the issuance of an injunction its primary objections to the interference by the Federal Court with the valid and unimpeachable State Court judgment in the case of *Vendo v. Stoner and Stoner Investments*, Cause No. 65-2134, in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois.

Not only has the Court erroneously interpreted the record and the extent of its own jurisdiction in this case, but the security which the Court would order to stand against the wrongful issuance of such an injunction is entirely too small to conform with the requirements of law.

Despite the minimal amount of security ordered by the Court, the draft injunction order proposed by the Plaintiffs would completely excuse them from any of the comparatively few responsibilities which this Court has attempted to place upon them.

While the Vendo Company is compelled to insist that the Court alter the terms of the draft injunction order to protect the pitifully small<sup>1</sup> security awarded, the Defendant by

<sup>1</sup> The total judgment in the State Court is \$7,516,335, exclusive of costs. Interest on that amount to date totals \$1,732,257.22. The total debt as of the date of filing these objections would be \$9,248,592. Interest on the judgment runs at the rate of \$1,235.56 per day—\$51.48 per hour! The bond ordered to be posted in this case would not even account for the interest which will accrue in the three days while the Court considers these objections and awaits the Plaintiffs' reply.

no means waives its overriding assertion that no injunction should be issued in any event.

## I

DEFENDANT REASSERTS ITS OBJECTION THAT  
THE FEDERAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION  
OVER PROPERTY WHICH HAS FIRST BEEN  
PLACED UNDER THE CUSTODY AND  
CONTROL OF THE STATE COURT

Stoner Investments, Inc. and the other citation respondents in the supplementary proceedings in the State Court are presently under a specific prohibition against the further transfer of any asset belonging to the State Court judgment debtors. The State Court order reads as follows:

"[You are] prohibited from making or allowing any transfer of or interfering with, any property not exempt from execution or garnishment belonging to the judgment debtor . . . until further order of this court."  
(Px 341, Citation to Stoner Investments)

Over and above the requirements of § 2283, Title 28 U.S.C., is the absolute prohibition against one court of concurrent jurisdiction from interfering with the proceedings of a sister court which has prior jurisdiction over the property involved, *Princess Lida v. Thompson*, 305 U.S. 456, 83 L Ed 285 (1938). The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the principle that the court which first obtains jurisdiction of property has the *exclusive* jurisdiction to proceed with respect to that property.

In our post-hearing brief (p. 34-38) we set out those facts and points of law upon which we based our argument that the issuance of an injunction in this case would wrest control from the State Court of assets, real and personal property, over which the State Court has obtained prior exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the citation prohibitions and the *voluntary acts of Stoner and Stoner Investments*. This Court has no power to interfere with that property now

being held under the *in rem* jurisdiction of the Circuit Court:

"Where, as here, a *res* has come into the possession and under the control of a state court, one having a right to go into the the federal court . . . cannot obtain a judgment entitling him to interfere with the administration of the *res* by the court having its possession. While he may not be denied his right to prosecute an action to judgment or a suit to final decree in the federal court, such judgment or decree can do no more than adjudicate the validity and amount of his claim." [*Pufahl v. Parks*, 299 U.S. 225 at 226 (1936).]

And the rule that other courts may not render any judgment or decree which will interfere with the constructive possession of a court which first took possession has been followed by the Seventh Circuit in *Barrett v. International Underwriters, Inc.*, 346 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1965). There the Federal Court adjudicated the validity of certain execution liens but specifically refrained from ordering a marshal's sale of the property subject to the liens but which was in the custody of the State Court.

This rule cannot be superseded by the Federal Court's power to protect its own jurisdiction. See IA Moore's Federal Practice ¶¶ 0.214—0.223.

Any other rule would create "an irreconcilable conflict between the state and federal judiciaries;" *Signal Properties, Inc. v. Farha*, 482 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1973).

We do not know whether the Court misapprehended or simply chose to ignore our arguments in this respect, for there is no consideration given to the *in rem* jurisdictional questions in the memorandum opinion.

In any case, the Court has already authorized the disbursement of funds held by the State Court so that Stoner could pay the Sidley and Austin law firm and his other attorneys. This occurred prior to the Court's decision on



the merits of injunctive relief, (p. 878—879 Feb. 14 Report of Proceedings), even though Vendo's attorneys insisted that the status of the supplemental proceedings must remain unaltered.

Later, when the Court issued its memorandum opinion, it was again clear that a primary purpose for the injunction was to allow Stoner the use of funds tied up in the State Court to prosecute this antitrust action. Presumably the Sidley and Austin firm and cocounsel for Stoner will be paid without delay, but Vendo will be prevented from receiving any further payment on the State Court judgment debt, which has been due and payable since the return of the State Court mandate December 9, 1974.

The Plaintiffs, not satisfied merely to meet the payroll for their lawyers, would seek a complete release of the *res* being held by the Circuit Court of Kane County.

Again, we must respectfully suggest that neither Sidley and Austin and associated counsel, nor the tax collector or Stoner employees or any other person has a superior claim to the funds which the State Court is holding for the sole purpose of satisfying its own judgment.

The views of the Plaintiffs and of this Court would erroneously deprive the Illinois Court of its rightful power to prevent further fraudulent transactions by Stoner and his corporation. The broad spectrum of his business misconduct, spiteful dealings and wasteful dissipation of assets reflected by the record in this Court must not be allowed to continue without security.

## II

### THE PROPOSED INJUNCTION ORDER WOULD COMPLETELY NULLIFY THE EFFECT OF THE STATE COURT JUDGMENT LIENS

The Vendo Company does not waive, nor has it ever waived any right that it might have under the first judg-

ment lien. The Vendo Company maintains that it has the present right to execute upon its judgment against the present holders of real estate to whom Stoner transferred his property subject to the lien prior to the execution of the Escrow Trust Agreement.

Stoner and Stoner Investments have received all of the proceeds from such sales despite the representation under oath by Stoner's attorney Barnabas F. Sears that such funds would not be released pending ultimate affirmance on appeal. Sears did not tell the truth in his sworn affidavit in this respect as can be seen from the testimony of Charles Mikula. (P. 753—Feb. 13 Rep. of Proceedings)

A contempt proceeding is presently pending in the Circuit Court as a result of the release of these real estate proceeds. If it is the intent of this Court to presently insulate the Plaintiffs and their lawyers from any inquiry into their questionable conduct, then the injunction order should specifically provide for service of notice on Judge Petersen that he is precluded from further requiring that Stoner and his corporation show cause why they should not be held in contempt for their misrepresentation to the Court.

In any case, there is no suggestion in the proposed order as to what action Vendo is to take in the event such an inquiry were resumed by the Circuit Court. Clearly the Vendo Company and its attorneys do not desire to engage in any contumacious behavior before the State Court. The failure of Vendo to participate in any state contempt proceeding for fear of further arousing the ire of this Court would subject the Defendant to possible contempt in the State Court.

With respect to the real property in question, those persons presently holding it took subject to the lien of judgment and Stoner has received all consideration due and owing on that account. There has been no finding by this Court that Vendo's effort to hold those landowners answerable to the judgment lien would have any effect upon the

jurisdiction of this Court. It is absolutely clear that if this Court must see fit also to protect persons not parties to this action, then the order should clearly so state.

### III

#### THE INJUNCTION ORDER MAY NOT NULLIFY THE OBLIGATIONS OF STONER AND STONER INVESTMENTS AND THEIR SURETIES UNDER THE 1967 BONDS

The draft order as proposed by the Plaintiffs improperly omits any reference to the continued effect and enforcement of the bonds of Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc. and their sureties which were executed and approved November 7, 1967 by the Circuit Court as security for the judgment in the State Court.

On November 26, 1971 following the first appeal, Stoner's attorney, Barnabas Sears, attempted to obtain a release on the 1967 bonds. These bonds following the first appeal (Px 320, 321) were construed by the Circuit Court to have remained in full force and effect (see Dx 404, Order of Judge Petersen dated November 26, 1971).

One of the sureties on the bonds is Ann Stoner. She is not a party to the Federal litigation. Her obligation to pay on the judgment is unrelated to any antitrust claim asserted in this Court. The fact that Ann Stoner's assets may be subject to execution has no effect on the ability of the Plaintiffs to prosecute their case in this Court.

The possibility that Ann Stoner may seek indemnification from the Plaintiffs is of no consequence. Rule 65 F.R.Civ.P. clearly states that an injunction may be binding only upon parties to the action in question. If it is the intent of this Court to prevent the institution of lawsuits against Stoner by persons other than Vendo, then the order should so specify so as to forewarn those persons involved as to the restrictions placed upon them.

### IV

#### THE PROPOSED ORDER WOULD COMPLETELY ELIMINATE THE EFFECT OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH APPEAL BONDS

The Plaintiffs in this lawsuit would completely destroy any control that the State Court has over the administration of the security agreement attached as Exhibit A to the proposed order. If it is the intention of this Court to completely hold for naught any power of the State Court to also control the disbursal of these assets, then its order should so state so that the matter might be properly appealable on that basis. Under the order as drafted at the present time, the disapproval of the State Court would bar any payment of funds held under that agreement even though this Court might approve. In any case, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to disturb or release any of the assets presently administered by the State Court under the security agreement.

### V

#### THE FEDERAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO DISSOLVE THE PROHIBITIONS ORDERED BY THE STATE COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

The proposal of the Plaintiffs under paragraph 2 of the proposed order is completely contrary to the decision of this Court in its memorandum opinion as to the effect of the state citation proceedings. The release of all assets held under any prohibitions involved in said proceedings would completely nullify their effect and if the Court wishes that result the order ought to say that. Also, the order should specifically state whether the Vendo Company will have the opportunity to approach the Circuit Court of Kane County to obtain periodic extensions of said citations which would be needed to keep them alive under State Statutes.



Sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 3 is insufficient for the same reasons. Stoner Investments is now prohibited from transferring or using any of its accounts or checking accounts which it has anywhere in the State of Illinois or elsewhere.

The standstill agreement between each of the parties and the Court was initiated prior to the time that Stoner Investments fully disclosed the true extent of its present assets and accounts. Some disclosure should be made at this time so that this Court has knowledge of the exact amount of security or lack of it that is available due to the citation proceedings. The Court is thus far operating under the assumption that a certain amount of monies are tied up. However, at the present date no one other than the Plaintiffs knows for certain how much is involved as security. If the Court intends to specifically decline the opportunity to ascertain the exact amount of security which it says it is ordering to be posted to protect the Defendant in this case, then the order should specifically so state. Vendo requests only discovery under these supplementary proceedings and an actual turnover need not be ordered until the dissolution of the injunction.

This matter has been pending for a long period of time and discovery so as to learn of the conduct of Stoner regarding the existence or concealment of assets will expedite proceedings in both the State and Federal Courts. If it is the intention of the Court to prohibit Vendo from engaging in such discovery, the order as presently drafted does not clearly prevent it.

Further, the order is unduly vague as to any continuing responsibilities that Stoner and Stoner Investments might have under the citation proceedings. See the affidavit of Wayne F. Weiler attached to these objections. Attorney John Dreyer is Stoner's Aurora counsel. The fact that Mr. Dreyer, a former partner of Barnabas Sears, fears eviction by Stoner leads to no other reasonable inference than that Stoner wishes to evade the citation proceedings by evicting

those tenants presently prohibited from paying him and to grant leases to persons not under any restraint from the Circuit Court.

Again, the draft order is vague in this respect. Are Stoner and Stoner Investments free to engage in such conduct? Is Vendo free to resist such a sham transaction? If the State Court were to institute contempt proceedings as a result of such activities are Vendo and its agents and attorneys barred from participating in such an inquiry upon the request of the State Court? Or is this to be another of those areas in which Vendo is left to act at its own peril, free to choose between contumacy in this Court or before the State tribunal?

## VI

### STONER ASSETS SHOULD NOT BE SUBORDINATED TO PAY CREDITOR OTHER THAN ITS JUDGMENT CREDITOR, THE VENDO COMPANY

Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 3 regarding borrowing and receiving credit and paying all trade and other creditors would again allow the Stoner Investments Company to transfer assets in violation again of the prohibition of the State Court citation proceedings. Stoner Investments, Inc., according to the record in this case, is a real estate investment company. Its assets are mainly in real estate, its employees are few, and its business is solely the business of buying and selling land all of which is subject to a lien. It does not purport to have any active ongoing business other than the sale and purchase of real estate.

Further, the Defendant specifically objects to the subordination of any accounts receivable or other obligations owing to Stoner Investments by Lektro-Vend to any loans made to Lektro-Vend or on behalf of any bank or lender which might see fit to loan money to Lektro-Vend. Such a subordination is clearly in violation of the prohibition of the State Court and the citation proceedings and it should

not be allowed. The Lektro-Vend Corporation is a poor credit risk (by its own admission) and that Corporation as such has never made a profit. A subordination of the obligations due and owing by it to Stoner Investments would clearly deprive the Vendo Company of any opportunity to collect on those obligations in the event it were ultimately successful in this lawsuit.

In any case, Lektro-Vend never saw fit to become a party to the motion for preliminary injunction in the first instance. Only as an afterthought did Plaintiff's attorneys attempt to interject Lektro-Vend into the proceedings by way of their reply brief and after Vendo had no further opportunity to object. The Court's inclusion of Lektro-Vend as one of the parties to the injunction is clearly erroneous and a deprivation of due process, (unlike the amendment of the complaint by Vendo in the state case where the issue was separately briefed and argued on notice to all of the parties).

Sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 3 of the order regarding loans to the Lektro-Vend Corporation at normal interest rates (and apparently without any security) is clearly in violation of the State Court prohibitions. As the record shows in this case, an investment in that Corporation or a loan to it would be made only by a person who wanted to take a high risk. Funds presently held for Vendo's protection should not be subject to such exploitation.

## VII

### VENDO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH ITS RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST THIRD PARTIES ACTING IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS

Further, the injunction does not make clear whether or not the Vendo Company would be able to institute actions against parties who are not Plaintiffs in this lawsuit but who are acting in fraud of creditors under the law of the State of Illinois. Such persons as David Stoner, Ann Stoner

and Ruth Netrey, among others, have been subject to the disposal of assets on the part of Harry B. Stoner and he has parted with all title to those assets for less than adequate consideration. Illinois law provides that such assets disbursed in fraud of creditors and without proper consideration is an actionable cause on the part of a judgment creditor in order to fulfill its judgment. Any State Court actions or injunctions against the further dissipation of such assets would not affect the present ability of the Plaintiffs to undertake or prosecute their antitrust claim, or to support or preserve the jurisdiction of this Court. Ann Stoner, David Stoner, Ruth Netrey, and others are not asking for any relief from this Court, and their obligations under Illinois law have nothing to do with federal antitrust law as it is at issue in this case. If the Court intends to prohibit the Vendo Company from instituting any such actions in the State Court to protect its rights under the judgment liens, the injunction order should specifically state which of the third parties involved will be insulated from suit.

## VIII

### PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, TAXES, UTILITIES OR OTHER EXPENSES FROM FUNDS HELD BY THE STATE COURT IS IMPROPER

The payment of any monies out of funds being held under the supplemental proceedings is improper. This is so even though the payments may be intended for taxes or upkeep of Stoner Investments real estate. Vendo does not consent to the release of any asset for any purpose. If the Stoner real estate becomes grossly depreciated or is sold for taxes it is by virtue of the order of this Court and not because of any act of ours.

Should the Court decide to follow the law concerning the prior *in rem* jurisdiction of the State Court, there is a possibility that Stoner's real estate would be sold for taxes. The injunction order should specify whether Vendo is



barred from participating in any tax sale proceedings in order to protect its judgment lien.

Nor does Vendo waive any of its objections to the payment of Stoner's lawyers out of funds held under the prohibition of the State Court. This Court should instead order an immediate accounting of all monies paid to the Sidley and Austin firm and Stoner's other lawyers after the institution of the supplemental proceedings. All funds improperly paid should be restored so as to comply with the terms of the State Court injunction.

Most certainly, the injunction order must be clarified as to how Mr. Baker's law firm and other counsel are to be paid if it is the Court's intent to grant them such an award. For example, there should be exact terms as to how Lektro-Vend's share of the fees are to be paid and who is to pay them. Certainly the assets of Stoner and Stoner Investments should not be released for such a purpose. The same is true of Harry B. Stoner, individually. Specific orders are also necessary to determine whether Stoner's lawyers are to be paid only for services in the Federal case or whether fees attributable to the State Court collection proceedings may also be billed and paid without restriction.

If the Court wishes to assure that the Sidley and Austin firm and Stoner's other attorneys can continue to collect attorneys' fees, then there should be a complete disclosure as to what the applicable fee arrangement is. Nothing less should be expected from Mr. Baker and his partners and their associated counsel if they are to succeed in the continued right to charge attorneys' fees—a right which will be substantially affected by the Court's determination in this proceeding.

#### CONCLUSION

No injunction should be issued in this case. To do so is contrary to longstanding authority.

The sheer immensity of the impact of this Court's injunction staying the State Court proceeding dictates a

draft order far more detailed than that which Plaintiffs suggest:

(1) Stoner's \$95,000.00 in liquid assets will find its way into his lawyer's pockets, not Lektro-Vend's.

(2) Stoner's penal bonds and voluntary security agreement cannot be suspended. The terms of these agreements must be enforced and the continued scrutiny of this Court will be required to assure that all of the terms of that document are not violated.

(3) Stoner Investment's \$200,000.00 in liquid assets will go to the same attorneys, whose right to payment has been substantially affected by the outcome of the motion for preliminary injunction.

(4) This Court would be required to sidestep the State Court's absolute prohibition against the disposal of any assets by Stoner Investments.

(5) Stoner Investment's real estate and other fixed assets will be jeopardized by reason of nonpayment of taxes—Stoner Investments has no motivation to pay because they acknowledge that a sale can only result in payment to Vendo.

(6) The possibility of third-party actions to reach assets transferred in fraud of creditors must be resolved.

(7) Every day Vendo loses another \$1,235.56 in interest alone on the judgment.

(8) This Court would have to take charge of Plaintiffs' assets—administer them and supervise payouts—perhaps even get involved in securing financial support for Lektro-Vend, about which Plaintiffs so loudly complain.

(9) This Court would necessarily interfere in the State Court's right to protect its own judgment by

marshalling the assets pledged to that Court by Stoner and Stoner Investments.

Respectfully submitted,

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L. M. Ochsenschlager

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**DEFENDANT'S ADDITIONAL MEMORANDUM  
REGARDING PROPOSED INJUNCTION ORDER AND  
SUGGESTION OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE**

(Filed June 17, 1975)

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

Defendant's objections to the form of injunction order proposed by Plaintiffs are already on file with the Court. The Vendo Company, however, has always been willing to enter into an agreement which would completely avoid any takeover of the Plaintiffs in this case which might subsequently deprive this Court of its jurisdiction.

The Court already has our letter of January 28, 1975, whereby Vendo offered to divest or place under Court control any stock in Stoner Investments or Lektro-Vend which might be subject to collection. Prior to the Memorandum Opinion issued by the Court no response or suggestion in relation to that offer was received from either the Plaintiffs or this Court.

However, as can be seen from the Court's own comments, the Court's desire to prevent any execution upon the stock of the two Plaintiff corporations so as to preserve its own jurisdiction is the primary reason for Federal Court intervention in the State Court proceedings:

"The Court also holds that § 2283 authorizes an injunction here because further collection efforts would eliminate two plaintiffs, Stoner Investments, Inc. and Lektro-Vend Corp. as parties under the case or controversy provisions of Article III since they would necessarily be controlled by Vendo. Vendo's offer to place the Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend stock under control of the Court does not meet this problem, because as a matter of substance Vendo would control both plaintiff and defendant requiring dismissal under Article III." (Mem. Op. p. 23)



Vendo has never had any desire or intention to control or acquire Stoner Investments or Lektro-Vend Corporation. The Defendant's only intention is and always has been to satisfy its State Court judgment. That goal can be accomplished without destroying any case or controversy before this Court.

In support of Defendant's contention that it is not now and never has been interested in acquiring Lektro-Vend or in defeating this Court's jurisdiction by obtaining control over any of the Plaintiffs, Vendo offers to enter into a consent injunction decree so as to resolve the preliminary injunction issue now before the Court. Vendo will agree to a form of order as follows:

1. Vendo will not acquire or attempt to acquire directly or indirectly any of the capital or preferred stock of Lektro-Vend Corporation.
2. Vendo will not acquire or attempt to acquire any of the stock of Stoner Investments, Inc.
3. Vendo will not levy or execute upon any account receivable, note or other obligation in existence prior to January 14, 1975, including interest thereon owing to Stoner Investments by Lektro-Vend Corp. and Vendo shall cause such obligation to be exempt from any State Court proceedings to satisfy its judgment in Vendo v. Stoner, Cause No. 65-2134 in the Circuit Court for Kane County, Illinois.
4. Stoner Investments, Inc. may agree with any bank to completely cancel or subordinate any accounts receivable, notes or obligations which were in existence prior to January 14, 1975, including interest thereon owing to Stoner Investments, Inc. by Lektro-Vend Corp. to any loans to Lektro-Vend Corp. by such bank or other lender.
5. This consent decree shall remain in full force and effect until the final determination on the merits of this

cause and thereafter Vendo shall take no action contrary to the terms of this consent decree without the prior consent and approval of this Court.

The above offer is made as a good faith effort to resolve any question relating to the preservation of this Court's jurisdiction. No Federal Court intervention in State proceedings would be required if the terms suggested above were taken to constitute the injunction order in this cause. The Vendo Company respectfully requests that its proposed consent decree be accepted in lieu of the injunction order suggested by Stoner and Stoner Investments to this Court.

L. M. OCHSENSCHLAGER  
L. M. Ochsenschlager

WAYNE F. WEILER  
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**Transcript of Proceeding Before the  
Honorable Richard W. McLaren on June 19,  
1975 at 10:05 A.M.**

[CAPTION OMITTED IN PRINTING]

\* \* \* \* \*

[24] MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: How would you like to have us proceed, in what order, your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, the plaintiffs suggested the form of order. I think that perhaps the best way to proceed would be for you to address yourself to any of the points that you particularly want to make with regard to changes in that order and provisions that you think, reserving [25] all of your rights, of course, provisions that you think should be in it.

\* \* \* \* \*

[39]

\* \* \* \* \*

[MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER]: And when we think about the fact that this petition for injunction has been in this court now for ten years, and they wait until this is all over, until this injunction is entered, when if there was anything wrong with the prosecution of this case, they certainly had the duty to come in and stop it, if this Court had a right to do it and a desire and an inclination to do it, long before all the time, effort, and money were put forth in the trial in the State Court case. I know your Honor—

THE COURT: Now, wait a minute.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Now I know your Honor—

THE COURT: Just a moment.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: As I understood this matter—and I think that I drew it as part of my original allotment back

in 1972—I had a pretrial conference with you gentlemen, and it was my understanding from your side as well as theirs that the cases were related in the state and here, but that it had been more or less agreed that the state case would go forward, and that when that was [40] completed, we would try the case here. We put this case off a great many times after various status reports and even some further pretrial conferences.

Now, certainly, I can't believe that it was in your mind that you would win the State Court case and then collect every penny they had and see that this case didn't get tried, or to prevent, in other words, the other half of the litigation being finished.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Well, your Honor, I worked with every ounce of strength I have to move the State Court case along where I was plaintiff. I feel that if they were sincere in their desires for injunctive relief, they would have done the same thing on their case. The injunction part they let go. The trial on the merits, maybe—I certainly didn't oppose it.

THE COURT: Are you saying now you didn't agree to this procedure?

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I did not agree to this procedure, no. At one stage, the case was set for hearing. I will say I didn't oppose this if that is what they wanted to do. And the remarks are all in there. There will be some where I said: This makes some sense if this is what the Court wants to do. One time, the Court set it for trial, and we were to come in here and go to trial. But [41] you must also, if I may mention—

THE COURT: I think we set it for a final pretrial, at which time there was to be a completion or a supplementation of the prior discovery, and then we were going to go ahead and try it because it looked like the state case was going to go on forever. And I never understood you



to raise any question but that we were letting the State Court case go first, and then this one would go to trial.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: Not as to the injunction. They should have gone ahead with that. In all of the cases we have read and researched, this always goes in at the start. When you want injunctive relief, go in in that instance, and most of these cases come up on that where they stop the State Court proceedings before it gets to a judgment stage, and that is the way this should have been done, and they should have done it. I didn't have the strength to run both cases.

THE COURT: This is a treble damage case, and I am talking about a trial of the treble damage case.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: I think it was incumbent upon them to move it ahead, and I want to say further, Judge, the issue, one of the issues, a very important one which apparently from your Footnote 4, you must have lost track [42] of, but I am sure your Honor is aware of the fact that they had as a special defense in the State Court their federal antitrust violation as a special defense in the State Court.

THE COURT: They chose to file it here, and it was remanded there.

MR. OCHSENSCHLAGER: That is the whole story, Judge, if I might conclude.

The judge in the trial court sustained our motion to strike that special defense. Judge Seidenfeld in the Appellate Court said the trial judge was wrong, and reinstated it. We were prepared to go to trial on remand on the defense of that state case with a special defense of federal antitrust involvement, and within a week or a few days before the case went to trial, they came in, Stoner and Stoner Investments, came in of their own volition and voluntarily struck from that case their defense of federal antitrust as a voluntary act of their own. So the remarks in Footnote

4 are not entirely correct. They did have an opportunity. They did have a forum. They chose to ignore it, and chose to dismiss it. This is where we would have had an exposure to the federal antitrust case that may have ended everything if they had left it in. If they are right now, they would [43] have been right then, and they would have had a complete determination of their case at that time so far as the so-called harassment of the State Court litigation that was won completely is concerned.

THE COURT: Well, you had a chance as plaintiff to select your forum for the charges you made, I think that they had an equal right to choose their forum for the charges that they made.

[55]                   • • • • •  
                          • • • • •

[MR. BAKER]: Would your Honor like me to answer any of the circumstances of why this case was continued beyond just [56] saying it is obvious to me that unless the judge was going to force us to trial here, that the outcome of the state case, if it were favorable to us, would make this what you might almost call a "shoo-in" under the antitrust laws where, as we often stated in this Court, it is a new ball game if the State Court is in first. So that while we still had a good opportunity of winning in the State Court case, it seemed such an unnecessary waste of time and man power to come in here and try a case under the antitrust laws when there was still a chance that the State Court might hold the covenants invalid. I mean, beyond that, I couldn't—

THE COURT: I understood that the parties had agreed and that Mr. Ochenschlager was in entire agreement that there would not be any effort, that it would be an undue burden on both sides, to try to carry on both suits concurrently. I certainly would not have held off for three years on the trial of the case before me if I had known that there was any question in his mind that somehow the plaintiff

here is waiving any rights by continuing the matter, and the Court was in some way giving the defendant an advantage by letting it proceed in the state proceeding and holding the matter up here. It was my understanding that both sides agreed that it would [be] a physical impossibility, [57] in effect, to carry on both cases at once, and it was agreed that the state case would go first, and that this case would go thereafter if there were any charges left to try, and I didn't think that there was anything in anybody's mind to the contrary. After all of this time and after all of the numbers of times that we have had status reports, it comes as a very severe shock to me, and I must say that I am very disappointed and very chagrined that I didn't simply force this case to go ahead along with other cases.

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[62]

THE COURT: Well, I thank you gentlemen for your presentations. I think you both understand, both sides, that what I intend is that we have a kind of a standstill agreement here that prevents the collection of this judgment in the State Court which, if the complaint is established, could very well be claimed as part of the fruits of the violation by the defendant of the antitrust laws.

I intend simply that in effect we have a standstill agreement, or order, rather, under which the parties can go along in the normal course of business, that, certainly, there will be a prohibition against any dissipation of assets or any transferring in fraud to creditors in the event that the state judgment is ultimately enforced, and I think that we are going to have an order of some specificity that, as Mr. Ochsenchlager mentioned, pretty well informs the parties what they are and what they are not allowed to do.

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[64]

THE COURT: Well, I should like to have it at least by the first of the week. It will take a few days to sort this

out now and to put the order that the Court will issue into shape, taking into account the recommendations and objections of both sides as well as the discussion and undertakings, more or less, that have been made [65] on the record here today. I think that I will set next Friday for the further date in this and the date when the order will issue.

I will expect that the standstill agreement that we have had to this point during this injunction question will continue until that time.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware  
corporation, HARRY B. STONER  
and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,  
a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE VENDO COMPANY, a  
Missouri corporation,

Defendant.

No. 65 C 1755

**ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

[Entered June 27, 1975]

THIS CAUSE COMING ON FOR HEARING on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the Court having considered the pleadings, the record, the evidence and argument and the post-trial briefs submitted by the parties, and the Court having made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, as more particularly appear in its Memorandum Opinion and Order dated May 29, 1975; and

IT APPEARING TO THE COURT:

1. That the plaintiffs have demonstrated likelihood of ultimately prevailing on the merits of their claims under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as alleged in Count I of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint;

2. That the balance of equities favors plaintiffs in that the harm to defendant from the issuance of the preliminary

injunction will be slight, whereas denial thereof would result in severe loss to plaintiffs;

3. That plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted in that the continued action of the defendant in collecting its state court judgments, hereinafter enjoined: (a) will prevent LEKTRO-VEND from marketing a promising, newly-developed vending machine, and put insurmountable barriers in the way of its raising capital necessary to the prosecution of its business; (b) will effectively place STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and LEKTRO-VEND CORP. under the control of defendant, which would require dismissal of the action under Article III of the Constitution of the United States as to said plaintiffs; and (c) will severely limit the ability of the individual plaintiff effectively to prosecute this action;

4. That the public interest in protection of competition requires the issuance of a preliminary injunction; that the paramount national interest requires court intervention by a preliminary injunction herein; that the failure to issue such injunction will deprive the Court of full and effective jurisdiction of the said federal antitrust claims set forth in Count I of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint and will impair, obstruct, or render fruitless the Court's determination of said claims; and that a preliminary injunction as provided herein is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of this Court; and

The Court being sufficient advised in the premises, It Is ORDERED:

1. That the liens of those certain judgments in the amounts of \$170,835 and \$7,345,000, plus costs of suit, entered on August 13, 1971, in the cause entitled *The Vendo Co. v. Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.*, General No. 65-2134, in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, and the two Bonds and the Security Agreement In Connection With Appeal Bonds, which Bonds and Agreement were dated and were

approved December 14, 1971, by the Honorable John S. Peterson, Circuit Judge, and which were entered into in connection with said judgments, remain in full force and effect. A copy of said Security Agreement is attached hereto and marked Exhibit A, and the parties thereto shall abide by the terms thereof, except that where said Security Agreement requires or permits application to the Court, such application shall hereafter be made to this Court. In order to preserve said assets subject to said judgment liens while this injunction is in force, HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. shall pay all taxes on, and bills for utilities and maintenance of said assets, including insurance presently covering said assets, from currently collected income.

2. That the enforcement of those certain supplementary Proceedings to Discover Assets Citations which defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, has caused to be issued in connection with said state court judgments, namely:

<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Date Issued</u>
Chicago Title & Trust Co.	December 20, 1974
Stoner Investment, Inc.	January 3, 1975
Valley National Bank	January 3, 1975
Dreyer, Foote & Streit Assoc.	January 21, 1975
Harry B. Stoner	January , 1975
Clifford Zabka	January 21, 1975

be and they are hereby stayed, provided, however, that VENDO may apply to the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, from time to time, for periodic extensions of said Citations, in order to prevent the automatic termination thereof, as provided by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(f), and plaintiffs may not object to such applications. All assets of STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. attached as the result of said Citations are released to the extent that STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. may collect all rent, interest, dividends, salaries, bank deposits, or other amounts due and owing

to them from the entities and persons named in said Citations.

3. Nothing in said Security Agreement shall preclude STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., in the ordinary course of business, from:

(a) collecting rents, interest, dividends and other income deriving from its assets for use as funds for payment of taxes, maintenance, insurance, and utilities so as to conserve and protect its assets;

(b) opening, maintaining, and using checking and savings accounts in any federally or state chartered bank in Illinois (STONER INVESTMENTS shall give notice to defendant of the establishment of any new account).

(c) paying all trade and other creditors' obligations incurred in the ordinary course of business;

(d) paying to its employees, excepting HARRY B. STONER, their ordinary salaries and wages;

(e) agreeing with any bank to completely cancel or subordinate any accounts receivable, notes or obligations which were in existence prior to January 14, 1975, including interest thereon, owing to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. by LEKTRO-VEND CORP., to any loans to LEKTRO-VEND CORP. by such bank or other lender.

4. Plaintiffs shall be authorized to pay their reasonable attorneys fees for services and expenses in this case, but plaintiffs may not make payments therefor prior to the rendering of such services or the incurring of such expenses, and this Court's approval shall be required before any such fees or expenses are paid.

5. This order shall not be construed to prevent defendant or its agents or attorneys from participating in any pending contempt proceedings in Kane County, Illinois Circuit Court, provided that such participation is required by that Court and that the Kane County Court determines to proceed *sua sponte* with that action.



6. Until otherwise ordered by this Court, the defendant, THE VENDO COMPANY, its agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, are enjoined from taking any further steps to enforce or collect, or attempt to enforce or collect, or commence or prosecute any related or supplementary actions or proceedings with regard to those certain judgments in the amount of \$170,835 and \$7,345,500, plus costs of suit, entered on August 13, 1971, in the cause entitled *The Vendo Company v. Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.*, General No. 65-2134, in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois.

7. Plaintiffs shall not dissipate any assets which may be subject to the above-described judgments and they shall make no expenditures or investments out of the ordinary course without Court approval.

IT IS, THEREFORE, FURTHER ORDERED that upon filing by plaintiffs of an undertaking in the sum of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars (\$2,500.00), in the form of a surety bond, or bond secured by the deposit of that sum in cash with the Clerk of this Court, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by defendant if it is found to have been wrongfully enjoined, there issue out of this Court, under the seal thereof, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, restricting said defendant, its agents, servants, employees and attorneys and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from doing any of the facts prohibited herein, unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

ENTERED:

R. W. McLAREN  
United States District Judge

DATED: June 27, 1975

**Exhibit A to Order Granting  
Preliminary Injunction**

**APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS  
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
FROM THE  
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL  
CIRCUIT, KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS**

**THE VENDO COMPANY,**

**Plaintiff-Appellee,**

**vs.**

**HARRY B. STONER and  
STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,**

**Defendants-Appellants.**

**No. 65. C-2134**

**SECURITY AGREEMENT  
IN CONNECTION WITH  
APPEAL BONDS**

AGREEMENT between HARRY B. STONER, ANN M. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

WHEREAS, on August 13, 1971, the Court entered judgments in this case against the defendant, HARRY B. STONER, individually, and against defendants HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.; and,

WHEREAS, Notice of Appeal from said judgments was filed in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois, on November 3, 1971; and,

WHEREAS, HARRY B. STONER, individually and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. have executed appeal bonds in connection with their appeal of said judgments; and,

WHEREAS, said Defendants-Appellants are unable to provide a surety company bond or schedule real or personal property as security for said bonds, yet are of the opinion

that they have good and meritorious grounds for appeal of said judgments; and,

WHEREAS, it is to the mutual benefit of the parties that this Security Agreement be executed by the Appellants to secure the Appellee and in order to permit the prosecution of said appeal without undue burden on the Appellants and without unduly jeopardizing the rights of Appellee to collect said judgments, if they are affirmed.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED between HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER, as shareholders, directors and officers of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., and by STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.:

1. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER represent that they are the sole stockholders of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., holding 245 shares and 155 shares, respectively, which shares are all of the stock issued and outstanding of an authorized issue of 1,000 shares; that HARRY B. STONER is President and ANN M. STONER is Assistant Secretary of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and, together, they comprise two of the three member Board of Directors.

2. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER represent they are duly authorized to execute this Agreement for and on behalf of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.; that the balance sheet for the year ended December 31, 1968 and the balance sheet as of September 30, 1971, attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, fairly reflect the financial condition of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. as of the dates stated. No material adverse change has since occurred.

3. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER hereby represent that STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. has made no investments in, advances to or guarantees of the obligations of any company, individual, or other entity, except those disclosed in said balance sheets.

4. HARRY B. STONER and ANN M. STONER agree that as a condition of the Court's approval of the said Appeal Bonds

signed by said STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and HARRY B. STONER that during the term of said bonds, less otherwise permitted by order of court, upon notice to plaintiff, and for good cause shown:

(a) They will continue to act in their said capacity as officers and directors of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

(b) Will not transfer or sell any of said shares of stock now owned by them; and

(c) Will not permit the issuance of any additional stock of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., or an increase in the membership of its Board of Directors.

5. STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., during the term of said bond, except as permitted by order of court, upon notice to plaintiff, and for good cause shown, will not:

(a) Sell or dispose of any of its assets below the fair value thereof.

(b) Purchase any shares of its stock.

(c) Declare or pay any dividends, except as required by good business or in order to prevent possible adverse tax consequences, if a dividend were not declared.

(d) Become a party to any merger or consolidation with any other company.

(e) Increase the aggregate compensation of its officers or directors in any fiscal year more than ten per cent (10%) above the compensation paid during the preceding fiscal year; and

(f) Make any material change in the management of STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. or conduct its business other than in a good and businesslike manner.

6. Promptly after approval of this Security Agreement and the appeal bonds to which it is related, by the Circuit



Court of Kane County or by the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District or by the Supreme Court of Illinois, STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. will cause the trustees of all the land trusts of which STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. is the beneficial owner, to convey all the lands held by such trusts to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. and the lien of said judgments will attach thereto.

7. STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. will enter into an Escrow Agreement with The Chicago Title and Trust Company, satisfactory to that company, which will provide for the deposit with The Chicago Title and Trust Company of the net proceeds of the sale of real estate sold by STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., or by any land trust of which STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. is the beneficial owner, which proceeds may be invested by The Chicago Title and Trust Company and which investments shall be held by Chicago Title and Trust Company and the income thereon accrued and added to the fund. The Escrow Agreement shall also provide that a portion of the net proceeds (not to exceed, in any one year, the lesser of (a) \$15,000, or, (b) the net proceeds deposited in that year), of sales of real estate so deposited are to be paid by The Chicago Title and Trust Company to STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. to reimburse STONER INVESTMENTS, INC. for real property taxes, interest, penalties and costs levied and paid on unimproved property held directly or indirectly by STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

8. Defendants have made a disclosure of the terms of a certain lease entered into between Merchants National Bank, as Trustee under Trust No. 1824, and Stoner Shopping Center, Inc., dated May 1, 1971, by furnishing VENDO with a copy thereof, but nothing in this Security Agreement shall be construed as denying VENDO the right to claim that Defendants have a property interest in Stoner Shopping Center, Inc.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed this Agreement as of the 14th day of December, 1971, to become

effective upon the approval thereof by the Circuit Court of Kane County.

HARRY B. STONER  
Harry B. Stoner

ANN M. STONER  
Ann M. Stoner

STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.

Attest: By HARRY B. STONER,  
Harry B. Stoner,  
*President*

ANN M. STONER  
Ann M. Stoner  
*Asst. Secretary*

Taken and approved by me this 14th day of December, 1971.

JOHN B. PETERSEN  
*Circuit Judge*

IN THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 75-1792 and 75-1793

LEKTRO-VEND CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; HARRY B. STONER; and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation,

*Plaintiffs-Appellees,*

v.

THE VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri corporation,

*Defendant-Appellant.*

Appeals from the United States District Court for  
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 65 C 1755

RICHARD W. McLAREN, *Judge.*

ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 1975 — DECIDED MAY 28, 1976

Before SWYGERT and SPRECHER, *Circuit Judges*, and  
WARREN, *District Judge*.<sup>1</sup>

SWYGERT, *Circuit Judge*. The overall question is whether the district court properly issued a preliminary injunction.

<sup>1</sup> The Honorable Robert W. Warren, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, is sitting by designation.

tion in this antitrust case, thereby staying enforcement proceedings in the Illinois state courts to collect two judgments entered in a suit on an employment contract that contained a noncompetition covenant. Among the specific issues raised is whether section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, comes within the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. We hold that it does. We also hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits and they would suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction.

The Vendo Company is located in Kansas City, Missouri. In 1959 it was a leading manufacturer and seller of vending machines for cold beverages, ice cream, and certain other products. It did not manufacture vending machines for ~~ice cream~~; candy, cigarettes, sandwiches, or coffee, but was conducting research and development in that area.

Stoner Manufacturing Company, located in Aurora, Illinois, was principally engaged in the manufacture of candy vending machines that had a nationwide market. Compared with Vendo it was a smaller and less diversified enterprise. Harry B. Stoner, his wife, and other members of his family owned all of the Stoner Manufacturing stock. Stoner was the president and controlled the company.

Following negotiations with Stoner, Vendo purchased the assets of Stoner Manufacturing Corporation in April 1959 with the exception of its real estate and buildings. (Upon consummation of the purchase, Stoner Manufacturing was reorganized as Stoner Investments, Inc.) The sales agreement imposed a ten-year noncompetition restriction on Stoner Manufacturing not to own, control, or manage any business engaged in the manufacture or sale



of vending machines. In addition, an employment contract between Vendo and Harry B. Stoner was executed whereby the latter would serve Vendo as a consultant for five years at an annual salary of \$50,000. This contract had a noncompetition covenant also. Stoner agreed that during the term of the contract and for five years following the termination of his employment he would not "[D]irectly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company [Vendo] . . . is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company . . . intends to extend and carry on business . . ." enter into the vending manufacturing business. The employment contract provided that Stoner "[S]hould regulate his own hours of employment and shall determine the amount of time and effort he shall devote . . ." to Vendo.<sup>2</sup>

Almost immediately after the Stoner Manufacturing assets were acquired by Vendo, friction developed between

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the noncompetition clause reads:

5. During the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following the termination of his employment hereunder, whether by lapse of time or by termination as hereinafter provided, Stoner shall not directly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities, enter into or engage in the vending machine manufacturing business or any branch thereof, either as an individual on his own account, or as a partner or joint venturer, or as an employee, agent or salesman for any person, firm or corporation or as an officer or director of a corporation or otherwise, provided however that the Company, its subsidiaries and affiliates shall be excluded from the restrictions hereof and provided also that Stoner shall be permitted to own, hold, acquire and dispose of stocks and other securities which are traded in the investment security market whether on listed exchanges or over the counter.

Stoner and his employer. Stoner complained that his services as a consultant were not being utilized and that he was being treated as a mere figurehead. Very likely this state of affairs prompted the development of the events that lead to the litigation in both the state and federal courts.

For several years before the sale to Vendo, Rod Phillips was the Stoner plant superintendent and his son, Bill, the assistant superintendent. Because of their disagreement with the policies and operations of Vendo, the father and the son resigned from their respective positions in mid-1960. Bill Phillips after quitting Vendo began the design of an electronic coin detecting device and attempted to interest Stoner in financing its development. Stoner evinced interest and agreed to pay the younger Phillips \$650 per month to develop the device. It was agreed that any patents on the invention would belong to Stoner Investments. By the end of 1960 a model was completed and a patent applied for. The patent was issued in October 1960 and was assigned to Stoner Investments; however, the patented device was never produced commercially.

About this same time Rod and Bill Phillips developed a machine for vending candy that was radically different from any previous machine. It combined in a novel yet practical design three existing vending machine features: stock rotation (known as "first-in, first-out"), a window to display the product to be vended, and a capacity for stocking mixed items in a single conveyance.<sup>3</sup> At Rod

<sup>3</sup> In 1959 when Stoner Manufacturing sold out to Vendo it was manufacturing a candy vending machine called a "drop shelf" machine. The Phillip's machine, which became known as the "Lektro-Vend" model, was an extension of the "drop shelf" model. After the purchase of the Stoner assets in April 1959, Vendo began experimenting with the same idea as that developed by the Phillipses. Two models were built. Vendo, however, considered the models defective in certain mechanical respects and too expensive to produce. The project was dropped.

Phillips's request Stoner agreed to finance the development of this new machine; however, neither Stoner nor Stoner Investments was to have any ownership or control over the venture. Interest-free loans aggregating \$200,000 were made by Stoner to the Phillipses during 1961-62. Stoner also made available a building in Aurora rent free.

By October 1962 prototypes of the machine developed by Rod and Bill Phillips had been constructed and were exhibited at a trade show in San Francisco. The machine won favorable interest in the industry. In the meantime Lektro-Vend Corporation had been organized. The original stockholders were Rod and Bill Phillips, Ruth Netray (Stoner's sister-in-law), and several employees of the corporation.

In December 1962 Mrs. Netray loaned the Phillipses \$350,000. The loan was later increased to \$525,000. The proceeds of those borrowings were used in part to pay off the \$200,000 loan made by Stoner. During that same month Stoner asked Vendo to be released from his employment contract, saying that he had an opportunity to invest in the Lektro-Vend venture. Vendo refused to accede to his request and Stoner was told that Vendo itself was interested in buying the Lektro-Vend machine. Stoner was asked to learn whether Rod Phillips was interested in selling and, if so, to arrange a meeting between Phillips and representatives of Vendo. Stoner reported that Rod Phillips was asking \$1,500,000.

Rod Phillips met with certain Vendo officials in January 1963 to show them the operation of the machine. Stoner was present, but took no part in the meeting. In March Stoner wrote Vendo's vice-president that he had told Phillips that he assumed in the absence of any word from Vendo that Vendo no longer had any interest in the patent. The vice-president responded that Vendo was still interested, but that the asking price was too high.

During the summer of 1963 Stoner had a conversation with Vendo's president. Upon inquiry from the latter as to the actual extent of Stoner's involvement with Phillips, Stoner said that his relationship was confined to loans which had been repaid by another person. He did not disclose that the other person was his sister-in-law.

In March 1964 Stoner Investments contracted to sell Lektro-Vend a new plant which had been built in Aurora by Stoner Investments during the previous year. The deal was financed through a bank loan which was subject to an agreement that Stoner Investments would repurchase the property in the event of default.

Stoner's contract of employment terminated June 1, 1964. During that same month Lektro-Vend issued 5,000 shares of stock to Mrs. Stoner and in July it issued 5,000 shares of stock to Stoner Investments. Stoner sent a letter to fifty vending machine operators in which he identified himself with the old Stoner Manufacturing Company and said that he was now interested in Lektro-Vend. He went to great lengths to recommend the Lektro-Vend product. Litigation soon followed.

Vendo sued Stoner and Stoner Investments in the Illinois state court in August 1965. In October 1965 Lektro-Vend, Stoner, and Stoner Investments sued Vendo in the federal court. The action in the state court was finally terminated in November 1974 when the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of its decision affirming judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc. in excess of \$7,000,000.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In an attempt to aid the reader to better understand this complex litigation and at the same time to shorten the opinion, a summary of the state court litigation follows.

*Vendo v. Harry B. Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.*

The suit was filed in Kane County, Illinois on August 10, 1965; the complaint charged breach of noncompetition covenants; an



The complaint in the federal action alleged violations by Vendo of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26). The case lay dormant until June 1975 when the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction staying defendant's efforts to collect its state court judgments until the merits of the federal suit could be determined. That action precipitated the present appeal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).

<sup>4</sup> (Continued)

amended complaint also charged theft of trade secrets. After a bench trial the court on December 16, 1966 found for Vendo. Judgments against Stoner for \$250,000 and against both defendants for \$1,100,000 were granted. Stoner and Stoner Investments were enjoined from further acts of competition.

An appeal was taken to the Appellate Court of Illinois. That court entered its decision on January 30, 1969, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261. The court held that no trade secrets were involved, the noncompetition covenants were valid and enforceable, and the covenants had been breached by the defendants. The grant of injunctive relief was affirmed. The court also held that though the trial court erred in striking the affirmative defense based on the federal antitrust laws, it was correct in denying the defense based on the Illinois antitrust laws. The cause was remanded for a determination of damages and further proceedings.

Upon remand the defendant withdrew its affirmative defense asserted under the federal antitrust laws. The trial court, after hearing evidence, entered judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments which totaled \$7,363,500.

Upon a second appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the court decided, on September 12, 1973, 13 Ill. App. 3d 291, that the trial court erred in the measurement of damages. The case was remanded for assessment of damages in accordance with the Appellate Court's original opinion.

Upon appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court on September 27, 1974, 58 Ill. 2d 289, the appellate court was reversed and the trial court's judgments were affirmed. The Supreme Court in deciding the case constructed a different theory of recovery—the breach of a fiduciary obligation on the part of Stoner—than had been asserted by Vendo.

I

The threshold question relates to the authority of a federal court to enjoin a proceeding pending in a state court. Specifically, the question is whether section 2283 of the Judicial Code<sup>5</sup> prevented the district court from issuing a preliminary injunction staying the efforts of Vendo to collect its state court judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments, Inc.<sup>6</sup>

The underlying purpose of this section, grounded in federalism is "[T]o prevent friction between state and federal courts." *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940). The statute is to be strictly applied *Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.*, 348 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1955). Unless one of the three exceptions listed in the statute is evident, it constitutes an absolute ban upon a federal court injunction against a pending state court proceeding. *Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970).

In the instant case the district court held that both the "as expressly authorized" exception and the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception applied and issued the preliminary injunction. Since we are of the view that the judge was correct in holding the first exception applicable, we need not reach the question raised as to the second exception.

<sup>5</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

<sup>6</sup> The injunction preserved Vendo's lien and rights under the state court judgments. It also contained detailed provisions regulating the conduct of the judgment debtors during the pendency of the injunction.

Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 26) provides that any person is entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties against threatened loss or damage from violations of the antitrust laws. The complaint in the instant case alleges violations of sections 7 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 7 and 2) and reads in part:

On or about August 10, 1965, Vendo filed suit in the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois against Stoner and Stoner Investments. The full text of the complaint is attached to this complaint as Exhibit C. The complaint alleges that Stoner had breached his agreement not to compete of June 1, 1959 and that Stoner Investments had breached that portion of the April 3, 1959 contract of sale which sought to eliminate competition for 10 years throughout the world. As has been previously alleged, the world-wide non-competition covenants contained in the said contracts are illegal and in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The purpose of the said law suit is to unlawfully harass Stoner and Stoner Investments and to eliminate the competition of Stoner, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend. The lawsuit is part of Vendo's plan to monopolize the vending machine manufacturing business. The threats to enforce such non-competition covenants and the bringing of a suit in an attempt to enforce the illegal covenants are overt acts of Vendo in monopolization and constitute an attempt to monopolize the trade or commerce in the State of Illinois among the several states and foreign countries in the manufacture of such vending machines. Lektro-Vend, Stoner and Stoner Investments have been injured in their business and property as a direct and proximate result of these overt acts of Vendo.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Other allegations specifically refer to the noncompetition covenants contained in the 1959 agreements.

The question before us is whether section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, should be interpreted as coming within the "expressly authorized" provision of section 2283 of the Judicial Code.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), provides guidance. In that case the Court held section 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, came within the meaning of the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute. The Court initially noted that, "Despite the seemingly uncompromising language of the anti-injunction statute prior to 1948, [it was] soon recognized that exceptions must be made to its blanket prohibition if the import and purpose of other Acts of Congress were to be given their intended scope." *Id.* at 233-34. The court also cataloged six separate instances in which it had found federal courts empowered to enjoin state court proceedings in carrying out the will of Congress "despite the anti-injunction statute." Mr. Justice Stewart observed that "[i]n addition to the exceptions to the anti-injunction statute found to be embodied in the various Acts of Congress, the Court [has] recognized other 'implied' exceptions to the blanket prohibition of the anti-injunction statute." *Id.* at 235. The relevant criteria to be applied in determining whether an Act of Congress comes within the "expressly authorized" exception were listed: (1) The "federal law need not contain an express reference" to the anti-injunction statute; (2) "[A] federal law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify as an exception"; and (3) "[A]n Act of Congress must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding." *Id.* at 237. Summarizing these criteria, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote: "The test . . . is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of



equity, could be given its intended scope only by a stay of a state court proceeding." *Id.* at 238.

Applying these criteria to section 16 of the Clayton Act, we are of the view that it falls within the "expressly authorized" exception. *Mitchum* noted that section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act "opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy" in vindicating basic federal rights. *Id.* at 239. So, too, does section 16 of the Clayton Act open the federal courts to private citizens offering a uniquely federal remedy as an important part of the enforcement provisions of the antitrust laws. The private enforcement of these laws by injunctive relief is vested exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This jurisdiction would be frustrated if federal courts did not have the power to enjoin a state court proceeding in an appropriate case. The present situation is a classic example. Here *Vendo* seeks to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged to be the very object of antitrust violations.

Several cases support our holding. In *Helpfenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971), decided prior to *Mitchum*, the plaintiffs had filed suit seeking to recover treble damages for violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The loss or damages claimed in the federal suit were due to one plaintiff being forced into arbitration and other plaintiffs being evicted from leased premises—consequences which under the issues presented to the federal court were alleged to have resulted from antitrust violations. The court, in upholding the trial judge's determination to deny an injunction, stated that there was no authority under the federal antitrust laws to enjoin state enforcement or remedy for collection of ordinary debts. The court found that the plaintiffs had "only remotely allude[d] to their potential loss or damage under federal law." *Id.* at 1071. There had

been "no attempt in either the arbitration or eviction proceedings to enforce the very conduct . . . prohibited by the Clayton or Sherman Acts." *Id.* The court found that the loss or damage done to the plaintiffs was related to their defenses as provided under state law. The loss did not flow from any prohibition under federal laws—there was no evidence that the evictions resulted from their refusal to buy according to a "tie-in" agreement they had executed with the defendants. While the court did not expressly decide that injunctive relief would have been proper had the loss or damage been intricately connected to a federal antitrust claim, it is clear from the logic of the decision that this result would have been reached.

Another decision prior to *Mitchum* reached exactly this result. In *United States v. Bayer*, 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court held that a contract between Bayer and I. G. Farber violated the Sherman Act. As part of the afforded relief, the court enjoined an assignee of Faber from enforcing in state court royalty payments under the contract. In holding that section 2283 did not bar the injunction, the court said:

The answer [to section 2283] is that § 4 of the Sherman Act grants the United States District Court jurisdiction "to prevent and restrain violations" of the Act. The injunction is a necessary incident to the Court's power in order to effectuate its judgment that the Bayer contracts are illegal. Simply to declare the agreement illegal and at the same time permit recovery of the proceeds would render the decree of the court quite sterile. The purpose of the decree is not only to prevent repetition of past offenses but also "to prevent the defendants from acquiring any of the fruits of the condemned project." 135 F. Supp. at 73.

*Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), is also instructive. In an appeal by a stockholder from an order of the district court enjoining the use of other stock-

holder authorizations obtained without compliance with the proxy rules in a state court proceeding to obtain inspection of Studebaker's shareholders' lists, the Second Circuit held that section 2283 did not bar the injunction. The court distinguished the federal securities statutes which afford enforcement by private parties from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act which restrict the enforcement of its provisions to the National Labor Relations Board. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, stated: "Section 16 of the Clayton Act . . . affords a closer parallel, since there as here the private suit plays an important part in enforcement." 360 F.2d at 698. He concluded that "where the very act of prosecuting the state proceeding violated federal law . . .," section 2283 did not stand in the way of enjoining the state court action. *Id.*<sup>8</sup>

When Congress enacted the various antitrust laws it created federal rights and remedies enforceable by private parties in a federal court of equity. That such powers were vested exclusively in the federal courts reflect the Congressional belief that the national objectives of the antitrust laws will be effectuated if entrusted to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If federal courts are prohibited from enjoining state court proceedings which are part of an anticompetitive scheme in violation of the federal antitrust laws, the full scope and force of those laws will be seriously impaired. Moreover, the national interest in the preservation of competition—one of our most important public policies—would be frustrated. Accordingly, we hold that section 16 of the Clayton Act constitutes an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction provision of the Judicial Code.

Vendo further contends that even if the district court was not barred by section 2283 from issuing the injunction,

<sup>8</sup> *Gittlin* was cited in *Mitchum* (407 U.S. at 237, n. 25) in discussing the meaning of the "expressly authorized" exception.

principals of comity and federalism constitute a bar. The principle of comity has no applicability when the exclusive remedy for an injury lies in the federal court. We are in agreement with the trial court's observation:

Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of an injunction considering the peculiar nature of this case. The federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention. *Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Company*, 403 F. Supp. 527, 537 (N.D. Ill. 1975).

It is also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reverse, review, or revise the state court judgments in a collateral attack. While the district court conceded that it had no power to directly review cases from state courts, it went on to point out that here the plaintiffs' claim that "[T]he state court proceedings did not take account of Vendo's violations of antitrust law and were prosecuted in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. . . ." *Id.* at 529. Therefore, the "[S]tate court proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme." *Id.* at 532. The judge additionally commented: "The final Illinois Supreme Court opinion makes such a review imperative. The Illinois court expressly refused to consider the allegations that the state proceedings were part of an anti-competitive scheme. Plaintiffs, having never had a trial on this issue, must be heard in the only forum now available." *Id.* at 532, n. 4. We agree with these comments.

## II

In determining that interlocutory relief was appropriate, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits of their



claims. Defendant attacks this ruling by arguing that there was a total failure of proof. It says that the state court judgments are based on Stoner's violation of fiduciary duties and do not depend (contrary to the trial judge's findings) on the noncompetition covenants. Additionally, it is argued that the covenants are lawful when tested by antitrust standards.

In the first place, defendant's attack is overbroad. As we said in *Bath Industries v. Blot*, 427 F.2d 97, 111 (7th Cir. 1970), "[I]t is not necessary that the trial court find the certainty of a wrong, a likelihood is sufficient." Furthermore, since the grant of a temporary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, *Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.*, 262 U.S. 43 (1923), appellate review is narrow. *Scherr v. Volpe*, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).

Secondly, when the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgments on the unadvanced theory that Stoner had violated his fiduciary duties, it did not consider or decide any of the antitrust issues presented here. It did not and could not evaluate Vendo's alleged monopolistic scheme which included the enforcements of the noncompetition covenants. The district court found that the covenants were "overly broad" and that there was substantial evidence that Vendo had the "required specific intent to monopolize" in a relevant market. Given the limitations of our review, we cannot say the trial court erred.

The judge states in his memorandum opinion:

On the record as a whole, the Court finds that a preliminary injunction will prevent irreparable harm, protect the public interest, and will benefit plaintiffs more than it will burden Vendo. Continued efforts at collection will prevent Lektro-Vend Corporation from marketing a promising, newly-developed vending machine. The state court collection process places insurmountable barriers in the way of raising capital

for any expansion program. Moreover, collection of the state judgment will effectively place Lektro-Vend in the hands of—or at least at the disposition of—Vendo. Stoner Investments is controlled by Mr. Stoner; 78.57% of Lektro-Vend is owned by Stoner Investments. Needless to say, Vendo would also control Stoner Investments. The case or controversy requirement contained in Article III then would require dismissal of Lektro-Vend and Stoner Investments. Continued collection thus would eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein. Moreover, Mr. Stoner's ability to effectively prosecute this action would be severely limited by further execution of the state court case. This also amounts to irreparable harm. (Citations omitted.)

We are not prepared to say that the court erred in reaching these conclusions.

Defendant's last contentions are that laches, waiver, and collateral estoppel bar injunctive relief. Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be presented for the first time on appeal. *United States v. Tyrrell*, 329 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1964). As we noted in *Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States F. & G. Co.*, 508 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1975): "[A] trial court should not be reversed on grounds that were never urged or argued below." Defendant failed to raise these issues in the trial court. Regardless of this procedural defect, we are convinced that these contentions are without merit.

The grant of interlocutory relief is affirmed.

A true Copy:

Teste:

.....  
Clerk of the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 28, 1976

Before

Hon. LUTHER M. SWYGERT, Circuit Judge  
Hon. ROBERT A. SPRECHER, Circuit Judge  
Hon. ROBERT W. WARREN, District Judge\*

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., etc., et al.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 75-1792 & 75-1793 vs.  
THE VENDO COMPANY, etc.,  
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United  
States District Court  
for the Northern Dis-  
trict of Illinois East-  
ern Division No. 65 C  
1755

The Honorable  
Richard W. McLaren,  
Judge

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause appealed from be, and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED, with costs, in accordance with the opinion of this Court filed this date.

\* Honorable Robert W. Warren, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, is sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

July 16, 1976

Before

Hon. LUTHER M. SWYGERT, Circuit Judge  
Hon. ROBERT A. SPRECHER, Circuit Judge  
Hon. ROBERT W. WARREN, District Judge\*

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., etc., et al.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 75-1792, 75-1793 vs.  
THE VENDO COMPANY, etc.,  
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United  
States District Court  
for the Northern Dis-  
trict of Illinois, East-  
ern Division.  
No. 65 C 1755

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and suggestion that it be reheard *en banc* filed in the above-entitled cause, no judge in active service having requested a vote thereon, nor any judge having voted to grant the suggestion, and all of the members of the panel having voted to deny a rehearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a rehearing in the above entitled cause be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

Note: Judges Cummings, Pell and Tone did not participate in the disposition of this petition.

\* The Honorable Robert W. Warren, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, is sitting by designation.



Supreme Court, U. S.  
FILED

SEP 2 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

**No. 76-156**

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
*Petitioner,*

vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER** and  
**STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**, a Delaware corporation,  
*Respondents.*

**On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United  
States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit**

**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION**

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

---

**No. 76 - 156**

---

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
*Petitioner,*

vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER** and  
**STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**, a Delaware corporation,  
*Respondents.*

---

**On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United  
States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit**

---

**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION**

---

*May It Please The Court:*

Respondents respectfully file this Brief in Opposition  
to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

---

**NOTE:** Pet. refers to the Petition of Petitioner

Pet. App. refers to pertinent pages in the Appendices to  
the Petition

Resp. App. refers to pertinent pages in the Appendices to  
Respondents' Brief in Opposition

Stoner Inv. refers to Stoner Investments

Emphasis supplied throughout unless noted otherwise

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

---

(1) Whether Section 16 of the Clayton Act “expressly authorizes” issuance of an injunction against the collection of state court judgments, within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283, where the procurement and enforcement of those judgments were part and parcel of an anticompetitive scheme which violated federal antitrust laws and collection thereof would thwart the trial of federal antitrust treble damage claims.

(2) Whether an injunction against the collection of state court judgments is “necessary in aid of [the] jurisdiction” of a United States District Court, within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283, where the procurement and enforcement of said judgments were part and parcel of an anticompetitive scheme which violated federal antitrust laws and collection thereof would eliminate two federal antitrust plaintiffs and severely limit the ability of the third plaintiff to effectively prosecute this action.

(3) Whether the injunction at bar offends principles of comity and federalism.

(4) Whether the Court below reversed, reviewed or revised a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court so as to justify an exercise of this Court’s supervision.

## ADDITIONAL STATUTES INVOLVED

---

Petitioner omits (Pet. 2-3) Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §§1, 2) and Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §15), which are set out in pertinent part in Appendix A.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

---

Petitioner’s “Statement of the Case” (Pet. 3-10) omits material facts and contains inaccuracies. Respondents therefore respectfully submit the following Statement of the Case.

### Preliminary

Count I of Respondents’ Amended & Supplemental Complaint charged, and on the evidence the District Court found, that Petitioner was guilty of anticompetitive conduct violative of §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Part of that anticompetitive conduct was the use of Illinois courts by Petitioner to harass Respondents. This abuse of the judicial process culminated in the affirmance by the Illinois Supreme Court of a judgment for \$170,835 against Stoner individually and another judgment for \$7,345,500 against both Stoner and Stoner Investments (“Stoner Inv.”).

Petitioner took immediate steps to enforce those judgments and collected \$582,126.09 which had been held in an Escrow Trust. Further collection threatened to strip Stoner and Stoner Inv. of their assets, which included the controlling stock in the third Respondent, Lektro-Vend, Petitioner’s competitor, thus eliminating two Respondents and severely limiting the ability of the third to effectively prosecute the antitrust complaint at bar. Respondents then moved for a preliminary injunction to stay the enforcement of the state court judgments pending a hearing of their antitrust case.

The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the Respondents had demonstrated the likelihood



of ultimate success on the merits of their antitrust claims; that the balance of equities favored Respondents; that they would suffer irreparable harm if Petitioner were to continue its efforts to collect its state court judgments; that the paramount national interest in protection of competition required court intervention; that the failure to issue the injunction would deprive the Court of full and effective jurisdiction of the antitrust claims and that relief was necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Court. *The injunction contained detailed provisions protecting the liens of the judgments and regulating the conduct of the judgment debtors during the pendency of the injunction* (Pet. App. 36-45).

On appeal, this injunction was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Pet. App. 1-17), and Vendo's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing *En Banc* was denied (Pet. App. 18).

#### **The Findings Of The District Court As To Petitioner's Anticompetitive Conduct**

The District Court found that Respondents "have placed considerable evidence in the record demonstrating illegal anticompetitive behavior on the part of Vendo" (Pet. App. 35). Petitioner attempted unsuccessfully to overturn the findings of the District Court in the Court of Appeals (See *Id.* 14-16), but it does not challenge them here. Rather, Petitioner's Statement virtually ignores the District Court's findings. They are material to the issues Petitioner raises. Accordingly we are compelled to state them.

#### **(1) Petitioner's Anticompetitive Practices In The Vending Machine Industry**

Petitioner's Statement omits that, within the increasingly concentrated vending machine market (Pet. App. 28), it maintained a significant market share (Pet. App. 29); "used litigation as a method of harassing and eliminating competition" (*Id.*);\* pursued "a uniform policy of extracting broad covenants not to compete" (*Id.*); and "maintained an aggressive acquisition program to buttress its product line and market share" (*Id.*).

#### **(2) Petitioner's 1959 Acquisition Of Stoner Mfg. Co. And Employment Of Stoner**

Among its acquisitions was Petitioner's 1959 purchase of the assets of Stoner Manufacturing Corp. (now Respondent Stoner Inv.) which was the "genesis" of this case (Pet. App. 21). Petitioner's purpose was in part the "elimination of Mr. Stoner as a potential competitor in the vending machine market" (*Id.*). The required Federal Trade Commission approval was secured by Petitioner's "[a]pparently . . . misrepresenting to the Commission that Stoner Manufacturing and Vendo were not actual or potential competitors [whereas] at the least Vendo was a potential competitor of Stoner Manufacturing" (*Id.* n.3).

Also omitted from Petitioner's Statement are findings that Petitioner extracted from Stoner and Stoner Inv. "overly broad" covenants not to compete, whose "object (and effect) were primarily directed at the elimination of competition rather than protection of good will" (Pet. App.

---

\* That is, in addition to its state litigation against Stoner and Stoner Inv.

21, 26-7); that contrary to Petitioner's representations to Stoner before the 1959 closing, "Mr. Stoner was virtually ignored or bypassed by the Vendo management [which] admittedly was thus only paying Mr. Stoner not to compete rather than employing him for performance of actual services" (*Id.* at 22, 27); and that "Stoner's position as a director was dependent on . . . the anticompetitive agreements [and] clearly was not intended to create additional duties" (*Id.* at 27-8).

**(3) Petitioner's Refusal To Release Stoner Or To Terminate Him In Connection With The Lektro-Vend Venture**

The District Court further found, and Petitioner omits, that in December, 1962, Stoner sought a release from his Vendo contract so that he could invest in the manufacture and sale of the new Lektro-Vend machine. But Petitioner refused (Pet. App. 22), even though Stoner "apparently was never called upon to perform significant services for Vendo" (*Id.* 27). Moreover, although Vendo had been "well aware" of Stoner's financial aid to the Lektro-Vend project "as early as [October] 1962" (*Id.* at 22-3), it "refused to terminate his employment as the contract allowed . . . in an attempt to limit Mr. Stoner's activities for the full planned term [10 years] of the post-employment [non-competition] agreement" (*Id.* at 27).

And Petitioner also ignores the finding that when Vendo requested Stoner to help it purchase the Lektro-Vend machine from its inventors, Petitioner declined to purchase the machine because it "thought [the] price too high . . . , that there were inherent technical problems in the Lektro-Vend and that it was too costly to produce." And this was despite Stoner's warning to Petitioner that it "was a serious mistake not to purchase the Lektro-Vend" (*Id.* at 22-3).

**(4) Petitioner's State Court Litigation Against Stoner And Stoner Investments**

After Stoner's employment with Petitioner expired in June, 1964, he became publicly affiliated with Lektro-Vend Corp. In March, 1965, Stoner sent a letter to the trade seeking to allay rumors (reportedly circulated by Petitioner's salesmen) that Lektro-Vend would soon founder (Pet. App. 23). Petitioner then filed its state court lawsuit against Stoner and Stoner Inv. in August, 1965. The District Court expressly stated (*Id.*):

"The Court proposes to examine these proceedings *only* insofar as they may reflect illegal anti-competitive conduct by Vendo."

**a. The First Trial And Appeal**

Petitioner's initial complaint charged only breach of the non-competition covenants in the 1959 sale and employment agreements by reason of aid to Lektro-Vend. In January, 1966, Petitioner added a charge that its trade secrets (vend-ing machine designs) had been misappropriated for Lektro-Vend's benefit. The *ad damnum* was raised from \$500,000 to \$1,500,000, and injunctions barring further aid to Lektro-Vend for the duration of the non-competition covenants—until July, 1969—were also sought. Upon trial, judgments were entered against Stoner for \$250,000 for violation of the covenants and against both Stoner and Stoner Inv. for \$1,100,000 for theft of trade secrets (Pet. App. 23-4).\*

\* Contrary to the Petition (Pet. 6 fn.), the only "misconduct" upon which the trial court's judgment could have been predicated was Stoner's claimed breach of the covenants and theft of trade secrets, which were the only theories pleaded, as the District Court found (Pet. App. 23-4), which finding the Court of Appeals af-

(footnote continued on following page)

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that Petitioner never had a trade secret, let alone that Stoner stole one (*Vendo v. Stoner*, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261, 278-81; 245 N.E. 2d 263, 271-73 (2d Dist. 1969)). Here the District Court found (Pet. App. 24):

"It is clear from all the evidence that *Vendo should have known that there was no theft of a trade secret*; indeed, the first Illinois Court of Appeals decision demonstrates that the effort by Vendo to prove theft of a trade secret amounted to vexatious litigation."

The \$250,000 judgment was also reversed, the Appellate Court holding that salary should be forfeited *only for the period when Stoner was in breach of his covenant* (105 Ill. App. 2d at 288-90; 245 N.E. 2d at 277). The covenants not to compete were held valid under Illinois law and Stoner and Stoner Inv. liable for breach thereof (105 Ill. App. 2d at 281-87; 245 N.E. 2d at 273-76), and the case was remanded with directions for further hearing *only* as to "the extent of [the] damages" Vendo suffered by reason of Stoner's wrongful competition through the instrumentality of Lektro-Vend in violation of the covenants not to compete (105 Ill. App. 2d at 291; 245 N.E. 2d at 278). Vendo was denied leave to appeal.

#### b. The Second Trial And Appeal

Before the second trial, the trial judge refused to reinstate a state antitrust defense and counterclaim which were

firmed (*Id.* at 6-7 n.4), and which the first Illinois Appellate Court opinion clearly shows (105 Ill. App. 2d 261, 278-92; 245 N.E. 2d 263, 271-79 (2d Dist. 1969)). Nor were the two money judgments upon "alternative grounds" (Pet. 6 fn.). The \$250,000 was a forfeiture of salary for breach of the covenants, and the \$1,100,000 was for theft of a trade secret (Pet. App. 24).

previously stricken. Stoner and Stoner Inv. then moved to withdraw their federal antitrust defense without prejudice.\* There being no objection from Vendo, the motion was allowed (Resp. App. 2).

Vendo again raised the *ad damnum*, this time to \$7,345,500, and attempted to prove what the District Court found was "the *entirely new theory* that Stoner was legally at fault for Vendo's failure to have a FIFO" (first in—first out vending machine), that is, the new Lektro-Vend machine (Pet. App. 24). On this new theory, the trial court entered judgments against Stoner and Stoner Inv. for \$7,345,500, and against Stoner alone for \$170,835, representing forfeiture of salary prorated to the period in which he breached the covenant.

Upon the second appeal, Stoner's salary forfeiture was affirmed but the \$7,345,500 judgment was reversed because the trial court disobeyed the mandate for measurement of damages and also because the evidence at both trials showed that Stoner was not responsible for Vendo's failure to have FIFO (*Vendo v. Stoner*, 13 Ill. App. 3d 291, 293-94; 300 N.E. 2d 632, 634-35 (2d Dist. 1973).)

\* In an opinion denying summary judgment in this case, dated June 1, 1971, District Judge McGarr (before whom the case was then pending) stated:

"Counsel for the plaintiffs have recently brought to our attention the fact that they have withdrawn their federal antitrust defense in the state court. *This was undoubtedly done in consideration of this court's expressed reluctance to consider the cause of action here while the same issue was pending between the same parties in the state court case.*"



**c. The Illinois Supreme Court Judgment**

Upon appeal by both parties to the Illinois Supreme Court, the second Appellate Court decision was reversed and the \$7,345,500 judgment entered in the trial court was reinstated. The \$170,835 salary forfeiture was affirmed. The Court did not decide whether the covenants not to compete upon which Vendo sued were void and unenforceable under Illinois law. Instead, it predicated liability on the basis of Stoner's breach of fiduciary duty as an officer and director of Petitioner amounting to diversion of a corporate opportunity (*Vendo v. Stoner*, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 303; 321 N.E. 2d 1, 9 (1974)—a theory of recovery which was "different . . . [than] had been asserted by Vendo" throughout the state litigation (Pet. App. 7 n.4, 15, 23).

But in any event, as the Court of Appeals noted (*Id.* 15), the District Court specifically found that the Illinois Supreme Court judgment, though cast in terms of corporate opportunity, nonetheless depended on the unlawful intent and effect of the noncompetition covenants when viewed in light of the total circumstances surrounding the creation of the 1959 agreements (*Id.* 27-28).

**(5) The District Court's Findings That The State Proceedings Were Part Of Petitioner's Antitrust Violation**

Contrary to Petitioner's assertion (Pet. 9 fn.), which strains credulity, the District Court most certainly *did* find that collection of the state court judgments would further a violation of the antitrust laws. It examined the state court proceedings "for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme" (Pet. App. 25), adding a footnote that the "Illinois Supreme Court opinion makes such a review imperative"

because "[p]laintiffs, having never had a trial on this issue, must be heard in the only forum now available" (*Id.* n.4).

It found that "the effort by Vendo to prove theft of a trade secret amounted to vexatious litigation" (Pet. App. 24); that "the corporate opportunity theory relied on in the final state court decision cannot either in logic or as a matter of federal antitrust law be separated from the anticompetitive intent and effect of the covenants" (*Id.* 27); that "[t]here is persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately" (*Id.* 30); that the Petitioner prolonged Stoner's employment for the full term so as to maximize the period for which the covenants would run (ten years), and that "[t]he purpose of this portion of the state litigation seems *purely* anticompetitive" (*Id.* 30). These are but some of its findings (*Id.* 26-31). *The District Court specifically held "that §2283 authorizes an injunction here where the state court proceedings are part of the anticompetitive scheme" (Id. 33-34).*

**The Proceedings Below**

Stoner and Stoner Inv. filed a petition for rehearing before the Illinois Supreme Court claiming, *inter alia*, that the Court's decision had violated federal due process guarantees. This petition was denied on November 27, 1974. On December 9, 1974, a stay of execution pending application for certiorari was denied. A writ of certiorari was applied for and denied (420 U.S. 975).

Petitioner had commenced collection proceedings in December, 1974; on January 10, 1975, it collected \$582,126.09 from an Escrow Trust. Its further proceedings threatened a takeover of Stoner Inv., the controlling stockholder and

largest creditor of Lektro-Vend Corp., and also threatened to strip the third Respondent, Stoner, of his assets. Respondents accordingly moved for a preliminary injunction on January 23, 1975.

A trial was held on the motion for preliminary injunction from February 10, 1975 through February 14, 1975. After briefing, the District Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order on May 29, 1975 (Pet. App. 19-35), holding that it had jurisdiction to enjoin Vendo from further collection activities based upon the first two exceptions set forth in the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283. The District Court further held that principles of comity and federalism did not bar the injunction "considering the peculiar nature of this case," namely, that the "federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined" (Pet. App. 34).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court on May 28, 1976. The Court of Appeals did not reach the second ("in aid of jurisdiction") exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283, since it upheld the District Court on the basis of the first ("expressly authorized") exception (Pet. App. 8). It also affirmed as to comity and federalism, quoting what the District Court said about "the peculiar nature of this case" (Pet. App. 14). Petitioner's contention that Respondents had not demonstrated a likelihood of ultimate success was rejected (*Id.* 14-15). So were its contentions that laches, waiver and collateral estoppel barred the injunction, because they were not raised below and were "without merit" (*Id.* 16). Nonetheless, Petitioner still pursues its "waiver" contention, arguing that injunctive relief was barred by Stoner and Stoner Inv.'s withdrawal of their federal antitrust defense, without prejudice, in the state proceedings (Pet. 8, 10, 11, 20-22, 23).

## ARGUMENT

### I.

**THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. THE INJUNCTION WAS BOTH "EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED" BY SECTION 16 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND "NECESSARY IN AID OF" THE COURT'S JURISDICTION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE, 28 U.S.C. §2283.**

Petitioner's argument that the District Court had no jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction completely ignores "the peculiar nature of this case," namely, that it "is based *in part* on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined" (Pet. App. 34). Having examined that state proceeding "for the purpose of determining" whether it was "prosecuted . . . as part of an anticompetitive scheme" (*Id.* 25), the District Court held that it was (*supra* pp. 10-11). It said:

"... the final state court decision cannot either in logic or as a matter of federal antitrust law be separated from the anticompetitive intent and effect of the covenants" (Pet. App. 27),

and that "If federal law is violated by continuation of the state court action the paramount national interest requires court intervention" (*Id.* 34).

In affirming, the Court of Appeals quoted this latter language with approval (Pet. App. 14), also saying:

"Here Vendo seeks to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged to be the very object of antitrust violations" (*Id.* 11).



Of the cases Petitioner marshalls, not one even remotely resembles the facts of this case or negates these principles laid down by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner would reverse a preliminary injunction which prohibits it, *pendente lite*, from obtaining the fruits of its illegal objective, namely, an objective which violated the antitrust laws, as the District Court found *from the evidence* (*supra* pp. 10-11). And this despite ancient law that if the objective is illegal, it cannot be accomplished by lawful means (*Aikens v. Wisconsin*, 195 U.S. 194, 205-6 (1904), *per* Holmes, J.), even if one of those means, as here, is recourse to litigation. See, *e.g.*, *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972). Moreover, the presumably lawful means employed was itself illegal. The District Court said:

"There is persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately,"

setting out that evidence (Pet. App. 30), as well as noting other "evidence that Vendo used litigation as a method of harassing and eliminating competition" (*Id.* 29).

**A. The Jurisdiction Of The Federal Courts To Adjudicate Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Claims Is Exclusive And Untrammelled.**

In *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955), *cert. denied sub nom. Walsh v. Lyons*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955), Judge Learned Hand described the exclusive character of federal jurisdiction in private actions to enforce the antitrust laws, as follows:

"In the case at bar it appears to us that the grant to the district courts of exclusive jurisdiction over the action for treble damages should be taken to imply an immunity of their decisions from any prejudgment elsewhere; at least on occasions, like those at bar, where the putative estoppel includes the whole nexus of facts that make up the wrong . . . There are sound reasons for supposing that such recovery should not be subject to the determinations of state courts. . . . Obviously, an administration of the Acts, at once effective and uniform would best be accomplished by an untrammelled jurisdiction of the federal courts."

The Court then held that plaintiff's treble damage action was not impaired by a state court's prior finding that the alleged antitrust violation, which had been raised by way of defense to the state action, was neither sustained nor established.

If state court determinations of federal antitrust issues are not binding upon federal courts in treble damage cases, certainly state court decisions based upon local law can have no greater effect. This Court said in *Schine Chain Theatres v. United States*, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948):

"It is not enough that the agreement may be valid under local law. Even an otherwise lawful device may be used as a weapon in restraint of trade or in an effort to monopolize a part of trade or commerce. Agreements not to compete have at times been used for unlawful purposes."

The Ninth Circuit said in *Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Winchester Drive-In Theatre*, 351 F.2d 925, 928 (1965), *cert. denied*, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966):

"State law cannot be permitted to impede the effectuation of the national objectives expressed in the statutory scheme of the antitrust laws."



And in *Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F.2d 820, 830, 832, 834 (9th Cir. 1963), it also said:

“We have noted here the congressional policy to entrust to the federal district courts the determination of questions of fact and law in treble damage suits brought pursuant to §15. We think it to be a part of our function to see that this policy, entrusted to the courts, is not frustrated or abandoned.”

Here Petitioner insists that its anticompetitive devices were held lawful under local law in a final decision of the Illinois Supreme Court (Pet. 10, 23). *Ergo*, it urges, “the matter should have rested there” (*Id.* at 23). Petitioner thus overlooks that the question is one of federal law, which governs and which has been decided adversely to it, namely, that its anticompetitive devices violated federal antitrust law (Pet. App. 27-28). At bar the issue is whether the “untrammelled jurisdiction of the federal courts” in treble damage cases (*Lyons, supra*) may be “frustrated or abandoned” (*Mach-Tronics, supra*) solely because Petitioner’s state court lawsuit finished first and it desires to reap the fruit thereof.

**B. Section 16 Of The Clayton Act “Expressly Authorized” The Preliminary Injunction Within The Meaning Of The First Exception To The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283.**

In *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), this Court construed the “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283. Petitioner concedes the importance of *Mitchum*, twice referring (Pet. 15, 16) to “the criteria” laid down therein for determining in what circumstances a statute will be held to have “expressly authorized” the grant of an injunction against a state proceeding. But Petitioner *nowhere states what those criteria*

*are*—an omission, we submit, which underscores their applicability to the facts of this case.

*Mitchum* held:

“The test, rather, is whether an Act of Congress clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding” (407 U.S. at 238).

Specific guidelines were articulated for application of this test:

- (1) The federal statute “need not contain an express reference to [Section 2283]”;
- (2) the federal statute “need not expressly authorize an injunction of a . . . state court proceeding”; and
- (3) the federal statute “must have created a *specific and uniquely federal right or remedy*, enforceable in a federal court of equity, *that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding*” (*Id.* at 239).

Manifestly, Section 16 of the Clayton Act meets these tests here. First, it is immaterial that Section 16 expressly refers neither to Section 2283 nor to state court proceedings. Second, as *Mitchum* noted with respect to Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, the Clayton Act “opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy” (407 U.S. at 239). Time and again this Court has emphasized that private antitrust suits are “not merely to provide private relief, but . . . to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.” *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969). And such suits may be heard only in a federal forum (*supra* pp. 14-16).

Frustration of these federal rights is imminent here. The Court of Appeals said this was not merely “an appropriate case” for the interposition of federal equity powers but, indeed, “a classic example” of such a case. Not only do Petitioner’s collection activities threaten to “thwart a federal antitrust suit”; in fact, the judgments it seeks to enforce are themselves the fruit of its antitrust offenses (Pet. App. 11).

Petitioner’s misreading of *Mitchum* is mirrored in its treatment of other authorities supporting the injunction at bar (Pet. 14 fn.). The Court of Appeals thoroughly analyzed *United States v. Bayer*, 135 F.Supp. 65, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (quoted at Pet. App. 12), *Helpfenbein v. Int’l Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971) (Pet. App. 11-12), and *Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) (Pet. App. 12-13), all of which Petitioner relegates to a footnote (Pet. 14 fn.).

The Court of Appeals’ analysis of these authorities was correct. Although *Bayer* spoke of effectuating its judgment, in the light of *Mitchum* it is clear that *Bayer*’s reasoning squarely supports the injunction here. For without it, Petitioner, like the defendant’s assignee, would “acquir[e] . . . the fruits of the condemned project” (135 F.Supp. at 73).

Though *Studebaker* arose under the Securities Exchange Act, as Petitioner points out (Pet. 14 fn.), Judge Friendly’s discussion of the Clayton Act was no mere “passing reference” but a fundamental step in the Second Circuit’s reasoning. Obviously, the Court deemed Section 16 to “expressly authorize” an injunction, and particularly where, as here, “the very act of prosecuting the state proceeding violated” the antitrust laws (360 F.2d at 698).

And *Helpfenbein* also supports the injunction at bar (Pet. App. 11-12). Relief was denied because there was no attempt in the state action “to enforce the very conduct . . . prohibited by the Clayton or Sherman Act” (438 F.2d at 1071), which is the very point here. To the same effect is *Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers*, 195 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1952).

Petitioner ignores that injunctions against further prosecution of state court suits were also issued under Section 16 of the Clayton Act in *Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.*, 351 F.Supp. 462, 494, 514, 517-19 (E.D. Pa. 1972) and in *Katz Drug Co. v. Shaeffer Pen Co.*, 6 F.Supp. 212 (W.D. Mo. 1933).

In *Sar Industries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries, Inc.*, (CCH 1976-1 Trade Cases, ¶60,816, at p. 68,523 (C.D. Cal. 1976)), the District Court based its jurisdiction to issue an injunction upon *Mitchum* and upon the District Court opinion in this case (Conclusion of Law No. 13). *Sar* held that “The prosecution of the state court action, as part and parcel of the scheme to violate the Sherman Act [as here], itself constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act,” citing *Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963) and the District Court’s opinion here (Conclusion of Law No. 14(g)).

Thus, Petitioner’s claim that “no court had ever held” that Section 16 of the Clayton Act expressly authorized federal injunctions against state court proceedings (Pet. 12) is unfounded.

None of the cases Petitioner cites as having “uniformly held” that Section 16 does *not* expressly authorize injunctions against state proceedings (Pet. 12) or as having created a “clear conflict between the Circuits” (Pet. 13-15)

come within gunshot of this case. Not one of them involved an attempt to make the courts a party to the carrying out of one of the very restraints forbidden by the Sherman Act. See *Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co.*, 212 U.S. 227, 261 (1909), cited by the District Court (Pet. App. 31). Nor did any of Petitioner's cases involve the imminent threat of frustration of "a specific and uniquely federal right" that Petitioner's collection activities posed here—where the Clayton Act "could be given its intended scope *only* by the stay of a state court proceeding" (*Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 237-38).

As Judge Friendly put it, Petitioner's cases are distinguishable in that they rest "on the ground that the prosecution of the state court action sought to be enjoined would involve no 'violation of the anti-trust laws'" (*Studebaker*, 360 F.2d at 698); those cases do not apply "where the very act of prosecuting the state proceeding violated federal law" (*Id.*). And the District Court in *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.* (Pet. 13) expressly recognized that an injunction would lie when "such restraint is absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the Federal court's jurisdiction" (109 F.Supp. at 925).

*Amalgamated Clothing Workers* (Pet. 16), *Potter* (Pet. 12 fn., 14), *Reines* (Pet. 12 fn.), *Bascom* (*Id.*), *Avon Publishing* (*Id.*), *American Manufacturers* (*Id.*), *Carter* (Pet. 12 fn., 13), *T. Smith & Son, Inc.* (Pet. 16) and *Vernitron* (*Id.*) are all inapposite. In none of them was there any showing that federal antitrust claims would be thwarted absent equitable relief or that federal law proscribed the precise conduct sought to be enjoined.

**C. The Preliminary Injunction Was Also "Necessary In Aid Of" The District Court's Jurisdiction Within The Meaning Of The Second Exception To The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283.**

Having decided that the "as expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute applied, the Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to reach the question whether the preliminary injunction was justified under the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to Section 2283 (Pet. App. 8), as the District Court had also held (Pet. App. 34).

The District Court's decision with respect to the second exception was fully justified. It found:

"(C)ollection of the state judgment will effectively place Lektro-Vend in the hands of—or at least at the disposition of—Vendo. Stoner Investments is controlled by Mr. Stoner; 78.57% of Lektro-Vend is owned by Stoner Investments . . . Continued collection thus would eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein. Moreover, Mr. Stoner's ability to effectively prosecute this action would be severely limited by further execution of the state court case" (Pet. App. 31-32).

Reciting the relevant facts, it held that:

" . . . §2283 authorizes an injunction here because further collection efforts would eliminate two plaintiffs, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corp., as parties under the case or controversy provisions of Article III since they would necessarily be controlled by Vendo. Vendo's offer to place the Stoner Investment and Lektro-Vend stock under control of the Court does not meet this problem because as a matter of substance Vendo would control both plaintiff and defendant, requiring dismissal under Article III. Thus the injunction is also necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Court" (Pet. App. 34).



*Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970), described the applicability of the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception as follows:

“[W]e conclude that it implies something similar to the concept of injunctions to ‘protect or effectuate’ judgments. Both exceptions to the general prohibition of §2283 imply that some federal injunctive relief may be *necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that case.*”

Here Petitioner seeks not merely “to seriously impair the . . . flexibility and authority” of the District Court to adjudicate Respondents’ federal antitrust claims; indeed, it seeks to “eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein” and to “severely limit” the third plaintiff’s “ability to effectively prosecute this action” (Pet. App. 32).

In *Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.*, 351 F.Supp. 462, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court enjoined a state proceeding, saying:

“The operation of the antitrust laws need not be delayed until one is trying to almost resurrect the dead; these laws are designed to preserve living competitors.”

And in *Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp.*, 454 F.2d 363, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1971), preliminary relief was awarded because the plaintiffs “may not be able to finance the trial on their legal claims if they lose their businesses now”—precisely the situation at bar, as the District Court held, citing *Milsen* (Pet. App. 32).

Further, since this is an antitrust treble damage action, Respondents have invoked a jurisdiction which Congress conferred exclusively upon the federal court (*supra* pp. 14-16). They sue “not merely to provide private relief, but

. . . to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the anti-trust laws” (*Zenith, supra* p. 17; Pet. App. 32). Upon the facts at bar, the need to preserve untrammelled federal jurisdiction is paramount.

## II.

### THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DOES NOT OFFEND PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND FEDERALISM.

The Court of Appeals said:

“The principle of comity has no applicability when the exclusive remedy for an injury lies in the federal court.

We are in agreement with the trial court’s observation:

“Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of an injunction considering the peculiar nature of this case. The federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention.” (Pet. App. 14).

Petitioner misstates this as a “sweeping” (Pet. 10) holding that “brush[es] aside principles of comity and federalism” (Pet. 20) solely on the basis that Section 16 of the Clayton Act confers equitable jurisdiction only on the federal courts (Pet. 19). Quite the contrary, in upholding the award of preliminary relief, the Court below expressly adopted the finding of the District Court with regard to “the peculiar nature of this case”, namely, that it “is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined” (Pet. App. 14).

Nor did Respondents invoke the exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction *solely* for purposes of seeking an equitable remedy—as if the purpose of this lawsuit were mere-

ly “to forestall collection of the judgments” (Pet. 10). Rather, Respondents are pursuing *antitrust treble damage claims*. Injunctive relief was also sought and required in order that those claims could have a meaningful trial on their merits.

Citing *Continental Wall Paper v. Louis Voight & Sons, Co.*, 212 U.S. 227, 261 (1909) (Pet. App. 31), the District Court found that Petitioner’s collection activities furthered the precise conduct violative of the antitrust laws. This fact alone renders inapplicable all of Petitioner’s cases, each of which involved state suits on claims collateral to any antitrust violation.\*

Throughout its argument (Pet. 8, 11, 18, 19, 21, 23), and principally under “comity and federalism,” Petitioner refers to the “withdrawal” of the federal antitrust defense in the state proceedings. Petitioner omits to state that this issue was raised in the Court of Appeals under the heading of “waiver” and that the Court of Appeals held it could

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\* Petitioner’s footnote argument (Pet. 21 fn.) that the Illinois Supreme Court’s judgments are “independent of the noncompetition covenants” is in the teeth of the District Court’s contrary findings (*supra*, pp. 10-11). Petitioner challenged these findings below, but the Court of Appeals affirmed them (Pet. App. 15-16), noting the “narrow” scope of review in light of the District Court’s discretion (*Id.* at 15). Thus the footnote citations of *Response*, *Helfenbein*, *Mullis* and *Kelly* are inapposite since the threatened injury here was a direct result of the antitrust violation.

*Singer* belongs neither in Petitioner’s footnote nor anywhere else in this case. It turned on the “unclean hands” doctrine. But after *Perma Life Mufflers v. Int’l Parts*, 392 U.S. 134, 138-41 (1968), *in pari delicto* no longer bars a federal antitrust action. Moreover, *Singer* was only an action for declaratory relief so that the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to redress antitrust treble damage claims was not there invoked.

not be considered on appeal since it was not presented to the District Court (Pet. App. 16).

The Court of Appeals further held that Petitioner’s procedural contentions—including this one—were “without merit” (Pet. App. 16). For good reason. First, Lektro-Vend was never a party to the state proceedings. Petitioner’s counsel specifically acknowledged this before the District Court (Resp. App. 6). Further, the federal antitrust defense was dismissed in the state courts on April 29, 1971, without prejudice, and *without objection by Petitioner* (Resp. App. 2; *supra* p. 9 fn.).

Moreover, Respondents sought preliminary relief on the basis of numerous actionable facts—involving Petitioner’s misuse of the state judicial process—which were not in existence when the defense was withdrawn. In 1971 District Judge McGarr (before whom the case was then pending) held that this case “encompasses issues which are broader than any presented in the anti-trust defense” and that “plaintiff cannot be precluded from asserting its antitrust cause of action in the federal court” (Resp. App. 3).

Petitioner’s “waiver” argument also overlooks the applicable law. Petitioner cites Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in *Lyons* (Pet. 18, *supra* pp. 14-15) as authority for the “well settled” proposition that state courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate federal antitrust defenses to state law claims. But Petitioner entirely misses the thrust of *Lyons*, which held that the jurisdiction of federal courts to adjudicate private antitrust treble damage claims is “untrammelled” by state court decisions, at least in cases like this one where “the putative estoppel includes the whole nexus of the facts that make up the wrong” (222 F.2d at 189). Accordingly, the Second Circuit permitted the plain-

tiff in *Lyons* to pursue his federal antitrust claims in federal court despite the fact that *those issues were raised by way of defense in the state court and were held without merit* (*Id.* at 185, 189).

*Mercoird Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.*, 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944), held that a federal defendant could pursue a federal antitrust counterclaim in a federal case even though the illegal activity alleged as part of that claim had not been raised in defense of a prior related litigation involving the same parties. Citing the public interest embodied in the federal antitrust laws, this Court declared that “the determination of that policy is not ‘at the mercy of’ the parties . . . nor dependent upon the usual rules governing the settlement of private litigation” (320 U.S. at 670).

Conceding *arguendo* that the principles of comity and federalism mandated in *Younger* (Pet. 10) for criminal cases and extended in *Huffman* (*Id.*) to §1983 civil rights cases apply in all federal civil proceedings, including antitrust cases, those principles must yield in “*extraordinary situations*” where the state proceeding sought to be enjoined was being conducted *in bad faith* or with *an intent to harass* and where the *injury would be “great and immediate”* (*Younger*, 401 U.S. at 46, 54; *Huffman*, 420 U.S. at 601-02)—precisely this case, as the District Court found.

Petitioner’s citations of this Court’s decisions with respect to federal relitigation of constitutional issues in *habeas corpus* and civil rights cases (Pet. 19, 21) are inapposite. The trial of this case was inevitable, no matter what the outcome of the state proceedings or what issues were litigated therein (*supra* pp. 14-16). Anything less would defeat the salutary paramount public policy under-

lying the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the statutory scheme which invests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts to enforce those Acts.

### III.

**THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT REVERSE, REVIEW OR REVISE THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT’S DECISION NOR DID THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTION ANY SUCH REVIEW. NO EXERCISE OF THIS COURT’S POWER OF SUPERVISION IS CALLED FOR.**

Denying Respondents’ claim under the Civil Rights Act (Count II of the amended & supplemental complaint), the District Court held that it lacked “power to directly review cases from state court” (Pet. App. 19 n.1). But the District Court recognized that Count I (the federal antitrust count) included the distinct claim that the state proceedings were prosecuted by Petitioner in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (Pet. App. 20). In passing upon Respondents’ antitrust claims, the District Court did *not* review the correctness of the Illinois Supreme Court decision upon the matters before it, saying:

“The Court proposes to examine these proceedings only insofar as they may reflect illegal anticompetitive conduct by Vendo” (Pet. App. 23);

and

“... the state proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anticompetitive scheme” (*Id.* at 25).

The Court of Appeals quoted and approved what the District Court said (Pet. App. 14).

Obviously, what the District Court reviewed was not the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court but the conduct of



Petitioner. There was no “fight . . . for control of a particular case” (Pet. 22) nor was “the correctness of fact conclusions” (*Id.*) in dispute. Rather, Respondents charged, and the District Court found, that Petitioner’s entire Illinois state court litigation, among others, was undertaken and prosecuted to enforce contracts which unreasonably restrained trade and as a part of a scheme to impede and eliminate competitors. As District Judge McGarr held herein in 1971, Respondent’s “allegations in this suit *transcend* the allegations in the state court suit” (Resp. App. 3). Even Petitioner’s counsel admitted, after the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision, that the parties were to make a “fresh” start in *this* case (Resp. App. 8).

This was the point of Judge Hand’s opinion for the Second Circuit in *Lyons* (*supra* pp. 14-15) when he stated that federal courts in treble damage cases have “an immunity of their decisions from any prejudgment elsewhere” and that this “immunity” exists “at least on occasions . . . where the putative estoppel includes the whole nexus of facts that make up the wrong” (222 F.2d at 189)—the case here. And as the Ninth Circuit held in *Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F.2d 820, 830 (1963):

“We do not see any way in which [the District Court] could avoid coming to grips with the contention made in the treble damage complaint that the action was brought in the state court for the purpose of giving effect to Ampex’s unlawful monopolistic scheme. Even if it were found that Mach-Tronics and its employees have been guilty of stealing the secrets and processes of Ampex, that would not avoid or otherwise dispose of Mach-Tronics’ treble damage case if the latter succeeds in establishing these allegations of its complaint. . . .”

## CONCLUSION

Petitioner ignores that on uncontroverted facts it has been found *prima facie* guilty of an attempt “to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged [and found] to be the very object of antitrust violations” (Pet. App. 11; *supra* pp. 10-11). It complains that the Chancellor’s writ staying the consummation of its illegal objective is an “insult to the processes of a state judicial system” (Pet. 21); that it would sanction widespread “frustrat[ion] and interfere[nce] with . . . state court proceedings” (Pet. 24). This rhetoric ill becomes one who seeks the fruits of its misuse and abuse of that state judicial process by denying the recipients of that misuse and abuse their day in court in the only tribunal empowered to give those recipients the relief they justly deserve.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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**APPENDIX A**

---

Additional Statutes Involved

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, provides in pertinent part:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. \* \* \*

Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2, provides in pertinent part:

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. \* \* \*

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15, provides:

Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

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**APPENDIX B**

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Excerpt from Transcript of Proceedings Before  
Illinois Circuit Judge John S. Petersen  
on April 29, 1971, in *Vendo v. Stoner, et al.*

3001-3002 (Trial hearings before Judge John S. Petersen  
began April 29, 1971).

3003 (Pursuant to notice previously served on plain-  
tiff's attorneys, Mr. Sheridan moved to dismiss  
without prejudice defendants' sixth affirmative de-  
fense as amended, that is, the federal anti-trust  
defense. There being no objection, the Court en-  
tered its order that the motion be granted.)

---

**APPENDIX C**

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Memorandum Opinion of United States District  
Judge Frank J. McGarr, Dated  
October 21, 1971, in *Lektro-Vend et al. v. Vendo*

This is a complex anti-trust case involving allegations of  
monopoly and restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and  
2. Plaintiffs Stoner and Stoner Investments are defendants  
in a state court breach of contract suit filed by the defend-  
ant Vendo. As an affirmative defense to the state suit,  
Stoner and Stoner Investments claimed that the contract  
sued on violated the anti-trust laws. The state court struck

the defense, but was reversed. *The Vendo Co. v. Stoner*,  
105 Ill. App.2d 261, 296-97 (1969). After this decision was  
rendered, Stoner withdrew the defense in the state court.  
The case presently before this court encompasses issues  
which are broader than any presented in the anti-trust  
defense.

This court was concerned about the res judicata implica-  
tions of the state breach of contract suit vis-a-vis the fed-  
eral anti-trust issues, and asked the parties to brief the  
question. It is clear that the plaintiff cannot be precluded  
from asserting its anti-trust cause of action in the federal  
court. The allegations in this suit transcend the allegations  
in the state court suit, and the relief sought is more exten-  
sive. A less obvious determination is whether the plain-  
tiffs are now precluded from offering as an element of  
damages any part of a possible state court award. The  
court is now satisfied, based in large part on its own re-  
search, that the two causes of action involved here are  
sufficiently dissimilar to negate any application of the doc-  
trine of res judicata.

Enter:

/s/ Frank J. McGarr

United States District Judge

Dated: October 21, 1971

---



APPENDIX D

Transcript of Proceedings Before United States  
District Judge Richard W. McLaren on  
October 1, 1974, in *Lektro-Vend et al. v. Vendo*

IN THE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
Northern District Of Illinois  
Eastern Division

LEKTRO-VEND CORPORATION, a Delaware Corpo-  
ration, HARRY B. STONER, and STONER IN-  
VESTMENTS, INC., a Delaware Corporation,

vs.

Plaintiffs,

THE VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation,  
Defendant.

65 C 1755

Transcript of proceedings had in the above-entitled cause  
before Hon. Richard W. McLaren, one of the Judges of  
said Court, sitting in his courtroom in the United States  
Courthouse at Chicago, Illinois, on Tuesday, October 1,  
1974, at 10:00 a.m.

Present:

Mr. Barnabas F. Sears and

Mr. James E. S. Baker,  
on behalf of plaintiffs;

Mr. Lambert M. Ochsenschlager,  
on behalf of defendant.

The Clerk: 65 C 1755, Lektro-Vend Corporation v. The  
Vendo Company. For report on status.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: Lambert Ochsenschlager from Au-  
rora representing the defendant, The Vendo Company.

Mr. Sears: Barnabas Sears, and this is Mr. James  
Baker. We represent the plaintiffs in the case and the de-  
fendants in the other case.

The Court: Well, gentlemen, I am sure we have here  
the oldest case in the building.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: I beg your pardon, your Honor? I  
am a little hard of hearing.

The Court: I say I am sure we have here the oldest case  
in the building.

Mr. Sears: I am not surprised at that, I guess, your  
Honor, in light of the litigation that we have had. I sup-  
pose that one of us ought to report to you the fact that  
the Supreme Court handed down an opinion last Friday  
finding in favor of Mr. Ochsenschlager's client and against  
Mr. Baker's and my clients, and no passing on the question  
of validity of the non-competitive covenants of either the  
sales contract or the employment contract.

And entirely apart from that, of course, you ought to  
consider the fact that losing counsel is speaking, I think  
the opinion, itself, really raises more questions than it set-  
tles. It is a substantial amount, and we propose, of course,  
to file a petition for rehearing and exhaust that, and hav-  
ing exhausted that, we think the two constitutional ques-  
tions involved in the case might merit consideration by the  
Supreme Court on certiorari.

So that is about all we have to report. I think outside  
of my conclusionary remarks about the opinion, I guess I  
have stated it accurately.

Isn't that right?

Mr. Ochsenschlager: Well, yes, but most of it was conclusionary.

I do believe that it did refer to the "non-compete" agreement, but it said, in addition, there was a breach of fiduciary duty. I don't want to take up your time on that, but they found in our favor, and affirmed the trial court where the amount of the award was over seven and a half million dollars.

The opinion was written by Justice Schaefer, and if it would help enlighten your Honor anything about what we have been troubling the Court with, and being in here all of these years, we would like to leave a copy of the opinion with you if you would care to see it.

The Court: I would be glad to have it for the file. I doubt that I will start studying it 24 hours a day right at the present time.

You are going to be applying for rehearing in the Supreme Court?

Mr. Sears: Yes, we are, your Honor. We have 21 days within which to do that, and then, of course, if we file, after that, there is an automatic stay of mandate until the petition for certiorari has been passed on.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: At the appropriate time, we may come in with some other motion for summary judgment if we, based upon this decision at least as to part of the plaintiffs, if not all of them in this case—Lektro-Vend was not a party in the state case, but the other two plaintiffs were—and it may mean some further motions in that regard.

We think, speaking for ourselves, that the Supreme Court pretty well finalized all of the many issues involved. It is a very lengthy opinion, and it is pretty inclusive.

The Court: How long would you expect it would be before they would rule on the motion for rehearing?

Mr. Sears: Well, that varies, your Honor. Sometimes they don't pass on them until the succeeding term which would be the November Term, sometime during the first week of the November Term.

I have known them to pass on them between the terms, so I couldn't tell your Honor with any degree of accuracy precisely when they would pass on this petition.

We filed 21 days from last Friday. They come in the second Monday of November.

The Court: I take it it is obvious that if any part of this Supreme Court opinion stands up, it disposes of some of the issues in the case that we have here?

Mr. Sears: I don't know. I can't say, your Honor. I don't think it does because one of the principal issues here before your Honor is the question of the validity of the sales contract and the contemporaneous, relatively contemporaneous, employment contract which we claim violates the Sherman Act, and with respect to which no interpretation by a state court, assuming that they interpreted the statute, which I don't believe they did; maybe I misread the opinion—but in any event, any interpretation by a state court of a federal statute, while it might be entitled to weight before your Honor, depending upon the persuasiveness of the reasoning, it certainly wouldn't be binding upon a Federal Court.

The Court: This is an interpretation by the Illinois Court of the federal statute?

Mr. Sears: No.

The Court: No?

Mr. Baker: No, this is a holding as to the validity of these covenants not to compete under the Illinois common law. They refused to apply the Illinois anti-trust law, and as your Honor stated a couple of times in our conferences

in chambers, the validity of these covenants and the actions of the defendant, Vendo, toward the plaintiffs, Stoner, the anti-competitive acts, are a matter to be determined strictly under federal law.

I think I have said to your Honor before, if the State Court holds the covenants invalid, that is very significant in this case, but if the State Court holds them valid, we start afresh here and determine their validity under the federal law.

The Court: And that is where we are now—

Mr. Baker: Yes, sir.

The Court: —you are saying.

Mr. Baker: Yes, sir.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: Yes, we are fresh.

If the Court please, it might be that a pretrial conference sometime to get, really, the contentions of the parties clear might be of some help, I don't know.

The Court: I would guess that the likelihood of the Court granting rehearing in a case like this after it has had it as long as it had—in fact, it has been up there twice, hasn't it?

Mr. Sears: No, they didn't have it very long at all. The Supreme Court has had it once.

Mr. Baker: We argued May 23d, and the decision was filed last Friday.

It has been to the Appellate Court of Illinois twice, and the action, I believe, is here.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and affirmed the judgment granted in the trial court.

The Court: Let's set it down for a pretrial conference. We have got to do something with this thing. We can't just let it sit here. Let's set it down for a month or so from

now after you have a chance to analyze just what happened and what is left in this case that we have before us.

Suppose we set it down for 1:30 in the afternoon on November 7.

Mr. Ochsenschlager: Thank you.

The Court: November 7 at 1:30 p.m.

Mr. Sears: Thank you, your Honor.

### CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing 7 pages constitute a full, true and correct transcription of shorthand notes taken upon the hearing of the above-entitled cause before Hon. Richard W. McLaren, one of the Judges of said Court, on October 1, 1974.

/s/ Agnes M. Thorne  
Assistant Official Court Reporter to  
Dorothy L. Rasoul  
Official Court Reporter  
United States District Court  
Northern District of Illinois

---



**Supreme Court of the United States**

**October Term, 1976**

**No. 76-100**

**THE VIDEO COMPANY, a Missouri corporation,**

**Petitioner,**

**vs.**  
**UNITED VIDEO INC., a Missouri corporation,**

**LARRY E. STONE and STONE INVESTMENTS, INC.,**

**Respondents.**

**Respondents**

**On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United  
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit**

**BRIFEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION**

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

**No. 76-156**

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
Petitioner,

vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
a Delaware corporation,  
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United  
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

**REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION**

The respondents' brief in opposition only serves to underscore the need for review by this Court.

As pointed out in the petition for certiorari, this is the first case in which any federal court ever held that § 16 of the Clayton Act "expressly authorizes" federal injunctions against state court proceedings as an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283. It is also the first to hold that such an action is not subject to established principles of comity and federalism. On both these critical issues, as examination of respondents' brief confirms, the decision below directly conflicts with decisions of other Courts of Appeals.

Respondents and the Court below also seriously err in asserting that the exclusive federal jurisdiction granted by § 16 over original claims for antitrust injunctive relief suffices to meet the standard of *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S.



225 (1972), for determining whether a federal statute "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings. Moreover, the test adopted by the Court of Appeals would lift the restraints of § 2283 not only where an injunction is sought under § 16 of the Clayton Act but also where suit is brought under any other statute providing for an equitable remedy in the federal courts.

Throughout their brief, respondents again and again repeat their astonishing central contention that Vendo's state court suit was nothing more than an "abuse of the judicial process" brought solely to "harass" them in violation of the federal antitrust laws. Yet they admit, as they must, that this alleged "abuse" resulted in judgments in Vendo's favor of more than \$7,500,000, that those judgments were unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and that this Court thereafter denied certiorari (420 U.S. 975).<sup>\*</sup> Whatever may be the propriety of re-

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<sup>\*</sup> Respondents do not and cannot cite any authority supporting the proposition that such *eminently successful* litigation falls within the "mere sham" exception which this Court in *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972), indicated was outside the protection of the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. Respondents also simply ignore the obvious fact that an isolated suit, brought by a single party not acting in concert with anyone else, cannot possibly be characterized as a "combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors from having 'free and unlimited access' to the agencies and courts," the situation dealt with in *California Motor Transport*, *supra*, 404 U.S. at 515. Furthermore, in its subsequent decision in *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States*, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), this Court expressly recognized that the institution of litigation is protected from antitrust liability under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine except where the purpose of such litigation to suppress competition is "evidenced by *repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims and thus within the 'mere sham' exception . . .*" (410 U.S. at 380, italics added).

In any event, *California Motor Transport* does not remotely purport to authorize federal *injunctions* even against state proceedings of the "mere sham" variety.

spondents' attack on the state suit in their treble-damage action, the relief granted below—a federal injunction barring enforcement of final state judgments affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court—violates fundamental precepts of federal-state relations.

Indeed, the present litigation presents a particularly striking example of the serious dangers inherent in the general relaxation of the restraints of § 2283 and of comity and federalism which has been advocated by respondents and approved by the Court of Appeals. Not only do respondents attack the final, fully reviewed judgments of the state courts on grounds which they could have presented to the state courts by way of defense, but the respondents do so on grounds which they actually *did* present, which the state courts held they were *entitled* to present, and which *would have been adjudicated* by the state courts except for respondents' *deliberate withdrawal* of those issues from the state proceeding. Respondents thus seek (and so far have been permitted) to nullify, by way of a federal injunction, the results of state court proceedings in which they were given a full and fair opportunity to present the very issues which they asserted many years later as grounds for the injunction.

To permit this new avenue of appeal from a final state court judgment to a federal district court would undermine the integrity of state judicial processes and thrust the state and federal courts into the very sort of direct opposition which § 2283 was designed to prevent. It also would—as this "Bleak House" case dramatically illustrates—significantly contribute to indefensible delay in the disposition of litigation.

**A. The Direct Conflict between Circuits Is Beyond Dispute.**

**1. The Conflict between Circuits on Whether § 16 of the Clayton Act "Expressly Authorizes" Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2283.**

Respondents for all practical purposes concede that the holding of the Court of Appeals directly conflicts with the decision of the Second Circuit in *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953), and with the decision of the Fourth Circuit in *Potter v. Carvel Stores of New York, Inc.*, 314 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963). Both Courts of Appeals—in direct conflict with the Seventh Circuit's decision in this case—squarely held that § 16 of the Clayton Act is *not* a statute which "expressly authorizes" federal injunctions against state court proceedings.

With respect to *Lyons*, *supra*, respondents have chosen to avoid even any mention of this decision of the Second Circuit in their brief.\* Respondents' silence, however, does not dispel the conflict.

Respondents do mention (albeit barely) the Fourth Circuit's decision in *Potter*, *supra*. Respondents merely assert (in a single sentence) that *Potter* and eight other cases are "inapposite" because there was not "any showing that federal antitrust claims would be thwarted absent equitable

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\* Respondents do cite the decision of the District Court in *Lyons*, contending that it "expressly recognized that an injunction would lie when 'such restraint is absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the Federal court's jurisdiction' (109 F. Supp. at 925)" (Resp. Br. 20). It is obvious, however, that the quoted language refers to the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to § 2283 and not to the "expressly authorized" exception. Both exceptions were held inapplicable in the *Lyons* litigation, whereas in this case the Court of Appeals rested its decision solely on the "expressly authorized" exception—a point which respondents confuse throughout their brief.

relief or that federal law proscribed the precise conduct sought to be enjoined" (Resp. Br. 20). The *Potter* opinions, however, say nothing of the kind. Furthermore, even apart from respondents' erroneous factual premise,\* respondents' proposed distinction does not make *Potter* "inapposite". The legal question of whether § 16 "expressly authorizes" stays of state court proceedings in no way depends on whether the plaintiff has otherwise demonstrated that equitable relief is warranted in the circumstances of the particular case. In fact, there is no need to determine the applicability of § 2283 unless an injunction is otherwise warranted. Thus, whether respondents did or did not meet the other requirements for an injunction is entirely irrelevant to the "expressly authorized" question under § 2283.

On that question, despite respondents' efforts to obfuscate it, both *Lyons* and *Potter* directly conflict with the decision below.

**2. The Conflict between Circuits on Whether Principles of Comity and Federalism Are Applicable to a Federal Injunction Against State Court Proceedings under § 16 of the Clayton Act.**

As pointed out in the petition for certiorari (pp. 19-20), the decision below holding that principles of comity and federalism are inapplicable to an injunction issued under § 16 of the Clayton Act is in direct conflict with two decisions of the Fifth Circuit. *Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc.*, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952); *Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc.*, 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974). In both cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed § 16 injunctions granted against state court proceedings, holding that—

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\* It should be noted that there was not (and could not be) any finding that enforcement of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision would violate the antitrust laws; the Court below merely stated that this is what respondents "alleged" (Pet. App. 11).



even apart from § 2283—the injunctions were improper on the basis of principles of comity and federalism.

In their brief in opposition, the respondents have chosen to ignore this conflict. They do not even mention *Red Rock* with respect to the comity-federalism issue (although they fleetingly cite it with respect to § 2283—Resp. Br. 19).

As to *Response of Carolina*, they merely assert in a footnote that the decision is “inapposite since the threatened injury here was a direct result of the antitrust violation” (Resp. Br. 24). It is well established, however, that an injunction under § 16 cannot be issued except where the threatened injury was a “direct result” of the antitrust violation. See, e.g., *Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp.*, 502 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1974) (per Stevens, J.); *Helpenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1971). To suggest, as respondents do, that principles of comity and federalism are inapplicable where the requirements of § 16 are met is to argue in a circle. According to respondents’ reasoning, principles of comity and federalism would be applicable only if the “direct result” requirement is *not* met. But if that requirement is *not* met, no injunction can issue under § 16 and the comity-federalism question is not even reached.

Respondents’ brief highlights—rather than negates—the clearcut conflict between the Circuits.

#### **B. The Decision Below Conflicts in Principle with This Court’s Decisions Construing § 2283.**

Respondents gloss over the conflict in principle between the decision below and the decisions of this Court which have repeatedly held that the three limited exceptions to the “absolute prohibition” of § 2283 are to be strictly and narrowly construed. E.g., *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970); *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.*, 348 U.S. 511, 514-16 (1955). As pointed

out in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, 234-35 (1972), only eight federal statutes have been held by this Court to empower the federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings. Each of these statutes either contains specific language providing for stays of state proceedings or, in the absence of such language, necessarily requires by its very nature and function that conflicting state judicial proceedings must be enjoined to achieve the statutory purpose.

Unlike this Court’s decision in *Mitchum*, the decision below does not explain how § 16 of the Clayton Act would be “frustrated” if federal courts were not empowered to enjoin state court proceedings. The Court below did not even attempt to analyze the origins and history of § 16 in the way this Court in *Mitchum* analyzed § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, there is not the slightest basis for the holding below that § 16 “could be given its intended scope” within the meaning of *Mitchum* only by allowing federal courts to stay state court proceedings.

In essence, the Court below held—and respondents argue here—that § 16 “expressly authorizes” injunctions against state court proceedings on the ground that the state suit would allegedly be enjoined in the absence of § 2283 and therefore the application of § 2283 would impair the exercise of equity jurisdiction *in this case*. But the whole object of § 2283 is to bar certain injunctions which might otherwise be appropriate, and plainly the possible impact on any particular case was not the kind of special situation which under *Mitchum* would justify a conclusion that a federal statute “expressly authorizes” stays of state court proceedings.

In *Mitchum*, by contrast, the Court held that § 1983 met that standard because

“The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,



'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.'" (407 U.S. at 242.)

Furthermore, in enacting § 1983, "Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights" (*ibid.*). This clearly is not the case with § 16 of the Clayton Act.

**C. Respondents' Remaining Arguments Concerning § 2283 Have No Bearing on Whether § 16 of the Clayton Act "Expressly Authorizes" Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings.**

Respondents also argue that § 2283 is inapplicable because "The jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate federal antitrust treble damage claims is exclusive and untrammelled" (Resp. Br. 14). This argument is a *non sequitur*. The jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate treble-damage claims authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act is not disputed. The issue here relates to the federal courts' power to *enjoin* state court proceedings (and, more specifically, enforcement of final state court judgments)—not what effect the state court proceedings or judgments may have on respondents' *treble-damage* action. And the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over *treble-damage* claims as well as the cases cited by respondents in this regard have no bearing whatsoever on whether § 16 of the Clayton Act "expressly authorizes" the federal courts to *enjoin* state court proceedings.

None of the three treble-damage cases cited by respondents gives the slightest support to issuance of a preliminary injunction against state court proceedings. In both *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955), and *Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963), the holding was that a federal antitrust action should not be stayed until a related

state case is adjudicated.\* Furthermore, in the *Lyons* litigation, it had previously been held that the state court defendants could *not* obtain a federal injunction staying the state court proceeding "even though the [federal] Anti-Trust Laws are involved in both actions, as in this case." *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 109 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), *aff'd per curiam*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953).

In addition, evidencing their lack of confidence in their position on the "expressly authorized" issue, respondents argue at length that "The preliminary injunction was also 'necessary in aid of' the District Court's jurisdiction within the meaning of the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute" (Resp. Br. 21). However, as respondents concede (*ibid.*), and as the Court of Appeals acknowledged in its opinion (Pet. App. 8), the Court of Appeals did not decide this issue. An issue not decided by the Court below can have no bearing on the need for review by this Court of the important issues which the Court below did decide. As this Court has frequently pointed out, and as recognized in Rule 19 of this Court's Rules, it is the importance of the issues actually presented which govern the exercise of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction.

In any event, respondents' "in aid of jurisdiction" argument is patently without merit. According to respondents, collection of the state judgments should be enjoined to preserve the independence of two of the three plaintiffs and to enable all three plaintiffs to use the *money instead to finance the conduct of their treble-damage action*. The short answer is that the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to § 2283 does not permit enjoining state judgments for

\* In *Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc.*, 351 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1965), *cert. denied*, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966), the single question involved on appeal was what rule the federal courts should apply to govern the effect of a general release in a federal antitrust case.

such purposes. See, e.g., *In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975). See also *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1970); *Jennings v. Boenning and Co.*, 482 F.2d 1128, 1131-35 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); *Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin*, 440 F.2d 105, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1971).

#### D. The Preliminary Injunction Violates Principles of Comity and Federalism.

In direct conflict with decisions of the Fifth Circuit (*supra*, pp. 5-6), the Court below held that principles of comity and federalism were inapplicable in an action under § 16 of the Clayton Act on the ground that respondents' "exclusive remedy" was in the federal courts. In so doing, the Court mistook both the facts and the law.

The state courts expressly gave respondents a full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal antitrust issues by holding, in agreement with the position then asserted by respondents in the state court case, that the state courts had jurisdiction to consider respondents' federal antitrust defense. Respondents, however, subsequently chose to abandon that defense; requested and obtained its dismissal at the opening of the second trial in the state case in 1971 (see Resp. App. 2); and did not at any time thereafter seek to reassert that defense in the state suit.\*

---

\* Respondents' withdrawal of their defense "without prejudice" constituted, at most, a reservation of their right to reassert it prior to final judgment—not the right to reassert it after final judgment and in a different court. See Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110, §§ 46, 72; *Shapiro v. Di Giulio*, 132 Ill. App. 2d 428, 434, 270 N.E. 2d 622, 627 (1971). Nor are respondents (see Resp. Br. 25) somehow relieved of the federal consequences of their withdrawal of the defense by the fact that Vendo (not surprisingly) did not object to the withdrawal. Lektro-Vend, although not a party in the state litigation, is completely controlled by and in privity with the other two plaintiffs and stands in no better position (Pet. App. 32).

Respondents nevertheless assert that they are now entitled to raise those same federal antitrust issues as grounds for a federal injunction against enforcement of the resulting state judgments. In support of their claim that principles of comity and federalism are inapplicable to an injunction under § 16, respondents cite a number of other cases which are simply irrelevant to the issues presented here. Thus, *Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co.*, 212 U.S. 227 (1909) (Resp. Br. 24), merely held that the federal antitrust laws could, in some circumstances, provide a good defense to a contract claim. That case did not even remotely suggest that a state court defendant, possessed of such a defense, could forego presenting it to the state court and, after suffering an adverse judgment, nevertheless obtain a federal injunction against the judgment on the basis that he had a valid federal antitrust defense to the state claim against him. Yet that is precisely what respondents urge here.

Respondents' reliance upon the Second Circuit's 1955 opinion in *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955) (Resp. Br. 25-26), is entirely misplaced. That decision held that, where companion state and federal cases are in progress, both involving issues raised under the federal antitrust laws, the federal suit should not be stayed pending the conclusion of the state case. But there has been no such stay in the present instance; nor is petitioner here contesting respondents' right to pursue their treble-damage claims against petitioner in federal court. Moreover, respondents conveniently overlook the Second Circuit's other opinion in the *Lyons* case (*Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953)), which explicitly held that the federal court was barred in precisely the same circumstances from enjoining the state proceedings.

*Mercoird Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.*, 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944) (Resp. Br. 26), is equally inapposite. No

injunction was at issue there, much less an injunction against a state court proceeding. The issue in that case was the *res judicata* effect of a prior federal suit on the defendant's counterclaim for antitrust treble-damages. No issue of federalism or comity between state and federal courts is presented by that case. Nor, as already stated, is petitioner here contesting respondents' right to proceed with their treble-damage claims. Only the preliminary injunction against petitioner's state court proceedings is at issue on this appeal.

**E. The Decision Below Improperly Sanctions Collateral Review of the Illinois Supreme Court's Final Decision by the District Court.**

In granting the preliminary injunction, the District Court candidly acknowledged that it was reviewing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision, allegedly because of the lack of any consideration of respondents' federal antitrust defense in the state courts (Pet. App. 25); and the Court of Appeals approved this procedure (Pet. App. 14). Such review was patently beyond the power of the District Court—even apart from the fact that the lack of any state court consideration of the federal antitrust issues was due to the deliberate decision of respondents themselves (*supra*, p. 10).

Respondents point to no case in which such review has ever been sanctioned. Neither the Second Circuit's 1955 opinion in *Lyons v. Westinghouse*, *supra*, nor the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli*, *supra*, (Resp. Br. 28) suggests such a possibility. As previously stated, both those decisions held that, where companion federal antitrust and state cases are proceeding simultaneously, the *federal* case should not be stayed pending the outcome of the state suit. *Neither case in any way sanctions a federal injunction against the state suit*, even where (as in *Mach-Tronics*) the federal plaintiff contends that the state suit was brought for an anti-competitive purpose.

**CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated above and in Vendo's petition for writ of certiorari, the decision below not only is contrary to established law but also raises issues of broad national significance and is likely to have serious adverse effects on the relationship between state and federal courts. It is respectfully submitted that the petition should be granted.

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Dated: September 17, 1976.



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IN THE

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-156

THE VENDO COMPANY, a Missouri corporation,  
Petitioner,

vs.

LEKTRO-VEND CORP., a Delaware corporation,  
HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.,  
a Delaware corporation,  
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court  
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

## BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

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On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court  
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

**BRIEF FOR PETITIONER**

**Opinions Below**

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App.<sup>1</sup> 276), affirming the issuance of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of final state court judgments, is unofficially reported at 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶ 60,919. The opinion of the District Court (App. 226) is reported at 403 F. Supp. 527.

**Jurisdiction**

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on May 28, 1976 (App. 292). The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's petition for rehearing on July 16, 1976 (App. 293). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

<sup>1</sup> "App." refers to the Appendix filed with this Court pursuant to Rule 36.

August 4, 1976, and was granted on October 4, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

### Questions Presented

In a previously filed state court proceeding, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed judgments to compensate petitioner Vendo for respondent Stoner's violation of his state-law fiduciary duties while serving as a Vendo director and officer, and this Court denied certiorari. Before the judgments could be collected, however, Stoner obtained from the Federal District Court a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the judgments on the basis of Stoner's claim that the state proceeding and the judgments violated the federal antitrust laws. The questions presented are:

(1) Whether § 16 of the Clayton Act "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

(2) Whether principles of comity and federalism normally applicable to requested injunctions against state court proceedings do not apply where the injunction is sought under § 16 of the Clayton Act.

(3) Whether a single federal district judge has jurisdiction to review and nullify a final decision of the highest court of a state.

(4) Whether state court defendants who have deliberately withdrawn their federal antitrust defense (and thereby have prevented its consideration by the state courts) may on the same federal antitrust ground subsequently obtain a federal preliminary injunction against collection of final judgments entered in the state proceeding.

### Statutes Involved

The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as

expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, provides:

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

### STATEMENT

#### A. Introduction.

At issue is a preliminary injunction granted by the District Court enjoining proceedings in the Illinois state courts to collect final judgments awarded to petitioner Vendo against respondents Harry B. Stoner ("Stoner") and Stoner Investments, Inc. and affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Vendo is engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing certain types of vending machines. During the period 1959 to 1964, Stoner was both an officer and a director of Vendo. Stoner Investments (formerly Stoner Manufacturing Corporation) is a real estate and investment company wholly owned by Stoner and his wife.

In the state case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Stoner, *during the 1959-64 period when he was both an officer and director of Vendo*, had repeatedly and flagrantly violated his fiduciary duties to Vendo by, *inter alia*, misappropriating a corporate opportunity rightfully belonging to Vendo. The Illinois Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the judgments (in the amount of \$7,516,335) in Vendo's favor. *Vendo Co. v. Stoner*, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E. 2d 1 (1974). This Court denied certiorari, 420 U.S. 975 (1975).

The judgments having become final, Vendo instituted proceedings in the Illinois state courts to collect the judgments. The Stoner interests responded to these collection efforts by reactivating this federal action (which they had filed *over eleven years ago* shortly after Vendo's filing of its state court action) and by obtaining from the District Court a preliminary injunction barring Vendo from taking "any further steps to enforce or collect, or attempt to enforce or collect" the final state court judgments (App. 270). The Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction, and this Court granted certiorari to review that decision.

As already noted, both the state and federal actions were commenced *over eleven years ago*. Vendo filed its action on August 10, 1965 in the Circuit Court of Kane County, Illinois against Stoner and Stoner Investments. The federal action was filed against Vendo two months later on October 21, 1965 by the respondents—Stoner and Stoner Investments (the two defendants in the state court action) plus Lektro-Vend Corporation, a vending-machine manufacturer which (like Stoner Investments) is controlled by the Stoner family.

Both in their federal complaint and their answer to Vendo's state court complaint (by way of affirmative defense), the respondents charged that the state court litigation was brought and was being prosecuted in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. (App. 17-19, 21-25, 31-32.) (Subsequently, as pointed out *infra*, pp. 11-12, Stoner and Stoner Investments voluntarily withdrew their federal anti-trust defense in the state action.)

## **B. The Facts Determined by the Illinois Supreme Court.**

In the marathon state court proceeding, it was determined by the Illinois Supreme Court that Stoner, individually and through Stoner Investments, had violated his fiduciary duties to Vendo *during the 1959-64 period when he was an officer and director of Vendo* (a) by secretly supporting the development and marketing of a new type of candy vending machine by Lektro-Vend, (b) by withholding the facts concerning his involvement with Lektro-Vend and misleading Vendo with regard to its possible acquisition of the Lektro-Vend machine, and (c) by misappropriating Vendo's opportunity to acquire the machine.

It was also determined that Stoner and Stoner Investments had unlawfully breached the non-competition covenants in their agreements with Vendo, but the Illinois Supreme Court held that in any event the judgments were proper on the basis of Stoner's violation of his fiduciary duties "[q]uite apart from any liability which may be predicated upon a breach of the covenants against competition . . ." and "[r]egardless of the . . . disposition of those restraint-of-trade issues . . ." (App. 111, 117).

The basic facts are set forth in the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion written by Mr. Justice Schaefer (App. 100-23).

As there pointed out, Stoner was the president and the controlling owner of Stoner Manufacturing Corporation (now Stoner Investments), a company which had been en-



gaged in the business of making and selling candy-vending machines throughout the United States. In April, 1959, Vendo and Stoner Manufacturing entered into a contract for the purchase by Vendo of the assets of Stoner Manufacturing. Vendo's "purpose in making the acquisition was in part to add a candy-vending machine to its line. So far as Harry B. Stoner was concerned, the motive for the sale appears to have arisen from a concern that the poor state of his health would prevent him from continuing in the active direction of his company." (App. 101-02.)

Under the sale contract Vendo agreed to pay Stoner Manufacturing \$3,400,000 in cash, 60,000 shares of Vendo stock, and a share of certain profits realized from the use of the assets being purchased for a period of 10 years.<sup>2</sup> A non-competition covenant for the same 10-year period was also provided.<sup>3</sup>

On June 1, 1959, Stoner executed an employment contract with Vendo, providing for compensation of Stoner at a salary of \$50,000 a year. "Stoner was hired by [Vendo] on the basis of the skill and experience which he could bring to [Vendo]" (App. 112). The employment contract also con-

<sup>2</sup> Vendo agreed to pay Stoner Manufacturing for a period of 10 years (or until such time as Vendo might exercise an option to purchase the Stoner plant) all profits in excess of \$250,000 realized from the use of the assets being purchased, and for a period of 10 years 25% of the income received from foreign sales realized from the use of those assets.

<sup>3</sup> Stoner Manufacturing (now Stoner Investments) agreed that "... for a period of ten (10) years after the closing, the Company will not in any manner, directly or indirectly, enter into or engage in the United States or any foreign country in which Vendo or any affiliate or subsidiary is so engaged, in the manufacture and sale of vending machines or any business similar to that now being conducted by the Company." (App. 102-03.)

tained a non-competition covenant.<sup>4</sup> Stoner became a director of Vendo as well as president of the Company's Aurora Division (formerly the Stoner Manufacturing plant).

The candy-vending machine which was being manufactured by Stoner Manufacturing at the time it sold its assets to Vendo in 1959 was called a "drop shelf" machine. The "Lektro-Vend" model subsequently developed with Stoner's secret help, at the same time he was an officer and director of Vendo, possessed several significant advantages over the drop-shelf model (including a "first in, first out" feature) which made it popular and successful with companies which purchase and service vending machines. (App. 104.)

As the result of research into the possibility of developing a vending machine of this character, Vendo in August, 1959, had built two developmental models. Sketches of these were shown to Stoner.<sup>5</sup>

In mid-1960, two engineering employees of Vendo, Rod Phillips and his son William (who had previously worked for Stoner Manufacturing), resigned their employment at

<sup>4</sup> "5. During the term of this agreement and for a period of five (5) years following the termination of his employment hereunder, whether by lapse of time or by termination as hereinafter provided, Stoner shall not directly or indirectly, in any of the territories in which the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates is at present conducting business and also in territories which Stoner knows the Company or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities, enter into or engage in the vending machine manufacturing business or any branch thereof, either as an individual on his own account, or as a partner or joint venturer, or as an employee, agent or salesman for any person, firm or corporation or as an officer or director of a corporation or otherwise . . ." (App. 103-04.)

<sup>5</sup> While agreeing on the desirability of developing a machine with such capabilities, Vendo personnel considered the models to be defective in certain mechanical respects and too expensive to produce, and the research project to develop such a machine was accordingly shelved.

Vendo and solicited Stoner's financial support. In late 1960 or early 1961, Rod Phillips approached Stoner with a request that Stoner provide financial support to cover the development of a vending machine of the new type, and Stoner agreed to do so. Interest-free loans which aggregated some \$200,000 were made to Phillips by Stoner Investments during 1961 and 1962. Stoner also made available rent-free a building owned by him for use in conducting the development work. In 1961, when two more Vendo employees resigned, they joined Rod and William Phillips on the research and development project and received monthly salaries aggregating \$1,150 from Stoner Investments. (App. 105-06.)

By October, 1962, the developmental work on the new machine had progressed to the point where a prototype could be exhibited at a trade show, and it won a very favorable reaction in the industry. In December, 1962, Stoner asked Vendo's board chairman Elmer Pierson, to be released from his employment contract, stating that he had an opportunity to invest in the manufacture and sale of the Lektro-Vend machine. *"Stoner did not disclose that he had already been giving support to the development of Lektro-Vend."* (App. 106, italics added.)

Vendo refused to release Stoner from his contract, and Pierson informed Stoner that Vendo itself had an interest in buying the Lektro-Vend machine. Pierson asked Stoner to ascertain if Rod Phillips had any interest in selling it and, if so, to set up a meeting between Phillips and representatives of Vendo. Stoner then wrote one of Vendo's vice-presidents, Spencer Childers, that Phillips would be willing to sell if the price were high enough. Stoner told Vendo that Phillips wanted \$1,500,000 and that a third company had expressed a willingness to pay that amount. In March, 1963, Stoner informed Vendo that he had told Phillips that he assumed, in the absence of further word from Childers, that Vendo no longer had an interest in making the purchase. Childers wrote back stating that

Vendo still had such an interest, but that the asking price of \$1,500,000 was too high. (App. 107.)

In December, 1962, Stoner's sister-in-law—Mrs. Ruth Netrey—lent Phillips \$350,000, which was later increased to \$525,000, at an interest rate of 4½%. No payment was made on either principal or interest until September, 1963, at which time Mrs. Netrey received a note for the amount due her from the Lektro-Vend Corporation, which had just been organized. The proceeds of the loan were used in part to pay off the loan due Stoner, as Mrs. Netrey and Stoner each knew. The original stockholders of Lektro-Vend Corporation were Rod Phillips and William Phillips, certain other employees, and Mrs. Netrey, who held 50% of the stock. (App. 108.)

During 1963 Rod Phillips proceeded with his plans to set up a manufacturing operation, and in March or April Stoner Investments completed the construction of a building in Aurora which was made available to Phillips for this purpose.

Stoner had a further conversation with Pierson in the spring or summer of 1963, in which Pierson inquired as to the actual extent of Stoner's involvement with Phillips. Stoner told him that the relationship had been confined to loans and that these had since been repaid by another person. Stoner did not disclose that this other person was his sister-in-law. *"This conversation marked the first occasion on which Stoner disclosed any involvement with Lektro-Vend, and the disclosure was far from complete."* (App. 108, italics added.)

In March, 1964, Stoner Investments contracted to sell to Lektro-Vend Corporation the new plant which had been built by Stoner Investments during the previous year. The purchase was made by Lektro-Vend with the proceeds of a bank loan which was advanced subject to an agreement by Stoner Investments to guarantee the repurchase of the property in the event of a default on the loan.



Stoner ceased being a Vendo director in March or April of 1964. Stoner's contract of employment terminated June 1, 1964, and it was not renewed. On June 10, 1964, Lektro-Vend issued 5,000 shares of stock to Mrs. Stoner, and on July 15 it issued 5,000 shares of stock to Stoner Investments. (App. 109.)<sup>6</sup>

### C. The Decisions of the Illinois Courts.

In December, 1966, the state trial court sitting without a jury found in favor of Vendo. In response to "the question: What is the responsibility of a man who is in a position of trust and a fiduciary capacity to the stockholders?", the court stated that "I find it most difficult to come up with an answer that that sort of conduct is conducive and in compliance with the responsibility as a director of a corporation". (App. 41.) The court initially entered a judgment against the two defendants jointly for \$1,100,000 and a judgment against Stoner individually for \$250,000. (App. 47.)

The defendants appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, which in 1969 sustained the trial court's conclusion concerning Stoner's misconduct<sup>7</sup> but remanded the case to the trial court for a further hearing with respect to the amount of damages recoverable by Vendo. (App. 49-81.)

The Illinois Appellate Court also sustained the validity of the non-competition covenants in the sale and employment contracts. It found that the defendants' breaches of the covenants occurred "in-term", i.e., during the period

<sup>6</sup> On March 28, 1976, Stoner died; and on October 1, 1976, Mrs. Stoner as his administrator was substituted as a party plaintiff in the District Court.

<sup>7</sup> In addition to Stoner's violation of his fiduciary duties as an officer and director, Stoner had also been held liable by the trial court on the ground of theft of trade secrets belonging to Vendo, but this alternative ground was reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court (App. 61-64) and the issue was not pursued thereafter.

specified by the contract in which Stoner was to be paid to perform services for Vendo and in which Stoner Investments was to be paid as additional compensation a percentage of Vendo's profits derived from the assets which it had sold to Vendo. (App. 64-70.)

On the other hand, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the trial court had erred in striking the defendants' federal antitrust defense and that they were entitled on remand to a hearing on the issue. (App. 77-79.) However, just before the second trial was to commence, Stoner and Stoner Investments *formally withdrew their federal antitrust defense which the Illinois Appellate Court had at their behest sustained and had directed the trial court to consider.* (App. 82.)

At the second trial, in 1971, on the basis of additional evidence on damages, the trial court awarded a judgment to Vendo in the amount of \$170,835 against Stoner and a judgment against both defendants for \$7,345,500. (App. 89-91.) The defendants again appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, which in 1973 affirmed the judgment against Stoner but reversed the judgment against the two defendants jointly and remanded the case for a further hearing. (App. 94-99.) Each side filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, and both petitions were allowed.

In its opinion, written by Mr. Justice Schaefer, the Illinois Supreme Court sustained both judgments, strongly condemning Stoner's and Stoner Investments' "wrongful acts" (App. 123), "misconduct" (App. 114), and "misappropriating the Lektro-Vend" machine. (App. 115.) The Court held (App. 111, 112-13):

*"Quite apart from any liability which may be predicated upon a breach of the covenants against competition contained in the sales agreement and the employment contract, it is clear that Stoner violated his fiduciary duties to plaintiff during the period when he was a director and an officer of plaintiff. . . .*



*"Stoner had a foot in each camp. Not only did his undisclosed individual interest in controlling the further development and ultimately the manufacture and sale of the Lektro-Vend create the possibility of his taking an unfair advantage of plaintiff, but the evidence gives strong indication that he actually misled plaintiff while he was purportedly acting as plaintiff's agent with regard to plaintiff's possible acquisition of the Lektro-Vend."* (Italics added.)

With respect to the non-competition covenants, the Illinois Supreme Court held (App. 116-18):

*"The appellate court concluded, in our opinion correctly, that defendants' activities directed toward the development and thereafter the marketing of the Lektro-Vend, consisting of substantial financial aid, and the provision of physical facilities, as well as defendant's ownership interest in the Lektro-Vend enterprise, were so substantial as to go beyond the limits established by the covenants.*

*"Regardless of the appellate court's disposition of those restraint-of-trade issues, the defendants may, as we have pointed out, be held liable on the ground of a breach of fiduciary obligation on the part of Stoner. . . .*

*"At the original trial defendants raised as an affirmative defense and by way of counterclaim a charge that the sale agreement and the employment contract violated both the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 60-1 et seq.) and the Federal antitrust laws (15 U.S.C. sec. 1 et seq.). The latter charge was withdrawn by defendants on the remand, and references in the record indicate that at some point a suit was filed against plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois relating to the alleged violations of Federal law.*

*"With respect to the State antitrust claim . . . the Illinois act, having been enacted in 1965, long after the contracts here in question were entered into, cannot properly form the basis of a counterclaim by defendants."* (Italics added.)

On November 27, 1974, the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing filed by Stoner and Stoner Investments. On January 28, 1975, Mr. Justice Rehnquist denied their request for a stay of execution pending consideration of their petition for certiorari. On March 17, 1975, this Court denied the petition for certiorari (420 U.S. 975).

#### **D. The Proceedings Below.**

##### **1. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction.**

On January 2, 1975, after Vendo commenced efforts to collect its judgments, the respondents filed an amended complaint in the federal case, not only reasserting their antitrust claim with respect to the state action but also claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a denial of due process in the state action. (App. 124-59.)

Thereafter, on January 23, 1975, Stoner and Stoner Investments (but not plaintiff Lektro-Vend) filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (App. 177), contending that, if Vendo were permitted to collect the judgments against them, they would be without funds to pay their attorneys to prosecute their lawsuit against Vendo. They also claimed that collection by Vendo would result in Vendo's acquiring control of Lektro-Vend.

In its response, Vendo formally offered to enter into a consent decree which would preclude Vendo's acquiring such control of Lektro-Vend. (App. 208-10.)<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> After the District Court issued its opinion but before the District Court entered its injunction order, Vendo proposed an even more far-reaching consent decree. This second proposed consent decree would have categorically prohibited Vendo from acquiring any stock of either Lektro-Vend or Stoner Investments. (App. 257-59.)

In respondents' *post-hearing reply* brief, after Vendo had submitted its brief, Lektro-Vend moved to join in the request for injunctive relief.

## 2. The District Court's Decision.

In its decision on May 29, 1975, granting the preliminary injunction, the District Court acknowledged that it did not have jurisdiction to collaterally review the state court judgments. Accordingly, the Court refused to entertain respondents' due process claim based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (App. 226-27, n.1.) However, the District Court concluded that "... the state court proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme". (App. 232.) The District Court (App. 232, n.4) stated that the Illinois Supreme Court opinion "makes such a review imperative" because the Illinois Court "expressly refused to consider the allegations that the state proceedings were part of an anticompetitive scheme" (notwithstanding the fact that the only reason the Illinois Supreme Court did not consider Stoner's federal antitrust defense was because it had been voluntarily withdrawn by Stoner—see pp. 11-12, *supra*).

On that basis, the District Court made its own conclusory findings and held that there had been an adequate showing of likelihood of ultimate success. The District Court, however, neither found nor held that enforcement of the judgments would violate the antitrust laws. Instead, the Court merely concluded that the non-competition covenants "were overly broad" (App. 233) and that "There is persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine

attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately" (App. 237, *citing only events in the 1963-66 period*).<sup>9</sup>

The District Court held it to be immaterial that Vendo's state action had been found to be *meritorious* and that the Illinois Supreme Court—"[q]uite apart from" and "[r]egardless of" the non-competition covenants—had upheld the judgments on the basis of Stoner's violation of his fiduciary duties as a director and officer. The District Court reasoned that Stoner would not have been a director of Vendo if it had not been for the 1959 agreements, and that "[t]he 1959 agreements were cut from one piece of anti-competitive cloth and cannot be snipped apart." (App. 234-35.)

The District Court held that § 16 of the Clayton Act is a statute which "expressly authorizes" stays of state court proceedings within the first exception provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The District Court also held § 2283 inapplicable on the ground that the injunction is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Court, within the second § 2283 exception, since in the Court's view (notwithstanding Vendo's offer of a consent decree with respect to both those companies) two of the three plaintiffs, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend, might be eliminated from the case by Vendo's further collection efforts. (App. 239-41.)

The District Court further held that "Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of an injunction . . ." since "The federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined." (App. 241.)

<sup>9</sup> The District Court also stated that, "*If the state court litigation was itself part of the anticompetitive scheme, a judgment arising from such litigation is not an ordinary debt*" (App. 238, *italics added*), and "*If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention*" (App. 241, *italics added*), but reached no conclusion as to *whether* continuation of the state action (i.e., through collection of the state judgments) *would* violate the antitrust laws.



The Court's decision also granted Lektro-Vend's post-hearing request to join in the preliminary injunction motion. (App. 227, n.2.)

On June 27, 1975, the District Court issued its Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (App. 266-75) prohibiting all efforts by Vendo to collect its final state court judgments and requiring respondents to post an injunction bond of only \$2,500.00.

### 3. The Court of Appeals' Decision.

On May 28, 1976, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that 28 U.S.C. § 2283 did not bar the injunction. The Court held that § 16 of the Clayton Act "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings, within the scope of that exception to § 2283, on the ground that § 16 grants equitable jurisdiction only to federal courts. (App. 286, 288.)

The Court of Appeals also rejected Vendo's argument that, entirely apart from the absolute prohibition of § 2283, principles of comity and federalism barred the District Court's injunction against enforcement of the decision of the highest court of a state. The Court of Appeals held: "The principle of comity has no applicability when the exclusive remedy for an injury lies in the federal court." (App. 289.)

In addition, the Court of Appeals expressly approved the District's Court's assertion of its jurisdiction to review a final decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. (App. 289.)

### SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision below sanctions a procedure whereby a single federal district judge—through the device of a preliminary injunction—has effectively nullified final state court judgments which the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed

after nearly ten arduous years of litigation and which this Court declined to review. The district judge, moreover, did so on the very same federal claim which the plaintiffs in this case had deliberately withdrawn as a defense in the state proceeding.

Such a procedure is fundamentally at war with settled law regarding the Anti-Injunction Statute, principles of comity and federalism, and collateral review of state court judgments.

### I.

The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (*supra*, pp. 2-3), provides that a federal court "may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." This Court has repeatedly admonished that the exceptions to § 2283 are to be strictly and narrowly construed to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts.

### A.

Section 16 of the Clayton Act (*supra*, p. 3) does not "expressly authorize" injunctions against state court proceedings within the meaning of the first exception to § 2283. By its terms, § 16 does not provide for such injunctions; if anything, the statutory language is directly to the contrary. Nor is there any basis for construing § 16 to authorize such injunctions through some implied grant of power.

1. Prior to the District Court's decision in this case, no court had ever held that § 16 "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings. Indeed, every court which had expressly considered the issue—including the Second and Fourth Circuits—had uniformly held to the contrary.

2. Only eight federal statutes have been recognized by this Court to "expressly authorize" injunctions against state



court proceedings. See *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, 234-35 (1972). Each of these eight statutes either contains specific language providing for stays of state proceedings or, in the absence of such language, necessarily requires by its very nature and function that conflicting state judicial proceedings must be enjoined in order to achieve the statutory purpose. Thus, in *Mitchum*, this Court found that "the very purpose of § 1983" of the Civil Rights Act was to transform the previously existing relationship between federal and state courts and to prevent abuses by (*inter alia*) state courts.

Section 16 of the Clayton Act clearly is not a statute of this type. Even apart from the absence of specific language providing for stays of state proceedings, there is not the slightest basis (and the Court of Appeals pointed to none) for believing that § 16 was designed to prevent abuses by state courts or that it was "the will of Congress" to place injunctive restraints on state court proceedings.

The crux of the decision below is that the state suit would allegedly be enjoined in the absence of § 2283 and therefore the application of § 2283 would impair § 16 jurisdiction *in this case*. But the whole object of § 2283 is to bar certain injunctions which might otherwise be appropriate, "regardless of how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be" (*Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 229). Plainly the possible impact on any particular case—as distinguished from achievement of an overall statutory purpose—does not justify a conclusion that a federal statute "expressly authorizes" stays of state court proceedings.

Indeed, if it were otherwise, then *every* federal statute authorizing injunctive relief would fall within the "expressly authorized" exception and would permit enjoining state court proceedings—a result which is completely antithetical to the entire purpose of § 2283 and this Court's interpretation of it.

## B.

The "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to § 2283—which was relied upon by the District Court but not by the Court of Appeals—also is plainly inapplicable in this case.

According to the District Court, the preliminary injunction was "necessary" to its jurisdiction on the ground that Vendo's enforcement of its judgments might result in Vendo's taking control of Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend, thereby possibly eliminating two of the three plaintiffs in the federal suit as independent parties. Such reasoning is doubly erroneous.

First of all, Vendo had offered a consent decree which would eliminate any possibility of Vendo's acquiring control of those two plaintiffs. Therefore, an injunction against enforcement of the state court judgments could not possibly be "necessary" to the District Court's jurisdiction.

Second, there is wholly lacking any authority for holding that a state court proceeding may be enjoined to preserve federal plaintiffs' compliance with the "case or controversy" requirement. Even more clearly, there is no justification for enjoining a state court proceeding to preserve the standing of *only some of the plaintiffs* in the federal case. Here, irrespective of the standing of Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend, Stoner (or his administrator) would continue to be an adverse party and, therefore, the District Court would not in any event be deprived of jurisdiction.

## II.

Even apart from § 2283, the injunction granted by the District Court violates fundamental principles of comity and federalism which must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding. These principles apply even where an injunction is sought under a federal statute that "expressly authorizes" injunctions against

state court proceedings. See *Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.*, 420 U.S. 592 (1975).

Considerations of comity and federalism are especially critical where, as in the present case, (1) the attack upon state court proceedings is against final judgments which had been affirmed by the highest court of the state and (2) the attack is on grounds which actually were presented to the state courts and which would have been adjudicated by the state courts except for respondents' deliberate withdrawal of those issues from the state court proceeding.

The Court of Appeals clearly erred in holding—in direct conflict with Fifth Circuit decisions—that principles of comity and federalism do not apply to injunctions issued under § 16 of the Clayton Act. Contrary to the decision below, a federal injunction against the final state court judgments was not the respondents' "exclusive remedy" under the federal antitrust laws. Instead, respondents had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the antitrust issues in the state court proceeding—and could then have presented the matter to this Court on certiorari—but they chose for their own tactical reasons to withdraw those issues from the state courts' consideration.

### III.

The District Court also lacked jurisdiction to reverse, review or revise the final judgments of the state courts by collateral attack. Such a judgment, affirmed by the highest court of the state, can be reviewed only by this Court (which in this case denied certiorari) and not by any lower federal court.

### ARGUMENT

The decision below and the theories offered to support it constitute an affront to the most basic principles underlying federal-state relations and the use of federal equity power.

As set forth more fully in the Statement (*supra*, pp. 11-13), the Illinois Supreme Court, after nearly ten arduous years of litigation, affirmed judgments to compensate Vendo for Stoner's flagrant violations of his state-law fiduciary duties while serving as a Vendo director and officer. This Court denied certiorari, and the state judgments were unequivocally final and entitled to full faith and credit. But then, in order to forestall collection of the judgments against them, Stoner and Stoner Investments hit upon a new strategem. They obtained from the District Court a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the judgments on the claim that the state suit from its very inception was violative of the federal antitrust laws—the same claim, moreover, which they had deliberately withdrawn as a defense in the state proceeding (and thereby prevented the state courts and this Court from adjudicating in that proceeding).

The ramifications of this procedure—approved by the Court below—are, to say the least, extraordinary. It would give to every district judge the power to review, set aside, and nullify final state court judgments through the preliminary injunction device. It would reduce the highest tribunals of any state to the status of special masters subject to *de novo* control by a single district judge. Nor is there any reason why such control should be exercised only under the federal antitrust laws; on precisely the same theory, final state court judgments—even, as here, after the denial of certiorari—could likewise be preliminarily enjoined under myriad other federal statutes as well.

To permit this new avenue of appeal from a final state court judgment to a federal district court would undermine the integrity of state judicial processes and thrust the



state and federal courts into frequent and bitter conflict. It also would—as this “Bleak House” case (now in its *twelfth* year) dramatically illustrates—significantly contribute to indefensible delay in the disposition of litigation.

As we shall show, the decision below sanctioning such a procedure is fundamentally at war with settled law regarding the Anti-Injunction Statute, principles of comity and federalism, and collateral review of state court judgments.

# I. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS BARRED BY 28 U. S. C. § 2283.

The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (*supra*, pp. 2-3), provides that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”

This statute represents “a limitation of the power of the federal courts dating almost from the beginning of our history and expressing an important Congressional policy—to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts”. *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1939). See also *Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.*, 314 U.S. 118, 129 (1941); *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, 232-233 (1972).

Pursuant to this fundamental policy, the statute constitutes an absolute bar to a federal court injunction against pending state proceedings except where one of the three specifically stated exceptions applies. *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286-287 (1970); *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1972).

This Court has repeatedly held that the three exceptions to § 2283 are to be strictly and narrowly construed. Thus, in *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.*, 348 U.S. 511 (1955), the Court stated, in referring to

the enactment in 1948 of § 2283 in its present form, that “. . . Congress made clear beyond cavil that the prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation” (p. 514) and that “*This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application*” (pp. 515-516, italics added). Similarly, in the *Atlantic Coast Line* case, *supra*, the Court admonished that “*the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.*” (398 U.S. at 287, italics added; see also p. 297.)

In this case, the District Court held that two of the exceptions applied; the Court concluded that § 16 of the Clayton Act “expressly authorizes” injunctions against state court proceedings, and that such an injunction was also “necessary in aid of” the District Court’s jurisdiction. (App. 239-41.) The Court of Appeals rested its decision as to § 2283 solely on the “expressly authorized” exception and did not pass on the applicability of the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception.

Both decisions below are directly contrary to the established law interpreting § 2283 and the clearly defined legislative and judicial policies against *ad hoc* expansion of the exceptions to the statute.

## A. Section 16 of the Clayton Act Does Not “Expressly Authorize” an Injunction to Stay Proceedings in a State Court.

By its terms, of course, § 16 of the Clayton Act (set forth *supra*, p. 3) plainly does not “expressly authorize” an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court. On the contrary, the statute merely permits “. . . injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . ., when and *under the same conditions and principles* as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, *under the rules governing such proceedings . . .*” (italics added). If anything, the text of the statute clearly



indicates that § 16 injunctions are subject to the usual and customary restrictions on federal equity power—including, preeminently, § 2283's restriction against enjoining state proceedings.

Furthermore, as we shall show, § 16 does not "expressly authorize" injunctions against state court proceedings by way of some implied grant of power.

### 1. The Decisions Below Are Contrary to a Previously Settled Interpretation of § 2283 and § 16.

In accordance with the principle that § 2283 exceptions are to be strictly construed, and as pointed out in *Mitchum v. Foster*, *supra*, 407 U.S. at 234-37, only a small number of federal statutes have been found by this Court to "expressly authorize" injunctions against state court proceedings. And, prior to the District Court's decision in this case, *no court had ever held that § 16 was such a statute*. On the contrary, every court which had expressly considered the issue—including the Second and Fourth Circuits—had uniformly held that § 16 does *not* "expressly authorize" injunctions against state court proceedings.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953), affirming 109 F. Supp. 925, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); *Potter v. Carvel Stores of N.Y., Inc.*, 314 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963), affirming 203 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1962); *Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp.*, 182 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); *Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp.*, 9 F.R.D. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); *Avon Pub. Co. v. American News Co.*, 143 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); *American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.*, 1966 Trade Cases ¶ 71,918 (S.D.N.Y.). See also the recent decision in *Carter v. Ogden Corp.*, 524 F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1975), reversing an injunction issued under § 16 of the Clayton Act and holding "that under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 this injunction was prohibited. . . ." On the other hand, compare *Sar Industries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries, Inc.*, 1976-1 Trade Cases ¶ 60,816 (C.D. Cal.), relying on the District Court's decision in this case.

*Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953), involved circumstances remarkably similar to those present in the instant case. Westinghouse had sued Lyons and others in the New York state courts for breach of a contract and an accounting. The state court defendants raised a federal antitrust defense in the state suit, claiming that the contract violated the antitrust laws. Thereafter, they brought suit in the federal court against Westinghouse under the federal antitrust laws advancing the same federal antitrust grounds which they had asserted by way of defense in the state proceeding. The District Court held that it could not enjoin the state proceedings, "even though the [federal] Anti-Trust Laws are involved in both actions, as in this case," because "*a stay of these State court proceedings is not expressly authorized by any act of Congress*, and it is not required in aid of this court's jurisdiction or to effectuate its judgments." 109 F. Supp. 925-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (*italics added*). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, specifically holding that the District Court "*rightly held that 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 prevents the issuance of such a stay*." 201 F.2d at 510 (*italics added*).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The Court below placed heavy reliance on *Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966). (App. 287-88.) That case, however, did not involve either the Clayton Act or any antitrust issues. The passing reference to the Clayton Act in *Studebaker*, by way of dictum, did not conclude that § 16 "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings and did not even remotely overrule the Second Circuit's prior decision in *Lyons, supra*.

Equally inapposite are the other two cases cited by the Court below concerning § 2283. (App. 286-87.) *Helpenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1971), neither held nor implied that § 16 "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings. *Helpenbein* merely decided that, since the plaintiff's injury had not resulted from an antitrust violation, no

(Footnote continued on p. 26)

*Potter v. Carvel Stores of New York, Inc.*, 314 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963), likewise involved companion state and federal lawsuits in which the state court defendant was the plaintiff in a federal antitrust action brought against the state court plaintiff. The District Court refused to enjoin the state action on the ground that it was barred by § 2283, specifically agreeing that "Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26, which provides for private antitrust injunctive relief is not one of the 'Act of Congress' exceptions engrafted into the flat prohibition of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283." 203 F. Supp. 462, 465 (D. Md. 1962). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that "... for the reasons stated by [the District Court], we think that the refusal to enjoin the state court proceedings is unassailable on appeal." 314 F.2d at 46.

See also the recent decision in *Carter v. Ogden Corp.*, 524 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1975), reversing an injunction issued under § 16 of the Clayton Act and holding "that under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 this injunction was prohibited. . . ."

## 2. The Decision Below Flouts This Court's Interpretation of the "Expressly Authorized" Exception to § 2283.

As previously stated (*supra*, pp. 22-23), this Court has repeatedly held that the exceptions to § 2283 are to be strictly and narrowly construed. In *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), this Court dealt specifically with the "expressly authorized" exception.

(Footnote continued from p. 25)

injunction of any sort was authorized by § 16. The Court did not even reach the question whether, if a proper showing of causation had been made, the injunction would nevertheless have been barred by § 2283. *United States v. Bayer Company*, 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), was based on a different exception to § 2283—the "effectuate its judgments" exception—and does not even refer to the "expressly authorized" exception.

The Court in *Mitchum* (pp. 234-35) reviewed the seven federal statutes under which "the Court through the years found that federal courts were empowered to enjoin state court proceedings, despite the anti-injunction statute, in carrying out the will of Congress . . . ." <sup>12</sup> The Court pointed out that this had been essential "if the import and purpose of other Acts of Congress were to be given their intended scope" (*ibid.*).

Applying the same criteria, the Court then analyzed in depth "the import and purpose" of the statute involved in *Mitchum*—§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (407 U.S. at 239-40, 241-42):

"Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against in-

<sup>12</sup> The seven statutes enumerated by the Court are as follows: (1) the provisions in the Bankruptcy Act expressly providing for stays of suits against the bankrupt; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e), providing that upon the filing of a petition to remove a state suit to federal court the "State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded"; (3) 46 U.S.C. § 185, providing that upon filing of a shipowner's petition in federal court for limitation of his liability and deposit of the requisite funds by the shipowner with the court, "all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease"; (4) 28 U.S.C. § 2361, providing that in federal interpleader actions "a district court may . . . enter its order restraining [all claimants] . . . from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property, instrument, or obligation involved in the interpleader action"; (5) 11 U.S.C. § 203(s)(2), the provision of the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act expressly staying "all judicial or official proceedings in any court"; (6) 28 U.S.C. § 2251, providing that a federal court before which a habeas corpus proceeding is pending may "stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State Court . . . for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding"; (7) the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, establishing a wartime system of judicial remedies and specifically authorizing the Government to bring enforcement actions in both state and federal courts.



cursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.

"It is clear from the legislative debates surrounding passage of § 1983's predecessor that the Act was intended to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'against state action, . . . whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (emphasis supplied). Proponents of the legislation noted that state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights." (Emphasis the Court's; footnote omitted.)

• • •

"Those who opposed the Act of 1871 clearly recognized that the proponents were extending federal power in an attempt to remedy the state courts' failure to secure federal rights. *The debate was not about whether the predecessor of § 1983 extended to actions of state courts, but whether this innovation was necessary or desirable.*

"*This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts.*

"Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century when the anti-injunction statute was enacted. *The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and*

*the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial.'*" (Italics added; footnote omitted.)

Based on that analysis, this Court determined that § 1983 qualified as the *eighth* statute within the "expressly authorized" exception.

In this case, in holding that § 16 of the Clayton Act also meets that standard, the Court below wholly misapplied the *Mitchum* rationale. The decision below represents, in fact, a broad departure from the whole line of this Court's cases concerning § 2283 and sets forth an approach which, if generally accepted, would have serious consequences for the relationship between the federal and state courts, not only in the antitrust field but in many other areas of the law as well.

Without even attempting to analyze "the import and purpose" of § 16, in the way this Court analyzed § 1983 in *Mitchum*, the Court below held that § 16 created a "uniquely federal remedy" merely on the ground that its grant of injunctive powers to enforce the antitrust laws was conferred only on the federal courts. (App. 286, 288.) According to the Court below (*ibid.*), this jurisdiction "would be frustrated" if Vendo were allowed to enforce its state court judgments. However, it is well established that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction does not justify holding that the "expressly authorized" exception applies. *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.*, 348 U.S. 511, 515 (1955).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> In *Amalgamated*, this Court specifically held that § 2283 may bar an injunction even where a state court has acted "wholly without jurisdiction over the subject matter, having invaded a field preempted by Congress." Accord, e.g., *T. Smith & Son, Inc., v. Williams*, 275 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1960); *Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin*, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971). In the instant case, there is not even any such preemption.



Furthermore, in the context of this case, it is especially clear that Stoner's federal antitrust remedy against Vendo's prosecution of its state court action was by no means "uniquely federal." While the Clayton Act confers only federal jurisdiction of *original claims for relief* brought under the federal antitrust laws, it is well-settled that the state courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate federal antitrust *defenses* to state law claims, as the Illinois Appellate Court specifically held in this case. (App. 77-79.)<sup>14</sup> Here Stoner and Stoner Investments had such a remedy, but they chose to withdraw their federal antitrust defense at the opening of the second state court trial. If that defense to Vendo's claims was valid, they could and should have asserted it in the state court proceedings, and they could thereby have "nipped in the bud" any alleged "injury" from the state action.

Unlike this Court's decision in *Mitchum*, the decision below does not remotely explain *how* § 16 would be "frustrated" or "could [not] be given its intended scope" if federal courts were not empowered to enjoin state court proceedings. Stripped of such conclusions, the decision boils down to the proposition that the state suit would allegedly be enjoined in the absence of § 2283 and therefore the application of § 2283 would impair the exercise of equity jurisdiction *in this case*. But the whole object of § 2283 is to bar certain injunctions which might otherwise be appropriate, "*regardless of how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be*" (407 U.S. at 229, italics added). Plainly the possible impact on any particular case—as distinguished from achievement of an overall statutory purpose—does not justify a conclusion that a federal statute "expressly authorizes" stays of state court proceedings. Indeed, if it were otherwise, then *every* federal statute

<sup>14</sup> See also, e.g., *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); 1A Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.208 (2d ed. 1974), p. 2325.

authorizing injunctive relief would fall within the "expressly authorized" exception.

Even more important, the impropriety of holding that § 16 "expressly authorizes" stays of state proceedings is demonstrated by comparing § 16 with the seven statutes reviewed in *Mitchum* (407 U.S. at 234-35) and with § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Each of these statutes either contains specific language providing for stays of state proceedings or, in the absence of such language, necessarily requires *by its very nature and function* that conflicting state judicial proceedings must be enjoined in order to achieve the purpose of the statute.

Four of the seven statutes reviewed in *Mitchum*<sup>15</sup> contain specific language authorizing stays of state court proceedings (the Bankruptcy Act, the Interpleader Act, the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act, and the Federal Habeas Corpus Act). A fifth statute, concerning federal removal procedures, specifically provides that "the state court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." A sixth statute, dealing with shipowners' liability, specifically provides that on the deposit of certain funds "all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease." The seventh statute, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, was a wartime measure construed by this Court as impliedly amending the Anti-Injunction Statute because the Act provided an intricate system of judicial remedies and authorized the Government to enforce the Act in both federal and state courts. Then, in *Mitchum*, as already noted, the Court held that § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act also fell within the "expressly authorized" exception because the "very purpose of § 1983" was to transform federal-state relations and to impose restraints on state governmental bodies including state courts.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 12, *supra*.

Section 16 of the Clayton Act is clearly not a statute of this type. Even apart from the absence of specific language providing for stays of state proceedings, there is not the slightest basis (and the Court of Appeals pointed to none) for believing that § 16—unlike, e.g., § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act—was designed to prevent abuses by state courts or that it was “the will of Congress” (407 U.S. at 234) to place injunctive restraints on state court proceedings.

Moreover, the special concerns expressed in *Mitchum* concerning the role of the federal courts in enforcing federal constitutional guaranties against the states and their courts have no counterpart in the area of the anti-trust laws. While § 1983 may have been “a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century” (407 U.S. at 242), there surely is no reason to conclude that any such transformation in federal-state relations was contemplated by the passage of the federal antitrust laws generally or § 16 of the Clayton Act in particular. On the contrary, it appears that Congress intended thereby to continue the complementary relationship between state and federal jurisdictions that has prevailed in the field of business regulation ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in *Cooley v. Board of Wardens*, 53 U.S. 299 (1852). See, e.g., *Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc.*, 419 U.S. 186 (1974); *United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries*, 422 U.S. 271 (1975).

Of course, as the Court below pointed out, the federal antitrust laws express an important public policy. But the same is true of numerous other federal statutes as well as the Anti-Injunction Statute itself. See, e.g., *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1939). Clearly the importance of the antitrust laws is not a proper criterion for determining whether the “expressly authorized” exception to § 2283 is applicable.

**B. The District Court’s Injunction Was Not “Necessary in Aid of” Its Jurisdiction within the Meaning of § 2283.**

The “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception—which was also relied upon by the District Court in this case but not by the Court of Appeals—is plainly inapplicable.

Like the entire statute of which it is a part, this exception must be strictly and narrowly construed. See *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, *supra*, 398 U.S. at 295.

The long-standing rule with respect to *in personam* actions has been that “[e]ach court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court”, allowing for the possibility that either may go to judgment first. *Kline v. Burke Construction Co.*, 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922); *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Engineers*, *supra*, 398 U.S. at 295-296. Cf. *National Labor Relations Board v. Nash-Finch Co.*, 404 U.S. 138, 141-142 (1971); *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.*, *supra*, 348 U.S. at 518-519.

These principles were recently applied by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in *Jennings v. Boenning and Co.*, 482 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1973), and *In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975). In both cases, the Court of Appeals reversed a preliminary injunction against execution of a prior state court judgment and specifically rejected the applicability of the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception to § 2283.

The *Jennings* case was procedurally very similar to the present one. Defendant Boenning had previously sued the Jennings (who were the plaintiffs in the federal suit) in state court and obtained a judgment based on a state-law cause of action. The Jennings could have, but did not, raise a defense to the state suit based on the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In the course of their subsequent federal suit under that Act for damages against Boenning,



the Jennings sought a preliminary injunction against execution of the state court judgment. The Court of Appeals held that, even "... assuming without deciding that [the plaintiffs] have a proper claim for money damages, the federal Anti-Injunction Act prevents the issue of an injunction restraining state proceedings to enforce the state judgment." (482 F.2d at 1135.)

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to the same conclusion in *Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin*, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1971), also arising under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and holding that "Vernitron should not be permitted to use the exceptions to Section 2283 as a means of avoiding an adverse state decision and in effect obtaining appellate review thereof in a federal district court."

This has also been the law in antitrust cases. See, e.g., *Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers*, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952); *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 109 F.Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), *aff'd*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953).

In its very recent decision in the *Glenn W. Turner Enterprises* case, *supra*, the Third Circuit held that § 2283 bars a federal injunction against proceedings to collect a state court judgment even where the effect of those proceedings would be to render the federal defendants incapable of paying any judgment that might be obtained against them in the federal suit. The Court held that such facts did not bring such an injunction within the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception, "... especially ... where the federal action, as here, has not culminated in a judgment. ..." (521 F.2d at 780.)

In the instant case, according to the District Court, its application of the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to § 2283 was based entirely on its concern that Vendo's

enforcement of its judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments might result in Vendo's taking control over Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend, thereby possibly eliminating two of the three plaintiffs in the federal suit as independent parties. (App. 241.) The District Court reasoned that, in that event, there would no longer be a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution *as to those two plaintiffs*.

The Court's reasoning is wrong on the law and wrong on the facts. To begin with, we are unaware of even a single decision holding that a state court proceeding may be enjoined to preserve compliance with the "case or controversy" requirement. Even more clearly, there is no justification for enjoining a state court proceeding to preserve compliance with that requirement *as to only some of the plaintiffs* in the federal case.

The decision below ignores the obvious fact that Stoner (or his administrator)—irrespective of Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend—would continue to be an adverse party and, therefore, the District Court would not in any event be deprived of jurisdiction under Article III. Furthermore, both before the hearing on the preliminary injunction motion and afterwards, Vendo made a variety of proposals on the record—including two proposed consent decrees—to insure that Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend would remain independent of Vendo's ownership and control (see *supra*, p. 13). Under no possible view of the law under § 2283, however, novel or contrived, can any such injunction be regarded as "necessary" to protect the Court's jurisdiction.

Although not mentioned by the District Court with respect to § 2283, the respondents argued in the Court of Appeals that a preliminary injunction against collection of the state judgments is needed to enable plaintiffs to finance their federal treble-damage litigation. In this connection, they pointed out that "Stoner and Stoner Inv. sustained



\$661,000 in legal fees and expenses" and asserted that their liquid assets "have been earmarked for the prosecution of this case".<sup>16</sup> Thus, according to respondents' argument below, collection of the state judgments should be enjoined so that the money can instead be paid to their counsel in the federal case. The short answer is that the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to § 2283 does not permit enjoining state court judgments in order to finance federal litigation.

Indeed, as the Third Circuit recently held in the *Glenn W. Turner Enterprises* case, *supra*, "State litigants should not be barred from collecting fully on their judgments merely to facilitate the collection of judgments resulting from federal actions" and "This is especially true where the federal action, as here, has not culminated in a judgment. . . ." 521 F.2d at 780. The Court further pointed out that ". . . the inability of defendants to pay a [federal] judgment . . . still would not be sufficient justification to issue the federal injunction" (*ibid.*). *A fortiori*, state court judgments cannot be enjoined to enable plaintiffs to seek a federal judgment.

## II. THE INJUNCTION VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND FEDERALISM.

In *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971), and in *Mitchum v. Foster*, *supra*, 407 U.S. at 243, this Court reaffirmed the principles of comity and federalism "that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding," even in a case where such an injunction is not absolutely barred by § 2283. See also *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976); *Cousins v. Wigoda*, 409 U.S. 1201, 1205-06 (1972).

<sup>16</sup> Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees (7th Cir.), pp. 54, 55. Subsequently, in addition to 1975 payments of \$73,918.37, the respondents submitted to the District Court a petition for approval of payment of additional fees and expenses amounting to \$269,925.21, bringing the total to \$1,004,843.58 (of which \$850,156.31 has been paid). Transcript of Proceedings, October 1, 1976, p. 10.

Thus, such principles apply even where an injunction is sought under a federal statute that "expressly authorizes" injunctions against state court proceedings. In *Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.*, 420 U.S. 592 (1975), this Court specifically held that principles of comity and federalism barred an injunction against a civil state court proceeding in the context of a suit brought under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act—the very statute which *Mitchum* held was designed to afford protection against unconstitutional acts by (*inter alia*) state courts.

Principles of comity and federalism are no less applicable to injunctions sought under § 16 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., *Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc.*, 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974), and *Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers*, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952). In both cases, federal injunctions against state court proceedings were sought under § 16. In both cases, the requested injunctions had been granted by the district courts. But in both cases the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that—even apart from § 2283—the injunctions were improper on the basis of principles of comity and federalism.

These principles are controlling even in the far less sensitive situation where the state court proceeding being attacked in federal court is in a preliminary unadjudicated status. But considerations of comity and federalism are especially critical where, as in the present case, the state court proceeding being attacked is a proceeding to enforce final judgments which had been unanimously affirmed on appeal by the highest court of the state (and which this Court had declined to review on certiorari).

Furthermore, the state courts specifically provided "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the very same federal antitrust issues. See *Stone v. Powell*, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3046, 3052 (1976). But the respondents then voluntarily withdrew those issues from consideration by the state

courts. They did so, it should be emphasized, *after* the Illinois Appellate Court, on appeal from the first state court trial, expressly held that the state trial court should hear and determine the matter. (App. 77-79.)

Thus, not only do respondents attack the final, fully reviewed judgments of the state courts on grounds which they could have presented to the state courts by way of defense, but the respondents do so on grounds which they actually *did* present, which the state courts held they were *entitled* to present, and which *would have been adjudicated* by the state courts except for respondents' *deliberate withdrawal* of those issues from the state proceeding. To allow federal courts to upset state court judgments on such grounds would make a mockery of the concept of federalism and would provoke that needless friction between state and federal courts that the principle of comity is intended to prevent.

Nevertheless, in direct conflict with decisions of the Fifth Circuit (*supra*, p. 37), the Court below held that principles of comity and federalism were inapplicable in an action under § 16 of the Clayton Act on the ground that respondents' "exclusive remedy" was in the federal courts. The Court's decision is erroneous both in law and in fact. Clearly a federal injunction against the enforcement of the state court judgments was never Stoner's "exclusive remedy" under the federal antitrust laws. As already pointed out, Stoner and Stoner Investments had another remedy in the state courts—a remedy which, if their defense was meritorious, would have prevented the very "injury" of which they now complain.

No greater insult to the processes of a state judicial system can be conceived than that which has occurred here: Having deliberately abandoned the assertion of their federal antitrust defense in the state courts, which had provided them with "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of that defense, and having elected to proceed to final

judgment in the state courts on that basis, the Stoner group then attacked the result of that process by asserting in federal court, as justification for an injunction against the state judgments, the same issues that they had withdrawn from the state courts' consideration. Thus, far from being inapplicable, principles of comity and federalism are particularly relevant in the circumstances of this case and should have barred such a flagrant abuse of federal equity power.

### III. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO REVERSE, REVIEW OR REVISE THE FINAL JUDGMENTS OF THE STATE COURTS BY COLLATERAL ATTACK.

The preliminary injunction issued by the District Court is nothing more than an attempt to reverse by collateral attack the final judgments of the Illinois courts in favor of Vendo and against Stoner and Stoner Investments. It seeks to abort the results of Vendo's successful state court action. Furthermore, it attacks that action on the basis of the very same federal antitrust issues which Stoner and Stoner Investments were explicitly afforded an opportunity to present to the state courts, by way of defense to Vendo's claims, but which they then voluntarily withdrew from the state courts' consideration.

A lower federal court has no jurisdiction to review a final judgment of a state court of competent jurisdiction. See, e.g., *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Such a judgment, affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, can be reviewed only by this Court (which in this case denied certiorari) and not by any lower federal court.

In *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970), this Court pointed out:

"Thus from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems. Each system



proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in this Court of the federal questions raised in either system".

The Court also warned (*ibid.*):

"Obviously this dual system could not function if state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case."

See also, e.g., *Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, Inc.*, 202 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1953) ("... it is not our business to review the correctness of fact conclusions reached by the Vice Chancellor of the State of New Jersey and its Supreme Court"); *In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975) ("... the state and lower federal courts are independent, and ... a federal action is not superior to a state proceeding merely because of its federal character. ... As a corollary to this principle, judgments resulting from federal actions are not preferred to judgments resulting from state actions because of their federal character.").

In this case, the District Court itself recognized the validity of these fundamental principles in rejecting plaintiffs' claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Court (App. 226-27, n.1) correctly held that it "has no jurisdiction to entertain this claim" and (quoting another decision) that "... no court of the United States other than the United States Supreme Court can entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a state court judgment which is in error." Yet, inexplicably, the District Court concluded that it had such jurisdiction under § 16 of the Clayton Act. (App. 232.) The Court of Appeals "agreed" on the ground that the Illinois Supreme Court "expressly refused to consider" the federal antitrust issues raised by the Stoner group. (App. 289.)

However, although acknowledged in a footnote (App. 282), the Court below then disregarded the fact that it was

the respondents themselves who withdrew the federal anti-trust issues from consideration by the state courts, and that it was only for this reason that the Illinois Supreme Court did not pass on those issues. Clearly, the Illinois Supreme Court never "expressly refused to consider" the federal antitrust issues. No such issues were even before the Illinois Supreme Court since they had been withdrawn by respondents years before and had never been raised again; and the Illinois Supreme Court merely noted that fact in its opinion.

In any event, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court is final and entitled to full faith and credit. This Court, which is the only federal court with power to review the final decision of the highest court of a state, denied certiorari, and the matter should have rested there. The anti-trust laws confer no greater power on a federal district court to perform this Court's reviewing functions than the Civil Rights Act or any other federal law. See *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, *supra*, 398 U.S. at 286.

## CONCLUSION

Under the analysis of the Court below, wherever a federal statute provides for a private injunction action maintainable only in the federal courts, then:

1. The bar of § 2283 would not apply, and state court proceedings would therefore be subject to federal stays without regard to the Anti-Injunction Statute;
2. No considerations of comity or federalism would apply in considering whether to grant such injunctions; and
3. Even a final judgment of a state court, reviewed by the highest court of that state, would be subject to collateral review by a federal district court in such an injunction action.



Through this technique, state court defendants would be able to utilize the federal courts to frustrate and interfere with state court proceedings, and (as in this case) even to nullify final judgments reviewed by the highest state courts. Moreover, it is not only the antitrust laws that might be utilized in that way by state court defendants, but indeed many other federal statutes as well.

Reversal of the decision below is essential, we submit, in order "to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts," *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1939), and to respect the "fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their Courts." *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, *supra*, 398 U.S. at 287.

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate the preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the final state court judgments.

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Dated: October 28, 1976.

NOV 27 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

—IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

**No. 76-156**

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
*Petitioner,*

vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER** and  
**STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**, a Delaware corporation,  
*Respondents.*

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court  
Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

**RESPONDENTS' BRIEF**

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### ABBREVIATIONS AND RECORD REFERENCES

"Stoner" refers to respondent Harry B. Stoner.

"Stoner Inv." refers to respondent Stoner Investments, Inc.

"Lektro-Vend" refers to respondent Lektro-Vend Corp.

"Vendo" refers to petitioner The Vendo Company.

"App." refers to the appendix.

"Pet. Br." refers to petitioner's brief on the merits.

"Tr. ...." refers to the five volume transcript of the hearing upon respondents' motion for preliminary injunction, held before the District Court from February 10, 1975, through February 14, 1975.

"Tr.," followed by a specific date and page reference, refers to other transcripts of proceedings before the District Court which are included in the record.

"PX" and "DX" refer, respectfully, to respondents' and petitioner's exhibits admitted during the five day hearing upon respondent's motion for preliminary injunction in February, 1975. Respondents' exhibits included "PX 301" through "PX 367," and petitioner's exhibits included "DX 401" through "DX 423."

Exhibits admitted in either of the two state court trials are referred to by their exhibit number ("PX ...." or "DX ...."). They are to be found in the two books of exhibits which were admitted during the preliminary injunction hearing in District Court as PX 301 (Vol. I, comprising PX 1A - PX 79 and DX 1 - DX 33) and PX 302 (Vol. II, comprising PX 101 - PX 135 and DX 201 - DX 304).

Other material from the state court proceedings, which is not reproduced in the District Court hearing transcript, is cited to the two volumes of the state court abstract, which were admitted in the trial Court as PX 303 (first state court trial, pp. 1-625) and PX 304 (second state court trial, pp. 627-1225).

"Item ...." refers to court papers in the record of the District Court proceedings which are not reproduced in the Appendix. The item numbers are indicated by the District Court Clerk in the list of docket entries and are recorded on the documents themselves.

IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

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**No. 76-156**

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**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
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vs.

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**HARRY B. STONER** and  
**STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**, a Delaware corporation,  
*Respondents.*

---

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court  
Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

---

**RESPONDENTS' BRIEF**

---

*May It Please The Court:*

**Additional Statutes Involved**

---

Petitioner omits (Pet. Br. 2-3) Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §§1, 2) and Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §15) which are set out in pertinent part in respondents' Additional Appendix A, *infra*.

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NOTE: For key to record references and abbreviations, see p. ix, *supra*. Emphasis supplied throughout unless otherwise noted.

### Questions Presented

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1—Whether upon an interlocutory appeal from the award of a preliminary injunction the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the District Court may not be set aside unless contrary to settled principles of jurisdiction or rules of equity, absent a clear abuse of discretion.

2—Whether Section 16 of the Clayton Act “expressly authorizes” a preliminary injunction against the collection of state court judgments, within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283, where the District Court found that those judgments depended on agreements violative of the Sherman Act, that their procurement was part of an anticompetitive scheme, and that the immediate collection of the balance of those judgments would thwart the trial of federal antitrust treble damage claims.

3—Whether the award of a preliminary injunction against the collection of state court judgments is “necessary in the aid of [the] jurisdiction” of a United States District Court, within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283, where the District Court found that those judgments depended on agreements violative of the Sherman Act and were part of an anticompetitive scheme, and where the immediate collection of said judgments would eliminate two federal antitrust plaintiffs and cripple the third plaintiff’s prosecution of the sole remaining federal antitrust claim.

4—Whether the preliminary injunction at bar offends principles of comity and federalism where, absent equitable relief, the trial of federal antitrust claims would be

thwarted, and where the conduct enjoined—immediate enforcement of state court judgments—would further a violation of the federal antitrust laws.

5—Whether respondents Stoner and Stoner Inv. waived their right to obtain the preliminary injunction at bar by dismissing, without prejudice and without objection, a federal antitrust defense previously asserted in the state court proceedings, considering the peculiar facts of this case and respondents’ role as private attorneys general enforcing the federal antitrust laws in the public interest.

6—Whether the District Court asserted jurisdiction to reverse, review or revise the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court by collateral attack or otherwise.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

---

Petitioner’s statement of this case sidesteps the very heart of the matter. The Courts below found petitioner *prima facie* guilty of sweeping violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; that the state proceeding—both from its inception and upon its culmination—was founded on illegal agreements; and that the proceeding itself was not “a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately,” but rather was part and parcel of a monopolistic scheme. Absent the preliminary injunction at bar, petitioner would have fully reaped the fruits of its anticompetitive devices. It would also have thwarted, not merely respondents’ private interests, but more importantly, the



overriding national policy of the antitrust law, whose enforcement in this case is entrusted to private attorneys general in a federal court possessed of an exclusive jurisdiction. Distilled, petitioner's brief amounts to no more than this: 1—that it is entitled to obtain the fruits of an illegal objective, in violation of ancient law that if the objective is illegal, it cannot be accomplished by any means, and 2—that no court of the United States has any power to prevent the successful consummation of its illegal enterprise, the federal antitrust laws notwithstanding.

Petitioner's brief contains assumptions contrary to the record, and cursory and inaccurate statements about the "marathon state court proceeding" (Pet. Br. 5) which resulted from two entirely false claims being asserted by it in two separate court trials, as part and parcel of an attempt to enforce agreements and covenants violative of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. This "classic example," as the Court of Appeals described the case (App. 286), cannot be understood within the frame of petitioner's Statement (Pet. Br. 3-16), with its carefully selected compartments which emphasize the Opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court, while ignoring the evidence below including, *inter alia*, the character, size and monopolistic practices of Vendo, including the contracts in question, not to mention the two findings of the Illinois Appellate Court that Vendo's claims were utterly bereft of evidence to support them. This "classic example" derives meaning and understanding only in the totality of its facts, and these we feel compelled to state.

# I.

## VENDO EMPLOYED STONER AND ACQUIRED HIS COMPANY (STONER MFG. CO.) AS PART OF AN ANTICOMPETITIVE SCHEME.

### A. Vendo's Preeminence In The Industry—Its Acquisitive Aims And Actions.

Vendo\* is the world's largest manufacturer of automated merchandising equipment (Tr. 797). By June, 1959, it manufactured and sold more vending machines than any other company. It touted the "universality" of its markets, which encompassed the "whole world over" (PX 303, pp. 20-28; 36-37; Tr. 153-54; see PX 354). Its corps of 112 salesmen sold in every state and it exported machines to fifty-eight countries throughout five continents (*Id.*; PX 8, p. 2).

Vendo intended to expand throughout the world wherever coins were in use (PX 303, p. 472). Prior to 1959, it had an "aggressive acquisition program" to buttress its product line and market share (D. Ct., App. 236; \*\* Tr. 795-96, 848). Among other firms, it acquired Coin Acceptors, Inc., Continental Vending Machine Corp. and Continental APCO, Inc., closing down the latter's plants and ceasing production of its machines (App. 133-34; Item 104, ¶¶ 11, 19). Vendo's acquisition of the Vendorlator Company, a manufacturer of bottle vending machines, provoked a Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") proceeding. This culminated in a consent decree which required FTC clearance for certain future acquisitions (Tr. 799, 833).

\* In setting forth the pertinent evidence below, this Statement refers to petitioner, The Vendo Company, as "Vendo."

\*\* Pertinent findings of the District Court are indicated as follows: "D.Ct., App. ...." For the key to other record references and abbreviations, see p. ix, *supra*.

**B. Vendo's 1959 Acquisition Of Stoner Manufacturing And Its Employment Of Stoner.**

Vendo's acquisition of Stoner Manufacturing Co. ("Stoner Mfg.") was the genesis of this dispute (D.Ct., App. 228). As early as 1955, Vendo's executive vice-president Wagstaff told Stoner that "they were going to acquire [Stoner Mfg.] or else they were going to manufacture a copy of [the Stoner Mfg.] machine and put it on the market so cheap they would put us out of business" (Tr. 528). After the death of a close associate and his own illness, Stoner decided to sell (Tr. 529; PX 303, p. 175; PX 2). Negotiations commenced in earnest in October, 1958 (Tr. 203; PX 303, p. 453).

(1) *The Acquisition Was Expressly Spurred By Vendo's Intent To Suppress Competition*—Vendo wanted to acquire Stoner Mfg. not only to expand its product line but also to eliminate Stoner as a potential competitor in the vending machine market (D. Ct., App. 228). During the negotiations a "confidential" memorandum was circulated within Vendo. It cited a "consensus of opinion" within the Marketing Division that Vendo's expansion would be "definitely retard[ed] with a competitor such as Stoner already in the field" (PX 319, ¶ 5). Moreover, Vendo had already made a "definite decision" to develop its own new product line similar to Stoner's (*Id.*, ¶¶ 1, 3). It feared this would prove "very unprofitable" if Stoner Mfg. were acquired by some other "more aggressive competitor with an easement of [Stoner Mfg.'s] credit policies" (*Id.*, ¶ 6).

Wagstaff, Vendo's chief negotiator, reported to Vendo's chairman Pierson that at least two other competitors were "actively negotiating" with Stoner and that, unless Vendo acquired Stoner Mfg., it would be more difficult for Vendo

to become a "full line" manufacturer, which it was "trying hard to do" (DX 1, p. 5; Tr. 255).

(2) *Vendo Secured FTC Approval By An Apparent Misrepresentation Of Competitive Facts*—In view of the Vendorlator consent decree (*supra*, p. 5), Vendo sought FTC clearance for the Stoner Mfg. acquisition (Tr. 833). Apparently Vendo accomplished this by misrepresenting to the Commission that Stoner Mfg. and Vendo were not actual or potential competitors. The record demonstrates that at the least Vendo was a potential competitor of Stoner Mfg. (D. Ct., App. 228 n. 3).

Thus when Vendo supplied to its counsel data for the FTC, that data differed markedly from the content of its internal memoranda. Vendo emphasized to its FTC counsel that the Stoner Mfg. products were substantially different from its own products and were not used for similar purposes (PX 313). But Vendo did *not* disclose that it had already made a "definite decision" to produce Stoner-type products and was, in fact, already developing them (PX 319, ¶¶ 1, 3; Tr. 68-69, 851-52). Vendo decided against further development of its own new products because "it would take a considerable sum of money [and] a considerable amount of time" (PX 319, ¶ 2). Instead it decided to take over Stoner Mfg., which already had acceptable machines on the market (*Id.*, ¶ 3, Tr. 70).

(3) *Vendo Insisted Upon Elaborate Restraints Upon Competition—The Termination Provisions*—"[S]pearheaded" by chairman Pierson (Tr. 260, 262), Vendo militantly pursued a "uniform policy of extracting broad covenants not to compete" (D. Ct., App. 236) "[w]herever it [could] get them" and "in anything it [could] get them into" (Wagstaff, Tr. 260; Pierson, Tr. 88). Thus its negotiators ag-



gressively demanded elaborate restraints against competition on the part of Stoner and his company. Initially, Vendo required that Stoner Mfg. (to be renamed "Stoner Investments") not compete for five years following the acquisition (DX 5). But Vendo then insisted that "[t]he period should be ten years," and that "Mr. Stoner individually should enter into a similar covenant not to compete" (DX 6, p. 5). Thus a ten year non-competitive covenant was written into the final acquisition agreement, executed April 3, 1959, as section 15 thereof (App. 153).

By a separate employment agreement, dated June 1, 1959, *Stoner was bound* "to serve as an officer or in such other executive or advisory capacity" as Vendo "*may request* and as Stoner's physical condition will permit . . . and to serve without additional compensation . . . as a director." It was recited that the value of Stoner's services (\$50,000 per year) was not measured by the amount of time and effort he devoted but *by the value of his advice and counsel* in the operation of the plant and his know-how, experience and reputation (App. 155, ¶¶ 1-3).

The covenant not to compete applied, *not* to where *Stoner Mfg.* did business, but "in any of the territories in which [Vendo] or its subsidiaries or affiliates intends to extend and carry on business by expansion of present activities" (App. 156, ¶ 5). The patent overbreadth of these covenants was not inadvertent. Anent their design, Wagstaff testified that any lawyer who "wouldn't put something like that in there . . . wouldn't represent us very long" (Tr. 239). Thus the Vendorlator acquisition contract likewise barred Vendorlator, the seller, from competing anywhere the purchaser, Vendo, did business (PX 353, ¶ 19).

Stoner's employment could be *terminated* in several ways: (a) Vendo "shall have the right to terminate . . . in the event of [a] *substantial violation of the terms* hereof by Stoner"; (b) Stoner could only terminate "in the event he is not physically able to perform his duties hereunder." If not terminated by either party, the employment would expire at the end of the five year term or on Stoner's death, whichever came first (App. 156-57, ¶¶ 6-8).

If the employment were terminated before completion of the five year term, Vendo would have to pay compensation to Stoner only to the time of the termination (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6, 9) and *the second five year period*, relating to the covenant not to compete, *would immediately commence running at the time of the termination* (*Id.*, ¶¶ 5, 6).

(4) *The Covenants Not To Compete Were Admittedly A Major Goal Of The 1959 Transaction*—The District Court found not *only* that the covenants were "overly broad" (Pet. Br. 14) but also that "their object (and effect) were *primarily* directed at the elimination of competition rather than protection of good will" and that "Vendo's president admitted the major purpose and intent of the employment contract was to obtain the anticompetitive benefits accruing from the covenants" (D. Ct., App. 233-34).

Indeed, Vendo's highest officials repeatedly testified to the purpose and intent underlying the covenants. Wagstaff swore that Stoner "wasn't to compete *anywhere*, in the whole world, *anywhere*, he wasn't to compete;" that Stoner "wasn't to compete, *ever*;" that "[t]here's no question in my mind that [Stoner] understood that he wasn't to compete with us" (Tr. 245-46); and that tying up Stoner so that he couldn't compete "certainly would have been [chairman Pierson's] understanding" (Tr. 260).



Pierson wrote to Stoner in January, 1963, that "one of the major advantages of the Stoner acquisition contract, from our standpoint, was the fact that it guaranteed that your design genius and experience would *never* be coupled with our money to put a new and most formidable competitor into the business against Vendo" (PX 28). Vendo's vice-president (Childers) testified: "We certainly wanted to be sure in making this acquisition that [Stoner] would be on our side of the fence and not a competitor" (Tr. 774).

(5) *Vendo's Employment Of Stoner Was Itself But An Anticompetitive Device*—Mr. Stoner had been led to believe he would be able to take an active role in research and development and would be treated as Chairman of the Board with respect to the purchased assets of Stoner Mfg. (D. Ct., App. 229; Tr. 72, 85, 299; PX 370; see Tr. 870). But "in actuality, Mr. Stoner was virtually ignored or bypassed by the Vendo management" (D. Ct., App. 229), was apparently "never called upon to perform significant services for Vendo" (*Id.* 234) and "was given no duties" (*Id.* 237).

Having relegated Stoner to the role of "senior citizen," "father confessor" and "advisor" (Tr. 293-95; PX 5; Tr. 535-36, 777, Tr. 772, 776, 875; PX 303, 172), Vendo's officials then never sought his advice and, when it was offered, spurned it. While acknowledging Stoner's "design genius" in creating innovative vending machine products (D. Ct., App. 228; see PX 28), Vendo never assigned him to its products planning committee (Tr. 778) nor called upon him for any exercise of his "genius" (Tr. 861; PX 30). Pierson conceded that neither he nor anyone else at Vendo *ever* asked Stoner to assist in the design of any device (Tr. 117).

Vendo management admittedly was thus only paying Mr. Stoner not to compete rather than employing him for performance of actual services (D. Ct., App. 229). Since "Stoner was never called upon to perform significant services for Vendo the covenant amounted to a naked agreement not to compete, solely anticompetitive in purpose and effect" (*Id.* 234).

Indeed, Vendo equated Stoner's employment with non-competition. Chairman Pierson testified that the employment contract was "necessary for us to have if we were going to spend as many millions of dollars for the property as we were" (Tr. 86); that "we certainly ought to have an [em]ployment that he would agree to stay out of competition for five years" (*Id.*); and that Vendo was "paying [Stoner] \$50,000 a year" in return for his obligation not to compete (Tr. 99). Wagstaff also acknowledged that Stoner's employment contract and his non-competition covenant "go hand in hand;" that he didn't propose that Stoner would perform "any specific duties;" and that getting a covenant from Stoner was "[o]ne of the main justifications for" Stoner's employment contract (Tr. 253-54).

### C. Vendo's Refusal To Release Stoner And Its Failure To Terminate His Employment.

(1) *Vendo Refused Stoner's Request To Join The Lektro-Vend Venture*—In 1960 Stoner ("virtually ignored or bypassed by the Vendo management" (D. Ct., App. 229)) began making loans for vending machine research and development by Rod and Bill Phillips, former employees of Stoner Mfg. The Phillipses' work culminated in the development of a revolutionary design (first in/first out or "FIFO") which was called "the Lektro-Vend machine" (D. Ct. App. 229; App. 53-55, 57).

After the favorable reception of their machine at a trade show in October, 1962, the Phillipses determined not to sell the design, as initially planned, but to produce and sell machines. When they invited Stoner to join in this new project, he sought a release from his contract before a Vendo board meeting in December, 1962. Vendo refused the request because the 1959 acquisition agreement "guaranteed" that it would "never" have to compete with Stoner (D.Ct., App. 229; PX 28, *supra*, p. 10).

(2) *Well Knowing Of Stoner's Aid To Lektro-Vend, Vendo Does Not Terminate Him, For Anticompetitive Reasons*—Vendo was well aware of Stoner's involvement with the Lektro-Vend inventors as early as the 1962 trade show when Vendo employees were present and made initial inquiries about purchasing the Phillipses' new design (D. Ct., App. 229, 230; Tr. 867-68; see PX 352, handwritten note).

Wagstaff testified that there was "outrage" within Vendo officialdom "about the whole Lektro-Vend set-up" at that time (Tr. 279) and that other executives told him "that [Stoner] was financing Lektro-Vend to go into competition with Vendo" (Tr. 280). Pierson, who disclaimed any "official" knowledge, admitted having heard "many rumors" from employees and customers that Stoner "was bringing out the superlative in fine candy vending equipment" (Tr. 143-44). But Pierson never checked or pursued these rumors (*Id.*; see also Tr. 105; Tr. 773, 775-76).

Vendo never terminated Stoner's employment despite its contractual right to do so "in the event of a substantial violation of the terms" by Stoner (*supra*, p. 9), and thereby "lengthen[ed] the period for which its non-competition covenants would run" (D. Ct., App. 237).

#### D. Vendo "Negotiates" For The Purchase Of The Lektro-Vend Machine.

(1) *Pierson Requests Stoner To Intercede*—In December, 1962, after he was refused permission to join Lektro-Vend, Stoner told Pierson that "maybe this [machine] is something that the Vendo Company should have" (Pierson, Tr. 104; see PX 27). Pierson then told Stoner to see if Phillips was interested in selling and, if so, that Vendo would "assign someone with the authority to negotiate such a deal to work with you and Mr. Phillips" (PX's 29, 30).

(2) *Vendo's Experts Disdain The Purchase*—Vendo proceeded to "find out just how serious" it was about the purchase (PX 33). In early 1963 within "three or four days . . . two separate groups of people" travelled from Kansas City to Aurora to reevaluate the new machine (Tr. 775, 778). The engineers reported serious technical problems (DX's 11, 11A, 12; Tr. 855) and that it was "too costly and could not be sold competitively" (Tr. 856; DX 13). Vendo's marketing chief also "didn't think" Vendo should buy since Lektro-Vend "took the high-cost route . . . which in my mind is not economically a good route to go" (Tr. 785-86).

(3) *Stoner Warns Vendo Of "A Serious Mistake"*—On March 28, 1963, Stoner wrote to Vendo headquarters that Phillips, who had heard nothing further, "could be relinquished of his promise to give Vendo first chance for acquiring" his machine. Stoner added: "*I think that the future will show that this represents a serious mistake on your part*" (PX 32).

Childers responded that the asking price (\$1.5 million) was too high but that Vendo would offer to "pay for all



out-of-pocket costs . . . plus a fair profit to Rod and his associates" (PX 31). Stoner then called Childers and asked "if he had a specific figure in mind that he wanted me to talk to Rod Phillips about" (PX 304, pp. 1149, 1152) but Childers "said no. He said, 'We just can't see any market for it. It's too expensive a machine'" (*Id.*, p. 1152). Stoner also called Vendo's senior vice-president, who testified that he "told [Stoner] that I had checked with our people who were concerned, and they had said no, they were not interested" (Tr. 789; see also Tr. 788-91).

(4) *Chairman Pierson Personally Inspects—And Rejects—The Lektro-Vend Machine*—According to Pierson, Childers reported "that he didn't think it would be advisable" to continue negotiations (Tr. 127). Pierson also paid a personal visit to Aurora in May, 1963 when "someone said . . . that Mr. Stoner, you know, has been wanting me to see this Rod Phillips vending machine. So I went over there" (Tr. 156-57). Pierson told the Phillipses that their machine "looked pretty" (*Id.*); that "it should render a great service to the industry;" and that "if one can be perfected, why, at a reasonable price, I think it will do fine business" (Tr. 161-62).

Pierson also testified that Vendo did not purchase the Lektro-Vend because "the group decided" that its selling price would be too high. "I was told that they came to that conclusion" (*Id.*). Pierson never informed Stoner what "the group" decided nor that he had met with the Phillipses. Stoner later wrote Pierson that he "would have liked to [have] had a chat with you while you were here . . . if I had known you were coming." He added: "Please advise if you would like me to do anything further regarding your visit with Rod Phillips" (PX 311). But Pierson never responded (Tr. 596).

## II.

### **VENDO SUED TO ENFORCE ITS COVENANTS, PRESSED CLAIMS IT KNEW TO BE FALSE, AND SECURED JUDGMENTS WHICH WERE INERADICABLY TAINTED BY THE UNDERLYING ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS.**

On March 25, 1965, when no longer employed by Vendo,\* Stoner wrote his "Dear Operator" letter, announcing to the trade his affiliation with Lektro-Vend Corp. and seeking to allay rumors (reportedly circulated by Vendo salesmen) that the new company would soon founder (D. Ct., App. 230; PX 39). Deciding that Stoner had now gone "[t]oo far" (see PX 38, handwritten note), Vendo filed its state court suit against Stoner and Stoner Inv. in August, 1965. The District Court stated:

"The Court proposes to examine these proceedings *only* insofar as they may reflect illegal anti-competitive conduct by Vendo" (App. 230); and

". . . the state proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme" (App. 232).

#### **A. The Complaint—Removal And Remand—Vendo Precludes Litigation Of All Issues In One Forum.**

Vendo initially charged only a breach of the covenants not to compete in the employment and acquisition contracts, by reason of aid to Lektro-Vend Corp. "in competition with the plaintiff" (App. 6-10). Vendo sought \$500,000 in damages and an injunction against Stoner for the duration of his covenant, barring him "from engaging in the vend-

\* Stoner ceased being a Vendo director in March, 1964 (Tr. 143, 840). His employment expired on June 1, 1964.



ing machine . . . business . . . and *particularly* from participating in the operations of Lektro-Vend" until June, 1969 (App. 9).\*

Stoner and Stoner Inv. promptly removed the case to federal District Court (App. 11-14) "in an effort to avoid needless duplication of lawsuits between the parties" (App. 13). When Vendo refused to waive its objections to removal, the case was remanded to the Illinois trial court (App. 12), thereby precluding the adjudication of all claims and defenses raised by the parties—both state and federal—in the only tribunal capable of adjudicating all those claims and defenses.\*\*

After the case was remanded, Stoner and Stoner Inv. filed in state court substantially the same answer, defenses and state antitrust counterclaim which had been filed in federal court upon removal, including their sixth separate defense based upon the federal antitrust laws (App. 31-32), a defense under the Illinois Antitrust Statute of 1891 and a defense and counterclaim under the 1965 Illinois Antitrust Act (PX 303, pp. 12-13, 15-19, 39-41).

Since no federal antitrust counterclaim could be pleaded in the state court, on October 21, 1965—less than a month after remandment—Stoner and Stoner Inv., together with Lektro-Vend, filed this treble damage action in federal District Court.

Before trial commenced in the state court, the trial judge dismissed *all* antitrust defenses and the counter-

\* By a subsequent amendment Vendo sought similar injunctive relief against Stoner Investments (App. 35).

\*\* See 1A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶0.157[11], note 129 and accompanying text.

claim. He reasoned that state courts lacked jurisdiction to pass upon federal antitrust defenses (PX 303, pp. 97-100) and that, *inter alia*, federal preemption barred litigation of the state antitrust defenses and counterclaim owing to the interstate character of the parties businesses (*Id.* pp. 96-97)

# **B. The First State Court Trial And Appeal—The False Trade Secret Theory—Echoes Of Vendo v. O. C. Long.**

(1) *The Trial Judge Enters Judgments For Theft Of Trade Secrets And Breach Of The Covenants*—In January, 1966, Vendo added a charge that its trade secrets (vending machine designs) had been misappropriated for Lektro-Vend's benefit, and raised the ad damnum to \$1,500,000 (App. 33, 231). Upon trial, judgments were entered against Stoner for \$250,000 for breach of the covenants and against both defendants for \$1,100,000 for theft of trade secrets (App. 47).

Contrary to petitioner's assertions (Pet. Br. 10, *Id.* n. 7), no issue concerning "Stoner's violation of his fiduciary duties as an officer and director" was before the court since Stoner's claimed breach of the covenants and theft of trade secrets were the only theories pleaded (App. 6-10, 33-35). Although the trial judge spoke of Stoner's "obligations as a director" (Pet. Br. 10; PX 303, p. 485; App. 42) neither Count I nor Count II of Vendo's original or amended complaint charged either defendant with any violation of fiduciary duty (App. 6-10, 33-34).

Nor was Vendo's trade secret theory an "alternative ground" for both of these judgments. (Pet. Br. 10, n. 7). The \$250,000 represented forfeiture of salary for breach of the covenants, and the \$1,100,000 was for theft of a trade secret, representing the stated value of the Lektro-

Vend machine (\$1.5 million, *supra*, pp. 13-14), less the costs incurred in its development (App. 71).

(2) *The Appellate Court Reverses Both Judgments*—The Appellate Court reversed the \$1,100,000 judgment based upon the theft of trade secret theory, holding that Vendo never had a trade secret, let alone that Stoner had stolen one (App. 61-64). While petitioner's brief acknowledges that "the issue was not pursued thereafter" (Pet. Br. 10, n. 7) it ignores the District Court's finding below:

"It is clear from all the evidence that Vendo should have known that there was no theft of a trade secret; indeed, the first Illinois Court of Appeals decision demonstrates that the effort of Vendo to prove theft of a trade secret amounted to vexatious litigation" (App. 231).

Indeed, the Appellate Court said, *inter alia*, that Stoner's exposure to Vendo's alleged trade secret amounted to mere "glimpses and glances . . . [which] cannot seriously be contended . . . [to] be the foundation for the development of a revolutionary design that would take several skilled people eighteen months to develop" (App. 63).

The \$250,000 judgment was also reversed, the Appellate Court holding that Stoner's salary should be forfeited only for the period when he was in breach of his covenant (App. 71-73).<sup>\*</sup> The covenants not to compete were held

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<sup>\*</sup> In one sentence the Court said that "such a breach of Stoner's fiduciary undertaking as an employee . . . requires a forfeiture of salary during the period that the breach was occurring" (App. 71), but this obviously refers to "breach of the covenants not to compete," as set forth in the immediately preceding sentence. The rest of the opinion deals solely with the validity of the covenants (App. 64-69), the time period during which they were valid (App.

(footnote continued on following page)

valid under Illinois common law and Stoner and Stoner Inv. were held liable for breach thereof (App. 64-70).

Dismissal of the state antitrust defenses and counterclaim was affirmed upon federal preemption grounds (App. 79-81), although dismissal of the federal antitrust defense was reversed (App. 77-79). The case was remanded for a second trial upon the question of what damages Vendo had suffered by reason of defendants' wrongful competition through the instrumentality of Lektro-Vend, in violation of the covenants not to compete (App. 74). Vendo's petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied.

(3) *Another False Trade Secret Claim—Vendo v. O. C. Long*—In 1957, Vendo filed a similar action in Georgia against a former employee, Orlando C. Long, then employed by a competitor. The Georgia trial court held that the covenant not to compete was overbroad and local counsel recommended "against taking the matter further on appeal" (PX 344). Vendo's general counsel (Carbaugh) reported that "since . . . this lawsuit O. C. Long has calmed down a great deal of his annoying activities"; suggested interjection of trade secret allegations, though such relief would have "very little practical value" (*Id.*); and reported that despite dim "prospects on appeal . . . our Executive Committee has decided that it would be to the Company's advantage for many reasons to keep this case

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68-69), whether "defendants' activities amounted to the direct or indirect entering into or engaging in the vending machine business" as proscribed by the covenants (App. 69-70), and the measure "of damages for a breach of the noncompetition covenants" (App. 73-75), namely, the damages caused by "defendants' wrongful competition" (App. 74).



pending for awhile" (PX 345). Vendo's minutes recited that an appeal would be taken in order "to delay the final resolution of this matter" (PX 346).

Carbaugh reported upon efforts to secure "further delay" and to assure that "the matter will take still more time" (PX's 347, 348, 350). Finally, he concluded: "If this action hampered O. C. Long's activities somewhat as a practical matter, and the Sales Department says that it has, I assume it has been worthwhile" (PX 348).\*

**C. The Second Trial And Appeal—Vendo Ignores The Mandate And Claims That Stoner Was Responsible For Its Failure To Have A FIFO Machine.**

(1) *Vendo Prepares For The Second Trial—The Facts It Found Out*—Vendo's general counsel Carbaugh addressed two inquiries to the sales and engineering staffs before the second trial. First, in order to estimate "sales . . . and profits we would have made if the Lektro-Vend machine had never been introduced," Carbaugh inquired "what is now and has been the impact of Lektro-Vend in the market?" (DX 218, p. 2). The answer was that Lektro-Vend's sales were comparatively miniscule—only two or three percent of industry sales (DX 203, p. 4). Another

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\* Vendo's militancy embraced not only the exaction but the enforcement of its covenants not to compete (Pierson, Tr. 153; Wagstaff, Tr. 283). Apart from the *O. C. Long* and *Stoner* cases, Carbaugh's testimony was vague (Tr. 836-37). But the evidence reflected that Vendo similarly sought to enforce covenants against other former employees (PX 310, p. 8; Tr. 125-26), and Carbaugh did suggest that Vendo threatened a patent infringement suit against Vendorlator even though "patent counsel . . . felt, at least they said at that time they didn't think they were" infringing (Tr. 821).

FIFO manufacturer outsold it "8 or 10 to 1" through 1969 (PX 304, p. 821; see also *Id.*, pp. 784, 1029, 1043, Tr. 810). Through 1969, Lektro-Vend's *gross sales* were only about \$7 million.

Carbaugh addressed a second inquiry: "What is the present status as well as the past history of our development work on our own FIFO unit?" (DX 218). Carbaugh received Vendo's "very best thinking" (*Id.*) on this subject in a four page, single-spaced memo (DX 227) which detailed why Vendo rejected FIFO in 1959, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1968 and in 1969: (a) emphasis on "stop-gap adjustments" of non-FIFO products; b) insistence upon low cost and selling price; and (c) disagreement within management as to "just how much the FIFO feature was worth" (*Id.*, p. 4). Nowhere in DX 227 was Stoner even mentioned.

(2) *The Trial Court Denies Reinstatement Of The Illinois Antitrust Defense And Counterclaim And Defendants Dismiss Their Federal Antitrust Defense*—In 1969, after the first Appellate Court decision, the Illinois General Assembly—referring specifically to the *Vendo v. Stoner* case—amended the 1965 Illinois Antitrust Act, underscoring its intent that the statutory proscriptions applied equally to interstate, as well as purely intrastate, transactions (see "Historical and Practice Notes—1970," Smith Hurd Ill. Ann. Stats., Ch. 38, §60-7.9, p. 882). Based upon this amendment, Stoner and Stoner Inv. moved to reinstate their state antitrust defense and counterclaim. The trial judge, however, denied the motion.

Before the second trial, Stoner and Stoner Inv. moved to dismiss their federal antitrust defense *without prejudice*. There being no objection from Vendo, the motion



was allowed (App. 82). In an opinion denying summary judgment in the instant case, dated June 1, 1971, U.S. District Judge McGarr (before whom the case was then pending) said that dismissal of the federal antitrust defense "was undoubtedly done in consideration of this court's expressed reluctance to consider the cause of action here while the same issue was pending between the same parties in the state court case" (App. 85).

(3) *Pierson Blames Stoner For Vendo's Failure To Have A FIFO Machine*—Contrary to its own "best thinking" (DX 227) and the testimony of its officers Pierson (Tr. 102), Andrews (Tr. 855-56) and Burlington (Tr. 785-86), Vendo attempted at the second trial to implicate Stoner in its own decision against FIFO. Vendo's theory was that Stoner had deprived it of "his advice and counsel" (App. 155, ¶ 3) and thus was legally at fault for its failure to have a FIFO machine. This theory was entirely new (D. Ct., App. 231), and departed from the applicable measure of damages laid down by the Appellate Court, which general counsel Carbaugh had acknowledged to be the "business and profits [Vendo] lost due to Lektro-Vend's impact in the market" (DX 218, p. 2). Vendo now "had no interest in Lektro-Vend" (PX 304, p. 780; Tr. 809-10) and offered no evidence as to sales Lektro-Vend might have diverted from Vendo.

Vendo's new claim against Stoner was based upon Pierson's testimony at the second trial: "If we had known in 1963 that Mr. Stoner was doing this, [Vendo] would have moved full speed ahead to try [to] develop a FIFO unit at that time. The reason we didn't was that Mr. Stoner said 'I don't believe there is a market for such an expensive unit as would be necessary to be built at that time'" (Tr. 870-71). On cross, Pierson said that he "did not per-

sonally talk to Stoner about this" but had heard "this information about [Stoner's] advice from our people who were [at] a products planning meeting held at Aurora" and that this was "in the fall of 1960, I believe" (Tr. 871-72; see PX 304, pp. 930 et seq.). But none of the Vendo officers who attended that meeting testified that Stoner gave any such advice therein (PX 303, pp. 318, 421). The minutes of that meeting do not even reflect Stoner's attendance (PX 48, p. 1); they *do* reflect that Vendo's own staff opposed the FIFO project then under consideration (*Id.*, p. 3; see DX 11). This was, moreover, the very same meeting at which Vendo claimed in the first trial that Stoner was exposed to its "trade secret"—an exposure which the Appellate Court called mere "glimpses and glances," saying the charge "cannot seriously be contended" (App. 63).

(4) *The Trial Court Enters Judgment*—Judgments were entered against Stoner for \$170,835 (forfeiture of salary during the period he breached his covenant) and against both Stoner and Stoner Inv. for \$7,345,500 based on Vendo's new theory. The trial judge expressly stated that he was bound by "the Mandate of [the Appellate Court]" and "the law of this case" (App. 89), and said nothing about any breach of fiduciary duty by Stoner as a director or the misappropriation of any corporate opportunity. He specifically cited pages of the Appellate Court opinion which referred to "damages for a breach of the non-competition covenants . . . because of defendant's wrongful competition" through the instrumentality of Lektro-Vend (App. 89, 74).

(5) *The Appellate Court Reverses The \$7,345,500 Judgment*—Upon the second appeal, Stoner's salary forfeiture was affirmed but the \$7,345,500 judgment was reversed

because "Vendo made no attempt to prove lost profits caused by defendants' 'wrongful competition'" and thus disobeyed the Appellate Court's mandate (App. 96, 97). The Court also held that "[n]either the evidence in the first trial nor in the trial on remand establishes that Stoner was responsible for Vendo's failure to have FIFO," referring in part to its first opinion (*Id.*).\* The case was remanded to give Vendo a third chance to prove the damage allegations of its original complaint (App. 99).

**D. Refusing To Consider Any Restraint-Of-Trade Issues, The Illinois Supreme Court Reinstates The \$7,345,500 Judgments Based Upon A New Theory Of Liability—Diversion Of A Corporate Opportunity. The Very Basis Of The Judgments Is Bound Up With The Federal Anti-trust Issues At Bar.**

Both sides were granted leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court which affirmed the \$170,835 salary forfeiture and, reversing the Appellate Court, reinstated the \$7,345,500 judgments entered in the trial court.

(1) *What The Illinois Supreme Court Decided*—The Supreme Court predicated liability on a new and previously unadvanced theory of liability (D. Ct., App. 231). It held that Stoner, while an officer and director of Vendo, diverted a corporate opportunity—Vendo's opportunity to acquire the Lektro-Vend machine. It held that Stoner nurtured the Lektro-Vend machine, failed to disclose his financial involvement with Lektro-Vend and misled Vendo during its negotiations with the Phillipses. The Court *expressly refused to consider* the contention of Stoner and

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\* Vendo also omits this finding in its Statement (Pet. Br. 11).

Stoner Inv. that the covenants not to compete, upon which Vendo sued, were unreasonable restraints of trade and thus unenforceable under Illinois common law (App. 111, 117).

The Court also affirmed the trial court's striking of the Illinois antitrust defenses and counterclaim upon the ground that the 1965 Illinois Antitrust Act could not be applied retroactively to contracts entered into in 1959 (App. 117-18), although the counterclaim alleged acts of Vendo which occurred *after the passage* of that Act, and which the Act made criminal (Ill. Rev. Stats., Ch. 38, §§60-1 to 60-11; PX 303, pp. 15-19, 39-40, ¶¶ 7-8, 9, 10).

Nor did the Court deny the defendants' contention that the new theory of damages which Vendo urged at the second trial—that Stoner was responsible for Vendo's not having FIFO—was contrary to the Appellate Court's mandate which fixed the law of the case for the parties and the trial court. Instead, the Supreme Court held that it was not bound by the law of the case (App. 114-15). It also rejected the contention that Vendo tried to prove a case it did not plead, stating that "the acts of defendants in misappropriating the Lektro-Vend and their use of it to compete against plaintiff are intertwined, the latter being, so to speak, the means by which the former was brought to bear against plaintiff" (App. 115).

The damage award of \$7,345,500 was reinstated based on the Supreme Court's conclusions: (i) that it could not say that Vendo would have declined to purchase the Lektro-Vend machine or develop one of its own, had a genuine opportunity been extended to it (App. 114); (ii) that Vendo's damages should be measured by what it would have earned had it owned the Lektro-Vend machine (App. 118);



and (iii) that the amount of the judgment was within the range of the testimony of Vendo's experts (App. 121).

The Court did not mention Stoner's letter to Vendo that the future would show that Vendo's failure to purchase the Lektro-Vend was "a serious mistake on [its] part" (*supra*, p. 13). Concerning Childers' letter that Vendo would be willing to pay the Phillipses' costs plus "a fair profit" (*supra*, pp. 13-14), the Court stated that "[t]he record does not indicate whether this counteroffer was transmitted to Phillips" (App. 107). *But the record before it showed* (PX 304, pp. 1149, 1152) *that Stoner called Childers to ask if he had a specific figure in mind and Childers "said no. He said, 'We just can't see any market for it. It's too expensive a machine'"* (*supra*, p. 14). The record also showed that Vendo would not have bought the Lektro-Vend machine at any price. That *Vendo well knew that its theory was false* is demonstrated conclusively by additional evidence adduced before the District Court (*supra*, pp. 13-14, 19,23).

(2) *The Foundation Of The State Court Judgments Is Bound Up With The Federal Antitrust Issues At Bar*—Here we note petitioner's central assertion that, in the instant case, the District Court "neither found nor held that enforcement of the [state court] judgments would violate the antitrust laws" (Pet. Br. 14, 15, *Id.* n. 9). This is incorrect. The very foundation of those judgments was directly placed in issue by respondents' claims under both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and necessarily depends upon the merit of those claims. The pertinent findings of the District Court are fully developed *infra*, pp. 43-47.

### III.

#### PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURTS BELOW.

##### A. Proceedings In The District Court Pending The Outcome Of The State Case.

Contrary to petitioner's assertions, respondents did not "reactivat[e] this federal action" (Pet. Br. 4) nor resort to a "new stratagem" (Pet. Br. 21) in asking the District Court for injunctive relief. That relief was only required to assure that there would be a trial upon respondents' federal antitrust treble damage claims. It was the understanding of the parties—including petitioner—that this case would proceed to trial when the state proceedings were determined. This is clearly borne out by the record of proceedings before the District Court (App. 260-64).

That record shows petitioner's acknowledgement that, apart from discovery, this case "was stayed pending the trial and completion of the State Court case" (Item 75, ¶ 2) until cross motions for summary judgment were filed, and denied (App. 83-88). It further shows that petitioner expressly represented that both sides were "waiting for our trial," that this procedure was "right" (Tr., Nov. 23, 1971, pp. 2-3), and that its counsel "appreciat[ed]" and "certainly fe[lt] . . . fair" the District Court's declared unwillingness "to get into a long difficult trial in this case when we don't know what impact the State case might have on the effect" (Tr., June 16, 1972, pp. 3-4, 5).

Thus when petitioner's counsel protested for the first time on June 19, 1975 (during oral argument concerning the form of the injunction order) that respondents should have sought to enjoin the state proceedings at their inception, Judge McLaren stated:



“... it was my understanding from your side as well as theirs that the cases were related in the state and here, but that it had been more or less agreed that the state case would go forward, and that when that was completed, we would try the case here” (App. 261).

## B. The Motion For A Preliminary Injunction.

(1) *The District Court Directs The Parties To Prepare For Trial*—The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court was initially filed on September 27, 1974. On October 1, 1974, after discussion of the impact of that decision upon the issues in this case, respondents' counsel stated before the District Court that “we start afresh here.” Petitioner's counsel concurred: “Yes, we are fresh” (Tr., Oct. 1, 1974, p. 6).

After the Illinois Supreme Court denied rehearing on November 27, 1974, a pretrial conference was held on December 5, 1974, during which Judge McLaren directed the parties to prepare for trial of this action. New pleadings were to be filed, memoranda of further discovery exchanged, and a further pretrial conference (never held) was scheduled for March 3, 1975 (Item 91).

Accordingly, on January 2, 1975, respondents filed their amended and supplemental complaint (App. 124-59).

(2) *Vendo Commences Collection And Precipitates An Emergency*—Despite the fact that preparations were underway for trial of this case and certiorari had not yet been applied for or denied, petitioner commenced a host of citation proceedings in an attempt to collect its state court judgments forthwith (App. 178-207). On January 10, 1975, Stoner and Stoner Inv. were compelled to intervene in Vendo's proceeding against an escrow trustee, which culminated in Vendo's unlawfully premature collec-

tion of over \$582,000 (App. 186-87, ¶3, 149-50, ¶¶ 13, 14; Tr. 896-900).\*

Further collection, which was imminent, threatened a takeover of Lektro-Vend and Stoner Inv., and the consequent destruction of their federal antitrust claims. Those efforts also threatened to strip the remaining respondent, Stoner, of his assets. Thus, on January 23, 1975, respondents\*\* presented the District Court with a motion for preliminary injunction (App. 160-63, 177-207) seeking to stay any further collection activities pending a hearing.

Judge McLaren declined to issue a stay. Rather, he directed that Stoner and Stoner Inv. seek a stay of execution of the state court judgments from this Court, thus “exhaust[ing] all of the possibilities that are open to you in that other litigation” to avert the emergency. If unsuccessful, respondents were to receive “an immediate hearing on the preliminary injunction” (App. 170-72).

(3) *Vendo's Voluntary “Standstill Agreement”*—On January 27, 1975, Stoner and Stoner Inv. filed their petition for certiorari and motion for stay of execution in this Court.

On January 29, 1975, respondents returned to District Court, fearful of further imminent takeover orders. But

\* This escrow trust agreement barred “all proceedings” to enforce the judgments until the trustee verified that there had been a “complete and final determination” of the appeal (Ex. H to am. and suppl. compl., pp. 12, 13 (Item 92)). Since certiorari was to be applied for, the trustee formally declined to pay out. Nevertheless, petitioner continued to proceed against the trustee (Tr. 896-900) and to take further actions to enforce its judgments forthwith.

\*\* Petitioner's repeated complaint that Lektro-Vend was not formally a movant for injunctive relief (Pet. Br. 13, *Id.* n. 13, 14) is wholly specious. Lektro-Vend's interest was articulated and litigated not only during the injunction hearing (App. 227, n. 2; Tr. 27, 41, 43) but also on January 23, 1975, as counsel's remarks clearly show (App. 162-63).

petitioner's counsel then announced *a voluntary standstill agreement* pending the District Court's decision:

"... we are assuring your Honor on the record that we are voluntarily not planning to take any action out there that would in any way result in a turnover order and we intend to stay that out there until we hear from the United States Supreme Court and certainly we would intend to abide by any decision your Honor makes here" (App. 214).

The parties subsequently learned that Justice Rehnquist had denied the motion for stay of execution on January 28, 1975.

A hearing was held on the motion for injunctive relief from February 10, 1975 through February 14, 1975. On the final day of the hearing, petitioner's counsel specifically reaffirmed the standstill agreement, "assur[ing] the court here that *until your Honor has had an opportunity to make this decision*, we will continue all pending motions" in the state court collection proceedings (Tr. 876-77).\*

\* As part of the "standstill agreement," the District Court authorized Stoner and Stoner Inv. to pay counsel fees and expenses "in the ordinary course of business, whatever you normally do" (Tr. 879).

On April 16, 1975, concurrently with its post-trial brief, Vendo filed a motion to "clarify" the standstill agreement (Item 118), claiming for the first time that such payments of fees and expenses would contravene the state court citations (Tr., April 16, 1975, pp. 2-4). It also sought forthwith to institute "maybe twenty-five lawsuits" against third parties (*Id.*, pp. 5-6, 13), to levy upon certain Stoner Inv. real estate (*Id.*, p. 11) and to reactivate a contempt proceeding against Stoner and Stoner Inv. which had "been pending for about eight years" in the state court without action thereon (*Id.*, pp. 14-15).

The District Court directed that the parties "continue with the standstill agreement . . . in good faith," that Stoner and Stoner Inv. pay taxes on their properties and that they cease any further payment of fees or expenses until the motion was decided (*Id.*, pp. 22-23).

### C. The District Court's Decision.

(1) *The Memorandum Opinion And Order*—The District Court issued its memorandum opinion and order on May 29, 1975 (App. 226-42), awarding the preliminary injunction.

First, the Court dealt with the factors generally applied "to determine whether interlocutory relief is appropriate" (App. 232). It held that respondents "demonstrated likelihood of ultimate success on *both* the section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act claims" (App. 233), specifically noting the "*substantial*" (App. 236) and "*considerable* evidence in the record demonstrating illegal anticompetitive behavior on the part of Vendo" (App. 242). It further found "[o]n the record as a whole . . . that a preliminary injunction will prevent irreparable harm, protect the public interest, and will benefit plaintiffs more than it will burden Vendo" (App. 238). It also stated:

"Few public policies are more important than protection of competition. In the instant case, as previously mentioned, the number of competitors in the vending machine market is declining. Thus the courts have a duty to vigilantly protect the remaining competition" (App. 239).

Then the Court separately addressed the "special burden" imposed on respondents because state court proceedings would have to be enjoined (App. 239). The Court held that it had jurisdiction to enjoin Vendo from further collection activities based upon the first two exceptions set forth in the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283. Applying the tests prescribed by *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), it held that Section 16 of the Clayton Act "expressly authorized" injunctions against "certain state actions, if necessary" (App. 240); that the federal anti-



trust “laws, in the instant case, can only be given their intended scope by staying the state court proceedings;” and “that §2283 authorizes an injunction here where the state court proceedings are part of the anticompetitive scheme” (App. 240-41).

The second (“in aid of jurisdiction”) exception provided in 28 U.S.C. §2283 was also held to apply since petitioner, unless restrained, would “as a matter of substance” control two of the three antitrust plaintiffs, requiring their dismissal under Article III (App. 241).

Further, the District Court recognized that “principles of comity and federalism militate against *unnecessarily interfering* with pending state court actions even if §2283 is satisfied” (App. 240), but it held that those principles “do not prevent the issuance of an injunction considering *the peculiar nature of this case*,” namely, that “[t]he federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention” (App. 241).

(2) *The Injunction Order—A “Standstill Order” Supported By Elaborate Security Arrangements*—The District Court’s injunction order issued on June 27, 1975 (App. 266-75). The Court intended “a standstill . . . order . . . under which the parties can go along in the normal course of business” (App. 264) *pendente lite*. Asserting that the order required “an injunction bond of only \$2,500.00” (Pet. Br. 16), petitioner omits that it already collected over \$582,000 (App. 239; *supra*, pp. 28-29). Petitioner likewise omits that its right to collect the balance of its judgments, should it ultimately prevail, is secured by bonds of \$300,000 (PX 326) and \$7,400,000 (PX 327), and a security agree-

ment (App. 271-75) which, together with the liens of the judgments, were continued “in full force and effect,” not to mention the other detailed security provisions contained in the order (App. 267-70).

#### D. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court on May 28, 1976. It did not pass upon the second (“in aid of jurisdiction”) exception to 28 U.S.C. §2283 since it held the first (“expressly authorized”) exception applicable. The Court found that Congress intended to afford private citizens “a uniquely federal remedy” when it enacted Section 16 of the Clayton Act. It also found that:

“This jurisdiction would be frustrated if federal courts did not have the power to enjoin a state court proceeding in an appropriate case. The present situation is a classic example. Here Vendo seeks to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged to be the very object of antitrust violations” (App. 286).

Thus the Court held that the tests set forth in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) had been satisfied. The Court of Appeals also affirmed as to comity and federalism (App. 289).

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Court of Appeals did *not* “expressly [approve] the District Court’s assertion of jurisdiction to review a final decision of the Illinois Supreme Court” (Pet. Br. 16). On the contrary, it recognized that the District Court *expressly disclaimed* any power “to directly review cases from state courts,” and examined the state proceedings *only* to determine “whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anti-competitive scheme” (App. 289).



The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioner's contention that respondents failed to demonstrate a likelihood of ultimate success in proving their antitrust claims and did not satisfy the other requisites for injunctive relief (App. 289-91). It specifically rejected petitioner's argument that the state court judgments did not depend on the covenants not to compete since they were based on Stoner's violation of fiduciary duties. It held that this argument was "contrary to the trial judge's findings," which it affirmed (App. 290).

Finally, the Court of Appeals also rejected petitioner's contentions that the injunction was barred by laches, waiver and collateral estoppel, since those issues were not argued below and were "without merit" (App. 291). Despite this finding, petitioner urges its same "waiver" point here, under the heading of "comity and federalism" (Pet. Br. 36-39).

#### E. Subsequent Proceedings In The District Court.

This action is now pending trial in the District Court before the Hon. Hubert L. Will.\* In light of the death in March, 1976 of respondent Harry B. Stoner, his administrator, Ann Stoner, has been substituted as a plaintiff. The District Court also amended the preliminary injunction order to permit petitioner "to initiate or participate in any proceedings in [the probate of Stoner's estate]

\* Hon. Richard W. McLaren, who entered the order appealed from, died earlier this year.

which are available to creditors of an estate . . . to investigate and ascertain the nature and value of the assets properly belonging to the estate," except that it "shall not initiate citation proceedings for the recovery (as distinguished from discovery) of property, nor move for or otherwise attempt to obtain allowance of said claim, or accept any amounts in payment of said claim or any portion thereof."

The parties have been engaged in final preparation for trial.

### SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case, as the Court of Appeals described it, presents a "classic example" (App. 286) in which petitioner, *prima facie* guilty of sweeping violations of both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, attempts by writs of execution "to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged [and found, *infra*, pp. 43-47] to be the very object of antitrust violations" (*Id.*).

The injunction at bar, tailored precisely to the exigencies of this case, effectively preserves the *status quo* so that respondents, as private attorneys general, may invoke the statutory remedies available *exclusively* in the federal courts for the private enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. Infringing no significant state interest, the preliminary injunction awarded by the District Court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, vindicates both the paramount national interest embodied in the antitrust laws and the special character of the exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction entrusted by Congress to the federal courts.

I.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the award of a preliminary injunction, which only preserves the *status quo*, pending a trial upon the merits of respondents' federal antitrust claims. Apart from jurisdiction, the scope of appellate review is therefore limited to determining whether the District Court violated some principle of equity or clearly abused its discretion. The District Court's findings are closely intertwined with the issues at bar.

A.

One finding of the District Court goes to the heart of this case—that petitioner's collection of the balance of its state court judgments would further its violations of both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Petitioner makes the startling, and utterly baseless, assertion that no such finding was made. But the District Court unequivocally found that petitioner's state court judgments depended on agreements violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act and were procured in pursuance of a monopolistic scheme violative of section 2 of the Sherman Act, and the Court of Appeals affirmed those findings.

B.

The District Court further found that continued collection of the state court judgments would eliminate two respondents from this case precluding the further prosecution of their claims, and would effectively cripple the third respondent's ability to prosecute the sole remaining antitrust claim. Therefore, absent equitable relief, immediate enforcement of petitioner's judgments would thwart the trial of federal antitrust claims.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner, *pendente lite*, from collecting the balance of its state court judgments. Both the first ("expressly authorized") and second ("in aid of jurisdiction") exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283, applied.

A.

In appropriate cases §16 of the Clayton Act "expressly authorize[s]" injunctions against state proceedings under the first exception to §2283, as the Courts below held, in light of the controlling criteria set forth in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Under *Mitchum*, a federal statute need not refer in terms either to §2283 or to state court proceedings, but it must have created "a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding" and "could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding" (407 U.S. at 237-38).

1. Supplementing the private enforcement provisions in the Sherman Act, §16 authorizes private plaintiffs to secure the "uniquely federal remedy" of injunctive relief in the federal courts. By its exclusive grant of federal jurisdiction Congress intended that federal antitrust enforcement be "effective and uniform" as well as "untrammelled" by the effects of related litigation in the state courts. *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied* 350 U.S. 825 (1955) (*per* L. Hand, J.).

2. Both the clear terms and legislative history of §16 show that its "intended scope" would be "frustrated" (*Mitchum, supra*) if federal courts could not enjoin state proceedings where, as here, the precise conduct proscribed by the antitrust laws is sought to be furthered therein. Furthermore, "Section 16 should be construed and applied" with a view toward "the high purpose" served by private antitrust enforcement. *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969).

3. Injunctions are not barred by §2283 when sought by federal agencies asserting "superior federal interests" (*Mitchum, supra*). The result should be no different when private antitrust plaintiffs seek to restrain state proceedings which "threaten loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws," since §16 was clearly intended to facilitate the vigorous enforcement of federal antitrust policy by private attorneys general. *Cf. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F.2d 692, 697-98 (2d Cir. 1966).

4. Affirmance of the injunction at bar would not impair the continuing vitality of §2283 because §16 authorizes relief *only* when state proceedings threaten "loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws," a showing made in *none* of the cases petitioner cites.

#### B.

The second exception to §2283 also applied since the preliminary injunction was "necessary in aid of" the District Court's jurisdiction. The District Court correctly found that, absent relief, two respondents would be, at least in substance, under petitioner's control or at its disposition, requiring their dismissal under Article III. The third respondent, Stoner's administrator, would then be unable to

prosecute the claims of Lektro-Vend and Stoner Inv., and her own ability to prosecute the sole remaining antitrust claim would be effectively crippled.

An injunction is permissible under the second exception to §2283 when state proceedings threaten "to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide" a case. *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970). Here petitioner's collection proceedings would not only further violations of the Sherman Act; they also threaten the very extinction of federal antitrust claims, *prima facie* meritorious, depriving the federal court of its exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims. And this jurisdiction should be zealously protected because Congress, by conferring it exclusively upon the federal courts, intended to secure not only private rights but the national interest in the preservation of free competition.

#### III.

The decision below struck a proper balance between state and federal interests and is entirely in accordance with principles of comity and federalism. The Court below held those principles inapplicable not *only* because §16 affords an exclusive federal remedy but also in view of the peculiar nature of this case, namely, that it is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined.

This Court's recent decisions concerning comity and federalism do not require blind deference to state interests but a fair balancing of legitimate state and federal interests. Here the balance tips decisively in favor of federal interests, which are paramount.



1. Enjoining collection of petitioner's judgments, *pendente lite*, does not unduly infringe any legitimate state interest, since those judgments arose out of purely private litigation. Moreover, "special circumstances" exist since enforcement of those judgments would further violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

2. On the other hand, paramount federal interests require that petitioner neither reap the fruit of its federal antitrust violations nor succeed in thwarting the prosecution of federal antitrust claims by private attorneys general.

#### IV.

Dismissal by Stoner and Stoner Inv. of their federal antitrust defense in the state court action did not preclude the award of injunctive relief. Such a result would unfairly penalize respondents in view of the circumstances: simultaneous pendency of state and federal actions was made necessary by petitioner's objections to removal; it was the understanding of the parties that the federal trial would follow the state trial, and the injunction only insures that a federal trial can take place; the federal defense was dismissed without prejudice and without objection, only after the state court dismissed the state antitrust defenses and counterclaim; the federal judge then presiding was reluctant to consider this case while federal antitrust issues were before the state courts; dismissal of the defense avoided the risk of conflicting state and federal decisions upon the same federal antitrust issues; and preliminary relief was based in part on actionable facts not in existence when the federal defense was dismissed. Respondents thus *did not* and *could not* have waived their rights to relief

upon their federal antitrust claims, which relief is obtainable *only* in a federal court. Moreover, federal jurisdiction to adjudicate federal treble damage claims is "untrammelled" by state court decisions upon federal antitrust issues. *Lyons v. Westinghouse, supra*.

Apart from respondents' own interests, dismissal of the federal defense could not have immunized petitioner's unlawful conduct because the overriding national antitrust policy is not to be left at the mercy of private parties nor subjected to the usual rules governing private litigation (*Mercoird Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.*, 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944); *Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.*, 317 U.S. 173, 177 (1942)), particularly where, as here, the injunction prevents petitioner from enforcing its unlawful agreements and consummating its anticompetitive scheme in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

#### V.

The District Court neither reversed, reviewed nor revised the final judgments of the Illinois courts. It examined the state proceedings only to determine whether petitioner prosecuted them as part of an anticompetitive scheme. *What the District Court reviewed was not the Illinois judgments, but rather, petitioner's anticompetitive conduct in procuring those judgments.* Passing solely upon issues of federal antitrust law, the District Court found that petitioner sued and recovered on agreements violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that it procured its judgments in pursuance of a monopolistic scheme violative of section 2 of the Sherman Act.

## ARGUMENT

### I.

**THE SCOPE OF THE REVIEW HERE, ASIDE FROM JURISDICTION, IS LIMITED TO DETERMINING WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED SOME PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY OR CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION.**

Provided there is no lack of jurisdiction (*United States v. Corrick*, 298 U.S. 435, 437-8 (1936)),

“It is well settled that the granting of a temporary injunction, pending final hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court; and that, upon appeal, an order granting such an injunction will not be disturbed unless contrary to some rule of equity, or the result of improvident exercise of judicial discretion. . . .”

“Especially will the granting of the temporary writ be upheld when the balance of injury as between the parties favors its issue.” *Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co.*, 262 U.S. 43, 50-51 (1923).

This is a well settled principle, particularly applicable when, as here, a preliminary injunction is issued merely for the purpose of preserving the *status quo* pending a determination of the action on the merits (*Bath Industries v. Blot*, 427 F.2d 97, 111 (7th Cir. 1970)), because the district judge is typically presented with an abbreviated set of facts requiring a delicate balance of the probabilities of ultimate success at the final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable injury which could possibly flow from the denial of preliminary relief (*Scherr v. Volpe*, 466 F.2d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 1972)).\*

\* The District Court recognized this doctrine (App. 241 n.5).

Much of petitioner's brief is written as if this were a final appeal after trial. Authorities have established that, assuming jurisdiction, even if the reviewing court were to disagree with the trial court that the situation required the issuance of a preliminary injunction, such reversal would not be warranted (*Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina, Inc.*, 264 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir. 1959)). The Court of Appeals recognized this doctrine (App. 289-291).

Petitioner's brief largely ignores the detailed findings of facts by the District Court and in effect seeks to have this Court retry *de novo* the case the District Court tried and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Although petitioner assails the decision of the courts below on four grounds (Pet. Br. 2), the issues it poses are closely intertwined with the facts of this case. Those facts are reflected in the findings made by the District Court in the proper exercise of its judicial discretion. They receive scant, inaccurate and argumentative treatment by petitioner (Pet. Br. 14-16). They are vitally important and hence we treat them.

#### **A. The District Court Found That Petitioner's Efforts To Collect The Balance Of Its Judgments Would Further A Violation Of The Federal Antitrust Laws.**

Petitioner nowhere challenges the District Court's finding that collection of the balance of its state court judgments would further a violation of the Sherman Act—a finding which goes to the heart of this case. On the contrary, petitioner's brief makes the utterly startling assertion that no such finding was made. It says:

“The District Court, however, neither found nor held that enforcement of the judgments would violate the antitrust laws” (Pet. Br. 14).



Then, in a footnote, petitioner adds:

"The District Court also stated that, *'If the state court litigation was itself part of the anticompetitive scheme, a judgment arising from such litigation is not an ordinary debt'* (App. 238, italics added), and *'If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention'* (App. 241, italics added), but reached no conclusion as to *whether* continuation of the state action (i.e., through collection of the state judgments) *would* violate the antitrust laws" (Pet. Br. 15 n.9; emphasis petitioner's).

This is desperation, to put it mildly. In the Court of Appeals petitioner specifically challenged the pertinent findings of the District Court, contending "that the state court judgments are based on Stoner's violation of fiduciary duties and do not depend . . . on the noncompetition covenants" (App. 290). The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, expressly noting that *it was "contrary to the trial judge's findings"* (*Id.*).

And consider what the District Court said. In passing upon applicability of the first ("expressly authorized") exception to 28 U.S.C. §2283, the Court expressed *the very basis of its holding*:

"This Court therefore holds that [the federal anti-trust] laws, in the instant case, can only be given their intended scope by staying the state court proceedings and that §2283 authorizes an injunction *here where the state court proceedings are part of the anticompetitive scheme*" (App. 240-41).

What's "iffy" about that statement? Is it anything less than plain unequivocal language?

Even apart from what the District Court said, what it held equally belies petitioner's assertions. Seizing upon

selected "If" clauses in the Court's opinion, such as its statement that court intervention would be required "[i]f federal law is violated by continuation of the state action," petitioner underscores the "If" and says that the Court "reached no conclusion," ignoring the obvious fact that the Court *did* intervene. Indeed, that very "court intervention" provoked petitioner's appeal!

Moreover, the District Court held "that plaintiffs have demonstrated likelihood of ultimate success on *both* the section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act claims" (App. 233), and the very basis of petitioner's state court judgments was directly bound up with *both* of those claims. As the Court said:

"The section 1 claim does not rest alone on the theory that the state litigation was an essential part of an illegal anticompetitive scheme but rather depends on an analysis of the total circumstances surrounding creation of the 1959 agreements. The Court believes that viewed in this light the corporate opportunity theory relied on in the final state court decision cannot either in logic or as a matter of federal antitrust law be separated from the anticompetitive intent and effect of the covenants" (App. 234-35);

whereupon the Court delineated its further findings that Stoner's status as a director and his fiduciary duties were themselves but additional anticompetitive devices imposed on Stoner pursuant to the unlawful 1959 agreements (*Id.*).\*

\* It makes no difference that diversion of a corporate opportunity might be classified as a "tort," as petitioner contended in the Courts below, since the state law duties which Stoner was adjudicated to have breached arose out of and by virtue of the underlying anticompetitive agreements, as the District Court found (App. 234-35). Indeed, petitioner bound Stoner to become a director by those agreements, assigning to him no duties nor intending any, all in pursuance of its monopolistic scheme (*supra*, pp. 8-11).



Since petitioner's "anticompetitive clauses are essential primary elements of the bargain," they could not be severed from the rest of the transaction, thereby rendering "*all elements of the 1959 agreements unenforceable*" (App. 235). The Court concluded:

"Vendo's reliance on the ultimate theory of the state court litigation thus is not well taken. The 1959 agreements were cut from one piece of anticompetitive cloth and cannot be snipped apart" (*Id.*).

Similarly the District Court expressly stated that respondents' claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act, if sustained, would furnish still *another basis* for holding further collection unlawful:

"If plaintiffs can prove that Vendo's state court litigation against the Stoner interests was not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately, antitrust liability in the instant case under section 2 of the Sherman Act would follow" (App. 237).

The Court not only held that respondents *did* sustain their section 2 claim (App. 233), but also delineated its findings in support of that claim (App. 235-38). Noting that it was "considering the record as a whole" (App. 237),\* the Court said:

"There is persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately" (*Id.*).

It also found that there was other "evidence that Vendo used litigation as a method of harassing and eliminating

\* Thus petitioner's italicized assertion that the District Court "cit[ed] only events in the 1963-66 period" (Pet. Br. 15) is baseless.

competition" (App. 236), as we have shown (*supra*, pp. 19-20, 20n.). Accordingly, since petitioner chose only to deny the existence of these findings, eschewing any claim that the District Court abused its discretion in making them, there can be no question but that enforcement of the state judgments would further petitioner's violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

**B. The District Court Found That Immediate Collection By Petitioner Of The Balance Of Its State Court Judgments Would Thwart The Prosecution Of Federal Antitrust Claims.**

The District Court made explicit findings that petitioner's collection activities, unless restrained, would extinguish two of the three pending federal antitrust treble damage claims at bar:

"[C]ollection of the state judgment would effectively place Lektro-Vend in the hands of—or at least at the disposition of—Vendo. Stoner Investments is controlled by Mr. Stoner; 78.57% of Lektro-Vend is owned by Stoner Investments. Needless to say, Vendo would also control Stoner Investments . . . . *Continued collection would thus eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein*" (App. 239).

Thus when petitioner says that the District Court found only that further collection might "*possibly eliminat[e]* two of the three plaintiffs in the suit as independent parties" (Pet. Br. 35), it misstates what the Court said. Moreover, in contending that it was "wrong on the facts" in making this finding (*Id.*), petitioner makes no effort to show that the District Court clearly abused its discretion—the standard of review upon an interlocutory appeal.

In any event, assuming that petitioner *does* claim an abuse of discretion, the record fully supports the pertinent findings. Neither of petitioner's proffered consent decrees would have obviated the elimination of Lektro-Vend or Stoner Inv. as federal antitrust plaintiffs.

Only the first proposed consent decree was before the District Court when it decided the motion for preliminary injunction. Petitioner states that this proposal, filed January 29, 1975 (App. 208-10),\* would have "preclude[d] Vendo's acquiring . . . control of Lektro-Vend" (Pet. Br. 13). It would have done nothing of the sort. It provided only for "the absence of any voting power in Vendo" through the device of a voting trust. It expressly contemplated that Vendo might be "the successful purchaser" of Lektro-Vend stock at a sheriff's sale, thus becoming the beneficial owner of all shares held in that voting trust (App. 210); and that those shares would be divested "at the fair market value [including the value of Lektro-Vend's right of action against petitioner?] at the earliest reasonable date" (*Id.*). As the District Court further found:

"Vendo's offer to place the Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend stock under control of the Court does not meet this problem because *as a matter of substance* Vendo would control both plaintiff and defendant . . ." (App. 241).

\* In his counter-affidavit (App. 208) and attached letter (App. 210), which set forth the first consent decree proposal, petitioner's counsel implied that petitioner was previously unaware that Stoner Inv. had become majority shareholder in Lektro-Vend. The record shows, however, that petitioner well knew this *at the latest* in February, 1971, when it sought summary judgment based in part upon that very fact (See Item 52, pp. 2-3, Exh. "Q").

In fact, petitioner's proposal made no mention of Stoner Inv., as petitioner tacitly concedes (Pet. Br. 13).

Petitioner's second consent decree—proposed nearly three weeks *after* the District Court's decision—likewise fell short of preserving the viability of the two antitrust plaintiffs. Although purporting to prohibit petitioner from acquiring *for itself* any Lektro-Vend or Stoner Inv. stock or obligations, petitioner would have been wholly unrestricted from precipitating the immediate liquidation of the majority interest in both corporations, presumably including the forced sale of their federal antitrust claims at the very time when the District Court had directed the undertaking of final preparations for the trial of this action (App. 258-59; *supra*, pp. 28-29).

During the five day hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, petitioner offered no evidence with respect to its proposal. On the contrary, the only pertinent evidence showed that, upon Lektro-Vend's forced liquidation, "without a viable organization there, the building and equipment wouldn't have any value" (Tr. 710-11), and that prospects for securing vitally needed financing would have been destroyed (Tr. 621-22, 706-15, 708-09).

Thus petitioner's latest offer, like its predecessor, did not upset the District Court's findings that "collection of the state judgment will effectively place Lektro-Vend . . . at least at the disposition of" petitioner (App. 238-39), or that "as a matter of substance Vendo would control both plaintiff and defendant" (App. 241). As the Court of Appeals concluded, petitioner "seeks to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments



which are alleged to be the very object of antitrust violations" and, absent equitable relief, federal antitrust jurisdiction "would be frustrated" (App. 286).\*

## II.

**THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN PETITIONER, PENDENTE LITE, FROM COLLECTING THE BALANCE OF ITS STATE COURT JUDGMENTS. THE FIRST TWO EXCEPTIONS TO 28 U.S.C. §2283 APPLIED HERE.**

**A. The Preliminary Injunction Was Expressly Authorized By §16 Of The Clayton Act, Within The Meaning Of 28 U.S.C. §2283.**

The parties are agreed that the determination of this question must rest squarely on the principles which this Court, in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), distilled

\* A wealth of additional evidence in the record amply supported the findings below that petitioner sought by its collection proceedings to thwart the prosecution of this antitrust suit. Thus in April, 1975, petitioner's counsel announced his intention forthwith to institute "maybe twenty-five lawsuits" and to reactivate a contempt proceeding against Stoner and Stoner Inv. which had lain dormant in state court "for about eight years" (*supra*, p. 30n.).

In June, 1975, petitioner again insisted that it be permitted to investigate "questionable conduct" on the part of "[p]laintiffs and their lawyers" before the state courts and to pursue creditor's suits against Stoner's wife, his son and his sister-in-law and "about thirty-five other people," all in all, "some thirty-five or forty in name" (Tr., June 19, 1975, pp. 34-35; App. 247, 252-53).

The predicate for the contempt charges, the alleged "questionable conduct," and the host of lawsuits, was petitioner's charge of "monumental fraud" upon which it cross-examined (Tr. 628-748) and recross-examined (Tr. 885-89) Stoner at the hearing. The District Court found the charge groundless (App. 239), and petitioner did not appeal its finding.

from the prior cases applying the "expressly authorized" exception of §2283:

"In the *first* place, it is evident that, in order to qualify under the 'expressly authorized' exception of the anti-injunction statute, a federal law *need not contain an express reference to that statute*. . . .

"*Secondly*, a federal law *need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding* in order to qualify. . . .

"*Thirdly*, it is clear that, in order to qualify as an 'expressly authorized exception to the anti-injunction statute, an Act of Congress must have created a *specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding*. This is not to say that in order to come within the exception an Act of Congress must, on its face and in every one of its provisions, be totally incompatible with the prohibitions of the anti-injunction statute. *The test, rather, is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding*" (407 U.S. at 237-38).

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals analyzed the injunction here *in precisely these terms*. They concluded that §16 opened the federal equity courts to private citizens, creating a uniquely federal remedy which would be frustrated if the federal courts did not have the power to restrain the enforcement of a state court judgment in an appropriate case (App. 240-41, 285-89). But their holding was carefully limited. Judge McLaren held that "§2283 authorizes an injunction here where the state court proceedings are part of the anticompetitive scheme" (App. 240-41); the Court of Appeals likewise held this



to be an appropriate case on the grounds that "Vendo seeks to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged to be the very object of antitrust violations" (App. 286).

Neither "judicial improvisation" nor "loose statutory construction" nor "*ad hoc* expansion of the exceptions to [§2283]" (Pet. Br. 23) was necessary to support that holding. Rather, the decision below, that §16 "expressly authorized" the preliminary injunction at bar, was fully justified by the language, by the legislative history, and by the clear intent of that statute.

**1. Injunctive Relief Under §16 Of The Clayton Act Is A "Uniquely Federal Remedy," Entrusted By Congress To The Exclusive And Untrammelled Jurisdiction Of The Federal Courts.**

By enacting the Sherman Act of 1890, Congress supplemented the varying common law rules administered by the states with a uniform federal law. Common law merely voided unreasonable restraints, denying them enforcement. The Sherman Act, on the other hand, established positive prohibitions, outlawing trade restraints and monopolization as crimes. Federal equity powers were made available, and special provision was made to supplement government enforcement by private suits on the part of antitrust victims, who were to be awarded treble damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs upon recovery. By §16 of the Clayton Act, the federal courts were empowered as well to grant equitable relief at the behest of private plaintiffs.

The three positive remedies afforded private plaintiffs under these statutes—treble damages, the statutory award

of fees and costs, and equitable relief—could be invoked only in the federal district courts. In *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955) (*per* L. Hand, J.), the exclusive character of this jurisdiction was held to manifest a Congressional design that it not be impaired or limited by virtue of related litigation in the state courts:

"In the case at bar it appears to us that the grant to the district courts of exclusive jurisdiction over the action for treble damages should be taken to imply an immunity of their decisions from any prejudgment elsewhere; at least on occasions, like those at bar, where the putative estoppel includes the whole nexus of facts that make up the wrong. The remedy provided is not solely civil; two thirds of the recovery is not remedial and inevitably presupposed a punitive purpose. It is like a *qui tam* action, except that the plaintiff keeps all the penalty, instead of sharing it with the sovereign. There are sound reasons for assuming that such recovery should not be subject to the determinations of the state courts. It was part of the effort to prevent monopoly and restraints of commerce; and it was natural to wish it to be uniformly administered, being national in scope. Relief by certiorari would still exist, it is true; but that is a remedy bothersome to litigants and to the Supreme Court, already charged with enough. Obviously, an administration of the Acts, at one effective and uniform, would best be accomplished by an untrammelled jurisdiction of the federal courts."

The court then held that the plaintiff's treble damage action was not precluded even though a state court had previously found that the alleged antitrust violation, which had been raised by way of defense in the state action, was neither sustained nor established.

The basic rationale of *Lyons* is that no local law or state court determination may be permitted to defeat the jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce the overriding federal public policy of the antitrust laws. *Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.*, 317 U.S. 173, 177 (1942); *Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc.*, 396 F.2d 398, 401 (2d Cir. 1968); *Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F. 2d 820, 830 (9th Cir. 1963).

Because a defense based on federal antitrust law was available in the state proceedings here, petitioner argues (Pet. Br. 30) that the present injunction does not meet *Mitchum's* "uniquely federal remedy" requirement. This is an obvious *non sequitur*. If a remedy which affords private plaintiffs in the capacity of private attorneys general treble damages, fees and costs and equitable relief procurable *only* in a federal court is not a "uniquely federal remedy," it is difficult to conceive of one. And the fallacy of petitioner's argument is further apparent from an examination of the authorities.

In *Mitchum*, the federal issues upon which an injunction was sought were also available as a defense to the state action; nevertheless §1983 was held to constitute a "uniquely federal remedy." Similarly in *Porter v. Dicken*, 328 U.S. 252, 255 (1946), the Emergency Price Control Act was held to expressly authorize the federal court's injunction against a state eviction suit, even though the Act invested both the state and federal courts with jurisdiction to enforce its provisions (56 Stat. 33). The District Court in *Porter* had concluded that §2283 forbade the injunction because of the availability of a *concurrent* state court remedy. Even so, this Court rejected that contention! (328 U.S. at 234-35).

**2. Both The Clear Terms And Legislative History Of §16 Show That Its "Intended Scope" Would Be "Frustrated" If Federal Courts Were Powerless To Issue An Injunction Where Antitrust Violations Are Furthered By Collection Of State Court Judgments.**

The language of §16 is sweeping: "Any person . . . shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . .," subject to the ordinary principles and rules of equity proceedings.

Thus the preliminary injunction at bar was authorized by the plain terms of the statute, since the District Court found on the facts that the immediate collection of the state court judgment would have *threatened loss or damage* to respondents *by a violation of the antitrust laws*—in fact, by violations of *both* sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

The same reasoning guided this Court in *Porter v. Dicken*, *supra*, cited in *Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 235 n.17. The statute construed there was §205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act (56 Stat. 33):

"Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about to engage *in any acts or practices which constitute a violation of any provision* of section 4 of this Act, he may make an application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices . . ."

The Court held that "this authority is broad enough to justify an injunction to restrain state court evictions" which violated the Act (328 U.S. at 255).

Petitioner argues that the prohibitions of §2283 are incorporated into §16 by its language: "When and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief . . .



is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings" (Pet. Br. 23-24). Rather, it is obviously more reasonable to read this language as referring to the traditional doctrines of equity jurisprudence concerning requirements for injunctive relief, which requirements were fully applied by the District Court *before* it considered whether plaintiffs had met their "special burden" under §2283 and "comity and federalism" (App. 239).

It is clear that at the time of the passage of the Clayton Act, §2283 was regarded as a much less inflexible prohibition than it later became under *Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.*, 314 U.S. 118 (1941). See *e.g.*, *Sovereign Camp v. O'Neill*, 266 U.S. 292, 298 (1924); *Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor*, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); *Ex Parte Simon*, 209 U.S. 144 (1908); and *Marshall v. Holmes*, 141 U.S. 589 (1891). This makes it impossible to argue that "the text of the statute" incorporated any absolute prohibition of injunctions against state court proceedings (Pet. Br. 23-24).

Furthermore, petitioner's reading of §16 is precluded by the familiar rule of statutory construction, that "*inclusio unius est exclusio alterius*." Section 16 specifically prohibits injunctions against common carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It makes no reference whatsoever to injunctions against state court proceedings.

The decision of the Courts below is also supported by the clear legislative intent of §16. Prior to its enactment in 1914, though private antitrust plaintiffs could sue for treble damages, they were barred from seeking injunctive relief, which could be granted only at the behest of the government. Section 16 was consistently described as a measure undertaken to remedy this situation, which was

perceived as a significant defect in the Sherman Act.\* Rep. Carlin described the Judiciary Committee's deliberations as follows:

"First, we found that the Sherman law did not permit an injunction on petition of an individual. The government could enjoin a combination or a trust; and though an individual was standing face-to-face with destruction, though the monster of monopoly was knocking at his door, he would have to wait until destruction came, and then pursue his remedy at law for treble damages" (51 Cong. Rec. at 9270).

So the clear and simple intent of §16 is to allow an individual to have anticompetitive behavior enjoined by a federal court of equity before it destroys him. Where a party's prosecution of state proceedings is found to be "part of the anticompetitive scheme" (App. 241), then surely §16 can "be given its intended scope only by a stay of the state court proceedings" (*Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 715). Where "federal law is violated by continuation of the state action" and "the *precise conduct* proscribed by the antitrust laws is sought to be furthered in [the] state court action" (App. 237, 238, 241; *supra*, pp. 43-47), then surely the federal remedy of §16 would "be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding" (*Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 237).

After all, this Court in *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969), told us, in language particularly applicable here, how §16 should be construed:

\* See Note, The Federal Antitrust Laws and the Anti-Injunction Statute: Conflict and Coexistence, 42 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 115, 138-144 (1973); H. R. Rep. No. 627, p. 17; S. Rep. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); 51 Cong. Rec. 9261-62, 9270, 15944, 16275, 16319 (1914).



"[T]he purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws . . . . *Section 16 should be construed and applied with this purpose in mind . . . . Its availability should be 'conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect.'*"

Zenith's footnote 24, setting out §16, italicizes "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws" (395 U.S. at 130 n.24).

Despite *Mitchum's* holding that "a federal law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify . . ." (407 U.S. at 237), petitioner argues that a statute will pass muster under *Mitchum* only where its *legislative history* expressly shows a conscious and central Congressional intent to restrain abuses of state court proceedings (Pet. Br. 27-29, 32). But there is nothing in the language or the logic of *Mitchum* which requires such a limitation of its holding. Quite the contrary, the invalidity of any such limitation is evident when one examines the "previously recognized statutory exceptions" which *Mitchum* catalogued and from which it distilled its criteria.

For instance, the Emergency Price Control Act was held to constitute an exception to §2283 because of the breadth of the injunctive power authorized by the Act, despite the absence of any indication that Congress had ever expressly considered any need for injunctions against state court proceedings (*Porter v. Dicken, supra*, 328 U.S. at 255, cited in *Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 235) \* The same was true of the Fair

\* Petitioner attempts to distinguish *Porter v. Dicken* on the ground that the Emergency Price Control Act "provided an in-  
(footnote continued on following page)

Labor Standards Act (*Walling v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co.*, 59 F. Supp. 348, 351 (W.D. Ky. 1943), cited in *Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 237 n. 25); the Public Utility Holding Company Act (*Okin v. S.E.C.*, 161 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1947), cited in *Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 237 n. 25); and the Securities and Exchange Act (*Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F. 2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), cited in *Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 237 n. 25).

### 3. The "Intended Scope" Of §16 Would Be Frustrated Were Petitioner Permitted To Consummate Its Antitrust Violations And Thwart Private Enforcement Of The Antitrust Laws.

In canvassing the exceptions to §2283 which had been recognized in prior decisions, *Mitchum* noted that "other 'implied' exceptions to the blanket prohibition of the anti-injunction statute" had been recognized (407 U.S. at 235).

tricate system of judicial remedies and authorized the Government to enforce the Act in both federal and state courts" (Pet. Br. 31).

But even granting the arguable assumption that the Emergency Price Control Act provided a more "intricate system of judicial remedies" than do the antitrust laws, the fact is that *Porter* relied on no such ground, but rather on the breadth of the injunctive power authorized by the Act. As this Court explained in *Mitchum*:

"[T]he Emergency Price Control Act . . . provided that the Price Administrator could request a federal district court to enjoin acts that violated or threatened to violate the Act. In *Porter* we held that this authority was broad enough to justify an injunction to restrain state court proceedings." (407 U.S. at 235 n.17).

As for the Government's authorization to enforce the Act in both federal and state courts, *Porter* mentioned this *only* for the purpose of overruling the District Court's conclusion that the Administrator was required to pursue his injunction in the state courts (328 U.S. at 254-55).

Citing, *inter alia*, *Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States*, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), *Mitchum* stated:

“Still a third exception, more recently developed, permits a federal injunction of state court proceedings when the plaintiff in the federal court is the United States itself, or a federal agency asserting ‘superior federal interests’ ” (407 U.S. at 235-36).

This same exception to §2283 was also noted by the Second Circuit in *Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin*, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), a decision which *Mitchum* cited (407 U.S. at 237 n. 25). In *Studebaker*, a private litigant sought to enjoin a state court action whose prosecution furthered a violation of the proxy rules under the Securities Exchange Act. In an opinion by Judge Friendly, the court initially recognized that, under *Leiter Minerals, supra*, and other cases, §2283 would not have precluded an injunction against the state action had it been sought by a federal agency. Noting that Congress had intended to enlist the aid of private litigants to secure the “effective enforcement of the Exchange Act and SEC rules,” the court then held that the exception to §2283 available for government prosecutors was also available to private plaintiffs:

“... [T]here is little question that if the Commission had sought the injunction here, §2283 would not have blocked its way. We are not persuaded that a different decision is compelled under the circumstances of this case. *If the policy of the anti-injunction statute is superseded by the need for immediate and effective enforcement of federal securities regulations and statutes, the fact that enforcement here is by a private party rather than the agency should not be controlling.* The Supreme Court has recognized such a suit as being ‘a necessary supplement to Commission action’ in providing the protection for investors contemplated by the statute . . . . The situation is quite different from that in labor relations where Congress has vested

the sole right to seek injunctive relief to prevent violations of the Act in the National Labor Relations Board\* . . . . *Section 16 of the Clayton Act . . . affords a closer parallel, since there as here the private suit plays an important role in enforcement*” (360 F. 2d at 697-98).

The opinion then went on to distinguish other cases (including *Lyons I* (Pet. Br. 24, 25, 34) and *Red Rock (Id. at 34, 37)*) on the ground that the state proceedings attacked therein did not themselves involve any violation of the antitrust laws (*Id.*).

Judge Friendly’s assessment of the intended scope of §16 is in full accord not only with the legislative history of that statute but also with this Court’s own construction. In *Zenith Radio Corp., supra*, 395 U.S. at 130-31, this Court recognized that:

“[T]he purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws . . . . Section 16 should be construed and applied with this purpose in mind . . . *Its availability should be ‘conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect.’* ”

Likewise in *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.*, 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968), the Court declared that the “*overriding public policy*” embodied in the antitrust laws would best be served “by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of [those] laws.”

\* This disposes of *Amalgamated Clothing Workers* (Pet. Br. 22, 29, *Id.* n.13, 33) which involved the National Labor Relations Act, whose enforcement is wholly reserved to a federal agency.



Under *Leiter Minerals* and *Studebaker*, *supra*, it is clear that, because of the national interest involved, §2283 would not prevent the Justice Department from obtaining an injunction against a state court action whose enforcement furthered antitrust violations. The result should be no different here, where the enforcement of the antitrust laws is entrusted to a "private attorney general." The same "overriding public policy" is at stake.

As the lower Courts recognized, the present case is no mere private squabble. Judge McLaren granted the injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed it, because "the paramount national interest requires court intervention" (App. 236, 238, 241, 288). To deny the preliminary injunction here would not only deprive private parties of their uniquely federal remedies; more importantly, it would hamper the enforcement of the national public interest in free competition, and thus defeat the intended scope of §16 of the Clayton Act.

#### 4. Affirmance Of This Preliminary Injunction Would Not Impair The Continuing Vitality Of §2283.

Petitioner sounds the tocsin that affirmance here "would reduce the highest tribunals of any state to the status of special masters subject to *de novo* control by a single district judge"! (Pet. Br. 21). Other special masters "could be preliminarily enjoined under myriad other federal statutes as well" (*Id.*), namely, under "every federal statute authorizing injunctive relief" (Pet. Br. 18, 30-31). Hyperbole is not a very effective weapon.

There is no question here of exempting from §2283 "every federal statute authorizing injunctive relief." What is in issue, rather, is a statute providing a uniquely federal in-

junctive remedy, whose clear intent is to enlist the aid of private litigants in the enforcement of the overriding federal policy embodied in the antitrust laws, over which the federal courts have exclusive and untrammelled jurisdiction.

Nor is the issue here the exemption of *every antitrust injunction* from the prohibition of §2283. Section 16 only authorizes injunctions against "threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." Here the District Court granted the injunction only after finding that the state court proceeding was part and parcel of a violation of the antitrust laws, and that the intended scope of §16 would therefore be frustrated if a federal court were powerless to enjoin it, *pendente lite*.

Thus the decision below in no way conflicts with cases, such as those cited by petitioner (Pet. Br. 24 n. 24, 25-26), in which the alleged antitrust violation was only *collateral* to the state court action. As *Studebaker* noted (320 F. 2d at 698), neither *Lyons I* (Pet Br. 24, 25, 34) nor *Red Rock* (*Id.* at 34, 37) involved a showing by the federal plaintiff that the state proceeding sought to be enjoined itself offended the federal statute. All these cases\* involved actions "for collection of ordinary debts for goods delivered or services rendered" and not actions "to enforce the very conduct . . . prohibited by the Clayton or Sherman Act" (*Helpfenbein v. International Industries, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1971)).

On the other hand, courts have enjoined state suits under the antitrust laws when those suits "are in furtherance of an illegal act" (*Katz Drug Co. v. Schaeffer Pen*

\* The same is true of all the other cases petitioner cites: *Am. Mfrs.*, *Avon Pub. Co.*, *Bascom Launder*, *Carter*, *Reines* and *Potter* (Pet. Br. 24 n.24, 25-26) (see *infra*, pp. 67, 69).



Co., 6 F. Supp. 212, 214 (W.D. Mo. 1933)), or when necessary "to prevent the defendants from acquiring any of the fruits of the condemned project" (*United States v. Bayer*, 135 F. Supp. 65, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see also *Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.*, 351 F. Supp. 462, 494, 514, 517-19 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). Thus we do not ask this Court to obliterate "a previously settled interpretation of §2283 and §16" (Pet. Br. 24).

Finally, as the Court of Appeals declared, the facts here reflect a "classic example" of the impending frustration of uniquely federal remedies. Not only do Vendo's enforcement actions violate the Sherman Act, they threaten the extinction of the very right to redress that violation in a courtroom (*supra*, pp. 47-50).

**B. The Preliminary Injunction Was "Necessary In Aid Of" The District Court's Jurisdiction Within The Meaning Of The Second Exception To 28 U.S.C. §2283.**

The District Court held that the injunction was "necessary in aid of" its jurisdiction and thus qualified under the second exception to 28 U.S.C. §2283. The Court of Appeals did not pass upon this question, since it upheld the District Court under the "expressly authorized" exception to §2283.

The District Court's decision was correct. Petitioner entirely misconstrues what the Court held and ignores what it found. There is no question but that petitioner's "further collection efforts would eliminate two plaintiffs, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corp.," together with their respective federal antitrust claims. Absent the injunction those plaintiffs would be, at least in substance, under peti-

tioner's control or at its disposition (App. 238-39; 241). Petitioner does not contend that the District Court abused its discretion in making these findings which, in any event, are squarely based upon the evidence (*supra*, pp. 47-50).

Petitioner argues that "irrespective of Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend" the remaining antitrust plaintiff—Stoner's administrator—"would continue to be an adverse party and, therefore, the District Court would not in any event be deprived of jurisdiction under Article III" (Pet. Br. 35). But petitioner would be the first to object should Stoner's administrator try to continue the prosecution of *the two federal antitrust claims* of Lektro-Vend and Stoner Inv. Absent relief, the District Court would be left with but one federal antitrust claim, and even that claim could not be prosecuted "effectively" (App. 239). The antitrust claims of Stoner Inv. and Lektro-Vend would be placed upon the auction block of the sheriff. Obviously Article III would require dismissal of those two claims, as the District Court held (App. 241), not to mention that this would also spell the demise of petitioner's competitor.

In *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970), this Court described the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to §2283:

"[W]e conclude that it implies something similar to the concept of injunctions to 'protect or effectuate' judgments. Both exceptions to the general prohibition of §2283 imply that some federal *injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case.*"

Here petitioner seeks not merely "to seriously impair the . . . flexibility and authority" of the District Court to de-

cide this case; indeed, it seeks to “eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein” (App. 239).

When two meritorious antitrust claims are subject to imminent *extinction* in furtherance of an anticompetitive scheme, then the need for federal injunctive relief, under *Atlantic Coast Line*, is absolutely compelling. Far more is at stake than mere “flexibility and authority” to decide those claims; without court intervention the claims themselves would disappear. As the District Court put it in *Lyons I* (Pet. Br. 24, n. 10, 25, 34), an injunction “in aid of jurisdiction” *would* lie when “such restraint is *absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity* of the Federal court’s jurisdiction” (109 F. Supp. at 925), precisely the case at bar.

None of the other cases cited by petitioner involved any threat to the very exercise of federal jurisdiction such as petitioner’s collection proceedings—in furtherance of its antitrust violations—posed in this case. On the contrary, the grounds upon which courts have rejected injunctions in other cases directly support the injunction here. The Second Circuit’s recent decisions in *Jennings* (Pet. Br. 33-34) and *Vernitron* (*Id.* at 34) are particularly instructive. In *Jennings*, petitioner’s “procedurally very similar” case (*Id.* at 33), the Court found that execution of “the state court judgments did not constitute an impediment to the assertion of the federal right or remedy” (482 F. 2d at 1131); that it was “not enough that the requested injunction is *related* to [federal jurisdiction], but it must be ‘necessary in aid of’” that jurisdiction (482 F. 2d at 1134-35).

Likewise in *Vernitron* (Pet. Br. 34) the “only conceivable interference” with federal jurisdiction was *the possibility* that the state court might attempt to determine issues of federal law; this, however, hadn’t occurred

and “in any event would be wholly without effect” (440 F. 2d at 108). And in *Vernitron* the Second Circuit *did* say that §2283 *does* authorize injunctions “in those situations where *the real or potential conflict threatens the very authority of the federal court*” (*Id.*). Here the threatened conflict is not “potential” but “real” and “the very authority of the federal court” is indeed at stake.

That both *Jennings* and *Vernitron* support the injunction at bar is further demonstrated by the fact that *both* cases distinguished the Second Circuit’s earlier decision in *Studebaker*, *supra*, pp. 60-62, upon the identical ground: the state proceedings sought to be enjoined “did not constitute a furtherance of an ongoing violation of the Securities Exchange Act” (*Jennings*, 482 F. 2d at 1131; *Vernitron*, 440 F. 2d at 108). But the threat to federal jurisdiction here stems *directly* from petitioner’s antitrust violations (*supra*, pp. 43-47). This also disposes of *Red Rock* (Pet. Br. 34; see 195 F. 2d at 409, as well as *Glenn W. Turner* (Pet. Br. 33, 34, 36).

*Turner* (*Id.*) is patently inapt. It specifically found that the state suit did *not* “by its very nature [further] a violation of” federal law; on the contrary, it was prosecuted by a state attorney general and was “consistent with the goals of the federal securities laws” (421 F. 2d at 781). Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in *Turner*, we do not seek to enjoin petitioner’s creditors and preserve its solvency so as “to facilitate the collection of judgments” which we might subsequently be awarded in this action (*Id.* at 780). Rather we seek to uphold an injunction which bars petitioner from “facilitat[ing] the collection of [its] judgments” and thwarting the very exercise of *the District Court’s exclusive jurisdiction* over our meritorious federal antitrust claims. The issue therefore is not petitioner’s



solvency but whether there can be a trial upon antitrust claims in the only tribunal empowered to pass upon those claims.

Finally, the need to preserve the jurisdiction of the District Court over the claims at bar is particularly compelling in light of the "overriding public policy" embodied in the antitrust laws (*Perma Life Mufflers, supra*) and "the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect" (*Zenith Radio Corp., supra*).

### III.

#### THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STRIKES A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL INTERESTS AND THUS IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND FEDERALISM.

The Court of Appeals said:

"The principle of comity has no applicability when the exclusive remedy for an injury lies in the federal court. We are in agreement with the trial court's observation:

'Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of an injunction considering the peculiar nature of this case. The federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state action the paramount national interest requires court intervention'" (App. 289, quoting App. 241).

Charging that the Court below sanctioned a "flagrant abuse of federal equity power," "a mockery of the concept of federalism," and an "insult to the processes of a state judicial system" (Pet. Br. 38, 39), petitioner seriously overstates what the Court actually held. Contrary to petitioner's assertion (*Id.*), the Court did *not* hold that prin-

ciples of comity and federalism were inapplicable in *any* action under §16 of the Clayton Act simply because §16 affords an exclusive remedy in the federal courts. Quite the contrary, the Court of Appeals specifically adopted what the District Court said about "the peculiar nature of this case," namely, that it "is based in part on the very proceeding sought to be enjoined" (*supra*). Indeed, as the Court of Appeals noted (App. 290), the District Court *found* that the judgments petitioner sought to enforce depended on unlawful agreements and were obtained in pursuance of an anticompetitive scheme, contrary to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (*supra*, pp. 43-47).

Thus we dispose of petitioner's asserted "direct conflict with decisions of the Fifth Circuit" (Pet. Br. 38), which is illusory. *Response of Carolina (Id. at 37)* denied injunctive relief under §16 precisely because "the contract provisions sued on in the state court do not embody or further the anti-competitive practices" (498 F. 2d at 319); and *Red Rock* (Pet. Br. 37) likewise expressly recognized "that cases could arise in which a State Court proceeding could be properly considered to threaten 'a violation of the Anti-Trust laws' so as to come within" the express terms of §16 (195 F. 2d at 409). Both of petitioner's cases thus clearly envisaged federal court intervention, as here, upon a showing that "federal law is violated by continuation of the state action" (App. 241, 289), not to mention that further collection here would "thwart a federal anti-trust suit" (*supra*, pp. 47-50).

The issue that remains here can be stated simply: should the doctrine of *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and *Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.*, 420 U.S. 592 (1975) be extended to bar the preliminary injunction in the present case?



In *Younger v. Harris* (Pet. Br. 36), the Court reversed an injunction against a pending state criminal prosecution based upon the concept of "Our Federalism." The Court's opinion (per Black, J.) described this concept as follows:

"The concept does not mean blind deference to 'State's Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts . . . What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States" (401 U.S. at 44).

The Court then held that, absent "special circumstances" (*Id.* at 41, 45-49, 53-54), "the incidental 'chilling effect' of a potentially unconstitutional state statute upon the exercise of first amendment rights "does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution" (*Id.* at 51-52).

Then in *Huffman v. Pursue, supra* (Pet. Br. 37), the Court held that the principles of equity, comity and federalism canvassed in *Younger* also forbade federal restraint of a state civil proceeding which was quasi-criminal in nature. The District Court had enjoined the enforcement of a state court order closing down a movie theatre as a result of a prosecution by a county attorney under a state nuisance abatement statute. The Supreme Court quoted what *Younger* said about "not unduly interfer[ing] with the legitimate activities of the States" (420

U.S. at 601); it then found that the particular state proceeding involved was "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases," noting specifically that the state was a party, and that the proceeding was "both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes" pertaining to obscenity (*Id.* at 604). The Court concluded that:

" . . . an offense to the State's interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding . . . Similarly, while in this case the District Court's injunction has not directly disrupted Ohio's criminal justice system, it has disrupted that State's efforts to protect the very interests which underlie its criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the standards which are embodied in its criminal laws" (*Id.* at 604-05).

That the holdings of *Younger* and *Huffman* do not extend across the board to all civil proceedings was clearly reflected in both the majority and dissenting opinions in *Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States*, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483, 497-98, 500-01, 504 (March 24, 1976). What is required is not a "blind deference" to state interests, but rather a fair balancing of the "legitimate interests of both State and National Governments" (*Younger, supra; Huffman, supra*). When the present case is analyzed in these terms, it becomes clear that this preliminary injunction did not offend principles of comity and federalism.

**A. Enjoining Collection Of Petitioner's Judgments, Pendente Lite, Did Not Unduly Infringe Any Significant State Interest.**

The District Court recognized that "the principles of comity and federalism militate against unnecessarily in-

terfering with pending state court actions even if §2283 is satisfied" (App. 240, citing *Mitchum, supra*).

But the state interest involved here falls far short of the interests at stake in the previous cases where this Court held federal injunctive relief to be inappropriate. This state action was not a criminal proceeding (*Younger, supra*).<sup>\*</sup> Nor was it "akin to a criminal prosecution," where a federal injunction would "[disrupt the] State's efforts to protect the very interests which underlie its criminal laws . . ." (*Huffman, supra*). There was no interference here with state executive officers (*Rizzo v. Goode*, Pet. Br. 36); or the state's collection of its taxes (*Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman*, 319 U.S. 293 (1943)); or the state's certification of its delegates to a national political convention (*Cousins v. Wigoda*, Pet. Br. 36; see *Id.*, 463 F. 2d 603, 606-07 (7th Cir. 1972)).<sup>\*\*</sup>

Rather, the interests advanced in the state court action here were those of a private party—a private party, indeed, which has been found *prima facie* guilty of violations of both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Neither the State of Illinois nor any state official was a plaintiff here. Quite the contrary, *respondents'* repeated attempts to gain relief under Illinois antitrust law were supported, not

\* As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in *Younger*: "The offense to state interests is likely to be less in a civil proceeding. A State's decision to classify conduct as criminal provides some indication of the importance it has ascribed to prompt and unencumbered enforcement of its law. By contrast, *the State might not even be a party to a proceeding under a civil statute.*" (401 U.S. at 55 n.2, concurring opinion).

\*\* Mr. Justice Rehnquist, while warning in *Cousins* that federal courts should not "casually enjoin the conduct of pending state court proceedings of either civil or criminal character, also noted that "the test to be applied may be less stringent in civil cases than in criminal" (409 U.S. at 1206).

only by the Illinois attorney general, who appeared as *amicus curiae* during both state court appeals (See App. 99), but even by the Illinois legislature (*supra*, p. 21).

The District Court did not overturn any Illinois statute, nor did it reverse any state court interpretation of Illinois statutory or common law. And there was no disruption of the ongoing state adjudicatory process. While we recognize that petitioner's collection activities qualify as "state proceedings" for purposes of §2283, surely temporary intervention during this phase of the state proceedings presents a far less sensitive situation than would have been presented by federal interference in the state court's ongoing adjudication of the substantive issues in the case.

And petitioner's right to collect the balance of its judgments, should it ultimately prevail, "remains well protected" by substantial bonds, a security agreement and the continued pendency of the judgment liens (App. 242; *supra*, pp. 32-33). Thus any indirect state interest in the collection of those judgments is also protected. Certainly there was no affront to state interests when petitioner volunteered a "standstill agreement" while the District Court passed on respondents' claims at the preliminary injunction hearing (*supra*, pp. 29-30); a "standstill order" during the trial of those claims—which the parties had always anticipated (*supra*, pp. 27-28)—should have no larger effect.\*

\* This injunction was carefully designed to impose the minimum restraint necessary to assure prompt and effective adjudication of the treble damage claims. Thus, for example, the order provided that while petitioner should not reactivate the dormant contempt proceedings, the state court might freely do so *sua sponte* (App. 269-70). Also, the recent modification of the order (*supra*, pp. 34-35) permits petitioner to undertake discovery in the state court but not to secure further turnover orders.



Finally, as *Younger* and *Huffman* noted, federal abstention is inappropriate in certain circumstances: in cases of bad faith prosecution, harassment, or prosecution under "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional statutes (401 U.S. at 53-54; 420 U.S. at 601, 611).

But similar circumstances are presented in this case. The District Court found "persuasive evidence that Vendo's activities in its litigation against the Stoner interests in Illinois state court were not a genuine attempt use the adjudicative process legitimately" (App. 237). Moreover, the agreements upon which the petitioner sued and recovered were indeed flagrantly and patently violative of the Sherman Act (App. 233-35). Thus, Mr. Justice Stewart's observation in *Younger* is particularly appropriate:

"In such circumstances the reasons of policy for deferring to state adjudication *are outweighed by the injury flowing from the very bringing of the state proceedings, by the perversion of the very process that is supposed to provide vindication, and by the need for speedy and effective action to protect federal rights*" (401 U.S. at 56 (concurring opinion)).

Here the Illinois judicial process, which petitioner says should be vindicated, was found to have been employed by petitioner as part and parcel of its scheme to monopolize trade and enforce agreements violative of the Sherman Act.

**B. Paramount Federal Interests Required The Issuance Of This Preliminary Injunction.**

As against whatever state interests may be at stake, the federal interests at bar are paramount. Respondents prosecute this case in a federal district court invested by Con-

gress with an exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the claims at bar. Congress so acted, not to demean the state courts, but because "an administration of the Acts, at once effective and uniform would best be accomplished by an untrammelled jurisdiction of the federal courts" (*Lyons*, 222 F. 2d at 189). They prosecute this case as private attorneys general not merely to secure "private relief, but . . . to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws" (*Zenith Radio Corp.*, 395 U.S. at 130-131). And the determination of that policy is not 'at the mercy of' the parties . . . nor dependent on the usual rules governing settlement of private litigation" (*Mercoird Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.*, 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944)).

Given the District Court's findings, this preliminary injunction was necessary to prevent the immediate consummation of petitioner's anticompetitive scheme, which violated both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Otherwise, petitioner would succeed in thwarting altogether the prosecution of two of the antitrust claims here, and crippling the prosecution of the third. Thus the District Court concluded:

"That the public interest in protection of competition requires the issuance of a preliminary injunction; that the paramount national interest requires court intervention by a preliminary injunction herein; that the failure to issue such injunction will deprive the Court of full and effective jurisdiction of the said federal antitrust claims . . . and will impair, obstruct, or render fruitless the Court's determination of said claims; and that a preliminary injunction as provided herein is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of this Court . . . ." (App. 267).



And Mr. Chief Justice Stone said it all when he stated, on behalf of a unanimous Court in *Sola Electric*:

"Local rules of estoppel which would fasten upon the public as well as the petitioner the burden of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act must yield to the Act's declaration that such agreements are unlawful, and to the public policy of the Act which in the public interest precludes the enforcement of such unlawful agreements" (317 U.S. at 177).

#### IV.

#### **THIS INJUNCTION IS NOT PRECLUDED BY RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO PRESS THEIR FEDERAL ANTITRUST DEFENSE IN THE STATE COURT ACTION.**

At the very outset of this litigation, respondents, "in an effort to avoid a needless duplication of lawsuits between the parties" (App. 13), removed the entire action to the federal District Court (the only court which could have tried all the issues in the case). Separate lawsuits in the state and federal courts were made necessary only by petitioner's refusal to waive its objections to removal.\* Once petitioner made that decision, there was no question but that a *separate* federal action would be required to try respondents' injunctive and treble damage claims. (This fact alone negates any suggestion that the withdrawal of respondents' federal defense from the state action was a mere "tactical" attempt to get two bites at the apple.)

When the case was remanded to the state court (September 23, 1965), the respondents filed three separate de-

\* Petitioner's objections could have been waived. See 1A Moore's Federal Practice, §0.157[11] at n.29 (1974 ed.).

fenses in that court based on the Illinois and federal antitrust laws (October 20, 1965). The following day, they filed the present action in the federal District Court.

It was understood by the parties and by the District Court that a federal trial of respondents' antitrust claims would take place after the conclusion of the state court suit—regardless of who prevailed there—in order to avoid the "physical impossibility" of trying two complex lawsuits at once (App. 260-65). In its Reply In Support of Petition, petitioner again reflected the consistent understanding of the parties that the trial of respondents' treble damage claims would inevitably proceed. It stated:

"The jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate treble-damage claims . . . is not disputed. The issue here relates to the federal courts' power to *enjoin* state court proceedings (and, more specifically, enforcement of final state court judgments)—not what effect the state court proceedings or judgments may have on respondents' *treble-damage* action." (p. 8; emphasis petitioner's.)

Yet the plain fact is that, absent the injunction, federal treble damage claims will be defeated (*supra*, pp. 47-50). Thus, petitioner's argument boils down to the untenable proposition that, although respondents' right to proceed with their treble damage claims is conceded, they have no right to the equitable relief which is necessary to preserve the trial of those claims, because of the dismissal of their federal antitrust defense from the state action.

The facts surrounding that dismissal are pertinent. It was only *after* the state trial judge refused to reinstate their antitrust defenses (September 11, 1970) that the respondents requested the dismissal *without prejudice* of their federal antitrust defense as well, hoping thus to

avoid piecemeal, duplicative litigation of complex antitrust issues.\* There being no objection by petitioner, this motion was granted (App. 82). Obviously, under such circumstances, the dismissal *without prejudice* envisioned nothing less than a full preservation of respondents' rights to assert their federal antitrust issues in the federal court action.

Dismissal of the federal defense was also spurred by the same considerations of comity which petitioner claims have been ignored. District Judge McGarr, then presiding over this case, indicated that the simultaneous pendency of these federal antitrust issues in both state and federal courts "presents a conflict in the comity between our bipartite judicial system" (App. 82). When he was informed of the dismissal of the federal antitrust defense in the state case, he said,

"This was undoubtedly done in consideration of this court's expressed reluctance to consider the cause of

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\* The first Appellate Court decision held the state antitrust issues inapplicable under the doctrine of federal preemption—a palpably erroneous ground, as petitioner now candidly acknowledges (Pet. Br. 29 n.13). When the trial court refused to reinstate the state antitrust defenses and counterclaim in light of an intervening legislative amendment (*supra*, p. 21), the state defendants confronted the prospect of litigating their appeal to the Appellate Court and ultimately to the Illinois Supreme Court or to this Court, securing a third trial at which to litigate their state antitrust defenses and counterclaim.

Thereafter, respondents faced the inevitable prospect of having to try their treble damage claims in federal district court, making a total of three trials on complex antitrust issues against a litigious, deep-pocketed adversary.

action here while the same issue was pending between the same parties in the state court case." (App. 85.)\*

Indeed, the dismissal of the antitrust defense from the state action *lessened* the risk of "insult to the processes of a state judicial system" (Pet. Br. 38). For if the state court had proceeded to a decision on ultimate legal issues of federal antitrust liability, that decision would certainly have been subject to redetermination in the federal court, under the doctrine of *Lyons, supra*. Surely that would have been much more offensive than the present situation, which merely involves a temporary "standstill" order, *pendente lite* (App. 264).

And how can all three respondents be denied the right to proceed on their federal antitrust *claims* by virtue of the dismissal, without prejudice, by two respondents of a *defense* in the state action—a defense whose adjudication by the state courts would have been neither *res judicata* nor in any way binding on the federal court? (*Lyons, supra*, 222 F.2d at 189).

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\* Judge McGarr, after receiving briefs on the question of *res judicata*, concluded that respondents' federal antitrust case "encompasses issues which are broader than any presented in the [state court] anti-trust defense." Accordingly, he concluded that "plaintiff cannot be precluded from asserting its anti-trust cause of action in the federal court" (App. 92).

Indeed, respondents' Amended and Supplemental Complaint (App. 124), on the basis of which preliminary relief was sought, alleged numerous actionable facts which were not in existence at the time the antitrust defense was withdrawn. It is difficult to understand how, by withdrawing their federal *defense* without prejudice and without objection, the respondents could have waived their right to a full assertion of an antitrust *claim* based in part on actionable facts which could not have been included in that defense at the time it was dismissed.



*England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners*, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1964), approved practically the same procedure followed here: reservation of federal constitutional claims for adjudication in a federal court following the state court's determination of state law issues. It applies *a fortiori* in the case of federal antitrust claims, whose adjudication Congress entrusted exclusively to the federal courts. Nor should it matter that respondents were remanded to the state court by virtue of petitioner's refusal to waive its objections to removal, rather than by virtue (as in *England*) of the federal court's own application of the doctrine of abstention.

Further, the present situation, in which a preliminary injunction is required to preserve the respondents' right to a federal trial, has occurred only because the federal court, *by agreement of the parties*, stayed its hand in order to let the state trial conclude first. As Judge McLaren said,

"I understood that *the parties had agreed* and that [petitioner's counsel] was in entire agreement that there would not be any effort, that it would be an undue burden on both sides, to try to carry on both suits concurrently. *I certainly would not have held off for three years on the trial of the case before me if I had known that there was any question in his mind that somehow the plaintiff here is waiving any rights by continuing the matter, and the Court was in some way giving the defendant an advantage by letting it proceed in the state proceeding and holding the matter up here . . . .* I didn't think that there was anything in anybody's mind to the contrary. After all of this time and after all of the numbers of times that we have had status reports, it comes as a very severe shock to me, and I must say that I am very disappointed and very chagrined that I didn't simply force this case to go ahead along with other cases." (App. 264-65; see also App. 260-264).

Judge McLaren summed up the matter succinctly when he told petitioner: "Well, you had a chance as plaintiff to select your forum for the charges you made. I think that they had an equal right to choose their forum for the charges that they made" (App. 263). Indeed, respondents could have litigated their antitrust claims *only* in a federal forum.

Where the federal Court has stayed its hand because of such an understanding on the part of the Court and the litigants, it would be utterly unjust now to penalize respondents, not to mention the public interest, simply because they withdrew their federal antitrust defense *without prejudice* under the circumstances stated.

*Mercoird Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.*, 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944), held that a defendant could pursue a federal antitrust counterclaim even though it had failed to raise the antitrust violation as a defense in a prior related litigation between the same parties. Citing the public interest embodied in the federal antitrust laws, the Court declared:

"And the determination of that policy is not 'at the mercy of' the parties . . . nor dependent on the usual rules governing the settlement of private litigation." (*Id.* at 670).

The most that can be said of respondents' failure to press their federal antitrust defense in the state court is that they thereby permitted the entry of a final Supreme Court judgment. Petitioner cannot escape the fact that his is not a private action but one in which plaintiffs act as private attorneys general to enforce the salutary provisions of the Sherman Act. Nor can petitioner escape the finding of the Courts below (1) that the agreements on which those judg-



ments were based violated the Sherman Act, and (2) that the procurement of judgments based upon those agreements was part and parcel of the scheme to violate the antitrust laws. Therefore the enforcement of those judgments would *enforce the unlawful agreements* and consummate the anticompetitive scheme in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

Thus the pronouncement of Mr. Chief Justice Stone in *Sola Electric supra*, is directly in point:

"Local rules of estoppel which would fasten upon the public as well as the petitioner the burden of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act must yield to the Act's declaration that such agreements are unlawful, and to the public policy of the Act which in the public interest precludes the enforcement of such unlawful agreements" (317 U.S. at 177).

## V.

### THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT REVERSE, REVIEW OR REVISE THE STATE COURT DECISION BY COLLATERAL ATTACK OR OTHERWISE.

Petitioner's final argument is that the District Court had no jurisdiction to review the final judgments of the Illinois courts. But the District Court recognized that it had no such jurisdiction, citing the very case (*Rooker*) on which petitioner relies (App. 226 n.1, 232; Pet. Br. 39). The simple fact here is that the federal courts did not reverse any state court determination. In ruling that petitioner's anticompetitive agreements and other conduct were illegal under the Sherman Act, the District Court was passing on a question of federal law which was totally independent of the determination made by the state courts—which in-

volved purely state law issues. *E.g.*, *Schine Chain Theatres v. United States*, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948). What the District Court reviewed was not the Illinois judgments themselves, but *rather petitioner's anticompetitive conduct in procuring those judgments*:

"[T]he state court proceedings must be examined by this Court for the purpose of determining whether Vendo prosecuted those cases as part of an anticompetitive scheme" (App. 232).

The Court of Appeals quoted and approved what the District Court said with respect to such limited examination of the state proceedings (App. 289).

We have repeatedly stated what the District Court found upon that examination, namely, that the state court litigation which resulted in the judgments was predicated and depended upon illegal agreements and was part of an anticompetitive scheme in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (*supra*, pp. 43-47). One is sorely pressed to understand how judgments procured as a part of a scheme to violate that Act are "entitled to full faith and credit" (Pet. Br. 41) in the very federal court exclusively charged with the enforcement of that Act. In reality, petitioner says it is entitled to the fruits of its illegal enterprise, federal or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding. We could discuss this in greater detail, but deem it unnecessary. See *Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.*, 317 U.S. 173, 177 (1942); *Schine Chain Theatres, supra*, 334 U.S. at 119; *Lyons, supra*, 222 F.2d at 189.

## CONCLUSION

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Petitioner violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by agreements violative of Section 1 and monopolistic practices violative of Section 2. It employed the state court to enforce its illegal agreements and further its monopolistic practices, making false claims in furtherance of its anti-competitive objective. Thus, not only was its objective illegal, but so also were the means it employed. It had used the courts before for this purpose. While unsuccessful in the courts of Georgia (*supra*, pp. 19-20), its illegal enterprise, after two rebuffs by the Appellate Court of Illinois (*supra*, pp. 18, 23-24), finally proved successful in the Supreme Court of Illinois to the tune of over seven and one-half million dollars, in a case where the original *ad damnum* was \$500,000 (App. 9, 10). By writ of execution it now seeks the \$7,500,000.00 fruits of that illegal enterprise.

Success does not sanctify illegal enterprise nor put it outside the pale of law. Notwithstanding, petitioner boldly asserts that no Chancellor's writ can stay the consummation of that illegal enterprise, even though that consummation violates the public policy of one of the most important federal statutes in the land, and even though that consummation would deny a courtroom to two parties entrusted with the role of private attorneys general to enforce that public policy, and seriously jeopardize the day in court of the third party so entrusted, now represented by his widow as administrator of his estate.

The law has witnessed many vagaries. Few match this "classic example" of one "who seeks to thwart a federal antitrust suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged [and found by the District Court] to be the very object of antitrust violations" (App. 286). We respectfully submit that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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November 27, 1976

## ADDITIONAL APPENDIX A

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### Additional Statutes Involved

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, provides in pertinent part:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. \* \* \*

Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2, provides in pertinent part:

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. \* \* \*

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15, provides:

Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

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Supreme Court, U. S.  
FILED

DEC 16 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

**No. 76-156**

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
Petitioner,  
vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER** and **STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
a Delaware corporation,  
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court  
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-156

**THE VENDO COMPANY**, a Missouri corporation,  
 Petitioner,

vs.

**LEKTRO-VEND CORP.**, a Delaware corporation,  
**HARRY B. STONER and STONER INVESTMENTS, INC.**,  
 a Delaware corporation,  
 Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court  
 of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

**REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER**

**Introduction**

Although the issues before the Court are basically legal in character, respondents concentrate to a remarkable degree on highly inaccurate and vigorously contested factual assertions concerning the merits of respondents' anti-trust claim. This is neither the time nor place for a trial of that claim, particularly since its validity or invalidity cannot control resolution of the issues before the Court. However, at the minimum, we feel constrained to point out the following in response:

— With respect to respondents' heavy reliance on statements contained in the District Court's opinion granting the preliminary injunction, the District Court itself admonished (App. 241):

"The findings contained herein are interlocutory in nature necessarily based on an incomplete record.

Of course, a complete trial specifically directed to the issues in this case might produce evidence requiring a different or more limited result."

- No court (apart from the District Court's admittedly tentative ruling) has to our knowledge held a non-competition covenant ancillary to the sale of a business or an employment contract to be unlawful under the Sherman Act—let alone *per se* unlawful without regard to market impact (App. 233-34).<sup>1</sup>
- No court (apart from the District Court's admittedly tentative ruling) has to our knowledge held that the "dangerous probability" requirement of proving an alleged attempt to monopolize can be satisfied by an alleged 20% market share (App. 236).<sup>2</sup>

In any event, it is important to reemphasize the nature of the state proceeding which has been enjoined. *First*, it is a proceeding in which Vendo's state-court claim was found to be *meritorious* after exhaustive review. *Second*, the judgments are clearly final and entitled to full faith and credit. *Third*, as the Illinois Supreme Court squarely held, the judgments rest on Stoner's violation of his state-law fiduciary duties and do not depend on the challenged non-competition covenants. *Fourth*, the respondents deliberately rejected a full and fair opportunity to present their federal antitrust defense in the state proceeding.

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., *Bradford v. New York Times Co.*, 501 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1974); *Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc.*, 265 F.2d 619, 624-625 (5th Cir. 1959); *Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC*, 321 F.2d 825, 837 (7th Cir. 1963). For the background of the 1959 transaction, see Stoner's own signed statement to the Federal Trade Commission (Supplement A *infra*, pp. 29-31).

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., *Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co.*, 402 F.2d 968, 973-75 (8th Cir. 1968), *cert. denied*, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).

#### A. Vendo's Claim Was Found to Be Meritorious—Not Baseless or "Sham"—by the Illinois Courts.

Throughout their brief (e.g., pp. 3, 43-47, 74, 83-84), respondents attack Vendo's state court suit as "harassment" and "not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately". Yet they admit, as they must, that this alleged "harassment" resulted in judgments in Vendo's favor of more than \$7,500,000, that those judgments were unanimously affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, and that this Court thereafter denied certiorari (420 U.S. 975). Indeed, *all five* of the decisions rendered in the state proceeding agreed that Vendo had a well-founded claim and was entitled to recover damages.

Respondents do not and cannot cite any authority supporting the proposition that such *eminently successful* litigation falls within the "mere sham" exception which this Court in *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972), indicated was outside the protection of the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. See, e.g., *Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc.*, 497 F.2d 285, 290 (10th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975). A single suit, brought by a single party not acting in concert with anyone else, cannot possibly be characterized as a "combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors from having 'free and unlimited access' to the agencies and courts"—the situation dealt with in *California Motor Transport*, *supra*, 404 U.S. at 515.

Furthermore, in its subsequent decision in *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States*, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), this Court expressly recognized that the institution of litigation is protected from antitrust liability under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine except where the intention to suppress competition is "*evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims and thus within the 'mere*

*sham' exception. . .*" (410 U.S. at 380, italics added).<sup>3</sup> Not one such characteristic is present here.

In any event, even in the different situation where "mere sham" litigation is involved, neither *California Motor Transport* nor *Otter Tail* remotely purports to authorize *injunctions against pending state proceedings*.

**B. The Judgments Are Clearly Final and Entitled to Full Faith and Credit.**

This is not a case, furthermore, where a federal court undertakes to enjoin a state proceeding in its incipiency. On the contrary, after a decade of litigation, the judgments are fully reviewed (including this Court's denial of certiorari), clearly final, and ready for enforcement.

Respondents nevertheless attempt to deny that the state judgments are entitled to full faith and credit (p. 83). Respondents' contention is clearly erroneous. It is well-established that a final judgment entered by a state court of competent jurisdiction must be given full faith and credit, not only by courts of other states, but by federal courts as well (Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738).

Equally frivolous is respondents' contention that federal nullification of a final state judgment is preferable to "federal interference in the state court's ongoing adjudication of the substantive issues in the case" (p. 73). Respondents thus ignore the fact that the judgments are final and entitled to full faith and credit. On that basis, respondents

<sup>3</sup> See also the very recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in *Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Culinary Workers*, 1976-2 Trade Cases ¶ 61,102 (9th Cir.), similarly recognizing that "... defendant's instigation of the litigation [is] a right guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . ." (p. 69,990). The Court also pointed out: "We know of no case that holds that joint action that succeeds in persuading a public body to make an erroneous decision can give rise to a cause of action under the Sherman Act" (p. 69,986, n. 2).

also contend that the preliminary injunction "Infring[ed] no significant state interest" (p. 35) and "Did Not Unduly Infringe Any Significant State Interest" (p. 71). It is difficult to conceive of a state interest more significant than the jurisdiction of its courts, the finality and integrity of their judgments, and the enforcement of state-law rules as to fiduciary conduct. See, e.g., *Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.*, 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).

**C. The State Court Judgments Rest on Stoner's Violation of His Fiduciary Duties and Do Not Depend on the Challenged Non-Competition Covenants.**

Respondents' brief (e.g., pp. 41, 74, 82) is also based on the premise that, if Vendo were allowed to collect its final judgments, it would somehow be enforcing the non-competition covenants in the 1959 agreement. But the most elementary review of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision (App. 100-23) demonstrates respondents' error.

The Illinois Supreme Court held that Stoner violated his fiduciary duties as a director and officer of Vendo by misappropriating a Vendo business opportunity, by secretly giving substantial financial support to the development of the Lektro-Vend machine, and by failing to disclose to Vendo the full extent of his association with the Lektro-Vend project (App. 111-13). The Court further held that Stoner's liability to Vendo for his violations of his fiduciary duties was entirely independent of the non-competition covenants—i.e., "[q]uite apart from any liability which may be predicated upon a breach of the covenants against competition . . ." and "[r]egardless of the appellate court's disposition of those restraint-of-trade issues. . ." (App. 111, 117, italics added).

The District Court sought to circumvent this fundamental fact on the theory that Stoner "would not have become a



corporate director of Vendo absent entry of the anticompetitive agreements" and that "[t]he 1959 agreements were cut from one piece of anticompetitive cloth and cannot be snipped apart" (App. 234-235). But the Illinois Supreme Court expressly based its decision on Stoner's *tort*, not any contract provision, and there is no need to "snip apart" the 1959 agreements. Thus, the severability or non-severability, or enforceability or non-enforceability, of any contract provision, is irrelevant. The fiduciary duties which Stoner violated were imposed, according to the Illinois Supreme Court, as a matter of law apart from any contractual provision between the parties, and there is no conceivable reason why Stoner should be relieved of those duties or the adjudicated liability for his violation of those duties. See, e.g., *Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, Inc.*, 202 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1953).

Thus, even assuming *arguendo* that the covenants were illegal as respondents claim, such illegality would provide no basis for enjoining collection of the state court judgments.

Respondents argue at length (pp. 36, 43-47) that "The District Court Found That Petitioner's Efforts To Collect The Balance Of Its Judgments Would Further A Violation Of The Federal Antitrust Laws." But, as pointed out in petitioner's main brief (p. 14), the District Court did not and could not find that collection of the judgments would itself violate the antitrust laws. Instead, the District Court at most merely opined—on the basis of its erroneous "snipping-one-piece-of-anticompetitive-cloth" theory—that the entire litigation was somehow tainted by the challenged covenants and Vendo's alleged anticompetitive purpose. Any such conclusion ignores *inter alia* the square holding of the Illinois Supreme Court sustaining Vendo's right to recover on the basis of independent fiduciary duties. Cf. *Kelly v. Kosuga*, 358 U.S. 516, 518-21 (1959).

Whatever may be the propriety of respondents' claim for treble damages, the relief granted below—a federal injunc-

tion barring enforcement of final state judgments—is manifestly improper.

#### **D. Respondents Deliberately Rejected a Full and Fair Opportunity to Present Their Federal Defense.**

Not only do respondents attack the final, fully reviewed judgments of the state courts on grounds which they could have presented to the state courts by way of defense, but the respondents do so on grounds which they actually *did* present, which the state courts held they were *entitled* to present, and which *would have been adjudicated* by the state courts except for respondents' *deliberate withdrawal* of those issues from the state proceeding. Respondents thus seek (and so far have been permitted) to nullify, by way of a federal injunction, the results of state court proceedings in which they were given a full and fair opportunity to present the very issues which they asserted many years later as grounds for the injunction.

#### **I. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 2283**

##### **A. Section 16 of the Clayton Act Does Not "Expressly Authorize" an Injunction to Stay State Court Proceedings.**

##### **1. Respondents Urge a Flagrant Misapplication of This Court's *Mitchum* Decision Which Would Nullify § 2283.**

Contrary to respondents' assertions, § 16 of the Clayton Act plainly does not satisfy the criteria enunciated by this Court in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), for determining whether a statute falls within the "expressly authorized" exception to § 2283. Indeed, if respondents' interpretation of *Mitchum* were adopted, not only § 16 but literally dozens of other federal statutes similarly authorizing private injunction remedies would also fall within the

“expressly authorized” exception.<sup>4</sup> The effect of adopting such an interpretation would be to make § 2283 a nullity.

Unlike the statutory provision at issue in *Mitchum*—§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act—§ 16 is not a statute which “created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding” or that “could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding”. (407 U.S. at 237-38.)

In holding that § 1983 fell within the “expressly authorized” exception, the Court stressed that § 1983 created a “uniquely federal” remedy in the sense *that it directly concerned and altered the relationship between the States and the Federal Government*. The Court explained:

“The predecessor of § 1983 was thus an important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional amendment... [T]he role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly established.... Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a *uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation*.” (407 U.S. at 238-39, italics added.)

The Court also emphasized, after an exhaustive review of the statute’s legislative history, that

“The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the peoples’ federal rights—to protect

<sup>4</sup> A partial listing of such statutes—by no means necessarily exhaustive—is set forth *infra*, pp. 10-11 n. 7.

the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’” (407 U.S. at 242, italics added.)

Furthermore, in enacting § 1983, “Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights” (*ibid.*).

Section 16 of the Clayton Act clearly is not a statute of this type. Although respondents (pp. 55, 52) contend that “Both the clear terms and legislative history” of § 16 show that its ‘intended scope’ would be ‘frustrated’ if the courts were powerless to issue an injunction”, they point to nothing in the terms<sup>5</sup> or history of § 16 which indicates that Congress was concerned in any way with state court proceedings (or any other form of state action) in enacting § 16 or that it was even contemplated that the authority conferred by § 16 might be used to enjoin state court proceedings. Instead, respondents (p. 57) simply rely on Congress’ general intent to make antitrust injunctive relief available to private plaintiffs as well as to the Government.

Respondents’ argument could scarcely be more simplistic: They contend (1) that a § 16 injunction is a “uniquely federal” remedy because only federal courts are empowered by § 16 to issue such injunctions and (2) that the application of § 2283 here would “frustrate” the “intended scope”

<sup>5</sup> If anything, as pointed out in our main brief (pp. 23-24), the text of § 16 is precisely to the contrary. Undeterred, respondents (p. 56) invoke “the familiar rule of statutory construction, that ‘*inclusio unius est exclusio alterius*’”, arguing that § 16 prohibits injunctions against common carriers but “makes no reference whatsoever to injunctions against state court proceedings”. Respondents ignore, however, that § 2283 is a prohibition of general applicability to all federal statutes except for those held to be within the “expressly authorized” exception.



of § 16 because (allegedly) a § 16 injunction would otherwise be proper *in this case* in the absence of § 2283.<sup>6</sup>

As already pointed out, such an analysis of *Mitchum* not only perverts the rationale of that decision but would make a nullity of § 2283. The whole object of § 2283 is to bar injunctions against state court proceedings which might be appropriate apart from § 2283. In fact, if it were otherwise, then the “expressly authorized” exception would also permit injunctions under a great many other federal statutes which, like § 16, empower federal courts (but do not empower state courts) to grant private injunctive relief.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Respondents attempt to deny that adoption of their position would exempt every § 16 injunction from § 2283, on the ground that “Section 16 only authorizes injunctions against ‘threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws’” (p. 63, italics the respondents’). But this is to argue in a circle. As respondents acknowledge, there can be no injunction under § 16 unless it meets the quoted test. See, e.g., *Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp.*, 502 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1974) (per Stevens, J.). Since respondents propose the same test to override § 2283, any injunction that meets the § 16 test would thereby also be exempt from § 2283.

<sup>7</sup> E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 216 (§ 315 of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921); 7 U.S.C. § 2050a (Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act); 7 U.S.C. § 2305(a) (§ 6 of the Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967); 12 U.S.C. § 1731b(i) (§ 513 of the National Housing Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1976 (Bank Holding Company Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 298 (relating to the false stamping of gold and silver); 15 U.S.C. § 433 (providing for suits by farmers’ cooperative associations against discrimination by boards of trade); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (2), 1116, 1121 (providing for injunctive relief against trademark infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (Consumer Product Safety Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2102 (Hobby Protection Act); 17 U.S.C. § 112 (providing for injunctions against violation of any right secured by the copyright laws); 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b) (Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act); 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act); 42

(Footnote continued on next page)

Precisely the same argument which respondents make about § 16 could be made about each of these other statutes as well. Thus, it could be argued (1) that each such statute creates a “uniquely federal” remedy because only federal courts are authorized to issue an injunction under the statute and (2) that application of § 2283 would “frustrate” the “intended scope” of the statute in any case where an injunction under the statute would be proper in the absence of § 2283. Respondents’ argument thus proves too much. Acceptance of such an argument would result in the “expressly authorized” exception almost swallowing the entire prohibition—notwithstanding this Court’s repeated admonitions that the exceptions to § 2283 are to be strictly and narrowly construed. See, e.g., *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); *Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.*, 348 U.S. 511, 514 (1955).

## 2. The Cases Relied upon by Respondents either Are Patently Inapplicable or, If Applicable, Support Petitioner

Respondents’ brief fails to cite a single decision which, prior to the District Court’s decision in this case, had ever

(Footnote continued from previous page)

U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunities) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6305, 6395(e) (Energy Policy and Conservation Act); 45 U.S.C. § 547 (Title III of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(20), 322(b)(2), 916, 1017(b) (Interstate Commerce Act); 49 U.S.C. § 1487(a) (Federal Aviation Act). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (Endangered Species Act of 1973); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972); 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (Deepwater Ports Act of 1974); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (Noise Control Act of 1972).



held § 16 “expressly authorized” injunctions against state court proceedings.<sup>8</sup> Instead, respondents rely on a variety of cases having little if any relevance to the issue presented.

For example, they rely on *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); *Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.*, 317 U.S. 173, 177 (1942); *Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc.*, 396 F.2d 398, 401 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 393 U.S. 938 (1968); and *Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli*, 316 F.2d 820, 830 (9th Cir. 1963). Not one of these decisions involved—or even indirectly supports—the issuance of an injunction against state court proceedings. All four decisions involved antitrust treble-damage actions. The issue before this Court, however, is not what effect the state court proceedings or judgments may have on respondents’ treble-damage action, but rather the power of the District Court to *enjoin* the state court proceedings (more specifically, enforcement of final state court judgments).

Respondents’ extensive reliance throughout their brief on the *Lyons* case, *supra*, is particularly misleading. *Lyons* merely held that a federal antitrust action for treble damages should not be stayed until a related state case is

<sup>8</sup> Concerning the *Studebaker*, *Helfenbein*, and *Bayer* cases, see petitioner’s main brief, pp. 25-26 n. 11.

*Katz Drug Co. v. Sheaffer Pen Co.*, 6 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Mo. 1933), is based on a theory of “inherent power” subsequently overruled by this Court in the *Atlantic Coast Line* and other cases.

*Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.*, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), does not even mention § 2283 and the circumstances involved there are unknown.

*Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100 (1969), and *Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.*, 392 U.S. 134 (1968), merely contain generalized statements about the value of private antitrust enforcement and did not even involve injunctions against state court proceedings or any aspect of federal-state relations.

decided.<sup>9</sup> Respondents (pp. 37, 41, 53, 75) quote repeatedly from the Second Circuit’s opinion to the effect that a federal court’s “exclusive jurisdiction” over treble-damage actions is “untrammelled” by prior state adjudications. Quite apart from the fact that neither the holding nor dicta concern issuance of an injunction against state court proceedings, respondents neglect to inform this Court that on rehearing the Second Circuit issued an additional opinion (222 F.2d at 195-96) substantially retracting the statements quoted by respondents. Even more strikingly, in an earlier opinion in the same case, the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of an

<sup>9</sup> In *Mach-Tronics*, as in *Lyons*, the Court held that a federal anti-trust treble-damage action should not be stayed until a related state case is decided. The case does not give the slightest support to issuance of a preliminary injunction against state court proceedings.

In *Sola Electric*, the holding was simply that a patent licensee is not estopped by his license agreement from challenging a price fixing clause in the agreement by showing that the patent is invalid. No state court proceeding was involved. The language of the opinion which respondents (pp. 76, 82) twice quote (“Local rules of estoppel which would fasten upon the public as well as the petitioner the burden of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act must yield to the Act’s declaration that such agreements are unlawful...”—317 U.S. at 177) merely confirmed the applicability of federal substantive law to a federal cause of action and has nothing at all to do with the issues in this case.

In the *Janel* case, Lanvin previously had obtained an injunction in state court enjoining Janel from selling Lanvin perfumes at a price below the established fair trade price. In the subsequent federal treble-damage action based on Lanvin’s alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Second Circuit held that the state court decision enjoining violation of the state fair trade law was not binding on the federal court. The Court did not hold or in any way imply that the federal court could enjoin enforcement of the state injunction. Indeed, the Second Circuit noted that “Of course, there can be no damages arising from the state court injunction, even if the issuance of it was in error. Plaintiff’s remedy for an erroneous state court decision rests in the state courts.” (396 F.2d at 401 n. 2, italics added.)

injunction against the state court proceeding on the ground that it was barred by § 2283, "even though the [federal] Anti-Trust Laws are involved in both actions, as in this case." *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 109 F.Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), *aff'd per curiam*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953).

Respondents also refer to *Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States*, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), and *Porter v. Dicken*, 328 U.S. 252, 255 (1946). In *Leiter*, the Court approved an injunction directed against a state court proceeding, but the case has nothing to do with the "expressly authorized" exception to § 2283. As pointed out in *Mitchum*, 407 U.S. at 235-36, *Leiter* involved "[s]till a third exception, more recently developed, [which] permits a federal injunction of state court proceedings when the plaintiff in the federal court is the United States itself, or a federal agency asserting 'superior federal interests'." Respondents (pp. 60-62) attempt to use *Leiter* to argue that, since a Government anti-trust action seeking injunctive relief would not be subject to § 2283, a private antitrust plaintiff purporting to sue under § 16 as a "private attorney general" should also not be barred by § 2283. This argument, however, is directly contrary to the decision in *Leiter*, where the Court explained that

"There is, however, a persuasive reason why the federal court's power to stay state court proceedings might have been restricted when a private party was seeking the stay but not when the United States was seeking similar relief. The statute is designed to prevent conflict between federal and state courts. This policy is much more compelling when it is the litigation of private parties which threatens to draw the two judicial systems into conflict than when it is the United States which seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest." (352 U.S. at 225-26.)

Like *Leiter*, this Court's decision in *Porter v. Dicken*, *supra*, also involved a suit by a federal agency. The suit, moreover, was brought under a statutory provision which only authorized Government suits—a point which respondents conveniently ignore in their purported comparison of § 16 with the statute involved in *Porter*, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.<sup>10</sup> That Act established a war-time system of judicial remedies, specifically authorized the Administrator to bring enforcement actions in both state and federal courts, and at the same time specifically barred any suit *against* the Administrator in any state court or in any federal court other than the specially created Emergency Court of Appeals. See also the Court's earlier decision in *Bowles v. Willingham*, 321 U.S. 503, 511 (1944). Not only were the federal actions in both *Bowles* and *Porter* brought by the Government but also the state proceeding in the foundation *Bowles* case was brought to enjoin the Administrator and thus was specifically barred by Congress. In contrast, the federal action in the instant case was brought by a private party and there can be no question concerning the jurisdiction of the state court.

Unlike the Emergency Price Control Act, the other seven statutes which this Court has recognized to be within the "expressly authorized" exception provide for injunction suits by private parties. But, in contrast with § 16, each of those seven statutes relates directly to the allocation of functions between state and federal courts. Furthermore, in contrast with § 16, each of those seven statutes either contains language specifically allowing stays of state proceedings or requires by its very nature that conflicting state

<sup>10</sup> Respondents (p. 54) assert that the Emergency Price Control Act "invested both the state and federal courts with jurisdiction to enforce its provisions". However, as this Court noted in *Bowles v. Willingham*, 321 U.S. 503, 511 n. 6 (1944), this concurrent jurisdiction embraced "only enforcement suits brought by the Administrator, not suits brought to restrain or enjoin enforcement of the Act or orders or regulations thereunder."



proceedings must be enjoined to achieve the fundamental purpose of the statute. In sum, to classify § 16 within the "expressly authorized" exception would radically depart from the settled interpretation of § 2283.

**B. The Injunction Was Not "Necessary in Aid of" the District Court's Jurisdiction.**

Respondents' brief is devoid of any authority supporting their position with respect to the second exception to § 2283. Indeed, they have not cited a single case in which this exception to § 2283 was held to apply. Instead, respondents (pp. 65-68) simply attempt to distinguish the authorities cited in petitioner's main brief which demonstrate that the preliminary injunction was *not* "necessary in aid of" the District Court's jurisdiction.

The District Court's holding (which was not relied upon by the Court of Appeals) that the injunction was "necessary in aid of" its jurisdiction was based solely on the premise that "further collection efforts would eliminate two plaintiffs, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corp., as parties under the case or controversy provisions of Article III since they would necessarily be controlled by Vendo" (App. 241). The District Court's holding is erroneous on several grounds.

First of all, contrary to respondents' assertion (pp. 47, 66), the District Court made no finding that any antitrust "claims" would be "extinguished." Second, the legal standing of Stoner (or his representative) would be unaffected in any event. Third, there is no basis for the District Court's statement that Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corp. "would necessarily be controlled by Vendo"; it is equally plausible that a third party would have purchased Stoner's interest in those two companies.

Fourth, if there were any justifiable concern that Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corp. "would necessarily be controlled by Vendo," such control could have been pre-

vented by a simple order to that effect. Indeed, as pointed out in our main brief (pp. 13, 19, 35), Vendo had offered consent decrees which would eliminate any possibility of Vendo's acquiring control of Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend. Therefore, an injunction against enforcement of the state court judgments was not even "necessary" to prevent Vendo from acquiring such control—let alone "necessary" to the District Court's jurisdiction.<sup>11</sup>

Fifth, and even more important, not a single authority is cited by either the District Court or by respondents which holds that a federal court may enjoin a state court proceeding for the purpose of preserving the existence of a "case or controversy" between some (as here) or even all the parties in a lawsuit pending in the federal court. It is not difficult to conceive of a wide variety of situations in which the outcome of a state court proceeding might affect the legal status of one or more of the plaintiffs in a federal suit. Clearly, however, the important Congressional policy embodied in § 2283—"to prevent needless fric-

<sup>11</sup> Respondents assert that the first proposed consent decree would not prohibit Vendo from purchasing at a sheriff's sale Lektro-Vend stock owned by Stoner Investments. However, under the consent decree (App. 210), Vendo would have been required to divest any such Lektro-Vend stock it might acquire, with the stock placed in a voting trust pending divestiture to assure that Vendo could not obtain voting control. And Vendo's second proposed consent decree (App. 258-59) would have even prohibited Vendo from acquiring or attempting to acquire directly or indirectly any of the stock of Stoner Investments or Lektro-Vend.

Respondents also assert that even though Vendo could not have acquired control "petitioner would have been wholly unrestricted from precipitating the immediate liquidation of the majority interest in both corporations" (p. 49). However, the mere fact that ownership of the stock of Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend Corporation might pass to some third party would not eliminate the "case or controversy" between those plaintiffs and Vendo. Nor would it "extinguish" any antitrust claim they have.



tion between state and federal courts" (*Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.*, 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939))—would not be served if the federal courts were authorized to enjoin the state court proceedings in such circumstances.

Respondents' reliance (pp. 39, 65) on *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970), is entirely misplaced. In that case, the Court held that a federal injunction against enforcement of a state court injunction against union picketing was *not* "necessary in aid of" the federal court's jurisdiction even though the federal court itself previously had refused to grant an injunction against the picketing and even assuming that the state court improperly granted the injunction because the picketing was protected by federal law from the state court interference. The Court emphasized that

"Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy. The explicit wording of § 2283 itself implies as much and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to that conclusion." (398 U.S. at 297.)

The Court also stated (p. 295):

"It is not enough that the requested injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but it must be '*necessary in aid of*' that jurisdiction. While this language is admittedly broad, we conclude that it implies something similar to the concept of injunctions to 'protect or effectuate' judgments. Both exceptions to the general prohibition of § 2283 imply that some federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that

case . . . [N]o such situation is presented here."<sup>12</sup> (*Italics the Court's.*)

Ignoring the holding in *Atlantic Coast Line* and this Court's strong emphasis on the need to construe the exceptions to § 2283 narrowly, respondents (p. 66) assert that in this case "[f]ar more is at stake than mere 'flexibility and authority' to decide" their treble-damage claims because collection of Vendo's state court judgments would "eliminate two of the plaintiffs herein." As already pointed out, not only is this factually incorrect, but it has nothing at all to do with the *jurisdiction* of the District Court. Preserving a federal court's "flexibility and authority to decide" a case is not the same thing as preserving the continued existence of one of the litigants or its ability to finance the prosecution of its federal claim. Compare *In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation*, 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975). Contrary to respondents' assertion (p. 67), "the very authority of the federal court" to determine the issues in respondents' treble-damage action is *not* "at stake."

There only remains for brief consideration the respondents' fanciful assertion (pp. 47, 49) that Vendo seeks to

<sup>12</sup> The Court also observed that only it has potential appellate jurisdiction over federal questions raised in state court proceedings "and that broader jurisdiction allows this Court correspondingly broader authority to issue injunctions 'necessary in aid of' its jurisdiction" (398 U.S. at 296). The Court stated (*ibid.*):

"If the union was adversely affected by the state court's decision, it was free to seek vindication of its federal right in the Florida appellate courts and ultimately, if necessary, in this Court. Similarly if, because of the Florida Circuit Court's action, the union faced the threat of immediate irreparable injury sufficient to justify an injunction under usual equitable principles, it was undoubtedly free to seek such relief from the Florida appellate courts, and might possibly in certain emergency circumstances seek such relief from this Court as well."

But, the Court held, the union was not entitled to any relief against the state court in the federal district court.

"thwart" respondents' treble-damage action. Not only did the District Court make no such finding, and not only was Vendo's state court suit filed *before* the respondents' federal action, but furthermore as recently as November 1, 1976, counsel for the respondents assured the District Court in this case that the treble-damage action will be unaffected *irrespective of whether this Court affirms or reverses the grant of the preliminary injunction*.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, as the record in this case clearly demonstrates (see Supplement B, *infra*, pp. 32-35), it was respondents who "thwarted" their own case by persistently seeking and obtaining delay of this federal case pending resolution of Vendo's state court suit. Vendo, by contrast, expressed its readiness and willingness to proceed to trial without waiting for completion of review of its state court judgments.

Respondents' effort to bring themselves within the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception, like their effort to show that § 16 "expressly authorized" the injunction, cannot be sustained.

## II. THE INJUNCTION VIOLATES PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND FEDERALISM.

Even though the enjoined judgments were clearly final and entitled to full faith and credit, the Court below held that comity and federalism were inapplicable in an action under § 16 of the Clayton Act on the ground that respondents' "exclusive remedy" was in the federal courts. Re-

<sup>13</sup> At the status report on November 1, 1976, Judge Will inquired (Transcript, p. 8): "Where do we stand because I gather what the Supreme Court is going to consider doesn't effect the underlying case in any event."

Counsel for respondents (Mr. Baker) replied: "I think that is right."

The Court reiterated: "... I take it this case will be alive whether the Supreme Court raises the injunction or doesn't raise the injunction...."

Mr. Baker agreed: "That is right."

spondents seek to sustain that holding on a variety of grounds.

Thus, respondents (pp. 74-75) argue that federal district courts were "invested by Congress with an exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the claims at bar." However, it is utterly beyond dispute (as respondents themselves argued and as the Illinois Appellate Court specifically held in this case) that the Illinois courts had jurisdiction to pass upon precisely the same issues in connection with respondents' federal antitrust defense. It is equally clear that this Court had jurisdiction to pass upon those same issues on certiorari from the state courts' adjudication of the federal antitrust defense. Respondents, however, chose to abandon that defense, requested and obtained its dismissal at the opening of the second trial in the state case in 1971,<sup>14</sup> and did not at any time thereafter seek to reassert that defense in the state suit.

Respondents thus not only failed to utilize the opportunity afforded them by the state courts, but they actually *refused* to do so. Indeed, they deprived the state courts (and therefore this Court as well) of all opportunity to consider the federal antitrust issues. Yet, once the state court judgments had become final, respondents immediately sought and obtained an injunction against those judgments on precisely the same grounds which they had refused to allow the state courts to adjudicate.

<sup>14</sup> Respondents' withdrawal of their defense "without prejudice" constituted, at most, a reservation of their right to reassert it prior to final judgment—not the right to reassert it after final judgment and in a different court. See Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 110, §§ 46, 72; *Shapiro v. DiGuilio*, 132 Ill. App. 2d 428, 434, 270 N.E. 2d 622, 627 (1971). Nor are respondents somehow relieved of the federal consequences of their withdrawal of the defense by the fact that Vendo (not surprisingly) did not object to the withdrawal. *Lektro-Vend*, although not a party in the state litigation, is completely controlled by and in privity with the other two plaintiffs and stands in no better position (App. 239).



Such a procedure is completely antithetical to fundamental principles of comity and federalism. This Court has consistently denied relief to litigants who seek in federal court to enjoin or set aside a state court proceeding without having satisfied the necessary requirement imposed by this Court "that a State's judicial system . . . be fairly accorded the opportunity to resolve federal issues arising in its courts . . . ." *Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.*, 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975). See also *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971); *Stone v. Powell*, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976).<sup>15</sup> On this basis alone, the District Court should have declined to issue its injunction.

Respondents also contend that the principles expressed in *Younger* and *Huffman* do not apply where federal injunctions are requested against state civil suits, other than "quasi-criminal" proceedings of the type dealt with in *Huffman*. As noted in *Huffman*, however, several Courts of Appeals have applied *Younger* when the pending state proceedings were purely civil in nature.<sup>16</sup> Such decisions include cases where the pending state proceedings involved disputes between private litigants, as well as cases where such proceedings involved a suit against a state governmental body or officer. Indeed, no Court of Appeals has held that the doctrine of *Younger* and *Huffman* should bar

<sup>15</sup> Respondents incorrectly characterize this issue as one of "waiver." On the contrary, it involves the respect which this Court requires to be accorded to a state judicial system which has provided respondents with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the federal issue. *Huffman, supra*, 420 U.S. at 610-11.

<sup>16</sup> 420 U.S. at 607. See also, in addition to the cases cited there, *Louisville Area Inter-Faith Committee for United Farm Workers v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd.*, No. 75-1901 (6th Cir., September 29, 1976); *Ahrensfield v. Stephens*, 528 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1975); *King v. Jones*, 450 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1971), *vac. as moot*, 405 U.S. 911 (1972). *Contra, Hernandez v. Danaher*, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975), *prob. jur. noted*, 96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976).

a federal injunction only where the state proceedings are criminal or quasi-criminal in nature.<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, while it may be that comity-federalism considerations are of particular weight in connection with state criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, surely it is also true that comity-federalism considerations are of particular weight with respect to a state proceeding which (as here) *has gone to final judgment and is entitled to full faith and credit*. As this Court noted in *Huffman, supra*, 420 U.S. at 608:

"Intervention at the later stage is if anything more highly duplicative, since an entire trial has already taken place, and it is also a direct aspersion on the capabilities and good faith of state appellate courts."

Such considerations apply with even more force when the state trial court's judgment has been fully reviewed and affirmed on appeal by the state's highest tribunal.

As already noted, respondents also make the incredible argument that the preliminary injunction in this case "Infring[ed] no significant state interest" (p. 35) and "Did Not Unduly Infringe Any Significant State Interest" (p. 71). Even apart from the important interests of a state in the finality of its judgments, state courts could not provide an effective forum for adjudication if state court defendants were permitted to withhold applicable defenses from the state courts and, in the event of an adverse result there, seek federal relief on the grounds asserted in the withheld

<sup>17</sup> Neither does any statement made by this Court in *Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States*, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (Resp. Br. 71), so indicate. In fact, in that case, this Court held that under the circumstances the federal suit had properly been dismissed in deference to a state suit filed *after* the federal suit.



defenses. Such a procedure, if permitted, would impugn the very integrity of the state judicial system. Moreover, it would seriously complicate and interfere with the prevention and redress by the state courts of violations of important state-imposed legal duties, including, as in this very case, the duties of fidelity and trust imposed upon officers and directors of a corporation.<sup>18</sup>

Respondents also seek to justify the procedure they employed by repeatedly asserting (pp. 40, 77, 80) that there was an "understanding" or "agreement" with Vendo that the federal proceedings be delayed until completion of the state proceeding. Contrary to those assertions, there most certainly was no such "agreement" or "understanding." Indeed, petitioner vociferously protested against such delay on several occasions. On the other hand, respondents persistently sought and obtained delay of the federal proceeding, even claiming that it would have been a "waste of the [federal] Court's time" to proceed with the federal suit while the state suit was still pending. (See Supplement B, *infra*, pp. 32-35.) They did not reactivate this federal case and move to enjoin the state proceeding until after they had finally lost their contest in the state courts. Unsuccessful in a state forum which undisputably afforded them a full and fair opportunity to raise all pertinent issues, they then

<sup>18</sup> Respondents misleadingly assert that their "attempts to gain relief under Illinois antitrust law were supported . . . by the Illinois attorney general." (Resp. Br. 72-73.) In reality, the interest of the Attorney General, who appeared as *amicus curiae* in the state court appellate proceedings, was limited to supporting the legal proposition that the Illinois Antitrust Act applied to interstate as well as intrastate commerce. The Illinois legislature subsequently clarified the ambiguity of the Illinois Act, but the issue was mooted in the *Vendo* case by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision that the Illinois Act (enacted in 1965) could not, in any event, be applied retroactively to prior transactions (App. 117-18).

seized upon any possible means to escape the effects of the adverse decision rendered there.<sup>19</sup>

In support of their claim that principles of comity and federalism are inapplicable, respondents cite a number of other cases which are simply irrelevant to the issues presented here.

As already noted (*supra*, pp. 12-14), respondents wholly misconstrue *Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.*, 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (see Resp. Br. 76, 82), and *Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 350 U.S. 825 (1955) (Resp. Br. 79). Neither decision remotely sanctions—or even involved—federal injunctions against state court proceedings. Moreover, with respect to the *Lyons* case, respondents disregard the Second Circuit's other two opinions in the case: its opinion on rehearing (222 F.2d at 195-96) which substantially retracted the statements repeatedly quoted by respondents as to the "untrammelled" nature of federal jurisdiction over treble-damage antitrust cases; and the Second Circuit's earlier opinion in the same case which explicitly held that the federal court was barred by § 2283 from enjoining the state proceeding (*Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.*, 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 345 U.S. 923 (1953)).

*England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners*, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (Resp. Br. 80), is equally inapposite. The special

<sup>19</sup> Respondents wrongly state (p. 73) that Vendo's state court judgments are protected by "substantial bonds." These bonds, however, are mere personal undertakings of respondents Stoner and Stoner Investments (apart from the nominal \$2,500 bond required by the District Court) and are unsupported by any corporate surety or other guarantee of full payment. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 326 and 327.) Moreover, the financial statements attached to the Security Agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 328) and subsequent financial statements (e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibits 363 and 364) show a substantial decline in net worth during the period since the judgments were entered in 1971.

"procedure" endorsed in that case applies only where a federal court, in observance of the doctrine of abstention, refers the parties to a state court to obtain an interpretation of state law questions arising in the context of the federal suit. The decision does not even suggest that litigants in such cases may, upon their return to the federal court, challenge the result reached by the state court, either by injunction or otherwise. Indeed, to permit such a challenge would contravene the entire purpose of the federal court's abstention.

Respondents' reliance on *Mercoird Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.*, 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944) (Resp. Br. 81), is also misplaced. No injunction was at issue there, much less an injunction against a state court proceeding. The issue in that case was the *res judicata* effect of a prior federal suit on the defendant's counterclaim for antitrust treble-damages. No issue of federalism or comity between state and federal courts was presented by that case. Nor, as already stated, is petitioner here contesting respondents' right to proceed with their treble-damage claims. Only the preliminary injunction against petitioner's state court proceedings is at issue on this appeal.

### III. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO REVERSE, REVIEW OR REVISE THE FINAL JUDGMENTS BY COLLATERAL ATTACK.

Respondents do not argue that a federal district court has jurisdiction under the federal antitrust laws (or any other statute) to review and reverse the final judgment of a state court of competent jurisdiction. Yet they suggest (Resp. Br. 83), without citing a shred of supporting authority, that final state court judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit and may be annulled by a District Court's injunction where, as in this case, the District Court upon preliminary examination of the state court proceedings concludes that they were predicated upon "illegal agreements" and were "part of an anticompetitive scheme."

In substance and effect, such a procedure constitutes a review by collateral attack upon the state court judgments. Indeed, the District Court itself recognized that it was engaged in just such an enterprise, and the Court of Appeals specifically approved (App. 289). The District Court stated that "The final Illinois Supreme Court opinion makes such a review imperative" because allegedly "The Illinois court expressly refused to consider the allegations that the state proceedings were part of an anticompetitive scheme" (App. 232).

The District Court thus assumed, without explanation, that it had jurisdiction to review the antitrust aspects of the state court proceedings, while admitting that it did "not have jurisdiction to review the due process aspects" of those proceedings (App. 232). Neither form of review, however, is permitted by any statute or constitutional provision. The holding of this Court in *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), is applicable regardless of whether the alleged defects complained of in the state court proceedings are attacked as violative of the Constitution, as in *Rooker*, or of the federal antitrust laws, as in the present case.

Moreover, the District Court's stated factual premise concerning the nature of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was also erroneous. Far from having "expressly refused" to consider respondents' antitrust contentions, the Illinois Supreme Court in fact expressly recognized that respondents had withdrawn their federal antitrust defense prior to the trial on remand in 1971 (App. 117). And after due consideration of respondents' claims under the Illinois Antitrust Act, the Illinois Supreme Court held that "the Illinois act, having been enacted in 1965, long after the contracts here in question were entered into, cannot properly form the basis of a counterclaim by defendants" (App. 118). In short, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Act was inapplicable and did not consider the federal antitrust defense because it had been deliberately withdrawn several years earlier and never again reasserted.

**CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated above and in our main brief, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate the preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the final state court judgments.

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Dated: December 15, 1976.

**SUPPLEMENT A****STONER STATEMENT TO FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING 1959 ACQUISITION**

Respondents (pp. 6-11) make numerous assertions concerning the alleged background and purpose of Vendo's 1959 acquisition of the assets of Stoner Manufacturing (now Stoner Investments). We do not believe it is relevant to the issues before the Court to undertake a response to each of these assertions. Most, however, are answered by Mr. Stoner's own signed statement to the Federal Trade Commission dated April 6, 1959, concerning the transaction (PX2 contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 301), which states in pertinent part:

My name is Harry B. Stoner. I am President of Stoner Mfg. Corp., an Illinois corporation, with its principal office at Aurora, Illinois.

• • •

My own health has never been robust, partly because of an arrested case of infantile tuberculosis, on account of which I lost a year of school when I was in the Seventh Grade. Nevertheless, I had always felt able to, and had, managed the business without difficulty until the death of Clarence R. Adelberg on May 30, 1958. Mr. Adelberg was Executive Vice-President at the time of his death. While he was with the company, he had complete charge of sales and also assisted in other executive and administrative decisions. I concentrated on engineering, and the general supervision of the business. I was able to be absent from Aurora while Mr. Adelberg was living, knowing that he could handle anything that might come up. Since his death there has been a void in management which has not yet been filled.

I have not been in a position to look for someone to replace Mr. Adelberg and have not felt that an offer of employment by the company would be attractive to a top executive, in view of the fact that because of health or age



situations existing in the family, I could not offer continuity to a prospective executive.

Six weeks after Mr. Adelberg's death, in about the middle of July, 1958, I contracted virus pneumonia. About the tenth of August, I collapsed and was placed in an oxygen tent. Diabetes was diagnosed.

The first week in September I was again placed in an oxygen tent. At this time, I felt that my entire nervous system was affected. As already stated, my health has never been robust and I also suffered from hypertension, but have never felt unable to carry on until the incident just described, and since. Now the nervous and physical strain incident to the whole responsibility of running the business has become too much.

After my second oxygen tent experience, I decided the Company's assets should be sold. I did not feel equal to the task of continuing responsible for running the business alone. We had no one available to replace me. Neither my brother Ray nor any other present officer is qualified to take over as the chief executive officer. I am concerned because the principal asset of each of the stockholders is his Stoner Mfg. Corp. stock. I feel that the strain of my responsibility is too great in the present state of my health. In addition, if some thing should happen to me, without Adelberg being replaced the family would be confronted with the double problem of Federal Estate Tax with no sufficient source of liquid assets and the lack of top management personnel to operate the business. These are the reasons which prompted the decision to sell.

The negotiations which led to the recent contract for the sale of the assets of Stoner Mfg. Corp. to The Vendo Company commenced in October, 1958. These negotiations were themselves a strain on me. In January, 1959, I went to Mayo Brothers Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota, for a complete physical checkup and particularly to find out the cause of my trouble in breathing. My breathing trouble

is partly nervousness and hypertension aggravated by the recent virus pneumonia, and partly old lung damage. Otherwise they found no specific pathology but recommended that I take it easier in business, get rid of some of my responsibilities and spend more time in recreational or diversionary activities.

Since September, 1958, I have been absent from the office from time to time on account of my health, for perhaps a total of six weeks, plus short time on other days.

Vendo seemed to be a logical purchaser because no other prospective purchaser had any management people capable of running the business without being educated in the vending machine field. Vendo being experienced in that field will be able to take over with less assistance from me.

I am interested in having the business continued, by people who have capable management and who will continue to employ and be compatible with our present officers and employees and with a minimum of dislocation of business practices and employment security. I do not want to let the business just drift and carry on its own momentum, because this cannot continue indefinitely and there is great risk of loss involved in such a program. I attribute our poor showing in sales for 1958, and since, at least in part to the management difficulties I have already described.

Dated April 16, 1959.

/s/ HARRY B. STONER  
Harry B. Stoner

**SUPPLEMENT B**  
**THE RECORD CONCERNING**  
**DELAY OF THE FEDERAL CASE**

Respondents repeatedly assert (pp. 27-28, 40, 80-81) that there was an "understanding" and even an "agreement" between respondents and Vendo that proceedings in this federal case be delayed pending final determination of the state court proceedings. This contention is false. As shown below, respondents unilaterally insisted on delay of the federal proceedings, even after they had withdrawn their federal antitrust defense in the state court case. On the other hand, counsel for Vendo repeatedly urged, over the objections of respondents, that this case be brought to trial notwithstanding that the state court appeals were still in progress.

This federal action was filed in October, 1965, about two months after Vendo filed its state suit. It was originally assigned to Judge Joseph Sam Perry, who conducted the first hearing in the case on November 12, 1965. However, at the request of respondents, this case was held on Judge Perry's passed-case calendar from 1966 until 1969, during the initial trial and appeal of the state case.

On November 5, 1969, Judge Perry noted, upon hearing the case called: "That is my oldest case, if I am not mistaken." Mr. Sheridan, one of the attorneys for respondents, then explained to Judge Perry that in Vendo's state case the Illinois Appellate Court had directed the state trial court to consider Stoner's federal antitrust defense on remand:

"MR. SHERIDAN: . . . It is remanded now and the defense will be considered, presumably, by the trial court. Mr. Sears is appearing before Judge Peterson in Geneva tomorrow, as a matter of fact. The mandate has been filed and they are going to try to get it set for hearing.

"THE COURT: So that that will be litigated.

"MR. SHERIDAN: The federal antitrust question will be." (Transcript, November 5, 1969, pp. 3-4.)

On May 18, 1970, Judge Perry on his own motion dismissed the action for want of prosecution. Respondents then filed a motion to vacate the order and reinstate the case. At the hearing on this motion on May 26, 1970, the following colloquy occurred:

"THE COURT: I have no objection to doing it, except one thing: I want it tried. It is old. It should either be tried or you should enter into a stipulation that the parties will abide the outcome of the other cases that are pending.

"MR. BAKER [one of the attorneys for respondents]: I do not think that it is quite fair, your Honor, to ask us to enter into that stipulation. I am willing to go ahead.

"THE COURT: I do not want you to enter into a stipulation, but the case is fice [sic] years old. I just want the case tried.

"MR. BAKER: We have been litigating your Honor.

"THE COURT: I know, but not litigating my case.

"MR. BAKER: We originally put in on your passed-case calendar, because—

"THE COURT: I did, and I kept it there. It has been there for two years, and the time has come for me to have that case tried. I am perfectly willing to vacate my order and reinstate it. All I want is the case tried." (Transcript, May 26, 1970, p. 2.)

The Court set the case for trial on November 23, 1970. On October 20, 1970, however, the case was reassigned to Judge McGarr. On November 23, 1970, Mr. Baker appeared before Judge McGarr and explained:

"MR. BAKER: . . . This case was filed in 1965, at which time there was a case pending in Kane County. Judge Perry indulged us for several years by putting it over, because some of the issues or many of them might well be decided there.

"Now, this case has been to the Appellate Court once, it's back down in the trial court for further evidence. We have—so we think it would be a waste of the Court's time and that of the parties to have a trial in this case immediately." (Transcript, November 23, 1970, p. 2.)

On April 9, 1971, at the opening of the second trial in the state court case, respondents voluntarily withdrew their federal antitrust defense. (App. 82.)

On August 24, 1971, after appraising the Court of Vendo's \$7.5 million judgments in the state court suit (rendered August 13, 1971), and saying that these judgments would be appealed, Mr. Baker argued that trial of the federal suit should be postponed until the state case was completely disposed of. (Transcript, August 24, 1971, p. 2.)

At the status report before Judge McGarr on November 23, 1971, Mr. Baker once again argued that no further action should be taken in the federal case until the state court litigation was resolved. Judge McGarr continued the case until March 26, 1972. (Transcript, November 23, 1971, pp. 1-4.)

On February 3, 1972, the case was reassigned to Judge McLaren, who scheduled a status report for February 17, 1972. Counsel for Vendo received no notice of this status report and were not present. Counsel for the plaintiffs, after stating their version of the case to the judge, proposed that it be delayed pending the outcome of their state appeal. The Court then set June 16, 1972 for the next status report. (See Transcript, February 17, 1972.)

Counsel for Vendo, on learning of the February 17 status report, filed a motion to vacate the order continuing the case until June 16th. This motion was argued on March 10, 1972. At the hearing, Mr. Ochsenschlager on behalf of

Vendo argued against any further delay in the resolution of this federal suit:

"Now, we contend that this Court would not be aided in any way by awaiting the determination of the appeal that is now pending in the Appellate Court. . . .

"We feel that it would be better for all concerned, and we are the defendant, but we are urging that this cause we are here defending move ahead. . . .

"We are ready to move ahead in all phases of this case and think it should go ahead without regard to what happens in the State Court or what might happen." (Transcript, March 10, 1972, pp. 4-5, 7.)

The motion was, however, opposed by the respondents, and was denied by the District Court, thereby continuing the case until the previously scheduled date of June 16, 1972.

At the hearing before the Court on that date, the matter was further continued until September 15, 1972, once again over the protest of Vendo that the parties should proceed with this case. (Transcript, June 16, 1972, pp. 2-4.)

Thereafter, the case was continued on the same basis at each status report throughout 1972, 1973, and 1974, until after the Illinois Supreme Court had affirmed Vendo's judgments against Stoner and Stoner Investments in the state court case.